


U.S. MARINE CORPS. 3d DIVISION.

OPERATIONS IN THE BOUGAINVILLE CAM-
PAIGN, 1 NOVEMBER-28 DECEMBER 1943.

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
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3RD MARINE DIVISION



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OPERATIONS IN THE BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN 1, November - 28, December 1943

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ENCLOSURE A

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HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

21 March, 1944.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Via: The Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Combat Report of the 3d Marine Division in the Bougainville Operations, 1 November - 28 December, 1943.
Enclosures: (A) Narrative of the Campaign (D-3 Report)
(B) Report D-1 Section
(C) Report D-2 Section
(D) Report D-4 Section
(E) Report Division Air Officer
(F) Report 3d Marines
(G) Report 9th Marines
(H) Report 21st Marines
(I) Report 12th Marines
(J) Report 19th Marines
(K) Report Service Troops
(L) Report Special Troops
(M) Report 2d Marine Raiders

1. The Combat Report of the 3d Marine Division in the Operations at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, British Solomon Islands, from 1 November to 28 December, 1943, is presented as a narrative based on the Reports of the Executive Staff Sections and the several Administrative and Tactical Units of the Division, which Reports are appended to the narrative as annexes. The Annexes amplify, in detail, the incidents related in the narrative.

2. The purpose of the Combat Report is to establish an historical record of the campaign. The recommendations and suggestions for modifications of tactics, technique, organization, and materiel, which are a part of the Reports of Subordinate Units, are herein included as an essential part of the record inasmuch as the cause of a recommendation is an effect of an experience in combat.


A. H. TURNAGE

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
HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

~~SECRET~~

NARRATIVE OF THE
CAMPAIGN
(D - 3 REPORT)

ENCLOSURE A

~~SECRET~~



BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS



SCALE 1:2,640,000

1975
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HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

17 March, 1944.

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN
D-3 REPORT FOR THE OPERATION
AT EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY,
BOUGAINVILLE, B.S.I.

1. PLANNING.

Preliminary planning by this Division for operations in the Empress Augusta Bay area began on receipt of verbal instructions from the First Marine Amphibious Corps. A formal directive was issued later as a Letter of Instruction dated 27 September, 1943. By this letter as corrected, the 3d Marine Division was reinforced by the 3d Def Bn, the 2d Raider Regt (Provisional) and a number of artillery, engineer, signal, naval, air and service units. The mission assigned was to land in the vicinity of CAPE TOROKINA, seize, occupy, and defend an initial beachhead (to include PURUATA ISLAND and TOROKINA ISLAND) between the LARUMA and TOROKINA RIVERS and approximately 2250 yards deep from CAPE TOROKINA. The Division was to be prepared to continue the attack in coordination with the 37th Inf Div upon the latter's arrival subsequent to D day, in order to extend the initial beachhead and establish long range radars, naval base facilities and airfields in the TOROKINA AREA.

Tactical planning met with several limitations immediately. The transportation made available for the movement of the 3d Mar Div Rein for the initial landing consisted of eight combat transports and four combat cargo vessels. It would therefore be necessary to transport the Division reinforced to the area in echelons. Intelligence information regarding the strength and disposition of the enemy forces in the TOROKINA AREA was meager. Photo study revealed little other than the fact that the entire area was covered by dense jungle. On CAPE TOROKINA itself were some signs of activity, but, due to the denseness of the growth, its extent and characteristics could not be ascertained. Equally obscure was the size and extent of the swamp areas immediately inland from the beaches, nor was there any reliable hydrographic information obtainable.

Evaluation of the enemy strength and known dispositions on BOUGAINVILLE, coupled with the known characteristics of the TOROKINA AREA, (ie. the jungle covered swamp areas, its lack of roads) brought the conclusion that whatever the defenses the Japanese had established in the area, they must be localized and restricted by the terrain to small detachments; that large reinforcements, such as could endanger the landing of the bulk of the Division, could not be brought to the area readily and committed, except by sea; that the enemy air power would be employed in force immediately on our landing.

In weighing these factors in light of the mission, the tactical plan had to be based on these considerations:

- (1) Include initially at the expense of the combatant elements, a high percentage of noncombatant personnel for airfield site reconnaissance and the immediate initiation of airfield construction.

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

- (2) Unload the ships simultaneously in a minimum of time so they could withdraw.
- (3) Obtain maximum dispersal of men and supplies consistent with tactical safety for protection against air attack.
- (4) Be so disposed as to develop without delay a beachhead in whatever direction ground reconnaissance dictated after landing.
- (5) Be prepared to resist immediately a seaborne attack, and/or counter landing.
- (6) Provide air defense of the beachhead as soon as practicable.


The considerations listed dictated the following decisions:

- (1) To embark three task units in the ships allotted, two to be reinforced infantry regiments of 4 Landing Teams each, and the third basically anti-aircraft artillery of the 3d Def Bn. With each of these units were assigned the detachments of Engineer, Air, Naval Base, Signal and Service Troops whose mission was the immediate development of the Air and Naval Base facilities.
- (2) To restrict the loading of the ships to about 500 tons each in order to be able to unload within five to six hours total elapsed time.
- (3) To land all elements simultaneously, combatant elements covering non-combatant elements.
- (4) To seize a broad shallow beachhead, initially, in order to contain immediately whatever Japanese defenses had been installed, to institute vigorous terrain reconnaissance inland for location of routes of ingress and airfield sites, and to disperse troops and stores against air attack.
- (5) To be prepared to shift elements laterally without delay in order, either to reinforce, or to develop the beachhead to the direction reconnaissance dictated.
- (6) To be prepared to organize beach and air defenses immediately on landing.
- (7) To transport to Empress Augusta Bay area the remaining echelons of the Division as rapidly as the availability of ships and distance permitted.

The plan as completed divided the equipment and supplies of the organization into three categories:

- A - Those items essential to live and fight for ten days. This included at least ten days rations, 3 units of fire for the weapons embarked, and fuel for the same period.

THE LANDING
AT
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
BOUGAINVILLE, B.S.I.
November 1, 1943



(Not to Scale - Positions Relative)

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

B - Those items required for the continuation of combat, additional munitions, rations, fuel, and the engineering tools and equipment for the development of the beachhead area and airfields.

C - All other items not included in A or B.

Category A was to accompany the assault echelon, Category B was to be forwarded with subsequent echelons, and Category C was to remain stored with the rear echelon on Guadalcanal pending further instructions. Thus the equipment and supplies carried initially came within the tonnage limitations imposed for tactical safety of the transports.

The plan of landing was to employ twelve beaches, one per ship, eleven extending west from CAPE TOROKINA some 8000 yards and one on the north (inner) shore of PURUATA ISLAND. All elements were to land simultaneously, the 3d Mar reinforced by the Raider Regiment (less one Landing Team) in the right sector (6 beaches), the 9th Mar reinforced by one Landing Team (Raider) in the left sector (5 beaches), and on PURUATA ISLAND (1 beach). Two groups of the 3d Def Bn were to land in the right sector and two in the left sector. Each combat team was to overrun and destroy all enemy beach defenses, seize an initial shallow beachhead and institute vigorous reconnaissance immediately to the front and flanks, meanwhile unloading the ships as rapidly as possible and installing beach defenses, and prepared to shift laterally in either direction.

2. REHEARSAL.

With the completion of the plan of attack, the Combat Teams began embarkation at GUADALCANAL on 13 October, 1943, and proceeded to EFATE, NEW HEBRIDES, where complete rehearsal of the landing was executed. The Defense Bn task unit exercised at GUADALCANAL. All forces rendezvoused enroute to BOUGAINVILLE.

3. THE INITIAL LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

The initial landing was executed as originally planned but subsequent disposition of tactical units ashore was precipitated by the fact that stronger resistance than expected was met on the right flank. Beach and surf conditions to the west of the KOROMOKINA RIVER were found to be unsuitable for continued use as landing beaches (some 70 landing craft beached on these beaches D-day), and ground reconnaissance disclosed that the NUMA-NUMA - PIVA TRAIL area constituted the main overland access to our vital beachhead area for the enemy. As it became apparent that no immediate enemy contact was forthcoming on the left (west) flank, it was decided to execute the redistribution of units as previously planned for consolidation of the beachhead. Therefore, the (2) left Landing Teams, 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Mar, were moved in succession to the right (east) sector. The right LT, 1st Bn 3d Mar, was brought into reserve in the left sector and the center LT, 2d Bn 3d Mar, moved to the right of the left sector. As of 5 Nov 43, the disposition of troops consisted of five battalions on a limited beachhead line, a battalion in reserve in the left sector, a Raider battalion plus one Co with Regtl Hq in reserve in the right sector, a Raider company blocking the PIVA TRAIL beyond the beachhead, and a Raider battalion less two (2) companies occupying PURUATA ISLAND.

**SITUATION
ON
7-10 NOVEMBER
AND
THE BATTLES
OF**

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

Before the 3d Bn 9th Mar, landed initially on the left, could be shifted to the right sector, an enemy force estimated as a composite battalion, transported from RABAU in destroyers, made a counter-landing on 7 Nov 43, just beyond the left flank of the beachhead. Prompt development of the enemy by K Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar, and rapid employment of the left sector reserve battalion (1st Bn 3d Mar), plus the newly arrived 1st Bn 21st Mar, destroyed the major portions of the enemy and completely routed the remainder, so that by the evening of 8 Nov 43, they no longer constituted a threat to our beachhead.


On the afternoon of 8 Nov 43, the enemy made contact with the Raider company blocking the PIVA TRAIL. On 9 Nov 43, the 3d Raider Bn (less two companies) plus two companies of 2d Raider Bn, four companies in all, attacked, supported by artillery and mortars, and drove the enemy back towards PIVA VILLAGE after a very heavy fire fight. Movement to the flanks was restricted for both forces due to deep swamp on each side of the PIVA TRAIL. On the morning of 10 Nov 43, the 9th Mar (less 1 Bn), following a close support air strike, passed through the Raiders in column of Bns; found the enemy had withdrawn, occupied PIVA VILLAGE and blocked the NUMA NUMA TRAIL. Captured enemy documents at this time disclosed that the enemy had intended to draw our force to the left by landing in the KOROMOKINA RIVER AREA, then to strike from PIVA VILLAGE AREA down the PIVA TRAIL onto CAPE TOROKINA. The poor coordination and timing of the enemy attacking force, plus our immediate strong offensive reaction, caught the Japanese off balance, so that the threat to both or either flank was removed in the space of three days. In both these actions artillery and air played major roles in support of well conducted, spirited attacks by our ground forces.

The 148th Inf CT, having arrived on 8 Nov 43, commenced relief of our left sector units on 9 Nov 43; this was completed on 10 Nov 43. The 3d Bn 9th Mar moved to the right flank of the right sector prior to the attack of 10 Nov 43. The 3d Mar moved inland and to the east, thus creating a center sector of the beachhead. On 8 Nov 43, CG, IMAC arrived at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY and, at 1200, 9 Nov 43, assumed command of all forces in that area, relieving the CG, 3d Mar Div as CG, EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY AREA. The 148th Inf CT and 2d Raider Regt were left under the tactical control of CG, 3d Mar Div until a later date.

With the exception of the engagement of the 2d Bn 21st Mar in the Battle of the Coconut Grove, near the junction of NUMA NUMA TRAIL and EAST WEST TRAIL across the PIVA RIVER, 12-13 Nov 43, subsequent to which the enemy withdrew, there was no indication of enemy strength until 20 Nov 43. During this period the main attention of the Division was directed to patrolling, development of supply routes under extremely difficult conditions, and the extension of the beachhead line in the Div sector to include the proposed inland air field sites which had been selected by ground reconnaissance.

As elements of the 37th Div, USA, continued to arrive, the beachhead was extended inland with the 37th Div occupying the left (west) sector and the 3d Mar Div defending the right (east) sector. Extension of the beachhead in the 3d Mar Div sector was necessarily slow due to:

SITUATION
- ON -
13, NOVEMBER
AND
THE CONTACT AT
THE TRAIL JUNCTION



(Not to Scale - Positions Relative)

~~SECRET~~ NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).


- (1) Enemy resistance in force in the entire PIVA RIVER forks area,
- (2) Extremely swampy ground unsuitable for continued occupation, located east of the PIVA RIVER and south of the EAST WEST TRAIL and,
- (3) The great difficulties encountered in road construction and ingress through swamps for supply routes to the troops. Special precautions had to be exercised to the end that our forces be not advanced beyond our means of supply and evacuation.

As the beachhead was being extended, Japanese resistance was developed to the north and east of the PIVA RIVER forks and north of the EAST WEST TRAIL. The first indication of enemy resistance in strength appeared on 20 Nov 43. This developed into the BATTLE OF PIVA FORKS which was continued on through 25 Nov 43 by the 3d Mar, reinforced during the latter phases by elements of the 2d Raider Regt, the 9th Mar, and the 21st Mar. Artillery was constantly employed in increasing force until on 24 Nov 43, seven battalions fired the preparation for the 3d Mar attack. This attack destroyed the major portion of the enemy force (estimated as a reinforced regiment) and completely routed the remainder, most of whom fled well to the east of the TOROKINA RIVER.

On 25 Nov 43 the 1st Bn 9th Mar and six companies of the 2d Raider Regt passed through the 3d Mar and, against light retiring resistance, occupied the hill mass east of the PIVA RIVER dominating the EAST WEST TRAIL. Reconnaissance to the TOROKINA RIVER was initiated immediately. On 23 Nov 43, the CG, 3d Mar Div ordered the 3d and 9th Marines to exchange subsectors, thereby allowing the latter, which had been only lightly engaged at any time so far, to take over an active subsector and the 3d Mar to occupy the relatively quiet sector on the right (south) flank of the beachhead. This exchange of sectors was initiated on 24 Nov 43 and completed 26 Nov 43. The 21st Mar remained in the center subsector and the 2d Raider Regt returned to Corps Reserve. The 3d Mar badly depleted by battle casualties, sickness, and exhaustion, was reinforced in its new sector by the 1st Bn, 145th Inf (Regtl reserve) and other special units.

When reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was not occupying the hill mass just west of the TOROKINA RIVER, even though supply and evacuation would be most difficult, the CG, 3d Mar Div, initiated advance to and occupation of that general line -- Hills 1000, 600, and 500, and the high ridge running westward from Hill 1000. The first step was the occupation of an OPLR by the 3d Parachute Bn and units of the 9th, 21st and 3d Marines, pending construction of amphibian tractor routes for supply and evacuation through the dense jungle swamps. On 10 Dec 43 the three infantry regiments advanced to and occupied the FBL without incident. In the meantime, however, the 3d Parachute Bn, outposting Hill 1000 and a portion of the subsector to be occupied by the 21st Marines, had become engaged with an enemy force, estimated as a reinforced company, strongly entrenched on the east slope (nose) of Hill 1000. After repeated attacks by units of the 21st Mar, supported by artillery and close air bombardment, this force was eliminated on the evening of 18 Dec 43.

SITUATION
PRIOR TO-
THE BATTLE OF THE
PIVA FORKS



(Not to Scale - Positions Relative)

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

The line above described, with minor adjustments, became the MLR of 3d Mar Div's sector of FBL. The enemy having fled to areas east and northeast of the TOROKINA RIVER, and further activities being limited to local and distant patrolling, deliberate organization of the ground was initiated immediately together with continued construction of roads and trails over the swamp and hills of the subsectors. These projects were 85% complete at the time of relief of 3d Mar Div by the Americal Division.

Relief of front line elements of the 3d Mar Div commenced 21 Dec 43 with relief of the 3d Mar by the 2d Raider Regt and attached troops, and continued as elements of the Americal Division arrived at TOROKINA. CG, 3d Mar Div relinquished command of the East Sector to CG, Americal Division at 1600, 28 Dec 43.


Detailed accounts of the various operations may be found in reports by organizations of 3d Mar Div, enclosed herewith.

4. COMMENTS.

The unloading of the ships transporting and accompanying initial landings affects the tactical plan in numerous ways. In general there is need for employing, during the unloading period, approximately 33 1/3% of the personnel embarked in order to attain the maximum efficiency possible and thereby to reduce the unloading time to a minimum. Because a certain percent of this labor is performed by naval personnel who have no combat missions at the moment, the total result affects the combat troops to the extent of at least 25% of the total effective strength. There are two solutions to this labor problem, the most obvious one being to transport labor troops whose sole purpose is to handle the details of the unloading. This is not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as it causes the landing of elements which are not suitable for ground combat at a time when they may be a hindrance to the operation. Further, their maintenance and supply creates an additional burden on those functions without adding anything to the efficiency of the force landed immediately that the unloading is completed. The following solution would also provide the vital labor. When the estimate of the strength necessary to accomplish the combat mission has been determined, the combatant units should have their strength increased 25% in the ranks of private and private first class or organized replacements should be embarked to the strength of 25% of the combat troops. This additional strength would provide the shore party labor initially without jeopardizing tactical strength and unity of combat organizations. On the completion of the unloading this personnel is immediately available for replacement of combat losses, for garrison or other duties, or may be returned to rear areas in same ships.

When AKA's are employed with the assault echelon, the shore party organization should be embarked in APD's, LSD's or LST's and accompany the assault. AKA's cannot accommodate sufficient personnel aboard to constitute their own shore parties, and APA's may accommodate only their own in addition to the Landing Team embarked, otherwise, the Landing Team suffers such a drain on its personnel that its combat effectiveness is impaired.

DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
FINAL BEACH-HEAD LINE
10-26 DECEMBER.



(Not to Scale - Positions Relative)

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

The landing of all elements simultaneously in any assault on a beachhead without a Division reserve can only be justified by providing the least tactical unit with a local reserve, and by making detailed plans calculated for the execution of a lateral shift of force to meet unexpected threat. Plans in this instance were such that the time interval provided by the commitment of the local reserve would permit a lateral shift of reinforcing units to meet the situation. In the execution of the landing at TOROKINA the soundness of this plan was proved, the result being that reserve force continued to be increased in the area of contact during the early phases of action there.

The value of the early and continued employment of massed artillery fire cannot be overestimated. It is the one arm of the ground forces with which the commander can influence the action over his entire front without the movement of troops. The largest number of batteries possible, consistent with the size of the landing force, should be in the initial landing force, along with the proper artillery headquarters to make centralized fire control possible.

Where units not ordinarily a part of the Division are attached for a particular operation, these units should be attached well in advance of D-Day. This is necessary in order that both the Division and special units may become acquainted with each other and execute their initial planning together.

Without the constant use of amphibians on the right (east) sector of the beachhead, the development and final occupation of this sector would have been delayed by at least two weeks and very probably more. "Amphibs" were the only means of transport that could negotiate the swampy areas at all times. From D-Day on they were in constant use for forward displacement of supplies and equipment, and for evacuation of wounded. To say that they were "invaluable" would constitute an understatement. In this case they were a vital necessity.

In the seizure of successive objectives in jungle warfare the zones of action usually become broader and broader and lines become thin and overextended to the very limit of safety against penetration or infiltration. Under such conditions in the BOUGAINVILLE campaign, the following was found to be the successful method when contact was imminent:

- (a) When reconnaissance discloses the presence of enemy force out front, contain the advance elements of the enemy with thin lines (division front) and hit him immediately with a highly mobile striking force, well out front, strongly supported by artillery.

In the seizure of an area for the purpose of establishing airfields and other installations, everything should be subordinated to the capture and seizure of the area necessary for the security of such installations. Initially, the first priority should be the tactical situation together with means for supply and evacuation. All hands should be employed for this purpose before any installations for subsequent operations are undertaken. First priority -- tactical security of the installations to follow.

NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN (Cont'd).

The Jap is not a cross-country fighter. As a general rule he operates on or near a road, trail, or beach line which afford him the easiest means of ingress, supply, and retreat.

A relatively small force can defend a large area by blocking the trails until reserves can be brought up, if required.

Throughout the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY operation the 3d Mar Div was faced with three most formidable obstacles -- Jap forces, deep swamp, and dense jungles. It is believed that seldom have troops experienced a more difficult combination of combat, supply and evacuation than was encountered in this operation. From its very inception it was a bold and hazardous operation. Its success was due to the planning of all echelons, and the indomitable will, courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all organizations participating.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. Stuart
J. A. STUART,
D-3.

HJT/jmh

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

1 February, 1944

ANNEX "A" to D-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ENEMY OPERATIONS

I. GROUND.

The Cape Torokina area was defended on Nov. 1st by the 2d Company, 1stBn, 23d Infantry plus 30 men from the regimental gun company and one 75mm gun, type 41. Total strength was 270. On Nov. 5th the strength of this company was 68 and the company commander, Capt. ICHIKAWA had been replaced by the CO of the 2d Platoon, a probationary officer. The Cape itself was fortified with 18 pillboxes solidly constructed of coconut logs and dirt. The one piece of artillery was located on the Cape. Beach Green 1 (on PURUATA ISLAND) and Beach Green 2 were defended by a platoon each and TOROKINA ISLAND by a squad which was later reinforced by a few Japs who escaped from PURUATA ISLAND. All other beaches on which our troops landed were undefended. It became known subsequently that the enemy had based his dispositions on an estimate that allied forces would attack East of CAPE TOROKINA and West of CAPE MUTUPENA.

On D-day, 1 November, as our landing boats rounded PURUATA ISLAND on their way to Beaches Blue 1, Green 1, and Green 2, they were taken under cross fire by machine guns on PURUATA ISLAND, TOROKINA ISLAND, and CAPE TOROKINA as well as by one 75mm gun on the Cape, 3 boats were sunk and 3 damaged. As our troops hit the above beaches they were also fired on by mortars. There were 18 enemy pillboxes on CAPE TOROKINA and the last one was not reduced until 1900, 1 November. Enemy troops defending Beach Green 2 were overcome after they had inflicted several casualties on our troops. Enemy resistance on PURUATA ISLAND was very determined and consisted of several emplaced machine guns and well-concealed snipers.

During 2 November, fighting continued on PURUATA ISLAND. The remnants of enemy forces which had been on the Cape and on Beach Green 2 retired to the East.

On 3 November, resistance on PURUATA ISLAND finally ceased during the morning. After an artillery preparation at 1315, our troops landed on TOROKINA ISLAND and enemy resistance ceased shortly thereafter.

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During the first 3 days, 192 enemy dead were buried in all sectors including those buried by the enemy. One prisoner, a Sergeant Major, wounded in the elbow was captured on 2 November inland from Beach Green 2.

Enemy activity on 4, 5, and 6, November was confined to patrols on our flanks. 13 Japs were killed in this period.

At approximately 0600, 7 November, the enemy landed a provisional battalion on our West flank. This unit was composed of the following elements:

HqCo, 2dBn, 54th Inf Regt.
5thCo, 2dBn, 54th Inf Regt.
6thCo, 2dBn, 54th Inf Regt.
1st Plat. 7thCo, 2dBn, 54th Inf Regt.
MGCo, 2dBn, 54th Inf Regt.
6thCo, 2dBn, 53d Inf Regt.
1Plat. (38 men) Shipping Engineers.

The unit had come down from RABAU on 4 DD's and had landed in 21 boats and barges along the beach from just West of our left flank up to AT SINIMA BAY. 20 of them were killed crossing the LARUMA RIVER by our outpost which was near the mouth of the river. After the landing, this force, moved to the East and contacted our troops holding the Left flank. 90 of them were killed during the day's fighting. Our forces ambushed a part of this force at dusk at a point on the beach 500 yards West of the perimeter and killed 29 more. Meanwhile on the right flank, a company of Japs attacked the PIVA ROAD block and 8 were killed before the rest withdrew. 3 more were killed by a patrol just off the PIVA TRAIL.

On 8 November, on the Left flank, our troops attacked along the beach to the West at 0915 after a 15 minute artillery preparation. They killed 100 Japs during the course of the day's fighting. On the Right flank, the enemy began adjusting mortar fire on the PIVA road block at 0330. One enemy battalion was reported dug in just West of PIVA No. 2 village. Our forces attacked and killed 200 Japs.

On 9 November, on the Left flank, one Jap was killed. On the Right flank the Japs attacked, at 0600, our positions just Northeast of the PIVA road block. They were stopped, and dug in, 100 yards in front of our positions. After an artillery preparation of 800 rounds, our forces attacked at 0900. The enemy put up a very stubborn resistance and withdrew slowly towards PIVA No. 2 leaving 100 dead behind him. He was using the usual tree snipers, LMG's and 90mm mortars.

By the morning of 10 November, the enemy had withdrawn on both flanks. Hastily abandoned bivouac areas extending for 2200 yards along the NUMA NUMA trail North of PIVA No. 2, were estimated to have contained a battalion. Abandoned gear included demolitions, grenades, personal packs, 1-75mm mountain gun (Type 41), 1-37mm "Rapid Fire" gun, 1 heavy machine gun, several light machine guns, 50mm grenade dischargers, and small arms.

The enemy's first serious effort to counter-attack our beachhead was thus defeated by vigorous attacks of our forces whenever and wherever contact was made. He lost 551 killed in the 3 days of fighting. The enemy scheme of maneuver was as follows: The provisional battalion which landed on our West flank was to go inland and harass our perimeter on the left flank and in front. While they attracted attention to the West and North sectors of the perimeter, the East flank was to be hit vigorously at 0600, 9 November, by the 1st and 3d Bns. of the 23d Infantry supported by Field Artillery, the Regimental Gun Company, and a Light Trench Mortar Company. This force was to attack South and West from an assembly area near PEKO (Northeast of MOPARA) and effect a junction with the force on our Left flank in the vicinity of PIVA No 2. Another force (size unknown) was to make a landing immediately West of TOROKINA RIVER, and a platoon of 40 men and 1 officer just East of TOROKINA RIVER. The enemy estimated our beachhead was further to the East than it actually was and his estimate of our strength was 5-10,000 troops. There are some indications that the enemy planned to send further echelons down from RABAU but was prevented by U.S. Naval and air action. The two landings scheduled to be made East and West of the mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER were not carried out.

10, 11 and 12 November: The enemy was contacted only in small patrol actions resulting in the killing of 24 Japs.

13 November: A strong enemy position was established South of the junction of the NUMA NUMA and East-West trails. Strong resistance was offered to our troops who finally broke contact for the night. U. S. forces attacked again the next day, 14 November, using tanks. By 1545 the enemy had withdrawn leaving 25 dead behind. 6 MG's had been captured by our troops.

15, 16 and 17 November: Minor patrol activity. 2 Japs were killed on the 17th.

18 November: The enemy was patrolling aggressively feeling out our positions. A Jap Lieutenant and 8 men were killed. The officer was carrying a sketch which indicated the positions of the 1st Bn, 23d Infantry to our immediate front.

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19 November: 100 enemy foxholes in close proximity to our front lines were found to have been abandoned during the night presumably as a result of our artillery fire. 17 dead Japs were found.

20 November: At 1230, an enemy company attacked our troops just East of the East branch of the PIVA RIVER (136.2-219.6). The attack was beaten off and enemy casualties were thought to be heavy. About 1200 yards South of this point, 18-20 enemy positions and some machine guns were located.

21 November: As our troops attacked along the East-West trail, the enemy gave ground slowly fighting stubbornly all the time. Machine guns were emplaced to the North of the trail with fire lanes cut to cover the trail. 75 dead Japs were found. Sporadic 75mm enemy artillery fire was received during the day in our artillery positions in the general area (134.2-214.2). A company roster of the 1st Co, 53d Infantry was found. The 6th Co, 53d Infantry had been identified on the Left flank 7 November.

22 November: The enemy attacked with reinforced platoons during the day apparently probing for weak spots. The 1st and 3d Bns, 23d Infantry were displaced in depth North of the East-West trail. Machine gun and mortar fire was continuous all day. One company was located on high ground in the general area (136.3-220.3). Shortly after noon, artillery fire was received on the TOROKINA strip and near our 155mm gun positions. One gun position was hit and set on fire. Some 155mm shells exploded.

23 November: Contact was maintained, with the enemy firing 90mm mortars and 75mm artillery into our lines. Our LST's were shelled as they pulled into the beach at CAPE TOROKINA at 0840.

24 November: As our troops attacked astride the East-West trail, the enemy used 90mm mortars and 75mm artillery with great effectiveness. During our advance, extremely heavy resistance was met in the bend of the East branch of the PIVA RIVER at approximately (136.0-218.8). Casualties on both sides were heavy. At 1800, the enemy, withdrew to the East but some units returned during the night although no further fighting occurred. The 5th and 6th Cos, 54th Infantry were identified in this sector. It is believed that survivors of the 7 November attack on our left flank had come overland to our right flank. Two enemy 75mm batteries were neutralized by our artillery during the day. A captured enemy sketch indicating the enemy scheme of maneuver showed a 3 pronged attack originating from a Battalion headquarters position North of the East-West trail (Regimental headquarters was indicated to the East of Battalion headquarters): one on the North flank crossing the

[REDACTED]

25 November: An attack by our forces ran into strong resistance in the area (136.2-219.1) and was held up all day; but the enemy withdrew during the night. Immediately South of this area the enemy fired sporadic machine gun fire into our lines during the day. At 1845 enemy artillery, both 15cm. and 75mm, started shelling our artillery positions on CAPE TOROKINA, the division dumps on Beach Blue 1 and artillery positions Northeast of CAPE TOROKINA. This firing continued at intervals until morning of 26 November when all enemy activity quieted down. The second large-scale attempt to break up our beachhead had been defeated after 6 days of heavy fighting. The enemy had lost 1196 dead in this attempt. It is estimated that 450 of this number had been killed by artillery fire and the balance by infantry. A prisoner of war, captured 27 November stated that the 23d Infantry had suffered at least 40 per cent casualties and the Regimental Commander had been killed. Units identified were as follows:

23d Inf (less 2d Bn and 9th Co, 3d Bn)
7th Co, 2d Bn, 23 Inf.
1st Bn, 13th Inf.
2 Co's, 45th Inf.
6th Engineers
One 100m. platoon.
1st Bn, 6th FA. (2-2 gun batteries)
2d Bn, 4th Heavy FA. (2-2 gun batteries)
3d Light Mortar Bn. (less 1st Company)
5th Co, 54th Inf.
6th Co, 54th Inf.
6th Div. Signal Unit.
1st Co, 53 Inf (?) (Co roster only evidence)

27, 28, 29 and 30 November: No enemy activity except for 20-25 15cm shells which fell in the general vicinity of CAPE TOROKINA on 29 November. A gasoline dump was ignited which burned out a nearby 155mm gun position.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 December: No enemy activity except for small patrol contacts.

9 December: While one of our companies was advancing as part of a plan to straighten out the lines, they ran into an enemy force, estimated to be one company, in the vicinity of Hill 1000 (139.5-219.3) at 1530. Another company which was supposed to advance with them did not do so because of patrol contacts on their immediate front. Enemy snipers penetrated the gap between the two companies. The enemy broke off the fighting at 1830.

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10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 December: There were minor skirmishes with the remnants of the 3d Bn, 23rd Inf who were holding positions in the general vicinity of Hill 1000 (139.8-219.2). The enemy force consisted of about 200-300 troops. During this period our Northeast sector received sporadic shelling from 75mm artillery and 90mm mortars as well as 50mm mortar and machine gun fire.

15 December: After a preparation by artillery and dive bombers our troops attacked the Jap positions on Hill 1000 and by dark had occupied the western part of the Jap positions.

16 December: The enemy gave up all the higher ground after further attacks by our forces and withdrew into a pocket open to the North; but surrounded by our troops on the West, South and East. A reinforced platoon made contact with one of our patrols on the beach East of the mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER.

17 December: After a 15 minute artillery preparation, our forces advanced to attack Jap bivouac area 600 yards East of the mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER, but the enemy had evacuated. 8 dead bodies were found and portions of several others.

18 December: There were further patrol contacts in the vicinity of the bivouac area mentioned above and 9 Japs were killed. After a preparation by dive bombers, our troops attacked the pocket on Hill 1000 using flame throwers. All organized resistance ceased by 1730 when all the positions had been occupied although a few snipers remained in trees.

19, 20 and 21 December: Minor patrol contacts were made during this period in the general vicinity of Hill 600A. On 21 December, enemy 75mm artillery fire was received in our Northeast sector and, starting at 1900, 15cm shells began falling in the area bounded by the PIVA RIVER on the East, CAPE TOROKINA on the West and the junction of MISSION ROAD and MARINE DRIVE on the North. The Jap 15cm gun (or guns) was located due East of MORARA. Counter-battery fire was laid down on this position and on observed 75 mm positions.

22 December: At 1000, one of our combat patrols made contact with Japs occupying covered emplacements on Hill 600A. An attack by a company failed to dislodge them. The enemy was using light mortars and at least 3 machine guns. Our company withdrew before 1800 and, at 1800, 540 round of artillery fire were placed on the Jap positions.

23 December: A platoon patrol ran into Jap prepared positions near (140.50-211.85) at 1000. The point was a marine with a military dog. As soon as the dog alerted, the Japs opened fire, killing 4 (plus the dog) and wounding 10. Our patrol withdrew while an 81mm mortar concentration was laid in. Reinforced by another platoon, the attack was resumed but was unsuccessful and our troops withdrew West across the TOROKINA RIVER. The Japs were dug in around the bases of trees and had 1 heavy machine gun, 3 light machine guns as well as 50mm mortars. Another unsuccessful attack was made on the Jap positions in the saddle of Hill 600A.

24 December: Patrols on Hill 600A reported the enemy had withdrawn to the North. About 30 covered emplacements were found. The Japs were reported to be organizing a defensive position extending from the North end of Hill 600A on a 20 degree azimuth for 500 yards. One of our patrols had a brief fire fight at (140.5-219.8).

25 and 26 December: Minor patrol contacts were made and on 26 December. Fire from enemy 75mm, 10cm artillery and 90mm mortars was received in different parts of the division sector.

27 and 28 December: There were minor patrol contacts. One company crossed the TOROKINA going East and North of the old Jap position and attacked it from the East. 10 Japs were killed and 10-20 fled into the bush. Our troops wired the positions for demolition before withdrawing to the West across the TOROKINA RIVER.

1600, 28 December: Command of the Division sector was turned over to the Americal Division commander. There were no enemy forces in contact with our lines and no known enemy West of the TOROKINA RIVER. The Third Marine Division and attached units had killed 2,111 Japs.

II. NAVAL ACTION:

1 November: At 0750, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers were reported heading Northwest at 25 knots about 70 miles West of BUKA PASSAGE.

2 November: At 0248, CTF 39 reported that he was attacking on enemy surface force of cruisers and destroyers at 6-20S, 154-30E. At 0438, the enemy had been defeated and fled to the North leaving one cruiser and four destroyers sunk. A transport group, composed of 3-APA's (Hunter Liggett, American Legion, and Crescent City) and 1-AKA (ALCHIBA) had not been able to complete unloading all gear and equipment on D-day and was waiting offshore for daylight to return to CAPE TOROKINA to complete their unloading. This group was only 35 miles from the scene of the battle. Task Force 39 was heavily attacked by 100 enemy planes at 0824 which probably diverted a similar attack from the transports.

6 November: The enemy succeeded in transporting and landing a provisional battalion on the West flank of our beachhead during the night of 6-7 November. Four destroyers were used for this purpose.

25 November: At 0145, 6 Japanese destroyers were intercepted by 4 of our destroyers. 2 enemy destroyers were sunk by torpedoes, 1 by torpedoes and gunfire, and 1 by gunfire alone. The remaining 2 destroyers were chased to within 100 miles of RABAU. At 0435, our forces broke off the chase reporting that one of the remaining destroyers was damaged.

COMMENT.

The success of the CAPE TOROKINA operation was absolutely dependent on the maintenance of supply lines from GUADACANAL and the prevention of sea-borne attacks with troops from RABAU. This task was executed perfectly with the exception of the relatively small force (450 troops) landed on the night of 6-7 November. Captured documents indicate that the enemy had plans to land much larger forces from cruisers and destroyers (supported by a liberal application of naval gunfire on the beachhead area); but was forced to abandon these plans because of the excellent protection given by our naval forces plus the losses of warships sustained in heavy U. S. air raids on RABAU on 5 and 11 November.

III. AIR:

1 November: The beachhead area was strafed at 0745 by enemy fighters. During the day and early hours of darkness there were three bombing attacks. The convoy was forced to stop unloading and put to sea twice-once at 0805 and again at 1300. There were a few casualties from these attacks but no serious damage.

7 November: Between 0100 and 0330 numerous bombs were dropped. 1-250 Kg. (550lbs) bomb was dropped in the division command post killing one war correspondent and one marine enlisted; and wounding another correspondent, one marine officer, and five enlisted.

8 November: There was an air attack on AP's which were unloading. A 250 Kg. dud hit the JACKSON and was thrown over the side by 6 members of the crew. The FULLER was hit by a bomb which killed 5 and wounded 20 men but was able to continue unloading.

13 November: Summary for first 12 days - 52 alerts, 10 bombings, and 1 strafing attack.

15 November: Right after dawn enemy fighters came in low over the mountains and out of the sun to bomb and strafe the area.

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19 November: From 0130 to 0515 there were four alerts. 27 bombs were dropped killing 1 marine officer and 4 enlisted and wounding 12 enlisted. 1-75mm pack howitzer was put out of action and one battery galley and switchboard were destroyed.

20 November: There were several alerts between 0030 and 0657. A large fire in the dumps on PURUATA ISLAND was started by one string of bombs. 5 Jap fighters knocked down by our fighters as the Japs came over for early morning strafing. One pilot was picked up and made a PW.

21 November: There were seven alerts during the night. Two enemy planes were shot down in an early morning fighter battle.

23 November: Number of bombs dropped during the night, some being 20 minute delay type.

26 November: There have been 86 alerts from D-day to date. For the first time a whole night passed without any alert.

1 December: During November the CAPE TOROKINA beach-head had 90 alerts and 22 bombings. These caused 24 deaths and 96 wounded.

6 December: One enemy plane was shot down by a night fighter during an alert.

14-15 December: During the night there were 6 alerts between 2010-0536. At least 6 bombs landed in the area of which 2 were duds. Some damage was done in DSIO Headquarters and the fighter command camp area. One twin engine bomber was shot down.

16 December: At 0111, one single engine twin float monoplane was shot down by an F4U night fighter.

18 December: There were alerts from midnight to 0119 and from 0139-0236. 40-50 bombs were dropped, the center of impact being between CAPE TOROKINA and PURUATA ISLAND. Casualties were 1 dead, 10 missing, and 28 wounded. 3-LCVP and 1-LCM were sunk and 6-LCVP and 7-LCM were damaged. Our night fighter had engine trouble and did not get off the ground until 0210 after the bombing.

19 December: 10-15 planes were over and dropped 25-30 bombs. One hit near the fighter strip, one on PURUATA ISLAND, and one just off shore. There was no damage but 3 men were wounded.

20 December: About 15 planes came over in 4 waves and

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dropped 25-35 bombs in various parts of the beachhead area. 2 men were killed and 9 were wounded. One Jap plane was shot down by a night fighter.

24 December: The enemy dropped 2 small bombs 1 near the boat pool and 1 on PURUATA ISLAND. One plane strafed the TOROKINA fighter strip.

25 December: 135 alerts to date since 1 November.

27 December: One alert but the bogey did not close.

28 December: Summary: For the whole period 1 November-28 December inclusive, there were 136 air alerts. Bombs were dropped during 27 of these alerts. Approximate casualties were 28 dead, 10 missing, and 136 wounded among all forces located in the beach head area. One APD carrying Marines from the 3d Division was sunk by an enemy torpedo plane on its way to CAPE TOROKINA and 38 Marines were lost. Damage was relatively small and was confined chiefly to dumps on PURUATA ISLAND and boats in the boat pool.

H. J. Turton
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LtCol. USMC
D-2

HJT/fr

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

1 February, 1944.

Appendix 1 to Annex A, Enemy Operations

General Plan of Enemy Defenses, Cape Torokina

1. In general the Cape Torokina defenses were composed of a defense in depth consisting of mutually supporting bunkers, trench systems and individual rifle pits so sited as to cover all approaches to the Cape from the sea. The bulk of the defensive system was sited so as to cover the water approaches from the west. One 75mm Regimental Gun type "41" (1908) was emplaced in a bunker on the west side of the Cape near the base of the neck and was sited for anti boat defense. For further details on the enemy defenses refer to Combat Report of the Third Marines (Reinforced). For the general plan of the enemy defenses see sketch number 1, appended.
2. All bunkers were of log construction covered with sand, debris and vegetation for protective and camouflage purposes. (See appended photographs). Defensive installations were of the following types:
 - (a) Single Bunkers (See sketch No. 2).
Built to accomodate one or two machine guns.
 - (b) Twin Bunkers (See sketch No. 3).
Built in pairs with a connecting trench and containing one machine gun.
 - (c) Personnel and Storage Bunkers (See sketch No. 4).
Some of the bunkers had firing ports and openings through which fire could be delivered.
 - (d) Rifle Bunkers (See sketch No. 5).
Not bunkers in the true sense; but rather revetted rifle pits with an overhead covering of small logs or saplings.
 - (e) Individual rifle pits (See sketch No. 6).
Generally scattered throughout the cape area sited in groups to cover water approaches, or singly or in small groups to cover approaches to bunkers.

H. J. Turton
H. J. TURTON
Lt. Col. USMC.
D-2

HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

17 March 1944.

D-1 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT OF STRENGTH
AND CASUALTIES FOR THE OPERATION AT EMPRESS
AUGUSTA BAY, BOUGAINVILLE.

1. Casualty figures for this division during the Bougainville campaign were as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>			<u>WIA</u>			<u>MIA</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>		
	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
SpTrs	1	0	3	2	0	31	0	0	1	3	0	35
ServTrs	1	0	5	2	1	30	0	0	1	3	1	36
3dMar	4	1	79	20	0	378	2	0	15	26	1	472
9thMar	1	0	30	7	2	125	0	0	3	8	2	158
12thMar	1	0	9	3	1	25	0	0	1	4	1	35
19thMar	0	0	4	1	0	49	0	0	1	1	0	54
21stMar	7	0	47	6	1	195	0	0	39	13	1	281
TOTAL	15	1	177	41	5	833	2	0	61	58	6	1071

2. Total burials effected by this division were as follows:

	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Civ</u>
Cemetery #1	13	0	126	1
Cemetery #2	0	0	16	0
Cemetery #3	11	1	147	0
*TOTAL	24	1	289	1

*These figures include personnel of IMAC, Third Marine Division and miscellaneous naval units attached for the operation.

3. Total number of patients evacuated sick were as follows:

<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
79	9	1431

4. Total number of patients evacuated wounded were as follows:

<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
10	0	256

5. Losses in non-effectives throughout period of operation:

	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
KIA	15	1	177
MIA	2	0	61
Sick(Evac)	79	9	1431
Wounded(Evac)	10	0	256
TOTAL	106	10	1925

6. Died of wounds received in combat:

<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
4	0	56

7. Average strength present for entire campaign:

	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>
	783	62	13678
Auth strength	938	93	18006

ENCLOSURE (B)

8. Percentage of casualties by category against average strength present during campaign (1) and authorized strength (2):

	(1)				(2)			
	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Total</u>
KIA	1.92	1.61	1.29	1.33	1.60	1.08	.98	1.01
MIA	.26	----	.45	.43	.21	-----	.34	.33
Sk(Evac)	10.09	14.51	10.46	10.45	8.42	9.68	7.95	7.93
WIA(Evac)	1.28	-----	1.87	1.83	1.07	-----	1.42	1.40
TOTAL	13.55	16.12	14.07	14.04	11.30	10.76	10.69	10.67

C. S. White
C. S. WHITE,
LtCol., USMC,
D-1.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

ENCLOSURE (B)

S-E-C-R-E-T

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

1 February, 1944.

D-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY OPERATION.

1. The performance of the Divisional Intelligence Agencies during the Empress Augusta Bay operation was, on the whole, satisfactory. In order to avoid a tedious narration of trivialities; and matters of importance to the Division Intelligence Section only, this report will be confined to pertinent comments and recommendations.

2. For a resume of enemy operations during the period see Annex A, Enemy Operations.

3. Division Intelligence Section.

(a) In general the organization of the section was adequate; but it is considered that a reduction of personnel in two cases and an increase and redistribution in another, based on Table of Organization strength (E-93), is advisable. (See following discussion).

(b) Intelligence Unit.

(1) In order to effectively carry out the necessary clerical and administrative functions of the Intelligence Unit a total of six clerks was found necessary, the one, at present authorized, being inadequate. The distribution of the clerks should be as follows:

Combat Intelligence	- 3
Language	- 1
Reproduction and Photography	- 1
Public Relations	- 1

The four clerks at present authorized for the API unit are not necessary, one being sufficient. Therefore a net increase of one clerk over the authorized allowance for the section is recommended.

(2) Based on experience gained during the operation, it is considered that the liaison officers are an invaluable asset in maintaining a continuous flow of information between higher and lower echelons.

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(3) The language personnel performed outstandingly in interrogating prisoners and translating enemy documents. Two captured documents, when translated, gave information as to planned enemy schemes of maneuver which permitted our forces to take effective counter measures. Prior to the operation two Nisei (Second generation Japanese) were assigned to the division by ComSoPac. An additional one was assigned after the landing. The Nisei performed invaluable work and it is highly recommended if possible that six be assigned to the division prior to future operations - three to be assigned to the Division Intelligence Section and one to each infantry regiment. Except for the employment of Nisei as additional personnel where practicable, it is considered that the language personnel authorized for the Division are adequate.

(4) (a) Except for the manning of Division OPs which were nonexistent due to the terrain, it is considered that the observers at present assigned to the Division Intelligence Section are inadequate and without value. A well trained reconnaissance company attached to Division Headquarters, and under the operational control of D-2 would have proved invaluable. It is strongly recommended that the present observers be eliminated and special scout company be organized and made an integral part of the Division Headquarters Battalion to operate under the control of D-2 for the performing of the following special functions.

(1) Amphibious reconnaissance patrols as necessary prior to the actual operation.

(2) Special distant patrol operations as required.

(3) Manning of Division OPs as required.

(4) As special details to assist organization commanders in the gathering, segregating and guarding of enemy documents, equipment and material on the scene of combat operations until proper disposition of same can be made.

(b) The light tank battalion scout company was not able to perform its normal functions during the operation; and it is doubtful if it can be used in its normal capacity in the South Pacific Area. It is recommended, therefore, that the scout company be re-organized as a special infantry rifle company composed of a company headquarters, three rifle platoons each of twenty four enlisted and consisting of a platoon headquarters and three squads; and a normal infantry rifle company weapons platoon. Sufficient radio personnel should be included to permit each rifle platoon

to permit each rifle platoon to maintain its own radio communication while on patrols. The scout company as re-organized to be included as an integral unit of the Division Headquarters Battalion; but under the control of D-2 for operations and training.

(c) Aerial Photo Interpretation Unit.

(1) It was found that the personnel authorized for the Aerial Photo Interpretation Unit was in excess of that required. It is considered that two officers and six enlisted (API) plus one clerk can adequately perform the necessary photo interpretation work for the Division.

(2) After the landing, one API officer was loaned to the 12th Marines and thereafter one set of each photo coverage received was forwarded directly to the Artillery Regiment as quickly as possible. It was found that by allowing the artillery organization to conduct and follow through on their own interpretation of aerial photographs that the delay incident to Division Intelligence personnel determining targets and transmitting the information to the artillery was saved. It is strongly recommended that two API officers be assigned to artillery regiments for the purpose indicated above.

4. Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance.

(a) During the planning phase suitable verticals, mosaics and obliques should be made available in time for complete distribution down to and including platoon leaders prior to embarkation. Photo coverage received prior to and during the operation were excellent; but an increased quantity sufficient for distribution above is highly desirable prior to the initial landing.

(b) It was found impossible to pick up enemy positions in the jungle from aerial photographs. Except for the defensive positions on Cape Torokina, at no time were any of the subsequent enemy defensive positions determined from aerial photographs. Artillery targets beyond the beach head line were determined by noting the gradual increase in the use of trails and crossings across the Torokina River. Due to the jungle the great majority of close in air searches requested were negative.

(c) It is not considered that the taking of aerial photographs in jungle areas after landing is of any value until the enemy has been definitely located in strong defensive positions. No aerial photo coverage was requested on this operation until D plus 20 days due to the fluidity of the situation.

(d) After D plus 20 days a twice weekly coverage of of the beach head area was of marked assistance in the tracing and correct orienting of the increasing road network within the beach head area; and in terrain interpretation.

(e) The Piper Cubs assigned to the artillery for air spot missions were also used for air reconnaissance missions and as such were invaluable. It is recommended that at least one amphibian plane be placed under the control of the Division initially. These planes capable of operating from the water, would be available to the division possibly from D-day until the establishing of air fields ashore, thus initially greatly expediting requests for reconnaissance and small photographic missions. During the early stages of the landing and prior to the establishing of the fighter strip on Cape Torokina, reconnaissance and photographic planes were based at such a distance from the beach head and performing so many other missions that on occasions there was an interval of two or three days between the request for and the fulfilling of a mission.

5. Reproduction and Photography.

(a) All combat photographers must be thoroughly trained, not only in the technique of taking photographs; but also what to take. Insufficient pictures of actual combat operations were made.

(b) The processing of all photographic prints and negatives should be done by the Division Intelligence Section. The regiments were not capable of processing prints or developing negatives on the operation due to the loss or destruction of their equipment upon landing. If all film is processed by the Division Photographic Officer he is able to maintain a much greater degree of supervision over the type of pictures submitted by the combat photographers and can issue instructions and orders accordingly. Ruining of good negatives due to poor processing would also be eliminated.

(c) A total of 1527 still photographs and 33,000 feet of motion picture film were taken and submitted during the operation.

(d) Prior to the arrival of the reproduction and photographic trailers, undeveloped film was forwarded to higher echelons by the first available transportation. After the arrival of the trailers all photographic coverage, was processed by the Division Photographic Officer. The trailers were also used to process aerial photo film, a total of 16 rolls of 9 inch aerial film being processed. 3,124 9 x 18 inch prints were made from film developed.

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6. Public Relations.

Thirteen combat correspondents (one officer and 12 enlisted) wrote a combined total of 734 news articles based on various actions of the campaign. Seven magazine articles, including two based on picture sequences, were transmitted. A total of 650 news pictures, with complete captions by correspondents, have been transmitted. It is considered that the performance of the combat correspondents during the operation was highly satisfactory and they continually exposed themselves under fire at great personal risk in order to obtain stories of greater news value. Great emphasis was placed on the forwarding of the initial photographs taken for press purposes with the greatest possible speed.

7. Miscellaneous.

(a) Sufficient tentage to house the office personnel was not available until D plus seven days. As a result, the Intelligence Section suffered extreme difficulty in functioning during the frequent rains of the first week. Sufficient tentage to protect equipment and essential personnel must be made available as soon as possible after landing.

(b) In general, intelligence information was received from lower units with a minimum of delay. All communication agencies functioned satisfactorily throughout the operation and it is considered that the present agencies of communication are ample for normal intelligence requirements.

(c) The usual local security patrols were maintained at all times for a distance of from 400 to 2,000 yards to the front. After the establishing of the final beach head line, each regiment sent a daily combat patrol to cover the area in front of the regimental sector for a distance of 4,000 yards. In addition combat units provided special reconnaissance patrols to accomplish missions designated by Division. Patrol reports were in general satisfactory and in some cases were outstanding. In many cases patrol leaders were not sufficiently trained or instructed in what to look for and how to report it with the result that their information was practically without value. In jungle terrain, patrols are the only certain means of obtaining definite information on the terrain to the front; and all unit intelligence officers and potential patrol leaders should be indoctrinated with the fact that accurate terrain information is almost as vital as enemy information, especially during advances.

[REDACTED]

(d) (1) The amount of captured equipment and the number of weapons turned in was unsatisfactory due, it is considered, to the following conditions:

(a) The persistent instinct of personnel to retain items as souvenirs even though they had been thoroughly instructed to the contrary prior to the landing.

(b) The drain on personnel required for supply and evacuation purposes did not leave, in organizations, sufficient personnel to collect, segregate, and guard captured material on the scene of combat.


(c) Transportation problems over poor trails were so acute that, due to the demands of supply and evacuation, captured material could not be moved and therefore was abandoned or destroyed in the jungle.

(2) It is considered that the only practicable method of assuring that captured material and documents are not lost, destroyed, or retained as souvenirs is to have special units, supervised by officers, right on the scene whose primary mission is to gather, segregate, protect from the elements, and safeguard captured material and documents until proper disposition of same can be made. Regiments do not have sufficient spare personnel to perform the above tasks and it is believed that special units sent down from higher echelons to assist organization commanders in the gathering and safeguarding of captured material would prove to be of inestimable value. See discussion on special scout company under paragraph 3 above.



H. J. Turton
H. J. TURTON
Lt. Col. USMC.
D-2

SKETCH NO 1

GENERAL DEFENSIVE SCHEME OF CAPE TOROKINA





SKETCH NO 2
SINGLE BUNKER WITH TWO MACHINE GUNS
WELL CAMOUFLAGED WITH SAND & SPROUTING COCONUTS



NOV 2ND 1943

SKETCH NO 3

TWIN BUNKERS, EACH BUNKER FROM 8' TO 10' HIGH.
WELL CAMOUFLAGED WITH DEBRIS & VEGETATION.




NOV 2ND 1943

SKETCH NO 4

STORAGE & PERSONEL BUNKERS-ALSO SICK BAY-WELL CAMOUFLAGED WITH SAND AND SPROUTING COCONUTS



3 LAYERS COCONUT LOGS FOR ROOF- COVERED WITH SAND & COCONUTS (SPROUTS)



THIS SHELTER IN OPEN NO

NOV 2ND 1943


SKETCH NO 5



NOV 2ND 1943

SKETCH NO 6


INDIVIDUAL RIFLE PITS ALONG BEACH AND AMONG BUNKERS.
SCATTERED THROUGHOUT WERE LIGHT MACHINE GUNS.
NO CAMOUFLAGE



NOV 2ND 1943

CAPE TOROKINA

Bunker (Front View)




CAPE TOROKINA

Bunker (Front View)



CAPE TOROKINA

Personnel Shelter
showing entrances



HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

29 January, 1944.

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION REPORT, 3D MARINE DIVISION

DIPPER OPERATION

1. PLANNING.

Third Marine Division participation in the DIPPER Operation commenced October 4, 1943 with the submission of an embarkation plan for the movement of the Division reinforced by 3d Defense Battalion, 2d Marine Raider Regt (Provisional), 1st 155mm Arty Bn, IMAC Naval Construction Bn, Detachment COMAIRNORSOLS, Advance Naval Base Unit #7, ACORN 13, Branch #3, 4th Base Depot, Advance Echelon Headquarters IMAC, 1st Echelon H&S Bn IMAC and 1st Echelon 1st Corps Signal Bn. This plan (based on the shipping available together with certain restrictions on the amount of cargo that could be carried) called for some 13,900 men and 6,200 tons of cargo in the first echelon of eight APA's and four AKA's for the D day landing, followed by five LST echelons five days apart, each carrying approximately 3000 troops and 5,500 tons of cargo. The organization of the 3d Marine Division, reinforced, for this operation is shown in Annex "A".

COMMENT: This plan, with the addition of echelons to transport the 37th Division and with minor changes to meet the situation as it developed, was successfully carried out substantially as planned.

The AKA's were formed into a separate transport group. Such a group has an excess of cargo over personnel for combat loading and has no place in a landing against possible enemy opposition. It is recommended that AKA's to be used on D day be fitted into other transport groups in accordance with the tactical plan rather than being formed into a separate group.

2. SUPPLIES.

The embarkation plan contemplated that the first echelon would carry three units of fire for troops embarked (except two units for heavy AA units), ten days landing rations, ten days B rations and ten days fuel; and that succeeding echelons would carry similar amounts for troops embarked plus additional quantities intended to bring levels on hand at D plus 30 days to five units of fire and thirty days of other supplies. Each combat team was also furnished a thirty day supply of malaria control and medical items.

COMMENT: This scheme worked satisfactorily but for future operations such items as malaria control and medical supplies should be entrusted to the combat teams only in amounts to meet immediate requirements, the bulk of such supplies should be shipped later after division dumps have been established. Also replenishments in equipment and clothing (TBA Group 12) should be scheduled for shipment at intervals beginning about D plus 10 days.

3. EQUIPMENT.

The equipment of the division was divided into three categories as indicated below.

Category A: Equipment required to live and to fight for a limited period in a limited space.

Category B: Equipment necessary for the continuation of combat and extension of the combat zone.

Category C: Equipment for which no need was contemplated within the first 30 days. (to be sent forward on call).

Equipment was assigned to the several categories after consideration of the shipping available, the terrain of the proposed theater and the enemy opposition expected. These same principles

were applied to the formation of the battalion landing teams to land on D day (for example, no tanks or antitank units were attached to these landing teams).

COMMENT: The application of these rules produced a reinforced battalion landing team which could be accommodated on one APA with a load limit of 500 tons (category A equipment with necessary supplies), with the remaining category B equipment and units to follow in successive echelons. This plan worked satisfactorily but can be applied only when the several echelons are closely spaced.

Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and blanket roll being embarked as organization baggage (sea bags, cots and pads were classed as category C and not embarked in any echelon). For future movements it is recommended that the knapsack be left behind as category B equipment.

4. SHORE PARTIES.

Each APA was required to furnish a complete shore party of some 550 officers and men, of which 120 were for work in the ship, 60 were used as "boat riders" and 200 on the beach "with the sole duty of unloading cargo from boats"; remaining personnel being used for shore party headquarters, pioneer work, vehicle drivers, dump supervisors, communicators, medical personnel, beach party and for work at inland dumps. Each AKA was supposed to furnish 120 men to work in the holds, 50 men to ride the boats and 200 on the beach with the sole duty of unloading cargo from boats. As the AKA's carried only 350 officers and men, it was necessary to make up the difference by drawing men from the APA's (in addition to the regular APA shore party). Each AKA was joined with an adjacent APA, the APA shore party headquarters supervising the work on both beaches.

COMMENT: The application of these rules meant about 40% of the entire landing force was initially engaged on shore party duties. It is believed that this number is excessive and that with proper organization a shore party composed of 30% of the landing force should be sufficient (450 for an average APA). It is also believed that the personnel capacity of the AKA's to be employed on D day should be increased so that an AKA can unload itself without the need of drawing additional working details from the APA's.

5. FIRST PHASE. Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and blanket roll being embarked as organization baggage (sea bags, cots and pads were classed as category C and not embarked in any echelon). Twelve ships unloaded simultaneously on D day (November 1st) on a front of 8000 yards. Difficult hydrographic conditions caused the loss of some 86 boats on their initial trip. Difficult terrain inland (swamps) made the formation of inland dumps impracticable and all cargo was placed on the beach itself, just above the high water mark. Heavy surf caused the abandonment of the three western beaches after the personnel had landed, all cargo originally intended for those beaches was diverted to other beaches. The loss of large numbers of boats slowed the unloading; this condition was aggravated by frequent alerts which caused the ships to cease unloading and put to sea. Eight of the twelve ships completed unloading on D day, the remaining four returning on D plus 1 to complete unloading.

COMMENT: Regiments gradually assumed control of their beaches and consolidated their dumps but it was not until November 12 that division was able to assume control of the supply of rations, ammunition and fuel. During this period organizations and units obtained their supplies from the nearest shore party dump. To permit the regiments to perform this function, many units remained attached to the regiments that would normally have reverted to organic control earlier. For example, the dates on which certain units reverted to organic control is indicated below:

Nov 3d:	CB Battalion (to construct roads)
Nov 4th:	Artillery battalions
Nov 6th:	Pioneer Bn (for permanent shore party to handle succeeding echelons)
Nov 9th:	Engineer Battalion
Nov 11th:	Medical Companies
Nov 12th:	Service & Supply Platoons of S&S Co.
Nov 17th:	All remaining reinforcing elements.

The long delay indicated by the above table was caused by the lack of roads inland which made it necessary (in so far as supply and evacuation was concerned) to leave the problem in the hands of the regimental commanders until the situation clarified and the required supply routes could be developed.

6. ROADS.

Initially there were no roads. (The one native trail leading inland on the right flank broke down as soon as it was subjected to heavy traffic.) The beach itself was used as a road for all lateral traffic and amphibian tractors were used for the movement of supplies and for the evacuation of wounded; track laying trailers pulled by tractors were also used where practicable. (Eighteen track laying trailers with TD-9 tractors had been obtained especially for this operation). The front lines gradually advanced inland across the swamps until dry ground was reached. A division inland dump was then established (Dump No. 2, three miles by road inland from the beach). Until a road was built supplies were transported to this dump by amphibian tractors; jeeps and trailers were also ported forward by amphibian tractor for local distribution from this forward dump. This process was repeated at a later stage of the operation to meet a similar condition, i.e. the front lines advanced again across swamps beyond the existing road net. The table below shows the various stages.

Nov 1 to 14:	Supply from beach dumps.
Nov 15 to 24:	Supply via amphibian tractor trail to dump No. 2.
Nov 25 to Dec 8:	Supply by truck to Dump No. 2.
Dec 9 to 23:	Supply by truck to Dump No. 2 thence by amphibian tractor to Dump No. 3 (3½ miles inland from Dump No. 2).
Thereafter:	Normal supply, by truck to regimental or battalion dumps, thence forward by jeep, track laying trailers or hand carry.

COMMENT: On November 13, the date on which the first major movement of supplies by amphibian tractors commenced, there were 64 amphibian tractors available. On November 25, the date the road opened and amphibian tractors were relieved by trucks, there were only 28 amphibian tractors still in operation. By December 9th, 48 amphibian tractors had been repaired and made serviceable, but by December 23rd only 12 remained in running condition. It is obvious that amphibian tractors are special instruments for special operations and cannot be depended upon for hard service over extended periods.

It was noted that the 2½-ton cargo truck could negotiate roads that were impassable to jeeps. The track laying trailers previously mentioned were released to regiments for use in moving supplies forward beyond the head of navigation for 2½-ton trucks. The jeep was a useful supply vehicle only when conditions were good; in mud and rain the jeep cannot move and recourse must be had to 2½-ton trucks, track laying trailers, amphibian tractors or hand carry.

7. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES.

Ammunition expenditures for the two month period are indicated in Annex B.

COMMENT: It should be noted that in actual rounds fired the artillery expended considerably more than three units of fire per gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle and the 60mm mortar expended just three units of fire, while all other weapons averaged a much lower rate. (AA expenditures are not included in this list; such weapons were under corps control the majority of the time). It is believed these figures should be considered in planning re-supply to meet expenditures while retaining the policy of landing three units of fire with the troops on D day.

8. LOSS OF EQUIPMENT.

A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation. This matter is being handled by separate correspondence.

COMMENT: In spite of all that can be done, tremendous losses must be expected under difficult campaign conditions. To meet this fact, salvage operations should be started early and plans should provide for the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 days, of replenishments in all types of equipment. This equipment should be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day replenishment allowance should be provided for each 30 days of active operations.

9. EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT WITH ARMY.

The relieving Army Division left in rear areas, and this Division delivered in the combat area such items of heavy equipment as were common to each organization. This included machine guns, mortars, 105mm howitzers, 1/4-ton trucks, water trailers, cargo trailers, water cans, some tentage, some pieces of engineering equipment.

COMMENT: The exchange was limited to items for which spare parts were regularly provided by each organization and only serviceable items were exchanged. Considerable shipping space was saved by this exchange. However, neither division was entirely satisfied with the equipment they received.

10. RELIEF.

A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation. This matter is being handled by separate correspondence.

Departing personnel embarked in the same APA's and AKA's which brought the incoming, relieving echelons, taking with them only light equipment (maximum 50 tons per ship). The remaining heavy equipment, guns, vehicles etc, were brought back on returning LST's. For the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 days, of replenishments in all types of equipment. This equipment should be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day replenishment allowance should be provided for each 30 days of active operations.

COMMENT: The relief was accomplished without incident. As per original embarkation plan, as a rough figure the TBA 90 day replenishment allowance should be provided for each 30 days of active operations.

11. EVACUATION: should be provided for each 30 days of active operations.

Evacuation of wounded, while difficult, was executed in normal manner. Hospital companies were kept close behind the regiments, patients being evacuated to the Division Hospital, thence through beach evacuation stations for evacuation to rear areas by ship or plane. The main difficulty was the lack of roads.

COMMENT: The one-ton or 3/4-ton ambulance proved more satisfactory than the jeep ambulance. The pieces of engineering equipment.

12. AIRPLANE DROPS.

COMMENT: The exchange was limited to items for which spare parts were regularly provided by each organization and only serviceable items were exchanged. Considerable shipping space was saved by this exchange. However, neither division was entirely satisfied with the equipment they received.

COMMENT: Supply by air from distant bases, especially where the supplies must be dropped in thick jungle, does not appear to be a reliable means of supply.

Departing personnel embarked in the same APA's and AKA's which brought the incoming, relieving echelons, taking with them only light equipment (maximum 50 tons per ship). The remaining heavy equipment, guns, vehicles etc, were brought back on returning LST's. For the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 days, of replenishments in all types of equipment. This equipment should be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day replenishment allowance should be provided for each 30 days of active operations.

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Evacuation of wounded, while difficult, was executed in normal manner. Hospital companies were kept close behind the regiments, patients being evacuated to the Division Hospital, thence through beach evacuation stations for evacuation to rear areas by ship or plane. The main difficulty was the lack of roads.

13. CONCLUSION:

This report covers only selected important points of the operation which are believed to have a bearing on future operations. No attempt is made to report on matters of supply and evacuation which, while difficult, require no special solution.

ANNEXES: "A" ORGANIZATION OF 3D MARINE DIVISION REINFORCED.
"B" AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES DURING DIPPER OPERATION.
"C" EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY - 19TH MARINES MAP, 3RD
EDITION 1:20,000 - WITH ADMINISTRATIVE INSTAL-
LATIONS AND ROAD NET AS OF 20 DECEMBER, 1943
IMPOSED THEREON.

W. C. Hall
W. C. HALL
Colonel, USMC
D-4

ANNEX "A"

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

14 Oct., 1944.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO LTR CG, 3D MAR DIV DATED 14 OCT. 43.

ORGANIZATION OF THIRD MARINE DIVISION
REINFORCED FOR DIPPER MOVEMENT.

Reference: Division Memo-321-43.

1. The following indicates the organization of the Third Marine Division, Reinforced, into Task Units for the DIPPER Movement.

2. Unless otherwise indicated, all cargo is in Category "A" (reference "A" to basic letter). That is, only equipment and supplies necessary to live and fight for a limited period in limited space.

3. Category "B" (reference "A" to basic letter) as indicated, includes substantially 1/2 of all transportation, certain combat equipment, and substantially 1/2 mess personnel plus other cargo whose early forward movement is anticipated.

4. Organization into task units.

(a) Task Unit A-1
COMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
3d CT	4709	928
Det H&S, 12th Marines	40	0
Det S&S Co 3d Ser Bn	11	0
H&S Med Bn	15	6
2d Raider Regt (less 3d Bn)	1081	199
NCB, IMAC	300	75
Com Unit #7 (less det)	100	84
Det ACORN 13	75	0
Det Branch 3, 4th Base Depot	15	0
Det Adv Nav Base Unit #7	75	25
Rations, fuel, and ammunition	0	743
	6421	2060

Transportation: 4 APA's
Date of departure: 13 Oct., 43.

(b) Task Unit A-2
COMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
9th CT	4471	912
Det H&S 12th Marines	42	11
1st Ech Comd Gp plus 3d HqBn (less dets).	393	93
3d Bn, 2d Raider Regt	1046	88
Det Adv Ech, Hq, IMAC	20	10
Co E, 3d Med Bn	77	0
Det H&S, 3d Tk Bn plus 4th Plat Co D	54	0
3d Tk Bn (Scout).	0	823
Rations, fuel and ammunition	6103	1937

(c) Task Unit A-3
COMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
90mm Gp 3d Def Bn (less 6 SL's)	706	750
Btry I, 3d Def Bn		
Btry H, 3d Def Bn		
4th Plat Btry A 3d Sp Wpn Bn	65	40
Det Hq, Com Air N Sols	124	54
602 Radar Team, IMAC	5	10
ARGUS #5	117	115

(c) Task Unit A-3 (Cont'd)

COMPOSITION:

Det Com Unit #7
Co A, 3d Amph Trac Bn
Co E, 3d Med Bn
Det NCB IMAC
Det 3d Marines
Det 9th Marines (Incl 33 personnel, 40 tons, fr 1st Plat Btry H, 3d Spl Wpns)
Det 3d Sig Co.
Det Hq Co, Hq Bn
Det Boat Pool #11
Rations, fuel, and ammunition.

PERSONNEL

TONNAGE

48	31
136	300
11	41
25	10
3	19
49	87
12	36
8	15
91	50
0	637
1400	2195

Transportation: 4 AKA's
Date of departure: 26 Oct, 43.

(d) Task Unit B.

COMPOSITION:

1st LT, 21st CT
Det Com Air N Sols
4th Bn, 12th Marines
H&S Co, 3d MT Bn
1st Ech, Sig Bn, IMAC
1st Ech, HqBn, IMAC (plus 1 MT Co IMAC)
Det 3d Sig Co.
Det NCB, IMAC
Det ACORN 13
Det 75th NCB
Co D, 3d Tank Bn (Scouts) less 4 Plats.
Rations, fuel and ammunition.

PERSONNEL

TONNAGE

1669	546
90	70
521	216
118	139
176	220
152	465
122	70
330	400
250	234
1000	0
20	26
3548	2724
	5110

Transportation: 8 LST's and 8 APD's
Date of departure: 8 LST's begin loading AM D-day, depart AM D plus 2.
8 APD's begin loading AM D plus 2, dpt PM plus 2.

(e) Task Unit C.

COMPOSITION:

Co C, 3d Amph Trac Bn
3d CT Category B
9th CT Category B
2d LT 21st CT
H&S Btry, 12th Marines (less Det's)
H&S 3d Amph Trac Bn
3d Def Bn (less 90mm Gp and Btry I)
Det NCB, IMAC
2d Rdr. Regt Category B
Det 75th NCB
ACORN 13 (less Det's)
Rations, fuel, and ammunition

PERSONNEL

TONNAGE

117	257
1780	417
60	417
1593	546
81	50
51	143
691	619
1000	266
0	100
375	250
480	250
0	2890
3628	6205

Transportation: 8 LST's and 8 APD's
Date of departure: 8 LST's begin loading AM D plus 5, depart AM D plus 7.
8 APD's begin loading AM D plus 7, depart PM D plus 7.

(h) Task Unit F
COMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
21st CT Category B	58	577
H&S Co, 19th Marines Category B	18	150
H&S Btry, 3d Spl Wpn Bn Category B	12	30
Btry A, 3d Spl Wpn Bn (less 3d Plats category B)	21	23
H&S Co, 3d Tk Bn	33	77
H&S Co, 3d Tk Bn Category B	40	53
Co D (Sgt) 3d Tk Bn (less 3d Plats Category B)	19	7
3d Serv Bn, Category B	154	114
3d Medical Bn (less Co E) Category B	12	22
Det NCB, IMAC	68	413
Det Branch #3, 4th Base Depot (less Adv Ech).	375	10
Rations, fuel and ammunition.	0	3032
	<u>810</u>	<u>4508</u>

Transportation:

- 6 LST's and 6 APD's
- 6 LST's begin loading AM D plus 20, depart AM D plus 22.
- 6 APD's begin loading AM D plus 22, depart PM D plus 22.

5. Remainder of 3d Marine Division, reinforced, remains at present bases in Category "C" (reference (a) to basic letter) prepared to move personnel, supplies, and equipment forward on call.

(f) Task Unit D.COMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
3d CT Category B	88	323
9th CT, category B	68	223
31 LT, 21st CT	1491	541
4th Bn, 12th Marines Category B	20	38
2d Ech Comd Gp, 3d Mar Div	33	1
Det H&S Co, 3d Serv Bn	11	0
Det Boat Pool #11	50	250
75th NCB (less Det's)	450	250
Det ACORN 13	309	516
1st 155mm How Bn IMAC (less Det's)	538	406
1st Plat 3d MP Co	26	3
Rations, fuel and ammunition.	0	2871
	3084	5427

Transportation: 7 LST's and 7 APD's
 Date of departure: 7 LST's begin loading AM D plus 10, depart AM D plus 12.
 7 APD's begin loading AM D plus 12, depart PM D plus 12.

(g) Task Unit ECOMPOSITION:

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
Co C 3d Tk Bn	162	250
Btry B, 3d Spl Wpns Bn	83	63
3d CT Category B	164	0
Co A 3d Tk Bn	147	273
Btry C, 3d Spl Wpns Bn	91	81
9th CT Category B	181	0
21st CT, Category B	250	170
H&S Btry, 12th Marines Category B	22	43
4th Bn, 12th Marines Category B	25	105
H&S Co, 19th Marines (less Det's)	194	149
3d HqBn, Category B	73	110
H&S Btry, 3d Spl Wpn Bn	80	24
Btry A, 3d Spl Wpn Bn (less 4 plats)	27	33
S&S Co, 3d Serv Bn (less 2 det's and 3 plats minus bakery and Sal Secs)	50	7
Ordnance Co, 3d Serv Bn (less 3 Mun Secs)	10	0
Hq Co, 3d Serv Bn	15	0
H&S Co, 3d MT Bn (Category B)	45	117
H&S Co, 3d Amph Trac Bn (Category B)	15	29
3d Def Bn (Category B)	0	188
Det 155mm How Bn, IMAC	150	0
Det Adv Naval Base Unit #7	79	200
Det Com Unit #7	30	200
Det 75th NCB	104	493
Det ComAirNorSols Category B	0	40
Rations, fuel and ammunition.	0	2845
	2007	5422

Transportation: 7 LST's and 7 APD's
 Date of departure: 7 LST's begin loading AM D plus 15, depart AM D plus 17
 7 APD's begin loading AM D plus 17, depart PM D plus 17.

ANNEX "B" - AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES DURING DIPPER OPERATION.

TYPE OF WEAPON AND AMMUNITION	TOTAL EXPENDITURES	NO. OF UNITS OF FIRE (DIVISION)		NO. OF ROUNDS FIRED PER WEAPON PER DAY.
		Marine Corps	U. S. Army	
		Unit of Fire Table	Unit of Fire Table	
Carbine, cal..30, M1	563,000	1.35	1.35	1.24
Cart., carbine, cal..30				
Rifle, cal..30, M1				
Cart., ball, cal..30 (6rd clip)	1,174,732	1.46	.96	3.03
Browning Auto. Rifle				
Cart., ball, cal..30 (5rd clip)	619,920*	3.06	1.76)	
Cart., tracer, cal..30	25,500	.53	.30)	22.30
Gun, machine, cal..30 (both types)				
Cart., ball & tracer, cal..30 (belted)	1,862,650	.57	1.10	52.56
Gun, submachine, cal..45				
Cart., ball, cal..45	249,000	.37	.37	2.41
Gun, machine, cal..50, HB, M2				
Cart., AP, cal..50	94,580	.20	.83)	
Cart., tracer, cal..50	29,770	.16	.52)	7.79
Links, metal, cal..50	124,350	.19	.71)	
Gun, 37mm, (Tank & AT)				
Cannister, M2	2,735	.63	1.07	.72
Shell HE, M63, w/f M58	1,378	.21	.27	.47
Shot AP, M72	3,462	.23	1.35	.96
Mortar, 60mm				
Shell, HE, M49A2	14,598	3.00	1.80	4.89

NOTE: * Undetermined number of rounds expended by few Rifles, U.S., Cal..30, M1903

ANNEX "B" - AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES DURING DIPPER OPERATION (Cont'd)

Gun, 75mm, SP, AT	949	.82	12.65	1.64
Shell, HE, M48, w/f M48	505	.44	6.73	.81
Shell, HE, M48, w/f M54	491	.43	1.09	.85
Shot, AP, M61	108	.75		.01
Shell, chemical, M48 II				
Howitzer, 75mm, Pack	26,399	5.31	3.88	14.94
Shell, HE, M48, w/f M48	18,099	3.65	6.21	9.84
Shell, HE, M48, w/f M54	1,237	1.43	1.15	.64
Shell, chemical, M64				
Mortar, 81mm	5,817	3.37	8.08	4.67
Shell, HE, M48 (light)	3,387	1.96	1.30	2.08
Shell, HE, M56 (heavy)	735	2.27	2.04	.42
Shell, chemical, M57				
Howitzer, 105mm	8,609	7.79	5.43	17.21
Shell, HE, M1, w/f M48	5,438	4.93	9.44	10.70
Shell, HE, M1, w/f M54	558	2.91	2.32	.98
Shell, chemical, M60				
Grenades				
Hand, Fragmentation, MKII	22,165	1.84	5.46	15.60
Hand, Offensive, MKIIIAI	1,405	1.24	1.04	1.04
Hand, Smoke, HC, M8	325	.37	.60	.16
Hand, Incendiary, M14	325	.37	1.20	.19
AT, HE, M9A1	2,900	1.03	1.08	1.85

PER RIFLE COMPANY PER DAY

JTLDG/rn

~~SECRET~~

"REPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS,
3D MARINE DIVISION, BOUGAINVILLE, BSI"

Report of Direct Air Support During The Bougainville Campaign.

Enclosures: (A) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 10Nov43.
(B) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 13Nov43.
(C) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 14Nov43.
(D) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 14Dec43.
(E) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 15Dec43.
(F) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 18Dec43.
(G) Report of Direct Air Support Strike 25-26Dec43.

ENCLOSURE "E"

1. AIR LIAISON PARTY PERSONNEL. Three officers (restricted aviators) and six enlisted radiomen reported to the Third Marine Division from the First Marine Aircraft Wing early in August, 1943, to be formed into three air liaison parties for the Third Marine Division. Inasmuch as officers and men had not been trained to function as air liaison parties a Third Marine Division Air Liaison Party School was organized and conducted by the Division Air Liaison Officer. To this school came five Army Air Force aviation officers and ten enlisted radiomen who had reported untrained to the 25th Army Division to form five air liaison parties for that division. To school the infantry units of the division in the potentialities of air support, and to assure the maximum employment of that support in any operation that the Third Marine Division might participate, the Commanding General, Third Marine Division, further ordered an officer from the Third Section of each battalion and regimental headquarters to attend the school. By training an air liaison officer for each infantry battalion and regimental headquarters those units could be assured of having at least one officer present to advise the unit commander on matters concerning close air support.

2. PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT IN JUNGLE TERRAIN. Prior to the convening of the school a thorough study had been made of the employment of air in direct support during the campaigns on Guadalcanal and New Georgia. It was felt that air in direct support had not been utilized to the fullest possible extent. Ground troops wanted, and realized they needed, close aerial support. Their faith in air, however, had been shaken, when, after calling for assistance, they themselves had been bombed by the air they had asked to strike the enemy. Ground troops felt insecure in using white mortar smoke alone to mark a target area. Airmen claimed hesitation and doubt of target resulted when the enemy shot back white mortar smoke to confuse our airmen. The ground troops felt that successful direct air support in jungle terrain would have to be a real close support - a support by accurate bombing as close to the friendly troops as safety would permit. New Georgia had shown that jungle terrain did not offer an opportunity for much movement, that the enemy tended to advance whenever our troops withdrew to create a safety margin to permit the dropping of large bombs, and that an effective bombing on dug in personnel in jungle would have to be one that would plough the enemy up and under. The school started with the intention of developing a technique by which the enemy could be bombed with maximum accuracy a minimum distance from our own forces.

3. TRAINING OF AIR LIAISON PARTY PERSONNEL. CSP 1536 furnished the doctrine by which the air liaison parties were to be trained. Practice with the provided radio equipment gave each liaison party communicational proficiency. Experiments conducted in conjunction with Strike Command, ComAirSols, furnished a knowledge of the effect of different weight bombs with various fuses on known types of targets offered by the Japanese. Field exercises, with aircraft of Strike Command,

using colored smokes (U-S Army M16 colored smoke hand grenades) to indicate the position of foremost friendly troops relative to the target, and white mortar (WP shell) or artillery smoke (WP shell) to mark the target, developed the technique that later was to be employed by the Third Marine Division in the Bougainville campaign.

4. EMPLOYMENT OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT DURING THE BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN. The Third Marine Division during the Bougainville campaign requested air to perform ten strikes in direct support of ground forces. All called for bombs to be dropped within five hundred yards, of friendly forces - three strikes dropped at five hundred yards, three at two hundred yards, one at one hundred twenty yards, one at hundred yards, and two at seventy five yards. The only casualties to own forces occurred on one strike at two hundred yards when one plane of a flight of six negligently dropped bombs six hundred yards from the well mortar smoke marked target on a battalion command post killing two men; wounding six, and shocking six.

5. CONCLUSIONS ON DIRECT AIR SUPPORT REACHED AS A RESULT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN.

a. It is believed that except for the Division Air Liaison Officer, who is assigned to the division from aviation, infantry battalion and regimental air liaison officers and air liaison party enlisted men should be trained from personnel of the division. The regimental air liaison officer should be the assistant R-3. The battalion air liaison officer should be the battalion Gas Officer. It is felt that ground troop personnel are generally much more familiar with aviation problems than aviation personnel are with ground troop problems and thus can be more easily trained to function as air liaison parties.

b. Employment of Direct Air Support. The tendency not to use air in direct support of infantry on a target when it can normally be hit by artillery should be discouraged. It has been shown in the Bougainville Campaign that air can be employed close to friendly troops as accurately as artillery, and will, when employed with surprise, distract and confuse the enemy.

c. Request for Direct Air Support. Request for direct air support in addition to describing the target as to size and type, its location, and the time period during which an air attack is desired, must include information as to the location of foremost friendly troops relative to the target and the method that will be used to mark that location as well as the target. When the base airdrome is distant care must be taken, because of plane endurance limitations, to request the aircraft on station just prior to the time the strike is actually desired. Aircraft overhead for a long period of time prior to a strike will lessen the element of surprise essential in an attack. A recommendation should be made in each request as to the weight of bomb and length of fuse desired used in the strike. It is not desirable to request bombing of a target nearer than

seventy five yards to friendly troops. The one hundred pound bomb should be recommended in all requests for bombing in direct support closer than three hundred yards to friendly forces. The 4-5 second fuse in jungle close direct support will permit the pilot to approach very close to the target before dropping his bombs and allow the bomb to penetrate well into the ground before exploding. Dug in enemy must be ploughed up and under.

d. Coordinating Direct Air Support. Successful employment of air in direct support of ground troops is dependent upon positive coordination between air and ground. Air, as well as the ground unit it is supporting, must understand the part it is to play in the tactical situation. It is better that pilots acting in support be briefed by an officer familiar with the situation, but, successful briefing can be accomplished by dispatch. A direct air support mission can be successfully executed without radio communication between plane and air liaison party on the ground if the pilots are thoroughly briefed, the period of attack is definite, and the marking of friendly lines and target is executed exactly on time. Best results however, can be expected when the planes and the air liaison party are able to communicate direct with each other. The air liaison party then can direct the planes into position for the attack, change courses of bombing runs as necessary to fully cover a target, change a target, increase or decrease smoke marking as requested by the planes, and modify or cancel any previously made arrangements made for the support.

John T. L. D. Gabbert
JOHN T. L. D. GABBERT

Enclosure (A)

REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR 10NOV43


The CG 3d Mar Div at 2000 9 Nov 43 requested "18 TBF's on station 10 Nov at 0915 over 133.2--213.2 with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with instantaneous and one tenth second fuses to precede an infantry attack. A line parallel to and ahead of our infantry front will be marked with artillery smoke and bombs will be dropped on course 75 degrees from the center of this line to PIVA village. Also request 4 TBF's with same loadings on same station at 1015 to answer calls for direct support. Flight commanders report in on station to Able Love Peter 9".

ACTION ON REQUEST

As modified by Com Air Sols 12 TBF's reported in on station to Able Love Peter 9 at 0915. Able Love Peter 9 instructed Flight Commanders to bomb from white smoke markers to PIVA village covering area fifty yards on both sides of trail but not to bomb trail. Bombing attack was completed and infantry attack moved off at 1015. White smoke markers had been laid 100 yards ahead of friendly troops by artillery. First bombs were dropped 120 yards from friendly troops and designated target area well covered. Japs had evacuated and left equipment, ammunition, and rifles. Attacking troops reported 30 to 40 dead Japs in vicinity of PIVA village killed either by artillery, or air, or both.

Flight of 18 SBD's reporting in on station at 1015 to Able Love Peter 9 were returned to control of Com Air Nor Sols who ordered them to bomb JABA area.

Enclosure "A"



Enclosure (B)


REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR 14NOV43

The CG 3d Mar Div at 1745 13 Nov 43 requested "a minimum of one squadron TBF's with maximum load 100 pound bombs with tenth second fuses report on station fourteenth at 0730 Love at 135.4-217.9 to Able Love Peter 9. Target will be dug in personnel on a line running north and south 300 yards east of aforementioned station point or on a line east and west 300 yards north of station point. Target to be bombed will be marked with white mortar smoke. Do not bomb unless contact is made with Able Love Peter 9. Bombing attack will precede an infantry attack. Be prepared to strafe with bombing".

ACTION ON REQUEST

18 TBF's loaded as requested reported on station at time requested. Patrols had been sent out to locate the enemy and returned to designate the northern target as that to be hit. Attack began at 0850 and was completed at 0900. Infantry attack followed bombing attack and area was found to have been hastily abandoned and much enemy equipment left behind. The planes were credited with 95% hits in the designated target area. No report made as to number of enemy dead found in the area after the bombing but a report was made that the enemy left the area and crossed the PIVA river in great haste and confusion immediately following the bombing. The bombs were dropped 100 yards from friendly forces with no casualties to our own forces.

Enclosure (B)



Enclosure (C)

REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR 13DEC43

This strike originated as a result of a request made by CG 3d Mar Div in the early afternoon of 13 Dec 43 for direct air support for 14 Dec. The CG FMAC suggested that the three SBD's and three TBF's available locally at TOROKINA airfield be employed during the afternoon of 13 Dec to harass the target requested hit on 14 Dec. The CG 3d Mar Div requested the planes to strike the suggested target with one hundred pound bombs with one-tenth second fuses. Target area was to be marked with white mortar smoke.

ACTION ON REQUEST

The six planes, loaded with bombs as requested, began attack on mortar smoke marked target at 1845. Four planes dropped bombs on target. Fifth plane dropped bombs negligently on friendly troops 600 yards north and west of smoke marked target. Sixth plane did not bomb.

Enclosure (C)

Enclosure (D)

REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT FOR 14DEC43

CG 3d Mar Div requested at 1300 13 Dec "a minimum of one squadron TBF's with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with one tenth second fuses report on station at 0800 14 Dec at TOROKINA. Report in to Mine Base who will in turn turn flight over to Able Love Peter 21 when ready. Target will be dug in enemy with automatic weapons on nose 139.8-219.3. Target to be bombed will be marked with white mortar smoke. Friendly troops are on a line running north and south two hundred yards west of target. Position of foremost friendly troops will be marked with violet smoke. Request bombing runs be made from southerly to northerly direction. Bombing attack will precede infantry attack. Be prepared to strafe with bombing".

ACTION ON REQUEST

17 TBF's loaded with bombs as requested, landed at Torokina Airfield to be briefed prior to the strike. Foremost position of friendly troops relative to the target was marked with colored grenade smoke. Target was marked with mortar smoke shell. Planes attacked in three echelons of six, five, and six planes, respectively, in column. Friendly force line and target were smoke marked for each echelon. Planes bombed parallel to friendly line from a southerly to northerly direction. 90% of bombs dropped hit target area and 10% were either short or long in range.

Enclosure (D)

14 Dec 1943.

Δ Air Liaison C.

X Colored Smoke Markers.

Enemy Entrenchments.



Impact Area

Friendly Lines

→ Direction of Flight

Scale 1: 10000

Enclosure (B)



~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (E)

REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT 15DEC43

CG 3d Mar Div requested at 1500, 14Dec, "minimum of one squadron TBF's with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with one tenth second fuses be made available to bomb dug in enemy with automatic weapons on nose 139.8-219.3 at about 1100 15Dec. Friendly troops are on a line running northerly to southerly two hundred yards west of target area. Position of foremost friendly troops will be marked with colored smoke. Target to be bombed will be marked with mortar smoke. Request bombing runs be made northerly to southerly parallel to friendly troop line. Request planes land Torokina airfield 0700 for briefing by Strike Operations Officer and ground troop officer".


ACTION ON REQUEST

18 TBF's landed Torokina Airfield on schedule with requested bomb loads. Strike Operations Officer and ground troop officer reconnoitered by air area to be bombed. Pilots were clearly briefed using photographic stereo pairs. Strike began 1210 and was completed 1222. Strike Operations Officer and ground officer in a plane led flight. Position of foremost friendly troops was marked by colored smokes and target area was marked by mortar smoke. 90% of bombs dropped landed squarely on target. 10% landed slightly short of target. No casualties to friendly forces.

Enclosure (E)

AIRSTRIKE 15 DEC 1943

- △ Air Liaison
- X Colored Smoke Markers
- Enemy Entrenchments
- Impact Area
- Friendly Lines
- Direction of Flight
- Scale 1:10,000



Enclosure (F)

REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT 18DEC43

CG 3d Mar Div requested at 1900, 17 Dec "one squadron TBF's with maximum load one hundred pound bombs with 4-5 second fuses be available on call Torokina Field 1200 to dark 18 Dec to bomb as requested dug in enemy with automatic weapons on nose 139.8-219.3. Position of friendly troops on a line running northerly to southerly seventy five yards west of target area. Position of friendly troops to be marked with colored smoke. Target area to be marked by white mortar smoke. Pilots land Torokina Airfield to be briefed by Strike Operations Officer and ground officer.

ACTION ON REQUEST

Six TBF's, each carrying twelve one hundred pound bombs with 4-5 second fuses, landed at Torokina Airfield and were briefed by Strike Operations Officer and a ground troop officer representing the supported troops. The first strike started at 1200 and was completed at 1243. The position of foremost friendly troops was marked by colored smoke and the target area was marked by mortar smoke. Each plane made three individual runs and dropped four bombs on each run. The Strike Operations Officer and the ground troop officer flying an SBD over the target directed individual bombing runs by radio. 100% hits in target area. No casualties to own forces.

Five TBF's participated in the strike that started at 1600 and was completed at 1623. 36 one hundred pound bombs were dropped - 24 with instantaneous fuses and 12 with 4-5 second fuses. 3 planes made three individual runs apiece dropping four bombs on each run. All five planes made strafing runs on the target and executed dummy bombing runs as friendly troops advanced and captured the hill. The Strike Operations Officer and the ground troop officer observed and directed the bombing and strafing runs from an SBD over the target area. 90% bomb hits in the target area. No casualties to friendly forces.

Enclosure (F)

AR STRIKE A.M. 18 Dec 1943

Δ Air Liaison O.

x Colored Smoke Markers.


--- Enemy Entrenchments.

⊙ Impact Area


--- Friendly Lines

→ Direction of Flight

Scale 1:10000



P.M. 18 Dec. 1943



AIR STRIKE

△ Air Liaison C.

x Colored Smoke Markers.


- - - - - Enemy Entrenchments.

Impact Area

--- Friendly Lines

→ Direction of Flight

Scale 1:10000



Enclosure (G)

REQUEST FOR DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FOR 25DEC THRU 27DEC

CG 3d Mar Div at 1200 24 Dec requested "minimum one squadron TBF's at Torokina Airfield prepared to start bombing at 1100 25th and continuing as frequently as possible during daylight hours thru 27th numerous enemy installations varying from slit trenches to splinter proofed emplacements. Pilots will be briefed here on exact location each target. Targets will be marked with white mortar smoke. Foremost friendly troops will be about 500 yards from nearest target. Friendly positions will be marked with colored smoke. CO 21st Marines is authorized to arrange particulars direct with ComAirNorSols".

ACTION ON REQUEST

18 TBF's were made available. After briefing by strike operation officers and ground troop officers planes made one attack during morning and one during afternoon of 25 Dec, and, one during afternoon of 26th. Used 500 pound bombs with instantaneous and one tenth second fuses and one hundred pound bombs with instantaneous and one tenth second fuses. Object of the attacks were to clear out area reported by patrols as building up to a Japanese position. After bombing of morning of 26 Dec patrols investigated area and found it abandoned by the Japanese. Trenches and installations in the area indicated the possible occupation by about 800 Japanese. Area was completely covered by bombs leaving few trees standing and few installations intact. 100% hits in area. No casualties to own forces. Foremost position of friendly troops was marked by colored smoke and target area was marked by mortar smoke. Strike Operations Officer and ground troop officer in SBD led strike of morning of 25 Dec. Strike Operations Officer led other two strikes.

Enclosure (G)

AIR STRIKE AREA 25 Dec 1963

Δ Air Liaison

x Colored Smoke Markers

- Energy Entrenchments


⊙ Impact Area

||||| Friendly Lines

→ Direction of Flight

Scale 1:10000


Enclosure G



AIR STRIKE P.M. 25 Dec 1943.

ENCLOSURE G

- △ Air Liaison O.
- x Colored Smoke Markers.
- ~ Enemy Entrenchments.
- ☉ Impact Area
- Friendly Lines
- Direction of Flight
- Scale 1:10,000



AIR STRIKE AM 26 Dec 1943

△ Air Liaison

X Colored Smoke Markers

~ Enemy Entrenchments


■ Impact Area

--- Friendly Lines

→ Direction of Flight

Scale 1:10000

Enclosure G





IN REPLYING ADDRESS
THE COMMANDANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ATTENTION TO

SERIAL (003D13044)

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON

9 May 1944

~~SECRET~~
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps.
To: Distribution List.

Subject: This: Marine Division, Operations in the
Bougainville Campaign, 1 November -
28 December 1943, Report of.

Encls: (A) Combat Report "Third Marine Division -
Operations in the Bougainville Campaign".

1. The enclosure is forwarded for your information
and retention.

2. Transmission of this correspondence by regis-
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U. F. GOOD, JR.,
By direction.

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COMBAT REPORT
OF THE
THIRD MARINES
REINFORCED
IN THE
BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN
1, November - 25, December, 1943

PART ONE - OPERATIONS
PART TWO - TACTICS &
TECHNIQUE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE F

FOREWORD

1. The Combat Report of the 3rd Marines, Reinforced, 3rd Marine Division, in the Bougainville Campaign, is presented in two parts: the first is a narrative account of the Operations of the Regiment from the time it left its Base at Guadalcanal on 13 October until it returned on 27 December, 1943; the second is a commentary on the Tactics and Technique of the Regiment in battle and reviews its experience in a landing against opposition and in two months of combat in swamp and jungle.

2. The Combat Report is intended to serve three purposes: first, it is the historical record of the Campaign; second, it is the basis on which the Officers and Men of the Regiment may evaluate the worth of the continuous and progressive training for Jungle Warfare which they received in nearly nine months in Samoa, two months in New Zealand and three months in Guadalcanal, and, third, it is a gauge by which the standards of tactical excellence and technical proficiency demanded of the skilled Jungle Fighter may be set and by which the relative importance of the several phases of training for combat in similar theatres may be measured.

GOVO/lep
20 January, 1944.
Guadalcanal, B.S.I.

PART ONE

OPERATIONS

The Landing at Empress Augusta Bay
The Battle of Cape Torokina
The Battle of the Kormokina
The Battle of the Numa Numa Trail
The Battle of the Piva Forks
The Defense of the Eastern Sector

THE OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD MARINES, REINFORCED,
IN THE BOUGAINVILLE CAMPAIGN.
1 NOVEMBER-25 DECEMBER, 1943.

The Third Marines were reinforced for the Landing Attack at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, B.S.I., by the Third Battalion, 12th Marines (Pack Howitzers); a Composite Battalion of the 19th Marines (Engineers); Company "C", of the Third Medical Battalion; detachments of Motor Transport, Amphibian Tractors and the Band; a Scout Platoon, and, the Headquarters of the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) and the Second Raider Battalion. A number of detachments of Division and Corps troops were attached for transportation and were a part of the Shore Party during the Landing.

The Regiment, organized in four Landing Teams, embarked on 13 October, 1943, from Tetere, Guadalcanal, in the Combat Transports U.S.S. President Adams (1st Bn., Reinforced), President Jackson (2d Bn., Reinforced; Regimental Command Group, and Transport Division Flag), President Hayes (3rd Bn., Reinforced) and the George Clymer (2nd Raider Bn., and 2nd Raider Regiment Headquarters). The cargo accompanying each Landing Team was limited to 520 tons.

The Transport Division proceeded to Efate, New Hebrides, where from the 16th to the 20th of October, the Regiment engaged in Amphibious Exercises which terminated in a two-day problem involving tactical situations similar to those to be expected in the Bougainville Landing.

The Transport Division then stood by at Espiritu Santo until 29 October, when it proceeded to Guadalcanal to embark on 30 October the Commander, Transports, and the Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps, in the George Clymer. The Transport Division rendezvoused with the balance of the Attack Force on 31 October.

The Transports arrived on station off Puruata Island during daybreak of 1 November, the ships approaching in column behind the Mine Sweepers and flanked by the Destroyers. The debarkation of the troops was executed under the cover of Air Support and during the firing of the Naval Gunfire Preparation.


The Landing Schedule of the Regiment provided for the simultaneous landing of the four Landing Teams on beaches from Cape Torokina to the Koromokina River, the 1st Battalion landing on Cape Torokina, the 2nd Raider Battalion to the west

of the 1st Battalion, the 2nd Battalion to the west of the Raiders and the 3rd Battalion between the Koromokina River and the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Raider Battalion, attached to and under the control of another Combat Team, was to land on Furuata Island and destroy Anti-Boat Defenses which might be emplaced there.

As the several Boat Groups approaching their beaches passed the western tip of Furuata Island, they were subjected to a heavy volume of fire from Japanese machine guns which had as yet escaped the Raiders. Fortunately, casualties were light, but LCP's which were employed as Boat Group Commander's Boats were, because of their distinctive appearance as compared with LCV's, easily identified as Command Boats and were well worked over while in range of the enemy guns.

The initial waves of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions reached their beaches without opposition other than from a light fire of rifles and machine guns from enemy Observation Posts. The 2nd Raider Battalion landed in the face of two bunker positions and a series of entrenchments occupied by a reinforced platoon but quickly overcame this resistance. The 1st Battalion ran into serious opposition: Cape Torokina was defended by a force of 270 officers and men who were determined to make a stand in the emplacements they had constructed and which included 25 heavy log and sand bunkers, one of which housed a 75mm Mountain Gun. The well concealed bunkers were mutually supporting and the approaches to them covered by series of rifle pits and interlocking bands of machine gun fires.

As the boats of the 1st Battalion approached Cape Torokina they were again subjected to enemy machine gun fire, this time from positions on Torokina Island to their right: still casualties remained light. But now the 75 mm Gun began to fire at the Landing Craft, and for a time the situation appeared to be most serious. However, though this gun fired over fifty rounds of High Explosive Shell, it succeeded in destroying or seriously damaging but six of our boats, and the Landing continued unchecked. The gunfire did, however, blow up the Boat Group Commander's Boat (an LCP) and break up the Approach Formation, resulting in the landing of the Assault Units in an order practically the reverse of that planned. As the boats grounded on the beach, the Japanese opened fire with their beach defense machine guns, but the density of fire was insufficient to stop the charge of the Marines across the beach and into the brush. In spite of the disorganization of units and the wounding early in the attack of the Battalion Commander, a unity of effort existed that soon destroyed the continuity of the defense fires and insured the successful completion of the Landing.



In the meantime, shortly after H-hour, Japanese aircraft appeared, and the Transports temporarily withdrew to sea. Although the enemy was soon repulsed by our Air Cover, a number of his planes succeeded in strafing our beaches, but inflicted few casualties since the troops in the Shore Parties had prepared Slit Trenches immediately on landing. The most serious consequence of this air attack and several more which followed during the day was the resulting delay in the unloading of the ships: however, before dark and well within the five hours of working time which had been set as a standard for the task, the Transport Division had been unloaded. In spite of a heavy surf which ran on two of the Regiment's beaches to such a degree that they were subsequently closed to small boat traffic, the debarkation of equipment and supplies was completed without the loss of a single boat from other than enemy action.

The Scheme of Maneuver of the Division called for the landing on beaches within the Third Marines Sector of Engineer and Anti-Aircraft Artillery organizations from Combat Cargo Ships which rendezvoused with the Transport Division during the approach to Dougainville. These landings were successful and Anti-Aircraft defenses were established on the beaches before the debarkation of equipment and supplies was completed.

On Cape Torokina, as bunker after bunker fell to the assault of squads and platoons, control was gradually re-established over the Landing Team, the Rifle Battalion was re-organized and an advance begun which by evening terminated in the occupation of the proposed initial Beach Head Line.

With the sending out of the first patrols, it became evident that with the exception of two avenues of approach to Cape Torokina, the Landing Teams were hemmed in by swamps and the most dense and rugged jungle that the men had ever seen. With each Landing Team on its final objective for the first day, it was only by superhuman effort on the part of the Communicators that even lateral command lines between Teams could be laid before dark: patrols from the 2nd Raiders and the 1st Battalion, pushing through swamp and tangles that held their advance to a few dozen yards an hour could not make contact. To plug the gaps and close the possible avenues of approach of Japanese reinforcements which, from documents discovered on the bodies of the dead in the bunkers, were known to be north of Fiva Village, Company "E" of the 3rd Marines and Company "L" of the 3rd Raider Battalion were shifted to the Cape Torokina Sector and put in position to cover the flank and rear of the 1st Battalion, now nearly a thousand yards from its beach.

But the 2nd Raider Battalion had done its work well and, before the enemy could determine on a course of action, was securely established across the line of advance of whatever reinforcements the Japanese might have wanted to send to Cape Torokina. A counterattack against our position on Cape Torokina never materialized. Company "E", 3rd Marines, was returned to its Battalion on the 2nd of November when the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, was shifted to the Cape Torokina Sector to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines.


The daylight hours of the 2nd and 3rd of November were devoted to the sending out of flank contact patrols and reconnaissance patrols to the front, in establishing the Beach Defenses and in reinforcing and improving the defenses of the Cape Torokina Sector. Torokina Island, from which a small but determined band of Japanese harassed the Cape Torokina beaches with machine guns for two days, was, finally neutralized, marking the end of initial resistance to the landing.

At 1800, 3 November, control of the Cape Torokina Sector passed to the 9th Marines, who on the 2nd and 3rd had had two battalions shifted to the area: the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, went into Reserve under control of the 9th Marines at that time and remained on Cape Torokina until the 6th when it reverted to the 3rd Marines and was moved to a Regimental Reserve Position east of the Koromokina River.

In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, in a position on the left flank of the Division Beach Head, with its flank on the sea, had been attached to the 3rd Marines, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 3rd Marines, had begun an advance inland through the swamps. The general course of the 2nd Battalion was to be north and to enable it to maintain contact with the Raiders on the right, Company "A" of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, was attached to the 2nd Battalion from the 6th to 11th of November. The general course of the 3rd Battalion was generally north and then east, along the perimeter of the Division Beach Head: the 3rd Battalion was assigned the task of locating the route of a lateral road from the left flank to the right.

On the morning of the 7th of November, a Composite Battalion of the Japanese from Kavieng and Rabaul landed outside of the Division Beach Head west of the Koromokina River and moved against the Third Battalion, 9th Marines. The initial landing was made by about 75 men: over 400 more were observed to land at intervals throughout the morning at various points along the beach. However, the enemy was

SITUATION
ON
748 NOV. 1943
AND
THE BATTLE
OF
THE KOROMOKINA R.



distributed over so wide a front that his full strength could not be assembled quickly, and unless he were to delay so long as to lose the initiative, he had only the alternative of attacking with but a portion of his force. The enemy chose to attack at once. Although his attack was most aggressive, the enemy's strength was insufficient to carry him through our position. When the advance of the enemy had been checked, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, less Company "A", was ordered to pass through the left flank company of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines and attack the enemy, now numbering 200 or more, in his position. By nightfall, the offensive power of the enemy had been destroyed although during the night the remnants of the Landing Force kept moving up in an attempt to restore the Japanese position. At dark, the 1st Battalion went into defense west of the Koromokina River: two platoon patrols operated in the enemy's rear throughout the night and caused the Japanese considerable trouble.

Early on the 7th, the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines had been shifted to the Third Marines' Sector and had been placed in Regimental Reserve. It was now planned to finish off the enemy with an attack by this unit on the morning of the 8th. During the night, a coordinated Infantry-Tank-Artillery-Air Attack against the Japanese position was arranged, and soon after daylight, following a Fire Preparation by five batteries of Artillery, several Anti-Tank Weapons, and the Machine Guns and Mortars of the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, accompanied by light tanks, passed through the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, and advanced to a Lagoon 1500 yards west of the Koromokina River where, opposed only by a few shocked survivors of a force completely shattered by the fighting of the past twenty-four hours, it went into perimeter defense and sent out Combat Patrols to the north through the swamps and west to the Laruma River. The results of the patrols were negative and it was evident that the Japanese effort against our Left Flank had been destroyed by the attacks of the 7th and the Fire Preparation of the 8th.

On the 9th, to insure that the Koromokina Lagoon-Laruma River Area would be cleared of any possible concentrations of survivors, a Dive Bomber Strike bombarded and strafed the beaches, jungles and swamps from our lines to the Laruma River and for three hundred yards inland. Patrols later found the bodies of many Japanese who were caught by the strike as they returned to the area from the refuge they had taken in the back country.

The Air Strike of the 9th permanently ended all enemy activity on the west and at noon on that day the Sector and the control of the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, passed to the 37th Division of the Army. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, reverted to the 9th Marines and was shifted to the Cape Torokina Sector. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, returned to its position in Regimental Reserve.

With regard to the disposition of the units which had been attached to the 3rd Marines for the Landing on 1 November, almost all organizations reverted to the control of their own Regiments or to Division control soon after the completion of the debarkation of equipment and supplies. The Scout Platoon was the only organization to remain attached throughout the entire campaign: the Raider Regiment passed to Division Control on landing; Artillery Batteries soon passed to Artillery Battalion and then to Artillery Regimental Control, and by the 12th of November the Engineer Troops constituting the Regimental Shore Party had reverted to the 19th Marines and the Regimental Shore Party had been disbanded. After the detachment of these reinforcing units, Engineers, Service and Supply troops, Motor Transport and Amphibian Tractors were attached or placed in support of the Regiment as the situation, from time to time, might require. The 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, was in direct support of the Regiment throughout the campaign and Company "C" of the 3rd Medical Battalion maintained its Field Hospital in the vicinity of the 3rd Marines' Command Post during the first month of the operation.

As one of the consequences of the Battle of the Koromokina, documents were found on the bodies of the dead revealing that the purpose of the landing had been two-fold: first, to make a diversion on the west and create a favorable situation for an attack against our eastern flank by the Japanese 23rd Infantry which, less one battalion, was in readiness in the hills north of Piva; second, the attack of the 23rd Regiment having been successful, to make a junction with that force and establish and cover a Beach Head east of the Lauma River for the landing of additional forces from New Britain and New Ireland.

The entire scheme was ruined by the quick destruction of the Landing Force, and when the 23rd Regiment moved to the attack to carry out its part of the plan, it found its way blocked by the Raider Regiment. So, as it was later found, the enemy withdrew again to the hills and began the construction of defensive positions east of the East Branch of the Piva River and the setting of road blocks and ambushes on the Numa Numa and East-West Trails thereby preparing a base for further operations along other lines.

When the general locality of the enemy's main force had been established by our patrols, the rate of advance of the Third Marines, the speed with which the Lateral Road was being run in and the number and range of combat and reconnaissance patrols was stepped up to the limit of endurance of men and machines. Neither jungle or swamp interrupted the steady advance to the north and east to the vicinity of the junction of the Numa Numa Trail with the East-West Trail where, if no time were wasted, it was anticipated that a main action could be fought with the enemy before he could complete his defensive installations.

On the 11th of November, the 3rd Battalion, cutting in the Lateral Road, crossed the front of the 2nd Battalion which then advanced a thousand yards north of the road and covered it and the interval between the 37th Division and the left flank of the Third Marine Division now covering the Numa Numa Trail. On the 12th, the 1st Battalion, Third Marines, began a movement through the jungle which on the 15th put them in a position south of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, which was covering the Trail Junction of the Numa Numa and East-West Trails. On the 16th, the 3rd Battalion broke out of the jungle at the Trail Junction and connected its Supply Road from the west with the Numa Numa Trail which had been joined with Amphibian Tractor Trails from the east. The supply of the Regiment in further operations was assured. The Third Battalion took a position north of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines and west of the Numa Numa Trail. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, now passed to the control of the Third Marines.

The Regiment was now in position to begin the extensive patrolling and development which finally located the enemy's exact position and brought about a decisive action with the Japanese main forces.

As a result of patrol activity on the 17th and 18th, an enemy road block was discovered on the Numa Numa Trail one thousand yards north of the 3rd Battalion's position, and a Japanese outpost was located on the East-West Trail in front of the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, half way between the East and West Branches of the Piva River.


To release the 3rd Battalion for an attack on the Numa Numa Road Block, the 3rd Raider Battalion, now attached to the Third Marines, moved into the line.

On the morning of the 19th, the Third Battalion, 3rd Marines, accompanied by light tanks, advanced in a Contact Imminent Formation towards the enemy. The Japanese Road Block was by-passed and struck on its flank: the enemy, a reinforced company, after a short resistance, withdrew. The 3rd Battalion occupied the position and established a perimeter defense. On the morning of the 20th, the same Japanese company that had withdrawn the previous day, returned and attacked the 3rd Battalion in its rear but the outcome was never in doubt. As the survivors fled to the east, the 3rd Battalion followed. On the morning of the 21st, the 3rd Battalion encountered a Japanese defensive position of 150 foxholes to its front: without delay the Battalion attacked, carried the position and occupied a mass of high ground overlooking the main Japanese position which was now determined as being east of the East Branch of the Piva and astride the East-West Trail. In addition, the position now held by the 3rd Battalion cut the Japanese line of communication between the Numa Numa Valley and the Jaba district.

As for the East-West Trail Outpost, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, released from the left as the 37th Division extended its lines to the northeast on the 19th, approached behind the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, and on the morning of the 20th, passed through our lines and reduced the enemy position.

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, then continued on across the East Branch of the Piva in a Reconnaissance in Force which fixed the exact location of the Japanese defenses and resulted in the occupation of a commanding ridge from which artillery could be precisely adjusted on the enemy positions.

While the 2nd Battalion was still across the West Branch of the Piva, the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, which had been withdrawn from the right to a position in reserve on the 20th, now, on the morning of the 21st, advanced to the west bank of the East Branch of the Piva and, reinforced by machine gun squads from the Regimental Weapons Company and by Company "L", 3rd Raider Battalion, established a defensive line from the left flank of the 21st Marines Sector to the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, including the ridge which had been seized by the 2nd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, now reverted to the control of the 21st Marines and moved to the south.



On completion of its Reconnaissance on the 21st, the 2nd Battalion returned through the 1st Battalion's lines to an Assembly Area in rear of the 1st Battalion and south of the East-West Trail, but not without a fight: the enemy, with a strength of two battalions, reinforced, did his best to prevent a disengagement.

Then, while the 2nd Battalion's movement to its Assembly Area was in progress, the Japanese suddenly attempted a double envelopment of the 1st Battalion's newly occupied positions. Unfortunately for the enemy, his columns followed the obvious avenues of approach and his effort was destroyed in front of the machine guns that had been sited against just such an attempt. While the action was in progress, a Combat Patrol from Company "A", 21st Marines, came up and joined in the fight. Thereafter, and until the 21st Marines advanced their lines abreast the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, this Combat Patrol remained in a position covering the right flank of the 1st Battalion.

On the morning of the 22nd, the plan for the destruction of the enemy had been formulated: as the first step in executing it, the 2nd Raider Regiment, now coming under control of the 3rd Marines, advanced and relieved the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, in position. By the evening of that day the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, had been moved to an assembly Area in rear of the 1st Battalion, abreast of the 2nd Battalion, but to the north of the East-West Trail.

The Regiment was now in position for the attack. The enemy positions, consisting of rifle pits and small bunkers, and supported by artillery, had been found to be disposed as if to resist an attack from the south towards the hills. But the Plan of Attack contemplated an attack from West to East, enfilading the Japanese lines and paralleling the hill mass the enemy thought we would attempt to occupy.


The 24th was set as the date of the attack. The Scheme of Maneuver was that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, following an Artillery Preparation, would advance abreast, pass through the lines of the 1st Battalion, and attack to the east for a distance of 800 yards beyond the East Branch of the Piva. The East-West Trail was to be the boundary between Battalions.

The day of the 23rd was spent in completing the reconnaissance of unit commanders; the Artillery Forward Observers plotted in their targets and adjusted their batteries, and the 1st Battalion moved every available machine gun into the line, even including several Nambus and Hotchkiss machine guns which had been captured from the enemy.

By dark, all was in readiness: seven Battalions of Artillery, four of the 12th Marines and three of the 37th Division, were prepared to fire 8600 rounds of 75 and 105 mm High Explosive in 20 minutes into an area 800 yards square; batteries of 155 mm Guns and Howitzers were ready to fire on distant targets; the 1st Battalion had sited 44 machine guns and coordinated the fires of 12 81mm and 9 60mm mortars for a Fire Preparation across the front that was to be covered by the attacking Battalions.

On the morning of the 24th, right on time, the Artillery opened fire with the heaviest concentration that had ever been delivered before an attack by Marines: the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced to the line of Departure to the accompaniment of a continuous rattle and roar of machine guns, mortars and artillery. As the Battalions entered the Japanese lines, they were met with silence; the destruction of the enemy's positions within the beaten zone of the Fire Preparation had been complete. But, gradually, as the advance continued to its objective, the enemy rallied his survivors and committed those reserves who had escaped. By the time the left battalion, the 3rd, had moved forward about 500 yards, the enemy was ready and launched a counter-attack against our left flank. The 3rd Battalion met the attack in full stride and continued its advance in a hand-to-hand, tree-to-tree struggle that ended with the complete destruction of the enemy's flanking force. As the 2nd Battalion neared its objective, it too, closed with Japanese reinforcements coming forward to make a stand. The Battalions remained on their Initial Objectives only long enough to reorganize and reestablish contact: again they started forward, this time to a final objective 350 yards to the front. The Japanese here made a desperate effort but as the leading elements of the Third Marines came up to a line 1150 yards in front of the original Line of Departure, all resistance came to an end. The Japanese 23rd Infantry, leaving 1107 dead on the field, was destroyed.

This battle, known as the Battle of the Piva Forks, marked the end of serious opposition to the occupation and development of the Empress Augusta Bay Area as an American Air Base: the enemy, with the exception of small detachments and patrols, was driven east of the Torokina River.



and the high ground which he had held and from which he not only controlled the site which was to become the Piva Bomber Field but also from which he could have harassed the entire Beach Head was occupied by our forces.


The 25th and 26th of November was spent in consolidating the new position and in advancing the Division's lines to the flanks of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

On the 27th, the Sector was turned over to the 9th Marines, the Raiders were detached and the Regiment was shifted to the East where it took up a position in defense, from the sea on its right flank to Hill 500 on its left. The Regiment had now completed a transit of the entire Beach Head; from Cape Torokina and the mouth of the Piva to the Koromokina and then through the jungles and swamps back to the limits of the patrols of the first two days.

While the Regiment was in the Eastern Sector, the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, which maintained an outpost on the west bank of the Torokina at its mouth, and the balance of the Scout Company of the 3rd Tank Battalion were attached. Company "C" of the 19th Marines, a Combat Engineer Company, had been in support since before the actions on the Numa Numa Trail, building and maintaining hospital facilities and supply routes to the battle positions, accompanied the Regiment into the Sector. An Anti-Tank Battery of the Special Weapons Battalion supported the Beach Defenses on the right flank.

In order to afford the Rifle Battalions an opportunity to rest and reorganize their troops who had been on the go for twenty-seven consecutive days, a Composite Battalion was organized from among the Regimental Weapons Company, the Scout Company, the several Headquarters Companies and from available service troops, and assigned a position in the lines from November 28 to December 3, when, with the exception of the Scout Company, the units were returned to their normal duties. The Scout Company remained in the lines until the Regiment was relieved of the Sector.

The Sector bordered on deep swamps, fingers of which cut across the supply routes: the problems here again centered around maintaining the men in position. Though numerous patrols traversed the swamps daily and searched the east banks of the Torokina River from time to time, no evidence could be discovered that the Japanese intended to do more than keep the Sector under observation. A number of



PART TWO

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

--O--

A Review of
Combat Experiences

--O--

COMMENTS OF THE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE
THIRD MARINES ON BOUGAINVILLE, BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS FROM
1 NOVEMBER TO 25 DECEMBER, 1943.

This commentary on the Tactics and Technique of the Third Marines on Bougainville, British Solomon Islands, from 1 November, 1943 to 25 December, 1943, reviews the experiences of the regiment in a landing against opposition and in operations in the jungle.

In matters which, in discussion, were subject to differences of opinion, the findings which are presented represent a consensus of thought of the battalion and company commanders and platoon and squad leaders of the Third Marines and are based on their experiences in both combat and in fourteen months of progressive combat training in Samoa and Guadalcanal for Jungle Warfare.

In consideration of the fact that different conditions of combat require different solutions for the same problem, various subjects are presented in the order in which they came into prominence during the several phases of the campaign.

THE LANDING AT CAPE TOROKINA
1-3 NOVEMBER, 1943.

TACTICS

While the enemy situation prior to the landing was obscure, it was evident that enemy resistance to the landing of the division would be localized by the terrain and restricted to relatively small detachments. However, it was anticipated that Cape Torokina would be defended with the principle defensive strength being disposed to face the west.

The First Battalion, Reinforced, constituted the Landing Team assigned to the assault of Cape Torokina. The Landing Team Operations Order presented a plan in which a penetration of the enemy's defenses was to be made by the landing of two rifle companies, reinforced, abreast, in two waves of eight boats each, following which the companies were to follow diverging zones of action: thus, on the one hand containing the defenders on Cape Torokina, and, on the other hand, blocking the avenue of approach of possible reinforcements from Buretoni Mission. However, upon

the early arrival of the reserve company, landing in the third and fourth waves, on its initial objective, the interior flanks of the diverging assault companies would be covered and the battalion well disposed with three companies in line for continuing the attack in the most propitious direction. This decentralized attack on a broad front, which subsequent events proved to have great merit, was carried through successfully because of thorough preparation by all units and the exceptional aggressiveness of individuals.


PREPARATIONS FOR THE ATTACK

The orders for the landing were presented in detail by the Battalion Commander and his staff to every officer and senior non-commissioned officer in the Landing Team, several days before the landing. These in turn held school for the men of their units until they were certain that every man understood not only the mission and the purpose of his own squad, platoon and company, but that of every other company. The Shore Party was informed of the duties of the Assault Echelon and the Assault Echelon of the duties of the Shore Party. Each man was provided with a mimeographed copy of a terrain sketch which was in sufficient detail to insure that wherever a man wound up, he could find his way to his correct position, and, by referring to his sketch, be able to determine the location of supporting units. This thorough preparation proved to be of vital importance to the success of the landing inasmuch as few units were able, because of the effectiveness of the beach defense, to carry out the mission originally assigned to them.


EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK

At the moment of landing, enemy defenses succeeded in breaking up entire organizations. Platoons and companies were thrown out of position by being landed on the wrong part of the beach; even squad leaders found it difficult to retain control of their squads. This condition, brought about by cannon fire from the beach defenses directed against the landing craft, emplaced and coordinated machine guns from well protected bunkers covering the beach and by the thick, dense, brush from seven to eight feet high, which grew to within a few feet of the water line, might have resulted in the destruction of the attacking force had it not been for the unusually large number of men present who were trained as leaders, knew the mission and were ready and willing to take charge in a crisis.

Landing Schedule
 3RD Marines Reinforced
 EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
 BOUGAINVILLE B.S.I.
 1 November 1943
 "H" Hour 0730



SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
OF
THE PROPOSED LANDING
OF THE
1ST BATTALION, 3RD MARINES
ON
CAPE TOROKINA



Because every man, to the last private, was thoroughly briefed on the entire maneuver and even though he landed in the wrong place, it made no difference because he knew the mission of men landing in that sector, and he went on to accomplish that mission in spite of the mix-up. Thus, there was the condition of unity of effort with apparently an absence of control in the early stages of landing.

IMPORTANCE OF SMALL UNIT TRAINING

The extreme importance of Small Unit Training, particularly in Rifle Squad and Platoon Tactics, was demonstrated in this landing. Until the beach defenses and its supports were overcome, the battle was one of small groups, composed of men sometimes not even of the same squads but in every case taken in charge by some man whose instinct for leadership enabled him to take over. He was able successfully to direct his group as an organized fire team because thorough and progressive small unit training continued over a long period of time, had indoctrinated every man in the tactics and technique of the squad in the attack. Because the attacks by these small groups were in themselves well coordinated, well led and well executed, they succeeded. As a consequence, the survivors of the landing eventually reached the battalion's objective where, without delay, units almost automatically became reorganized and either shifted position to that sector originally intended for them or made an exchange of responsibilities with the consent of the Battalion Commander.

SYSTEM OF TRAINING

The system of combat training followed by this regiment in preparation for the operation followed the regular courses outlined in the Fort Benning Conference Courses, MTP7-4 and 4-1 to 4-18, inclusive, but with additional stress on Squad and Platoon Tactics and on Technique of Fire with the various infantry weapons. No modifications in these courses were necessary except to adjust the exercises to suit Marine Corps organization and to set time and space factors to conditions as they exist in the jungle. The total time devoted to the various subjects averaged 200% of that prescribed in the Conference Courses for Individual Conduct and Squad and Platoon Tactics and 125% for other phases. The standards of excellence required in tactical training were those prescribed in the Fort Benning Tactical Training Inspection Directives, D-1 to D-4, inclusive. Two rules for leaders which were repeatedly stressed in training and which were considered most important were: "Every man must become qualified for the next higher rank before this regiment is trained for combat", and

"Tell your men everything you know about the situation and the mission and everything that is going to be done about it."


Amphibious Training, following closely the Fleet Training Doctrines, included two series of landing exercises, one on UPOLU in April, 1943, preceded by a 36-hour course for officers and twenty-four hours of special instruction for the men, and one in EFATE in October, 1943.

DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY DEFENSES.


The defenses of Cape Torokina consisted of twenty-five bunkers disposed in depth and mutually supporting. Nine Bunkers faced the west side of Cape Torokina and covered the west beach. Six bunkers faced on and covered the east beach. Eight bunkers, from fifty to one hundred yards in rear of the nine facing the west, covered the intervals between the bunkers facing the beach. Two additional bunkers covered the approaches to the rear of the inland bunkers and those on the east beach.

Each bunker was surrounded by a series of rifle pits connected by narrow, deep, slit trenches which led, finally into the rear door of the bunker. The purpose of the rifle pits was to cover, not only the approaches to the particular bunker they surrounded, but also the approaches to adjacent bunkers. Machine guns within the bunkers were sited to fire diagonally along the beach or across the front of lines of probable approach, cross-firing with guns of adjacent bunkers. Generally, two guns were placed in a bunker and each gun laid on a Fixed-Line. In no case were pairs of guns employed on the same line. The fire bays of the bunkers were close to the ground and extremely small, limiting the use of the machine guns to Fixed-Lines only. From twelve to twenty-two Japanese soldiers were stationed in or around each bunker facing the west to resist the landing.


The bunkers were constructed of Ironwood and Coconut logs, from 18 inches to 24 inches in diameter, fastened together with the standard staple designed by the Japanese for the purpose. The log frame, as large as fourteen feet square and seven feet interior height, was then covered with a dome of sand sufficiently high that three to five feet of sand covered the roof at the eaves. Within the interiors of some bunkers baffle walls were constructed of sandbags to neutralize the effect of explosives which might be fired or thrown into the bunker.



FRONT VIEW OF A TYPICAL BUNKER
ON CAPE TOROKINA



GENERAL PLAN
OF
BUNKER DEFENSES



For camouflage, small palms and clumps of Bermuda grass were set into the sand covering the bunkers and the natural underbrush which covered Cape Torokina left standing. At first inspection, it seemed that the Japanese had seriously erred in not removing this underbrush. In other words, it would appear that the underbrush would restrict the field of fire of the defenders. However, once one took a position in a bunker or a rifle pit, it could be seen that the enemy had most cleverly prepared a field of fire by stripping the bushes of their branches from eight to twelve inches above the ground, thus making it possible for the defender to observe the feet of an approaching attacker. Because of the high bushes, the supporting bunkers could not be seen from the beach and their presence was detected only by their fire when the attackers broke through the beach defense line and attempted to pass into the rear area.

The key to the defense of the west beach was an emplaced Seventy-five Millimeter Regimental Mountain Gun, MEIJI-38 (1908), having a weight of 1200 pounds, measuring 13½ feet overall and with a 50" barrel. This gun has a maximum effective range of 2100 yards but its traverse is limited to six degrees. The gun was sited within five yards of high water for Anti-Boat Defense and its emplacement well protected by two nearby two-man bunkers and the usual rifle pits and slit trenches. Two hundred rounds of high explosive shell had been stacked ready for firing within the emplacement. During the landing, this gun fired approximately fifty rounds but due to its limited traverse and the poor gunnery of its crew, it sank or seriously damaged only six of our landing craft.

The defense force assigned to Cape Torokina was the Second Company, Reinforced, of the Japanese Twenty-third Infantry. From morning reports captured from the enemy on 5 November, 1943, it was determined that the strength of this company on 1 November, 1943, was two hundred and seventy.

The small arms which were used in the defense were: The 6.5 Millimeter Rifle, M-1905; the 8 Millimeter Luger Pistol; the 6.5 Millimeter NAMBU Light Machine Gun, M-1922; the 6.5 Millimeter Hotchkiss-Bren Light Machine Gun, Type 96 (1936); the 7.7 Millimeter Hotchkiss Heavy Machine Gun (M-1932); Heavy Grenade Thrower, Model 89 (1929), firing the Model 89 High Explosive Shell and, finally, the Grenade, hand, fragmentation, Model 91 (1931).

THE ATTACK OF BUNKER POSITIONS

From a study of Japanese bunker installations on New Georgia by officers of the Third Marines, it was discovered that regardless of any arrangement of bunkers for mutual support, there is always a blind spot in the defense, particularly if the riflemen in the rifle pits are eliminated by gun shot or grenade. The key to the attack of a bunker position is the finding of this blind spot.

Based on this idea, a technique was devised and practiced by all men in the regiment before leaving Guadalcanal. In general, the system is as follows: When a fire team (of three or more men with one of more automatic weapons) discovers a bunker either from observation or being fired upon, all hands take cover. The leader then reconnoiters the position until he locates the blind spot; that is, a point near a fire bay or a door which apparently is not subject to the fire of machine guns sited on Fixed-Lines from the bunker under study or adjacent bunkers. The leader then looks to see if the blind spot is covered by riflemen and, if so, where they are located. The leader then returns to his team and places his automatic weapons to cover the fire ports of the bunker by firing diagonally into them. He places other members of his team in a position from which they can kill or drive to cover the riflemen who are covering the blind spot. One or two men armed with sub-machine guns or automatic rifles and grenades or bombs then take position so that, at the right time, they can charge up to the blind spot between the lanes of their own supporting fires. On signal, all hands open fire and when it is observed that the blind spot has been uncovered, the sub-machine gunners and grenadiers move up to the blind spot and approach as close as practical to the fire bay or door and throw in several grenades or bombs. Immediately following the explosions, one or both of them may, with some safety, enter the bunker and complete the destruction of the defenders by gun fire. With the neutralization of one bunker, it is generally found that adjacent bunkers are uncovered at several points, making possible a quick reduction of the entire position by repeating the performance.

There is, of course, great danger to the sub-machine gunners and grenadiers of being struck by the fire of their own men or by ricochettes. Therefore, it is essential that such an evolution be practiced over and over again in training so that there will be team work and those that fire will know when to cease or shift their fire to keep from endangering their comrades who are closing in on the bunker. It is obvious that only good marksmen can safely be assigned to fire in an attack on a bunker position.

Machine guns were frequently employed to furnish the diversion against fire ports and to keep the defenders away from the bunker doors.

While seemingly a daring and dangerous evolution, this method of attack was found in actual practice to be less costly, when executed aggressively and the attack begun the moment the bunkers are detected, and before the Japanese can determine the location of the attackers, than any other method that can be employed by riflemen. While the use of Flame Throwers and Pole Charges of Dynamite and TNT would unquestionably facilitate the reduction of bunkers, the method of approach with such weapons would be similar.

Relatively few casualties were sustained by the attackers in the reduction of fifteen bunkers by the methods described above; 153 Japanese dead were found in and around these particular bunkers.

The total time required for the reduction of these fifteen bunkers, plus five on the east beach which were but lightly defended, was two hours and thirty minutes.

The five remaining bunkers were destroyed by AP Shot fired at the close range of fifteen yards from two 75mm Self-Propelled Tank Destroyers. This attack generally collapsed the bunker and crushed the defenders.

It is questionable that the Naval Gun Fire and Aerial Bombardment which preceded the landing had any material effect on the bunkers.

THE DEFENSE OF THE SECTOR

With the destruction of the defense force on Cape Torokina, the problem of defending the sector presented no unusual aspects. The battalion proceeded to its initial objective, advancing approximately six hundred yards from the beach, and having established a defensive line, sent out patrols for the purpose of establishing contact with friendly troops to the west and to discover avenues of approach that might be available to the enemy and such natural barriers as might exist.


In setting up the defense, the necessity of all officers, whether infantry or artillery, being familiar with the Standing Operating Procedures which are set forth in the Field Manuals on the Tactics and Technique of Infantry was well illustrated. As the first day came to an end, and, subsequently on the following days, great numbers of unrelated units were sent into the Cape

Torokina Sector for the purpose of setting up anti-aircraft and sea-coast defenses and to begin certain engineering projects. With these diverse arms and services concentrated within a small area, it was essential for the safety of all that the unit commanders understand the principles on which the infantry commander was basing his defense. Such an understanding apparently did exist in this case, and the infantry commander had little difficulty in gaining the intelligent and efficient cooperation of all units in preparing and coordinating the local defenses.

It is noteworthy that in the defense, each unit, even the squad, established itself in a perimeter defense. That is, an all-around security for the night. This principle was observed by the entire regiment throughout the campaign, and, on more than one occasion, was justified by the results in repulsing Japanese attempts to raid our positions. On the first night, the necessity of maintaining this close security, even in the battalion command post, was proved to all most forcibly when it became necessary for the battalion commander, his executive officer and the battalion surgeon to repulse, with knives, the threat of a Japanese reconnaissance patrol which had successfully passed through our lines and killed one communicator and wounded another before anyone became aware of their presence.

In a perimeter defense, it was customary for three men to occupy one foxhole so that during the usual twelve hours of darkness, each would stand a four hour watch and still have eight hours of rest. On setting up the perimeter, it was always required that automatic weapons, including automatic rifles, be cited on fixed lines and coordinated with adjacent units.

However, it was also a standing rule that weapons never be fired at night, except to repulse a major night attack. The regiment had long been advised, for the sake of safety to themselves and their comrades, and to prevent revealing their positions and the location of their automatic weapons, to resort only to the knife or bayonet in taking care of small infiltrating parties which might pass close to their foxholes; others were to be left unmolested and allowed to pass, on the presumption that they would be taken care of by the others within the perimeter or the following morning by gun fire if the party remained within our lines. During the campaign, there was very little night firing and only on one or two occasions were the positions of automatic weapons revealed by improper firing.



COMMUNICATION ON DEFENSE

One feature of night defense which was considered extremely important, and which not only on the first but practically every night during the campaign more than justified the trouble of setting it up, was the system of communications established within the battalion during the night hours by pooling the communication resources of the Battalion Communication Platoon and the 81mm mortar platoon. Thus, it was possible to have a telephone in the command post of each platoon in the perimeter as well as at each company command post. The platoon telephones were hooked up only to the company command posts in the company command posts to the battalion. All phones were on an open circuit and connected so that any word passed on the phone was heard by all. In the case of front line battalions, there was continuous open line to the regiment. It was required that every telephone be manned continuously from dark to daylight. The continuous open air circuits obviated the necessity of ringing the telephone in order to call a particular party; this was extremely important in view of the fact that company command posts were, of necessity, practically in the front lines and battalion command posts seldom as much as one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the forward companies. Furthermore, by this system, whenever something occurred during the night, all leaders within the battalion instantly became acquainted with the situation. It was customary for each telephone to check in to the next higher echelon at irregular but prearranged times, with nick names used for identification. Whenever it was necessary to pass information, a sort of double-talk was used which, though readily understood by our officer and men, was certain to be confusing to the Japanese. Although it was definitely established that the enemy tapped our lines on several occasions, it is unlikely that they received any rewards for their efforts.

In connection with communications, although it was customary to stand continuous radio watches at night, it was a standing rule not to start the generators except in case of dire necessity. An occasion for night radio transmission from a forward command post never arose, inasmuch as satisfactory telephonic communication was almost continuous throughout the campaign.

ARTILLERY

Shortly after the initial landing on Cape Torokina, it became evident that the battery of artillery attached to the First Battalion would have little employment if it remained in that particular area. It was therefore displaced to the left flank of the regimental sector. However, the artillery forward observers assigned to the First Battalion remained with the First Battalion and were successful in adjusting the fire of another battery in front of the First Battalion's defensive position early on the first night. This was the first of many examples to follow of the efficiency of the present system of artillery fire direction.

It is worthy of note that, in training, all officers in the regiment attended a series of lectures on Infantry-Artillery action, and several Artillery-Infantry firing problems were conducted by the third battalion, Twelfth Marines and the third Marines in Samoa and Guadalcanal. As a result of this training, in the absence of artillery forward observers or to supplement their work, rifle company commanders often successfully adjusted the fire of the artillery.

It is further noteworthy that, although it had been impracticable for the Artillery to establish a Fire Control Circuit between the Fire Direction Center and the First Battalion, Third Marines, Forward Observers by the night of the first day, no difficulty was encountered in registering and controlling the Artillery. The Third Marines has established a Command Circuit from the Regiment to the First Battalion on Cape Torokina and had received a line from the Third Battalion, 12th Marines, who had a battery in a position on the left flank from which it could fire in support of the First Battalion, Third Marines. The several Switchboard Operators of the Third Marines were sufficiently acquainted with the communications requirements of the Artillery that there was no delay in making a line available from the Artillery Forward Observer to even the gun battery whose fire he was directing. Whenever an outside party attempted to cut in on a circuit, it was interesting to overhear one or another of the switchboard operators speak up quickly and say, "Stay off this line, it is reserved for a fire mission." This close cooperation between Infantry and Artillery communications, as evidenced by their reactions in emergencies of this type, was of inestimable value throughout the campaign.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENDERS

The Japanese soldiers who defended Cape Torokina appeared to be first-class troops. Approximately one-half of them were big mature men and apparently had been in the service a long time. The remainder represented the usual conception of the small size Japanese. They were found to be dressed in spotlessly clean and well pressed uniforms and wearing their rank marks and service ribbons. Inasmuch as the enemy was aware of our impending attack for at least one hour and forty-five minutes before the landing occurred, it is not likely that they dressed in their best uniforms for the occasion of making their stand. The squad barracks, built of bamboo and palm fronds after the Fiji Islands fashion, were found to be well policed and their equipment neatly laid out in a uniform manner. The officer's quarters were especially well constructed, and the doctor's office was completely stocked with a first class assortment of medications and surgical equipment. The Japanese had cleared a small parade ground within the coconut grove and had mounted a number of dummies for bayonet drill. Two large warehouses had been constructed and one stocked with foods of high quality, including smoked salmon and canned tangerines, the other with munitions. That the enemy was exceptionally industrious was indicated by the excellent work he had accomplished in constructing his defenses in the short time the organization had been assigned to the sector. It appeared that the soldiers were highly literate for the effects of the Japanese all contained large stacks of letters, books and pamphlets. The majority had Japanese-English books which appeared to be well used. Each non-commissioned officer and commissioned officer had a large copy book filled with sketches of the Empress Augusta Bay Area and various solutions to tactical problems. Other documents revealed that the officers and non-commissioned officers were required to use these copybooks as part of a formal course in tactics. However, a complete lack of consciousness regarding Combat Counter-Intelligence was indicated inasmuch as complete sets of Situation Maps and Operation Orders, not only of Cape Torokina and Puruata and Torokina Islands but of the entire Empress Augusta Bay Area, were found on the bodies of several officers and non-commissioned officers. The Japanese were extremely gas conscious; they carried their gas masks to their battle stations and, when during the attack of one of the bunkers, a smoke grenade was inadvertently thrown into the bunker, the defenders immersed immediately on the run and wearing their gas masks. The moral of the Japanese was unquestionably high in view of the fact that, in spite of the overwhelming

force they could see approaching from the sea, not less than 202 of them remained at their posts to the end; this is the number of dead found on the field after the action had come to a close.

CASUALTIES IN LANDING OPERATIONS

The casualties sustained by the landing force were extremely low considering the density and the organization of the Cape Torokina defenses. As a pure school problem, it would not have been unreasonable to judge that the defense could not be overcome by a force the size of the one sent against it. This low casualty rate is due to two factors: First, errors of omission or poor technique by the Japanese and, secondly, acts of special preparation by the landing force. While each point in itself might seem insignificant, each may have saved a life on the side of the landing force and cost a life on the side of the defenders. Therefore, each is important and, collectively, they make up the difference between the outstanding success of the landing force in an operation which, theoretically, should have been repulsed or resisted with great loss of life to the attacker.

Among the deficiencies in the Japanese defense was poor Anti-Boat Gunnery. The 75 mm field gun, the key to the beach defense, was emplaced in such a position that in spite of the fact that the gun could be traversed but six degrees, three degrees on either side of center, practically every landing craft approaching the beach was forced to pass across or along the line of fire of this gun. Although the lateral angular speed of the targets was slow and the velocity of the gun high, in fifty rounds fired, only six landing craft were seriously damaged or sunk and the casualties inflicted on the landing force so few as to have no effect on the outcome of the landing. There is no doubt, however, that the field gun was the direct cause of the diversion of boats from their proper landing points with the resulting disorganization of units on landing. The Japanese, probably because of lack of available equipment, used single guns instead of double guns on fixed-lines from key positions in the beach defense, thereby resulting in intermittent breaks in the defense fires, permitting the attackers to pass through into the rear areas. This, of course, was the beginning of the end for the system of defense. It was bad psychology for the Japanese to construct their slit trenches connecting the foxholes covering approaches to the bunkers, so that they led into the bunker:

When the pressure got bad, too many of the Japanese soldiers became "bunker-minded", abandoned their rifle pits and took refuge in the bunker where they were trapped. Had they not had the opportunity so open to them to take cover in the bunkers, but had been forced by necessity to remain in their rifle pits, even then the result of the assault might have been in their favor.

Among the preparations and acts of commission of the landing force that contributed to the low casualty rate of the attackers were the following: during the approach of the boats to the beach, and while in line of the fire of the field gun, the boats were kept in line and on such course that they were not enfiladed at any time. Thirty-three percent more boats were used in the landing of each wave than had been customary in the Transport Division from which the troops were landing. This threw a greater number of troops on the beach over a far wider front than otherwise would have occurred. Debarkation of boat teams was extremely rapid: on two occasions when the ramps stuck and were slow to fall, the troops went over the side at almost the instant the boats touched the beach. Boat Teams were observed to deploy with extreme rapidity and, crouching low with weapons held at the ready, to rush across the beach through the beach defense fires and into the brush without a moments hesitation. Among the preparations which probably contributed in holding down casualties, once the troops entered the bush, was the use of camouflage uniforms and equipment and green vegetable stain on the face and hands. In preparation for jungle operations, this regiment, in the absence of an adequate number of regular camouflage uniforms, or in some cases in preference to them, had painted utility uniforms with camouflaging patterns of light green and yellow paints. Similar patterns were applied to all items of equipment including leggings, cartridge belts, packs, and burlap helmet covers topped off with netting. In the absence of theatrical grease paint, green, sand, and black, which is considered more desirable because of its durability, the men were provided with a vegetable powder which, when mixed with water, stained the skin light green. Having had considerable practice in individual concealment, the troops were able to conceal themselves in the brush to an amazing degree. In connection with camouflage or painted-up uniforms in the jungle, it was subsequently agreed that after a few days in the swamp all uniforms finally acquired the same appearance, but that if in the first stages of the operation they saved even one life, they were worth the trouble of providing them. As to helmet covers and nets, there is no particular agreement as to their desirability or necessity considering the most recent type of finish.

For one thing, it is customary among the men in the field to use their helmets as wash basins and stew pots. Therefore, the helmet covers and nets soon become lost. However, on the initial landing, the burlap helmet covers and nets provided a note of uniformity which was important in the identification of friendly troops. Although some Japanese wore nets, none were similar to ours and none wore covers over the brown metal. This mark of identity might well be worthy of preservation in the early stages of an operation inasmuch as a notebook of a Japanese officer later killed was found to contain a notation to warn his men that the uniforms of the Americans were exactly similar to their own jungle uniforms and might cause trouble for them. In individual contacts, the marksmanship of the Marines was far superior and the Americans far more aggressive. Marines had better fire discipline than the Japanese and, in spite of the lack of visibility in the bush and the milling around of great numbers of men during the attack, it did not appear that any of our men were killed by gunshot from our own weapons. It was further noted that our men exhibited more patience than the Japanese during the fighting on Cape Torokina and the subsequent defense of the sector.

These factors then, together with sound planning and superior leadership, individual conduct and tactical training of the attackers, account to a considerable extent for the relatively low casualty rate in the Cape Torokina landing.

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THE BATTLE OF THE KOROMOKINA
7-9 NOVEMBER, 1943

The outstanding features of this battle concerned matters of a technical nature which were brought out forcibly during an attack by what, at the time the First Battalion, Third Marines moved against the enemy, probably was a numerically inferior force in a frontal attack on an entrenched position.

MARKSMANSHIP

The number of Japanese who made the stand against the attack of the First Battalion, Third Marines is uncertain. However, from the number of foxholes later found in the defended areas, and from accounts of officers participating in the action, it is likely that the enemy numbered about 200, of which about 150, at 1500 on 7 November, were in foxholes and the remainder in an Assembly Area as a counter-attack force. The total number of riflemen in the assault probably did not exceed 180.

The Japanese positions were organized as squad strong points, with one man to a foxhole and each group closely supporting adjacent groups. The Japanese were armed with an unusually large proportion of automatic weapons, there being one NAMBU, 6.5 millimeter, or one HOTCHKISS-BREN Light Machine Gun for each group of four men. In general, the NAMBUS were fired from emplacements on the ground and each covered by a HOTCHKISS-BREN Light Machine Gun mounted in a tree in rear of, or slightly to one side of the NAMBU. In addition, there were a great number of Heavy Grenade Throwers, M-89, each protected by a cordon of rifle pits.

The foxholes of the Japanese, dug in sandy but firm soil, were most cleverly constructed to give a maximum of protection and concealment. Subsequently, it was found that it was impossible to detect the location of a single one of these foxholes from a distance of even ten yards by means of the unaided eye.

The approach from our lines to the Japanese positions was through dense, tropical jungle with the intervals between trees a tangle of vines and bushes. It would be unreasonable.

to suppose that an advance through such a thicket could be else but noisy, giving plenty of warning to the Japanese of the speed and direction of advance of the attackers. For the attacker, the necessity of holding his fire, because of the uncertainty of the exact location of the enemy's position and the irregularity of formations due to the vegetation, forced our men to advance completely at the mercy of the enemy until they could hunt him out and fight him at close range.

At the moment our advance began, it was, of course, observed by those light machine gunners who had taken station in the trees. At once, and until they closed with the enemy, our men were subjected to a terrific fire from machine guns and rifles, fired at a rapid and continuous rate. With all these advantages of cover, concealment, positions, automatic weapons and probably numerical superiority, the Japanese inflicted an unbelievably low number of casualties. The marksmanship of the Japanese was so atrocious as to be inconceivable, considering the excellent tactical training and courageous leadership exhibited by these Japanese. It is certain that no Marine saw a Japanese soldier until he was within ten yards or less of him, with the Japanese having heard his approach, seen him first and fired his weapon before the Marine even became aware of his presence. However, whereas with but few exceptions the Japanese missed, the Marines seldom did. After the battle, it was found that not less than 135 Japanese in the forward areas were dead from gunshot wounds of the head, neck and upper chest.

Perhaps never before had been demonstrated so forcibly the fallacy of the theory that dispersion of a high volume of fire will take care of battle field hits or of the truth of the statement that superiority of hits per minute, regardless of numbers engaged, may win a battle.

The superior marksmanship of the Marines who withheld their fire to keep from endangering their comrades until they were certain of a target at which they could fire a deliberate and precisely placed shot, stopped the advance of the enemy against the Division's left flank.

EFFECT OF SMALL ARMS FIRE IN THE JUNGLE

It had been brought out in tests in Samoa and Guadalcanal, in firing through thick jungles or the Saw Grass which covers open fields in the Solomons, that the probable maximum range which could be obtained with the cartridge, ball, calibre .30, M-2, was from 200 to 250 yards. Coconut and Iron Wood Trees up to 30 or more inches in diameter offer no protection whatever from this cartridge but would protect against cartridges of the type of the cartridge, carbine, calibre .30, M-1, and cartridge, ball, calibre .45, M-1911. The buttresses of Iron Wood Trees offer no protection from the rifle or the carbine cartridge but sometimes defeated the pistol cartridge at 35 to 40 yards. While two thicknesses of sand bags would defeat the rifle cartridge, rifle bullets were often observed to pass through four consecutive coconut trees in a grove.

OBSERVATION OF SMALL ARMS FIRE: USE OF TRACERS

The only practical means of observing and adjusting fire is by tracer. The danger of revealing positions by the use of tracers was well recognized, but, considering the extremely short range at which the fire fight must, of necessity, begin, it was agreed that the rapid movement which would follow the opening of the attack on an enemy position would prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the revelation of our gun positions. Even in a purely defensive situation, the moderate use of tracers to insure hits seems more than justified, in view of the fact that any automatic weapon can best be located in the jungle by following the sound of its firing.

TECHNIQUE OF FIRE IN THE JUNGLE

The characteristics of small arms fire in jungle described above, were carefully considered in plans for the Application of Fire in jungle fighting. With the rifle and automatic rifle, the distribution of fires was executed as would be normal in open terrain. Fire Orders, however, were issued by the leaders before the troops moved into the line, and no attempt was made to give a fire order when contact was made other than the order "Commence Firing". Extensive training in Technique of Fire insured intelligent application, distribution and control by what amounted to Standing Operating Procedures. Fire Discipline, throughout the campaign, was excellent.

THE MACHINE GUN IN THE JUNGLE

With the machine gun, in the conduct of fire preparations, it was considered better to assign a sector to each gun through which it would traverse on a given elevation, which sector would overlap those of one or more guns on either hand than it would be to fire guns by section or platoon on fixed lines or other technique, inasmuch as sections or platoons might then fire together into an impenetrable thicket, perhaps only a few yards in front of the guns. Seemingly such a situation should be avoided by reconnaissance preliminary to siting the guns for the delivery of a fire preparation. However, because of the range limitations of the jungle and the fact that the fire preparations were often to be fired on targets no more distant than fifty yards, the furthest advance of those who planned the fire might be limited to the line from which the guns were fired.

In this battle, and subsequent operations in the jungle, there was no opportunity for the use of machine guns in distant support or to deliver fire by overhead or indirect methods. However, the clinometer and compass were necessities in laying guns for fire preparations or on fixed lines on defense. It was always necessary to place direct support machine guns directly in the front lines. Break through guns could not be sited, because of the jungle, to cover intervals between front line guns but were concerned primarily in the defense of command posts and supply routes. However, it is considered vitally necessary that machine gun platoons be trained and ready to fire overhead and indirect fires in hilly country even though it be covered with jungle.

An interesting application of the heavy machine gun in support of a jungle attack was the custom of raising the fire of the guns to the tree tops fifty to one hundred yards to the front at the moment of the passage of our lines by the attacking troops and maintaining the fire until such time as ricochetting bullets might endanger our men.

This practice resulted in many casualties to the enemy who customarily took stations in trees in the attempt to overlook our positions. Light machine guns, of course, because of limitations of their elevating mechanisms, are unable to deliver such fires.

USE OF MORTARS IN THE JUNGLE

The jungle presents no obstacles to the use of the 60 and 81 mm Mortars that cannot be successfully and quickly overcome. Mortar leaders, from squad to platoon, must, of course, exhibit unusual initiative, ingenuity and skill and mortar crews trained to the peak of perfection. Equipment and demolitions for topping trees or otherwise clearing fields of fire must be available to the mortar squads, but the best mortarmen will, by vigorous reconnaissance, frequently locate clearings from which one or more mortars may be fired, particularly if the highest rather than lowest number of increments is used, in far less time than would be required in clearing a field of fire. Not infrequently, when mortar fires were urgently required, a test for mask clearance was made by firing a shell from which the safety pin had not been removed: If the shell went clear, the concentration was delivered without more ado.

ADJUSTMENT OF MORTARS AND ARTILLERY

In jungle fighting, communications must be provided for the 60 mm Mortar sections as well as for the 81 mm Mortars: the observers for these weapons must take station in the Front Lines or even in front of them as do the Artillery Forward Observers, and it is seldom that any control can be exercised except by phone. Radios are not practical as the basic means of fire control communications. It was customary to draw on the communication facilities of the Battalions for Sound Powered Telephones for the 60 mm Mortars. There should be an allowance of two Sound Powered Telephones for each 60 mm Mortar plus one additional for the section leader so that these extremely valuable weapons in jungle fighting may be used in any desired combination or distribution.

It was seldom that the mortars could be adjusted by visual observation. As a rule, they were adjusted entirely by sound. As with artillery, the most precise adjustments could be made at night when the flash of the exploding shell could frequently be seen. On more than one occasion during the day time, confusion was created by simultaneous firing of artillery and mortars because of the similarity in sound of the exploding shells. However, this difficulty was readily overcome since the Artillery Forward Observers and the Mortar Observers were usually close together and could agree between themselves as to who would shoot now and who would shoot later.

As a general rule, except in hilly country or swamps, there was little advantage to be gained by the Observers climbing trees in an attempt to get a clearer field of vision. However, Mortar Observers had provided themselves with Tree-Climbers and they were of value on several occasions in locating targets or clearings.

Although the jungle restricted observation of artillery and mortar fires, it had advantages in that, because of the denseness of the vegetation, artillery and mortar concentrations could be brought much closer to our own lines than would be practicable under other conditions. On this and many future occasions, 60 mm Mortars were adjusted with complete safety to our troops to within 25 to 35 yards of our positions: 75 mm Pack Howitzers and 81 mm Mortars to within 50 to 75 yards, and, 105 mm Howitzers to within 150 yards. This close adjustment was considered the answer to the report that the Japanese frequently moved forward towards our lines when normal barrages were fired.

EFFECT OF MORTARS AND ARTILLERY

In this battle, the fire of the 60 mm Mortars was extremely accurate and highly effective against exposed personnel. The 105 mm Howitzer shell was particularly destructive, and over 100 Japanese were torn apart by its explosion or killed in their fox-holes by the blast during a 15 minute concentration covering three squares by three batteries. The effect of the 81 mm light and medium shells and the 75 mm Howitzer shell was entirely satisfactory in this action and produced the results which has been expected as a result of jungle firing tests during training.

37 mm Cannister was of value in this action and accounted for a number of the enemy. Several Japanese were killed when knocked out of Iron Wood Trees by the explosion of 37 mm High Explosive Shell fired into likely parts of the tree trunks. As an indication of the denseness of the jungle, it is pointed out that Anti-Tank Guns could, on this occasion, with comparative safety, be rolled up to a point no more distant than 50 yards from the enemy and prepared for firing in support of an infantry assault.

IDENTIFICATION OF LANDING CRAFT

Training in the identification of landing craft is an essential subject for personnel of a Regimental Weapons Company. The initial landing of the Japanese was effected without opposition, although under the guns of an Anti-Tank Platoon sited in beach defense, because the Officer in Charge failed to recognize the boats as being Japanese. In the Regimental Weapons Company of the Third Marines, nearly as much time as was devoted to Anti-Boat Gunnery and Boat Identification was given to Anti-Tank Gunnery and Tank Identification because it had been anticipated that one of the primary assignments of the Anti-Tank Platoons in an amphibious operation would be in beach defense. This type of training is also of extreme value to light anti-aircraft gun batteries which frequently are sited on the beach and should form a part of the Anti-Boat Defense.

AIR-GROUND LIAISON

The system of attaching an Air Officer with a Communication Team to an Infantry Regiment, to make recommendations and arrange for the employment of Aviation in support of infantry was demonstrated during this battle as being highly effective. The jungle is no obstacle to the employment of Bomber Aviation particularly when our own lines, or targets discovered by ground reconnaissance, can be marked by smoke pots or smoke shells. Air-Ground communication in the jungle depends on radio alone, inasmuch as there is never adequate clearings for the use of Air-Ground Panels, nor can pyrotechnics always be successfully employed because they may be obscured by the high trees.

TANKS

The jungle is no insurmountable obstacle to tanks. The use of them, of course, is somewhat restricted by the vegetation which materially reduces their speed and maneuverability, but there are many important missions that may be assigned to them in support of an infantry attack through the jungle. Among these is the task assigned in the Battle of the Koromokina of running down and crushing machine gun positions. Because tanks are stone blind in the jungle, and their gunfire generally masked by friendly troops, it is essential that the infantry escort for the tanks in jungle fighting remain close to and surrounding them ever instant. This is difficult and, aside from the great courage and stamina demanded of their escorts in keeping to

their posts, it cannot be successfully accomplished until Tank-Infantry teams have practiced together in several jungle exercises and have become thoroughly acquainted with each others powers and limitations.

NIGHT OPERATIONS

Although the Third Marines had devoted over 100 hours in training to practical exercises in Night Raids, Night Approaches, Night Reliefs and Night Attacks, the only opportunity during the Bougainville Campaign for night operations was presented on the night of 7-8 November, 1943 on the Koromakina. On this occasion, two separate platoons were able, as a result of their training, effectively to raid the enemy's rear area and not only inflict a serious number of casualties, but upset the enemy's scheme of defense. If only to make possible the results of these two night raids, the long hours of practice and careful supervision necessary to make the regiment proficient in night operations, would have been more than justified.

As a matter of interest, it was found that a piece of equipment almost as essential to the success of night operations as the compass was a ten foot piece of one-quarter inch rope carried by each officer and man for use as a guide line which, when not in use, was coiled and attached to the pack.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY AT THE KOROMAKINA

Aside from the serious deficiency in weapons training which has been previously discussed, the Japanese troops who attacked our left flank, appeared to be well led and well trained in tactics. They were extremely aggressive and determined and aroused admiration for the speed with which they moved from their landing points to the scene of action, carrying their heavy packs and weapons.

The rapidity and skill with which the Japanese constructed their foxholes was interesting. Almost without exception the top diameter of the foxholes was no larger than that necessary for the man to get into the hole and the spoil so cleverly distributed that it was most difficult to detect the hole from even a few yards distance. The bottoms of the holes were belled out or under cut so that the occupant could lie down to sleep or rest. In some cases the foxholes were cut back under trees so that the occupants body was actually under the tree trunk itself.

Among the items of equipment carried by the Japanese into action were a number of expensively made periscopes and battery commander's telescopes to be used for the purpose of observing from foxholes without exposing the head.

The foolish error of officers carrying Situation Maps and Operation Orders was repeated by the Japanese in this battle. Within fifteen minutes after the advance of the eighth of November had begun, our Intelligence had come into possession of the scheme of maneuver, not only of the Koromokina action but of the operations planned against our entire beach head.

Small groups of Japanese were extremely active during the nights of the 7th and 8th, and some succeeded in passing as far as 1100 yards behind our lines. In one case, a Japanese patrol was successful in killing two sentries within twenty-five feet of the Division Hospital for the purpose of stripping them in the effort to identify American units in the area.

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MOVEMENT TO THE NORTHERN SECTOR
9-18 NOVEMBER, 1943

The outstanding features of this phase were concerned with the problems of supply through swamp and jungle. The Third Battalion led off on this movement soon after the initial landing and began breaking trail in a trek to the north and east, generally following the line of the Division Beach Head. The Third Battalion was subsequently followed by the First and Second Battalions until the movement finally terminated in the Battle of the Piva Forks. Although the movement of the Regiment as such included only the dates from 9 to 18 November, 1943, the Second and Third Battalions actually spent 17 consecutive days traversing the swamp.

SUPPLY

The difficulty of supply of the battalions through the swamp cannot be adequately described by words: Suffice it to say that day after day the men moved through water and slimy mud often waist deep, sometimes to the arms pits and seldom below the knees, their advance barred by a tangle of thorny vines that inflicted painful wounds when dragged across the skin; at night, machine guns were lashed to the trunks of trees and men slept sitting up in the water. In the sultry heat and stinking muck of this jungle swamp, an advance of 300 yards in a day was no mean feat and would test the strength of the most powerful men. Of course, any thought of food or dry clothing was out of the question.

Had it not been for the amphibian tractors, it is certain that the maneuver, as planned, could not have been successfully carried out. As it was, the amphibians were available in barely sufficient number to keep the men supplied with emergency rations and ammunition.

The work of the Amphibian Tractor Companies and the skillful devotion to duty of their personnel is one of the outstanding highlights of the Bougainville Campaign. Breaking trail through this terrible swamp and keeping the troops supplied during their approach to the northern sector made possible a continuous and steady advance of the regiment at such a rate that the

regiment was able to locate and engage the enemy in a main action before the Japanese were able to complete fortifications they planned to include in their defenses.

During the advance through the swamp, each battalion established a base of operations on the beach to which the regiment allocated and delivered supplies. A proportionate number of amphibians was assigned to each base and the Battalion Supply Sections completed delivery of the supplies to the troops. As the battalions advanced, Forward Distribution Points were established on islands in the swamp and an attempt was made to build up a supply level at each Distribution Point of three days rations and two units of fire. The supplies in the Forward Distribution Points were successfully leap-frogged forward from time to time.

COMMUNICATIONS

Telephonic communications between the battalions and the regiment were kept continuous throughout the advance and because of the heavy rains and continual dampness were relied upon as the principle source of communication. In addition, telegraph lines accompanied the advance and were extremely valuable on several occasions.

BAGGAGE

The clothing of the troops was brought ashore as Baggage in the Knapsack and an attached Horseshoe Roll. The Knapsack and horseshoe Roll were stacked at the Battalion Dumps near the beach. In the landing, the men wore the Marching Pack containing a standard list of items considered necessary to maintain the man's health and comfort in combat for periods of three to five days.

The contents of the Marching Pack included the following items: Poncho; pair of socks; suit of underwear; toilet articles, including soap and small towel; Atabrine Tablets; Sulpha Powders and Tablets; Aspirin; Salt Tablets; Iodine for cuts and water purification; Vitamin Pills; weapon cleaning gear; bottle of insect repellent (head net was carried in the helmet); toilet paper; spoon; Heat Tabs and Tripod; extra shoelaces and legging laces; water proof container for matches or, lighter fluid and extra lighter flint for mechanical lighter; tobacco, and, six meals, preferably four "K" ration meals broken down and two "D" ration meals. It was invariably found that when men attempted to carry more than these items, such as a shirt

or a blanket or a shelter half, they sooner or later discarded them. The basic items listed above were kept to the end. To each pack was attached the ten-foot piece of rope previously mentioned; each man carried a knife, preferably of the broad bladed Marble Hunting type, and an entrenching tool. Many carried long machettes and carried light work gloves to protect the hands from thorns and insects.

Due to the difficulties of transportation and the scarcity of equipment, few of the knapsacks and rolls could be delivered to the men before the 16th to 18th day after the landing; even then, satisfactory deliveries could not be made because rolls had become separated from knapsacks, lashings had come undone, and markings had become obliterated by the rain and mud. Fortunately the Supply Section was able to make a gratuitous issue of socks, shoes and trousers to men requiring them during the interim.

While the gratuitous issue helped materially, it did not solve the problem. The problem stems from the fact that the men do not want, and should not be made, to carry more than the merest essentials into combat. Assuming that the items previously listed constitute the ideal "combat pack", then steps must be taken to supply the items which the men eventually must have to sustain his health. For example, the mosquito net, which most men would not dare use during the first few nights on the offensive because it restricts their vision and confines their movement. Yet; on going into a quiet sector or in reserve, the men need and want their mosquito nets. Again, the blanket; the men will throw it away because of its bulk or because it becomes wet and muddy when carried in offensive combat, yet it is needed when shelters are constructed. It is agreed that the seabag is the most practical device for packing these items for delivery to the men, when action permits, for these reasons: (1) It reduces the baggage to one piece per man; (2) when packed only with the items necessary to sustain the man's health, as those items prescribed for the knapsack and roll, it is not as bulky as the pack and roll, is easier to handle, and is more readily stacked; (3) When marked with large characters along the side and bottom, the seabag is certain to be more identifiable because its smooth unbroken surfaces permit larger characters, less likely to be washed off by rain and obscured by mud, and because the characters can be readily seen when bags are stacked in piles, and, with the pack and roll and the greater ease of handling, there would be a material reduction of labor, and some in transportation, as well as in time in making deliveries.

THE COMPASS

The most valuable piece of equipment during the advance was the Lensatic or Prismatic Compass which had been issued in a proportion of one to every four men. Many ~~men and officers~~ have stated, with all seriousness, that if it came to the choice of going without their compass or their weapon, they would rather fight the Japanese with clubs than to attempt to fight the jungle without a compass. It would be advisable to issue a Lensatic or Prismatic Compass to every officer and man in the Rifle Regiment: even cooks may need them in delivering food to men in defensive positions.

CLOTHING

During the advance through the swamp, a number of interesting thoughts were observed to become crystalized on the subject of clothing. For example, the Army Mechanics Cap was praised as the most practical head gear that had been made available and the troops were highly pleased with it, both from the point of view of comfort and appearance: they greatly disliked the Army's Fatigue Cap, that is, the cap with an all around brim, of the grounds of appearance. While pleased with the field shoe, they thought the parachute trooper's boots far superior and considered that they would materially reduce foot and leg injuries. Everyone considered the wool sock as essential and expressed the wish that it be thicker, of a higher wool content, and longer in the leg. In the absence of the parachute-trooper boot, the legging was considered a desirable item but a liking was expressed for the short Army legging rather than the Marine Corps type. As to underwear, the Third Marines had dyed their undershirts prior to going into combat, but the lack of proper chemicals had resulted in a conglomeration of colors. However, it was considered that a properly dyed undershirt of green color would be worthwhile. A great many men objected to the draw strings on the side of the drawers on the grounds that they eventually caused tropical ulcers on the hip bones: it was desired that elastic insets, similar to those found on "Cooper's Mon Yana" underdrawers, be substituted for the draw strings, that the legs be made shorter to conform with modern styling and that drawers be made of a broadcloth rather than the material now used. Such matters are of extreme importance to the men because they invariably stop wearing and dispose of items of clothing which are uncomfortable or do not satisfy their sense of comfort or usefulness: for example, they completely discarded the Garrison Cap in favor of the Army Mechanic's Cap for wear with the Utility Uniform.

With Utility or Camouflage Uniform designated as the Combat Uniform, Khaki should not be taken in the baggage. The resulting mixture of uniforms is undesirable, and serves no useful or desirable purpose: the baggage space should be saved or used for additional suits of utility or camouflage clothes.

As to camouflage clothing, previously discussed under "casualties", it provided, they should be issued in the amount of two full suits per man. It is not desirable to have some men in one uniform and others in another: there is value in uniformity.

As a protective measure, officers invariably wore their rank insignia under the collar tabs, and wore the enlisted men's pack in combat. Apropos of this, officers and non-commissioned officers of units predominantly armed with the rifle were observed to discard their carbines and carry rifles in battle. The elimination of outward marks of distinction undoubtedly saved many leaders from receiving special attention from the enemy in the close combat of the jungle. No difficulty was experienced by officers in exercising their authority over even attached troops: Command Presence in an officer was more effective than rank marks.

WATER

During the advance through the swamp, it was practically impossible to supply an adequate amount of drinking water in water cans: most of the drinking water was obtained from swamp holes and individually purified with iodine or other chemicals which were supplied by the corpsmen. Previous thorough training in this matter was found to be effective, inasmuch as there were but thirteen cases of dysentery in the entire regiment during the first twenty-eight days of the operation and five cases during the last twenty-eight days.

RATIONS

In the matter of food, the serving of "B" Rations was generally not practical since it was necessary to set up the kitchens at such a distance from the troops over such terrain that it was impossible to deliver the meals while still hot. Furthermore, under such conditions hot water could not be furnished for the purpose of properly cleaning mess gear. Therefore, the troops subsisted during this period entirely on "C",

"D", "K", and "J" Rations, supplemented by cans of fruit and fruit juices. When a bivouac was made on an island in the swamp, it was noted, as mentioned before, that some men used their helmets as stew pots and prepared very tasty stews of "C" Ration, bouillon powder from the "K" Ration and cans of tomatoes or tomato juice. The "J" Ration as a supplement to the "C" or "K" was extremely popular. The "D" Ration was popular only when made into a hot drink. The "K" Ration Biscuits were unpopular and almost invariably discarded. When it was pointed out by the medical officers that the "K" Ration Biscuit was essential to the balanced diet, the men still refused to eat them in belief that the vitamin pills which they carried would make up the deficiency. It was generally customary among the men when issued "K" Rations to be carried in their packs for them to break down the ration and stew only the can of meat, candy unit, beverage and cigarettes in their packs, discarding the rest.

HEAT TABS

Few items of equipment met with more diverse reception than the Heat-Tabs and tripods. With the thick, heavy, canteen cup as a container, among those units which attempted to use Heat-Tabs as directed on the box, that is, burning a single Heat-Tab at a time, the men gave them up quickly in disgust. Among these units where men discovered that burning two Heat-Tabs at one time would quickly bring a canteen cup of water to a boil, the Heat-Tabs became the most popular piece of equipment in their packs. Among the newer men, there was an unfortunate lack of imagination on their part in attempting to heat "C" Rations or "K" Ration meat cans over Heat-Tabs; the older men, who through their former experiences in the Samoan jungle, knew the trick of opening the "C" Ration and heating half the contents of the can at a time in the can to which a few spoonfuls of water had been added, had no trouble in heating their food without burning it or themselves.

ENGINEERS

During the advance of the Third Battalion to the north and east, the extreme importance of the Composite Engineer Company, which is customarily attached to each Landing Team, training with the Rifle Battalion, was made apparent. As the Battalion advanced, engineer officers accompanied the screen, continuously searching out possible routes for the construction of jeep trails.

By keeping the advance of the Third Battalion bordering on the edge of the swamp and because the engineers, by training, were able to accompany the Battalion, a jeep trail from the left flank of the Division Beach Head was opened for the supply of the Regiment on the very day that contact was made with the main Japanese forces. During this advance, it was, of course, necessary for the engineer troops to take station in the Battalion's formation in the Approach March "When Contact Is Imminent". For the Engineer carrying an axe or peavy in one hand it was essential that he carry a rifle in the other; on more than one occasion, bulldozer drivers had to quit their machines while a skirmish was being decided around about them. It is interesting to note that the engineers which performed the feat of running in the jeep road was a C.B. platoon which had trained with the Third Battalion for two and one-half months in Samoa, preparing for just such an evolution. The Pioneer Platoon of this Composite Company had been withdrawn to the Division Shore Party and the Combat Engineer Platoon was operating in the Regimental Shore Party.

BATTLE OF THE NUMA-NUMA TRAIL
17-21 NOVEMBER, 1943

The outstanding feature of this battle, developed from a Meeting Engagement, following vigorous reconnaissance and combat patrolling by small units, were the tests of the efficiency of small patrol formations as practiced in the Third Marines and of the Battalion Formation known as "Contact Imminent", a formation designed for the advance of a battalion through the jungle during the Approach March when Contact is Imminent".

CONTACT IMMINENT

"Contact Imminent" was devised to insure the steady controlled advance of a battalion through a jungle, in a given direction, at a definite speed, covering the widest front practicable under given conditions of visibility, not subject to delay by small parties, yet sufficiently flexible to permit changes in direction and rapid deployment for combat to the front, flanks or rear.

Although the battalions developed variations in their Contact Imminent formations, there were certain similarities and requirements. Among the principles to be observed in Contact Imminent, and in Patrols where applicable, were: movements must be off all trails; communications must be established throughout the formation at the instant of halting or when contact is made with the enemy; distances traversed must be kept track of; in the absence of a definite terrain feature as a Phase Line, movement must be regulated on a time schedule; direction must be controlled by several agents; the formation must be sufficiently flexible to permit the inclusion of Tanks, Engineers or Regimental weapons in a covered position; outboard elements must be ready to fight at any moment; movements must be silent and every man in the formation must know where every other man and unit was in relation to him and what their actions were to be in a given situation.

During the transit of the Beach Head by the Third Battalion, this formation was continually employed; the advance of the First Battalion to their second objective east of Cape Torckina was in Contact Imminent, less one company, and companies on

combat or reconnaissance missions invariably moved in a reduced scale of Contact Imminent. Because of this and because small patrols followed the same principles, the Japanese never succeeded in ambushing a Third Marine formation; on the contrary, in a dozen situations, the Marines detected the enemy positions and attacked them on a flank before the Japanese became aware of their presence, or by-passed them without detection at the will of the leader.


In Contact Imminent, communications were maintained by running axial lines of combat wire during the march; a wire party in the screen let out the wire and another in the rear reeled it in. On halting, all unit commanders clipped Sound Powered Telephones to the axial wires and checked in to report their positions and receive instructions for the next move from the Battalion Commander who marched at the head of his Reserve. In this manner, the situation within a battalion could be checked in from three to five minutes. Distance was measured by marking the combat wire with tape to indicate the length of wire played out on the axial lines during a given march. In the absence of Phase Lines, advances were generally limited to fifteen minute intervals. Direction was controlled by the Officer in Charge of the Screen; working in teams of four, each team checking in the direction independently of the other teams.

RATE OF ADVANCE OF VARIOUS FORMATIONS

A Battalion in Contact Imminent could be expected to advance through the jungle at a rate of 500 yards an hour. The Regiment in Contact Imminent, with the three battalions forming a wedge, could advance nearly as fast as a single battalion, but although considerable attention was given to perfecting the Regimental Formation in training, no opportunity arose for using it on Bougainville.

A reinforced rifle company, operating as a combat patrol, could be expected to move cross-country at the rate of 750 yards an hour.

It was customary for Local Security Patrols, operating up to 500 yards in front of our positions, to be composed of five men, an officer or platoon sergeant, an automatic rifleman and three riflemen. It was expected that such a patrol would cover 1500 yards an hour.



The Principles of the Formation of the Battalion in

The Approach March When Contact is Imminent.

All Rifle Company Weapons Squads attached to the Rifle Platoons and the Heavy Machine Gun Platoons attached to the Rifle Companies.

* Frontage and Depth depend on visibility.

Small Combat Patrols and most of the Reconnaissance Patrols were composed of a rifle platoon, reinforced by one or two light machine gun squads and sometimes a 60mm mortar squad. Such a patrol was expected to cover 1000 yards an hour.

FIRE TEAMS

The basis of all small patrols was generally the "Four Man Fire Team" (Three riflemen and one automatic rifleman) in either the wedge or the box formation. For example a Reconnaissance Patrol might form a wedge or box of wedges of four men each, with the leader of each team in the center. In combat, when contact was made by one of these teams with the enemy, the idea was that the automatic rifleman would cover the target, one rifleman would cover the automatic rifleman and the other two move in immediately to flank the target: the speed of reaction of the team generally measured the degree of success of the attack. Another important feature of the attack which was carefully observed was that the pair of flankers moved inboard of their formations so that their line of fire would be away from other fire teams in the formation.

AMBUSCADES

The only matter of unusual interest in connection with ambushes which when set on trails one thousand yards or more in front of our lines were so successful as to gain the information which led to the battles of the Numa Numa Trail and the Five Forks, was the care with which fire plans were agreed upon by the men in the ambush when they had taken their positions. The idea of the fire plan was to arrange a distribution of fire so that all hands would not concentrate on a single man but would bring down the maximum number of the enemy at the first fire. By such careful planning, a special patrol of 17 was successfully able to ambush a Japanese working party of over 100, kill at least 9 of them, definitely wound many more, and effect an escape to our lines without a single man being killed or wounded.

BATTLE OF THE PIVA FORKS
21-26 NOVEMBER, 1943

The soundness of the tactical doctrines described in the Field Manuals for the Rifle Regiment and its subordinate units and special weapons were tested and proven in the Battle of the Piva Forks and found to be directly and invariably applicable to jungle fighting. While no deviation from principle was ever necessary, a considerable amount of common sense, good judgment and experience in the bush was called for in adjusting time and space factors to the limitations of the jungle and the swamp.



TACTICAL TRAINING

As an indication of the scope of tactical training necessary in preparation for jungle fighting, the following lists the evolutions of the Battalion and Regiment which were required by the course of battle during the operations on the Piva Forks: The Approach March; The Selection, Occupation and Security of Assembly Areas and Bivouacs; Reconnaissance in Force by a Battalion; The Attack, Attack through Woods, Passage of Lines, Preparation of Fire Plans, including Artillery Support: Battalion in Reserve, including Preparation of Plans for the execution of all normal missions of the Reserve; Combat Outposts; Hasty Defense, Defense on a Wide Front, Defense in Woods; Relief in Position, and, Daylight Withdrawals. These evolutions were executed according to the principles set forth in Field Manuals 7-20, "The Rifle Battalion", and 7-40, "The Rifle Regiment".


HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, INFANTRY REGIMENT

During the advance through the swamp, it became increasingly evident that the organization of the Headquarters and Service Company, Marine Infantry Regiment, was deficient. During the battle of the Piva Forks, the deficiencies assumed serious proportions. The Headquarters and Service Company does not include Service Troops in a number to permit the execution of certain necessary and essential services to the Regiment and its present organization obscures the functions of the Headquarters Personnel. The Headquarters Company, Rifle Regiment, as described in Field Manual 7-25, and the Service Company, Rifle Regiment, as described in Field Manual 7-30, have certain prescribed functions and

The Four Man Fire Team




Attacks an ambush set on a Trail.



OR- Attacks an Enemy Patrol coming up on the flank of our formation.

-OR- Attacks a Bunker



duties in connection with the problems of Administration and Supply of a regiment which in no way differ from the Administrative and Supply Problems of the Marine Regiment. Although the Service and Supply Company of the Division Special Troops attaches a platoon to the Regimental Headquarters and Service Company when operating in the field, this does not solve the problem. Frequently, the greatest service of the Supply Platoon is rendered when the troops are in bivouac: in combat the team work of the Service Platoon with normal Headquarters and Service personnel measures its value. Regardless of the competency and willingness of the personnel of the Service Platoon, unless they are a part of and continuously with the Regiment, they are unable to appreciate and anticipate the needs of the Regiment and perform those duties which are expected of them without a serious waste of time, effort and man power. Similarly, the lack of a Transport Platoon is sorely felt in maintaining the supply of the Regiment: the temporary attachment of a Motor Transport Unit does not alleviate the situation created by dividing the responsibility for a necessary service between two masters. Therefore, it is agreed that the organization of the Headquarters and Service Company, Marine Infantry Regiment, should be changed to provide both a Headquarters Company and a Service Company with sections, personnel and responsibilities comparable to those of the Headquarters Company and the Service Company of the Rifle Regiment of the Army.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, INFANTRY BATTALION

The Headquarters Company of the Infantry Battalion was also found to be deficient in that no agency is provided to perform those essential services described in Field Manual 7-20 which in the Army are the function of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, Headquarters Company, Rifle Battalion.

The services which are performed by an Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon are as essential and necessary in the Marine Battalion as in the Rifle Battalion of the Army: the work must be done. In the Marine Battalion, the only source of man power to do this work is the combat units and from them are drawn the personnel required to maintain the ammunition and ration supply and to construct and maintain minor, but essential, engineering projects. Coincidentally the number of men so engaged, at the expense of combat units, was that of the Ammunition and Pioneer.

Platoon of the Army. It is agreed that an Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon with personnel and responsibilities comparable to those prescribed for such an organization in the Army be included in the Headquarters Company of the Marine Infantry Battalion.

COMMAND POSTS.

During the entire Bougainville operation and especially during the Battle of the Piva Forks, it was found necessary for the Command Posts of the Battalions to be situated close to their assault or front line companies: as a rule, Battalion Command Posts were from 75 to 150 yards in rear of their front lines so that commanders could, by personal contact, keep themselves well informed, act quickly in case of emergency and maintain security for their command posts without unduly draining the strength of their reserves. If the situation indicated that special security measures were necessary, it was customary to establish Command Post Security with a Support Platoon of an assault or front line company when defending on a wide front, or, to use all or part of the Reserve Company for the purpose. The Support or Reserve thus remained close enough to the likely scene of action to permit its commission, when and if necessary, without undue delay. In the dense jungle there is no true front line, continuous in its security and observation. Therefore, Command Groups must ever be ready to defend themselves to the same extent as might be expected of any unit of similar size and armament, and it was felt by all commanders that the further forward the Command Post would be, the nearer to being under the guns, as it were, of our own troops as well as of the enemy were it to be located, the better the chance of the commander being able to control and influence the course of battle.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary to operate all Command Groups, including that of the Regiment, in at least two echelons: the commander and his Operations and Intelligence Officers forward in what was termed the "Battle" or "Forward Command Post" (Observation post would have been a misnomer), and the Personnel and Supply Officers in what was termed the "Rear Command Post". The Executive Officer and Communications Officer found it necessary to divide their time between both stations. In addition, it was necessary during a considerable part of the campaign for the Supply Officer to maintain a "Base" near the beach, complete with communication and messing facilities.

It was exceptional when a Command Group could be brought together into one Command Post, and it was because of this circumstance that the necessity for a Headquarters Company and a Service Company, similar to those of the Army, and of an Ammunition and a Pioneer Platoon for the Battalions, became so evident.

The customary location of the Regimental Forward Command Post was in the Command Post of a Front Line Battalion and the Regimental Rear Command Post, together with the attached Medical Company, in the vicinity of the Regimental Forward Distributing Point, normally from 400 to 800 yards in rear of the center of the front lines.

At one time, the Battalion Bases were from four to six miles distant from their Battalions through swamp and jungle; during this period, an amphibian tractor could be expected to make no more than one and one-half round trips per day between the Bases and the Forward Distributing Points.

In connection with administration in the field, the Administrative Echelon, operating in the Division's Base Camp at Guadalcanal, was eminently successful in carrying out its functions.

COMMUNICATIONS

Instantaneous and continuous telephonic communications is a prerequisite of a sound defensive position in jungle warfare and is essential to the control of a regiment in an attack. Communication installations should never be considered complete until multiple trunks have been installed between the Regiment and the Battalions with cross-lines along different routes laid between Forward Command Posts and Rear Command Posts from one Battalion to another. Artillery Fire Control Lines should never parallel Infantry Command Lines, so that damage to one will not necessarily cause damage to the other, but Infantry Command Lines must be made accessible to Artillery Forward Observers. Switchboard operators throughout the installation must be, not only thoroughly familiar with all of the possible combinations that may be resorted to in order to complete a circuit from any one station to another, but also with the requirements of the Artillery Forward Observers in handling fire missions over the telephone. The great need for flexibility in communications was brought out repeatedly during the Battle of the Piva Forks as a result of enemy artillery and mortar activity which was successful in tearing up long sections of wire on many occasions, creating situations which, had it not been for the system of multiple trunks and cross connections, might well have been disastrous.

The greatest burden on Communications Personnel during the battle and throughout the campaign was the laying of wire. It had been predetermined in training that the normal wire parties would be insufficient in numbers to carry the load through a long campaign; therefore, additional men were made available to the Wire Sections. As it turned out, a 100% increase in personnel would not have been excessive.

Telephone Wire W-130 was too light for the jungle and was used only for initial and temporary installations. Wire W-110 was entirely satisfactory and could be handled readily when made up into three-hundred yard coils.

Almost all failures of wire communication were caused by vehicles running off the trails or by road building machinery pushing trees across the lines. Overhead lines are most desirable, and too much emphasis cannot be placed on indoctrinating wire parties to keep the lines off the ground and away from vehicular trails and other personnel to protect wire lines from damage.

Radio was secondary to the telephone in this campaign. The TBY found no employment other than in Shore to Ship communications; the TBX was very satisfactory, and the TOS, though limited by the few roads, with its great reserve of power and ease of operation, was especially valuable for fast voice circuits. There were few failures in the TBX and TOS, all of which could be repaired quickly by the Regimental maintenance personnel.

Message Center procedure was standard throughout the Regiment. The necessity for thoroughly trained messengers was always evident.

Three Codes would have been sufficient for the entire operation; yet, in spite of a large number of codes carried, messages were received encoded in accordance with an SOI a copy of which had not been issued to the Regiment. This, caused undoubtedly by the great, and perhaps excessive, number of SOI's in use in the area, might have resulted in serious trouble.

A Regimental Supply Dump and Repair Shop was maintained at the Regimental Rear Command Post under the supervision of the Assistant Regimental Communications Officer. This was an

invaluable and essential service: there was approximately ~~a 100% weekly turn-over~~ in telephones throughout the Regiment as a result of the rains and hard service, but seldom was damage incurred that could not be remedied quickly in the Repair Shop.

WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS

Aside from the great care required in maintaining self-loading weapons in operating condition in the sand, mud and dampness, all weapons performed their functions most satisfactorily.

It was evident that the Carbine, M1, should not be considered as a substitute for the Rifle because of its lack of penetration and shocking power. This weapon was particularly difficult to keep in operating condition.

The Automatic Rifle, in spite of its weight, is a most necessary weapon in jungle fighting, and it was agreed that there should be three automatic rifles in the twelve-man Rifle Squads, particularly in the interest of the Four Man Fire Team, previously discussed.

The most important characteristics of the small arms cartridge in jungle fighting are: great penetration; high velocity; heavy weight and, terrific shocking power. Flashless powder and the non-corrosive primer would add materially to security and to the durability of the weapons.

~~It is agreed that, for the jungle, both 60mm and 81mm~~ Mortar shell of all types should be fitted with a universal Super Quick-Short Delay Fuse so that Tree or Ground Bursts could be obtained at will and as the situation required.

TRACTOR TRAILERS

The Caterpillar Tractor and the Athey Trailer were extremely valuable in the movement of equipment and supplies during the Battle of the Five Forks. Over muddy, unimproved roads, when all other forms of transportation except Amphibian Tractors failed, the Tractors and Trailers were able to get through: as a matter of fact, the broad tracks of the trailers often served to restore sections of roads that had become so rutted as to be impassable to 1/4 Ton Trucks.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE

The outstanding characteristic of the Japanese in the Battle of the Piva Forks was his amazing ineptness in the tactical use of artillery. His gunnery was excellent but the placement of his batteries was so poor that, without exception, they were soon detected and destroyed and always within a few hours after they had begun their adjustments. Their concentrations were of but short duration; the greatest number of rounds fired on a single target was fifty, fired by a four-gun battery which was detected by its muzzle blasts by one of our Forward Observers who almost instantaneously destroyed it with counter-battery fire. The scarcity of ammunition and the difficulty of transporting it through the jungle readily accounts for the short duration of Japanese artillery fires but there is no reasonable explanation for the Japanese repeatedly placing their guns on the forward slopes of hills under our observation and then firing them even at twilight or night when the muzzle flashes of the guns fixed their positions as surely as if they had turned a spotlight on them.

The Japanese made frequent use of their 90mm mortars during the period 17 to 25 November. This weapon is, by far, the most potent of any in the Japanese armament, even including their 15 centimeter gun when used as an anti-personnel weapon. The 90mm shell contains an explosive having such a terrifically high velocity of reaction as to be incomprehensible to one who has not been subjected to its force. Although the 90mm mortar was usually fired in series of only five rounds at a given target and while probably not over 150 rounds of this shell was fired into the Regimental Battle Position, it is not unlikely that more than one-fifth of all battle casualties suffered by this Regiment were inflicted by the blast or the fragments of 90mm mortar shells.

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DEFENSE OF THE EASTERN SECTOR

27 NOVEMBER--22 DECEMBER, 1943

The principle features of interest in connection with the defense of the Eastern Sector, from Hill 500 to the mouth of the Torokina River were: the wide frontage which was assigned for defense; the expedients resorted to provide a reasonably sound defense, and, the difficulties encountered in the supply of the troops in position.

TACTICS

Although the area was, for the greater part, deep swamp and dense jungle, it could not be considered impassable, but it was certain that large forces could not advance any considerable distance through it without being detected by one or more of the many patrols which were kept moving back and forth through the swamp during the daylight hours or by the Listening Posts which were maintained during the night. Every possible Battle Position along the front was heavily wired and mined. The Plan of Defense was based on the premise that Japanese forces approaching from the east could not reach our wire before our troops, warned by our patrols, could be moved into a position to oppose the advance of the enemy into our Beach Head. As it developed, from the report of frequent patrols sent across the Torokina, the Japanese apparently had no plans for the area other than to keep it under observation.

The rules in connection with this type of counter-patrolling which were very much to the point during this time were: First, do not move over your own trails the second time (emphasizing the rule to stay off trails always), and, Second, do not heckle the same Japanese Outpost twice unless prepared to fight a full scale war on the second go-round. Do either of these things and the Japanese will be ready and waiting.

SUPPLY

As in the advance through the swamp earlier in the campaign, the troops could not have been supplied in the positions they occupied without an exorbitant expenditure of manpower had it not been for the amphibian tractors.

From the first of December until the regiment left its position, bread was supplied by a Bakery Unit of the Service and Supply Company which was set up in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post. Bread was baked daily in the form of Pan Rolls, with two large rolls provided for each man in the Regiment and its reinforcing units. The rolls were considered to be far more satisfactory than loaf bread considering the problems of delivery and distribution. The uniformly high quality of the work done by this Bakery Unit attests to the adequacy of the equipment furnished and the industry and skill of the bakers who operated it.

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MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS

REGIMENTAL WEAPONS COMPANY

The Regimental Weapons Company found valuable employment in the attack of bunkers on Cape Torokina, in beach defense during more than six weeks of the campaign and in reinforcing and extending the defensive installations during the Battle of the Piva Forks and the Defense of the Eastern Sector.

The 37mm gun, M3A1 on the M4A1 mount has characteristics which make it most suitable for anti-boat gunnery, and this weapons was available in sufficient numbers to permit the establishment of a formidable defense on a wide front.

The Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton, 4 x 4, was not considered adequate as a prime mover for the M4 mount over the muddy jungle jeep trails because of its low road clearance: the Truck, 1 Ton, 4 x 4, would have been satisfactory.

The low silhouette of the M4 Mount was a distinct disadvantage in the dense, head-high brush carpeting the jungle which so limited the field of fire of the gun as to make it extremely difficult to locate suitable positions from which to deliver even defensive fires. For this reason, it was considered that the M6 Mount with a higher silhouette, higher plane of fire and greater mobility than the M4 with the $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton prime mover is the most suitable weapon of its type in a dense jungle.

The 75mm gun, M3, was extremely valuable in the attack against Cape Torokina and thereafter formed the key of the defenses of beaches assigned to the Regiment. These weapons are versatile: On one occasion they delivered accurate fire at a range of 6900 yards on a suspected Japanese Observation Post located on MAGINE ISLAND.

During the training of this company, considerable time was devoted to the supplementary subjects of Boat Identification, Demolitions, Attack of Bunkers and the technique of Machine Guns on Ground Mounts. As a result of this, a number of proficient demolition squads from the Regimental Weapons Company rendered important services, not only at Cape Torokina where they were solely responsible for the destruction of several bunkers, but throughout the entire campaign. Again, on the Piva Forks and during the Defense of the Easter Sector

where the terrain prevented the employment of the anti-tank guns, the company efficiently emplaced and manned many machine guns as a result of which the lines were materially extended and strengthened.

It is considered that the Flame Throwers which are now carried by the Engineers should be assigned to the Regimental Weapons Company and their number increased to twelve per Rifle Regiment.

MEDICAL SERVICE

Since the inception of the regiment, the medical personnel habitually trained in the field with the units to which they were attached participating in all problems and undergoing the tactical training of their units. This, in addition to the excellent professional attainments of the doctors and corpsmen resulted in exceptionally efficient medical service during combat.

The procedure in the collection, treatment and evacuation of the sick and wounded generally followed the principles set forth in Field Manual 7-30, "Service Company and Medical Detachment (Supply and Evacuation) Rifle Regiment", modified where necessary to suit the organization of the Marine Regiment and the Medical Battalion.

In the training of medical personnel, special emphasis was placed on the following subjects: First Aid; Administration of Plasma, with actual practice to insure the acquiring of skill in vena-puncture; the keeping of simple but standardized records of casualties in combat, and the functions of the Battalion and Regimental Medical Sections, the Collecting Sections and the Medical Company. It was considered vitally important for all medical personnel to be skilled in the use of the compass.

Company "C", Third Medical Battalion which served with the Regiment in Samoa, supported the Third Marines during combat on Bougainville. The mutual understanding and common interests which bound these two organizations as a result of their long service together was a major factor in the efficiency of the medical service.

It is necessary that all of the installations of the Field Hospital, including Wards and Operating Rooms be dug in. There was no place within the Beach Head where a hospital could be set up and expect to be safe from enemy action. As a matter of fact, due to the terrain and difficulties of transportation, it was necessary for the Field Hospital to be established close to the front lines. There are insufficient personnel in the Medical Company to dig in the Field Hospital, therefore, whenever a displacement is contemplated, Engineer Troops must be made available to the Medical Company to assist them.

As an indication of the difficulties under which the surgeons were expected to, and did, perform major surgical operations, bombs, mortar shells and artillery frequently fell within fifty yards of the installations, and on one occasion it was necessary for the medical personnel to make a stand against the approach of a Japanese patrol which had successfully advanced over one thousand yards within our lines.

The battle casualties of the Bougainville Campaign were extremely light, considering the numbers actually engaged at points of contact, the fact that the enemy was emplaced in a defensive position with all the advantages of the terrain in his favor in each engagement, the high proportion of automatic weapons employed by the enemy, and the great number of casualties inflicted on the defender by the attacker. This latter figure was all out of proportion to normal combat experiences.

Not less than 1,696 Japanese were killed in action in contacts with the Third Marines, Reinforced: the battle casualties of the Third Marines, no attached troops included, were as follows:

(a) November 1 to 26 inclusive (Battles of Cape Torokina, Koromokina, Numa Numa Trail and Piva Forks)

Killed in Action		98
Missing in Action*		17
Wounded in Action		370
Extremities	240	
Head	16	
Chest	19	
Abdomen	8	
Back	19	
Blast Concussion	68	

TOTAL..... 485

* Includes 16 missing from Landing Craft off Cape Torokina.

(b) November 27 to December 22 (In Defensive Sector)

Killed in Action		0
Missing in Action		0
Wounded in Action		12
Extremities	10	
Chest	1	
Blast Concussion	1	

TOTAL..... 12

Non-battle casualties were as follows:

	<u>Nov 1-Nov 27</u>	<u>Nov 28-Dec 25</u>	<u>Total</u>
Malaria	80	114	194
Filariasis	111	306	417
War Neurosis	16	11	27
Dysentery	13	5	18
Fungus Infection	46	10	56
Injuries	25	7	32
Combat Fatigue	247	20	267
Other Diseases	<u>121</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>320</u>
	659	672	1331

With respect to Combat Fatigue, it was discovered that quite a few of these casualties later developed signs of Filariasis, and it may be that the fatigue and exhaustion which resulted in evacuation for Combat Fatigue may have been a prodromal manifestation of Filariasis: statistics on this point are not available.

EAC/cm

9th Mar, 3d Mar Div, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.
5 February, 1944.

From: CO.
To : CG, 3d Mar Div.
Subject: Report of Operations, 9th Marines, Nov-Dec, 1943.
Reference: (a) Letter, CG, 3d Mar Div, ALB/crw, dated Jan 4, 1944.
Enclosures: (A) Overlays, No's 1 - 14.
(B) Report of Engagement of 1st Bn, 9th Mar.
(C) Report of Engagement of Co K, 3d Bn, 9th Mar.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report, covering the CHERRY BLOSSOM operation, is submitted:

2. The following lists the operations of this Regiment:

Nov 1: 9th CT, consisting of the following units -

9th Marines,
3d Rdr Bn, 2d Rdr Regt,
1st Bn, 12th Mar,
Det H&S Btry, 12th Mar,
1st Bn, 19th Mar (less Cos B & C),
Co D, 19th Mar,
Co G, 19th Mar,
Co A, 3d MT Bn,
Co A, 3d Med Bn,
Co E, 3d Med Bn,
1st Plat, S&S Co, 3d Serv Bn,
Det Mun Sec, 1st Plat, Ord Co,
1st Band Sec, Div Spl Trs,
1st & 4th Plats, Co D, 3d Tk Bn,
H&S Co, 3d Tk Bn,
3d Sig Co,
Det H&S Co, 19th Mar,
Det Co C, 3d Amph Trac Bn,
3d MP Co,
Hq Co, Hq Bn, 3d Mar Div,
Adv Ech, Hq IMAC,

landed on Beaches Red 1, 2 & 3 and Green 1 & 2 with the mission of seizing Obj O-a and furnishing protection and shore parties for Beaches Yellow 3 & 4, prepared for further operations ashore. (See Overlay No. 1).

H-hour was 0730. By 0750 signals had been made by all assault units indicating that they had landed successfully. At 0826, Beaches Red 1, 2 & 3, and Yellow 3 & 4 were strafed by a formation of three Zeros. One officer was KIA and five enlisted men WIA from the 3d LT as a result of these strafings. As a result of heavy surf conditions on these Beaches, a total of 70 Boats bronched and were put out of service during D-day. The landings on Beaches Red 1, 2 & 3, and Yellow 3 & 4 were made without opposition. The 3d Rdr Bn, with 9th Mar Regtl Wpns Co (less 3 Plats), Atchd, landing on Beach Green 1 (Puruata Island) met opposition consisting of 1 R Plat, Reinf. Fighting continued until 1800, 2 Nov, when Puruata Island was secured. Our casualties were 6 KIA and 18 WIA. By 1300, Obj O-1 had been secured, contact established between all Bns and with the 3d Mar on the right. The terrain was mostly dense jungle and swamp. Patrolling out to limits of Fwd Rcn and W to the Laruma River started at 0930. Laruma River patrol reported no enemy contact and set up an outpost in vicinity of Pt (126.3 216.6). Due to bad surf conditions and hostile air attacks, unloading of transports was not completed, ships departing after dusk. All lines dug in for the night. Regtl CP at (129.4 - 215.8).

ENCLOSURE "G" to 3d Mar Div Combat Report.

Nov 2: At daylight, in accordance with prearranged plans, LT-2 started drawing in its left flank to tie in to the W limit of Beach Red 2 preparatory to the shift of LT-1 to Beach Blue 1. Two Btrys of 1st Bn, 12th Mar registered on the Laruma River. Transports returned to anchorage and resumed unloading supplies and equipment to Beaches Blue 1, Yellow 1 & 2. At 0830, LT-1 commenced withdrawal and movement to Beach Blue 1 by Amph Tracs, completing the movement at 1730. LT-1 went into bivouac vicinity Beach Blue 1 under operational control of 3d Mar prepared to relieve 1st Bn, 3d Mar on Nov 3. Patrols to Fwd limit of Rcn and to the Laruma River reported no enemy contacts. At 1800 3d Rdr Bn reported Puruata Island clear of Japanese. Movement of supplies and equipment from Beaches Red 2 and Yellow 4 to Beach Yellow 1 was started. Orders for the relief of the 3d Mar Sector by 9th CT were received.

Nov 3: During night of Nov 2-3, 3d Rdr Bn on Puruata Island received sniper and MG fire. Since island had been cleared on the previous day it was believed the Japanese came from Torokina Island. LT-2 was withdrawn from Beach Red 2 and went into position in rear of 3d Rdrs who had established a road block on the Piva Trail. LT-3 extended its left flank to W limit of Beach Red 1 and was transferred to operational control of 3d CT. LT-1 relieved 1st Bn, 3d Mar and extended beachhead 1500 yds E of Cape Torokina with patrols to Piva River and inland. LT-1 established contact with LT-2 prior to darkness. 1st Bn, 3d Mar went into Regtl Res under operational control 9th CT. At 1300, two Plats of the 3d Rdr Bn were landed on Torokina Island after a 15 minute Arty preparation by 1st Bn, 12th Mar. This landing was successful and the island promptly secured. No casualties. All units dug in for the night. Regtl CP at (133.2 - 213.3) (See Overlay No. 1).

Nov 4: Continued active patrolling; LT-3 to Laruma River, LT-1 to Torokina River and both these LTs to Limit of Fwd Rcn. LT-2 reported enemy sniping at their lines. No casualties. Laruma River patrol reported 1 Japanese seen on Laruma River. All Rdrs except 1 Co at Puruata and Torokina Islands, withdrawn from those Islands by authority CG, 3d Mar Div. 1 Co, 3d Rdr Bn holding Piva Trail road block. Rdr Regt Atchd to 9th CT until further orders. 3d Rdr Bn reverted to 2d Rdr Regt by CO, 9th CT. Co G, 19th Mar reverted to 19th Mar control and Co A, 3d Med Bn reverted to 3d Med Bn control. 1 Co, 2d Rdr Regt patrolling Fwd to select airfield site. 9th CT supply dumps organized and functioning at Beach Blue 1. At 1300, Torokina River patrol from 1st Bn, 9th Mar killed 1 Japanese near Beach on W side of Piva River.

Nov 5: At 2200, road block attacked by enemy forces. No casualties. Some Japanese killed. Second contact at 2330. No casualties. Beach Blue 1 was bombed by an undetermined number of Japanese planes.

Nov 6: Patrol from Co G, 2d Rdrs returned having made contact with enemy forces during night of 5-6 Nov and having lost one officer and nine men and inflicted similar casualties on Japanese. Continued active patrolling to front and to Laruma and Torokina Rivers. No contacts reported. Co A, 3d MT Bn reverted to Div control. 1st Bn, 21st Mar placed under operational control of 9th CT, relieved 1st Bn, 3d Mar, which reverted to 3d CT.

Nov 7: Sub-sector bombed during early hours of morning. Japanese forces landed at daybreak on W flank of 3d Bn, 9th Mar. Engagement continued all day. At 0750, 1st Bn, 21st Mar was ordered to report to 3d CT and moved by boats from Beach Blue 1 by 1050. The Laruma River patrol and Beach patrol W of 3d Bn, 9th Mar were cut off by enemy landing. Regtl Wpns Plat and Co K, 3d Bn, 9th Mar heavily engaged all day near Beach on left flank of Div BHL and suffered 5 KIA and 12 WIA, two of these dying of wounds at a later date. 1st Bn, 3d Mar passed through the lines of 3d Bn, 9th Mar after a five hour engagement. Beach patrol from Co M, 3d Bn 9th Mar engaged Japanese force advancing from direction of Atsinima River suffered one officer and one man wounded and killed twenty Japanese. Patrol was extricated from position between Jap forces by boat. (See Enclosure C for details of action on W flank). Rdrs holding road block were Atkd by unknown number of Japanese. Mortars from 2d Bn, 9th Mar in direct support of Rdrs. 1st Bn, 19th Mar organized Beach Def on Beach Blue 1 and placed in sub-sector Res for the night. At 1400, patrol from 1st Bn, 9th Mar captured one POW in swamp W of Piva River.

Nov 8: At 1400, Rdr Co passed through road block and Atkd to N. 4th Plat, Regtl Wpns Co with 2 Tks was ordered to Reinf the road block. At 1600, 2d Rdr Regt, having committed 2 Reinf Cos to action and being unable to advance, withdrew behind road block for the night. At 1600, 1st Bn, 148th Inf reported under operational control 9th CT, and was assigned mission as Sub-sector Res. Orders were received from CG, 3d Mar Div for 9th CT to organize Atk and clear Japanese from front of road block commencing at daylight, Nov 9. Supply to 2d Rdrs and to 2d Bn, 9th Mar, was very difficult on account of swampy trails.

Nov 9: At 0800, CO, 9th CT, went Fwd to coordinate Atk on Japanese positions Fwd of road block. 3d Rdr Bn Atkd with 2 Cos abreast astride Piva Trail after a 15 minute Arty preparation by 1st Bn, 12th Mar. 2d Bn, 9th Mar in support. 1 Sec of Tks and 4th Plat, Regtl Wpns Co in Res. Atk advanced slowly at not more than 100 yds per hour. Flanking maneuvers were restricted by swamp. 3d Rdr Bn advanced to vicinity of (135.0 - 214.4) and dug in for the night. At 1430, 3d Bn, 9th Mar reverted to 9th CT having been relieved by 2d Bn, 148th Inf on Div left flank. At 1800, 3d Bn, 9th Mar designated as Div Res. Laruma River patrol from Co K, 3d Bn, 9th Mar returned at 1000 with one officer and one man WIA after having been in contact with Jap forces throughout Nov 8th & 9th. 1st Bn, 148th Inf reverted to parent organization. 9th CT was ordered to pass through 3d Rdr Bn and continue Atk and capture Piva Village tomorrow morning, Nov 10. Patrols to Torokina River and to the E. reported no contact. Patrol from 2d Bn, 9th Mar, suffered seven men KIA or WIA when caught by Japanese advance against the road block. (For disposition of units, see Overlay No. 2.)

Nov 10: Plan of Atk: At 0930, 9th CT to pass through 3d Rdr Bn in column of Bns, 2d Bn, 9th Mar, in assault, 1st Bn, 9th Mar, in support. 3d Bn, 9th Mar remained in Div Res occupying R flank of Div BH. 3d Bn, 2d Rdr Regt, was assigned mission of protecting left (NW) flank of Atk. Atk to be preceded by 15 Minute Arty preparation from 0910 to 0925. At 0925, 1 Squadron (12 planes) to bomb and strafe sides of Piva Village Trail and Piva Village.

Site of bombing run was marked by Arty smoke when planes arrived on station at 0900 (planes acknowledged target at 0920). H-hour was held up for ten minutes to allow Rdr patrol to withdraw from the area Fwd of L/D. At 0945, planes made bombing run and 2d Bn, 9th Mar, Atkd. At 1100, Piva Village was occupied by 2d Bn, 9th Mar, which organized a perimeter Def around Piva Village and dug in. 1st Bn, 9th Mar, dug in astride Numa-Numa Trail 250 yds to the N of Numa-Numa Trail - Piva Trail junction. Regtl CP established vicinity of Pt (135.2 - 214.6) (See Overlay No. 3). Supply Dps were organized on Piva Village Trail with Amph Tracs bringing up rations and Am. Co A, 19th Mar, re-attached to 9th CT. Orders were received from CG, 3d Mar Div, to occupy and organize the line A to E commencing at daylight tomorrow, Nov 11. 2d Rdr Regt detached 9th Mar and placed in Div Res. (See Overlay No. 4). Between 2130 and 0100 received repeated bombings by relays of Japanese bombers.

Nov 11: Line A to E occupied. Ground organized for Def. Contact with 3d Bn, 3d Mar, on the left by patrol. Regtl CP established at (135.3 - 215.5). Supply by Amph Tracs very difficult. No other type of vehicle was able to negotiate swampy trail from beaches. (For disposition of units, see Overlay No. 4).

Nov 12: Improving front line positions. Extensive patrolling for enemy activity, mapping, and gathering trail information.

Nov 13-14: At 0800, 2d Bn, 21st Mar passed through our front lines up Numa-Numa Trail and at 0930 became heavily engaged with Japanese forces 2000 yds Fwd of our lines. 3d Bn, 9th Mar captured one POW. Supply situation critical due to bad trails and swampy terrain. Much of this period was spent in hand carrying supplies, the making and breaking of supply routes and in evacuation of casualties of 2d Bn, 21st Mar through Regtl Aid Sta.

Nov 15: Advanced Regtl line to position generally N-S on W bank of Piva River. 3d Bn, 9th Mar relieved of Def of E Beach Limit by 3d Def Bn and took position tying in on R flank of Regtl Line. Regtl Wpns Co was Atchd to 3d Bn, 9th Mar. Continued organization of supply and construction of roads and trails. (For disposition of units, see Overlay No. 5).

Nov 16-20: Continued organization of the ground and active patrolling to the E across the Piva River for hostile activity and for route of advance and terrain information. Bridge crossing sites reconnoitered for and bridges across Piva River constructed in preparation for advance. On the 17th, patrol from Co C, 1st Bn, 9th Mar had contact with enemy 500 yds in front of its company area; two men KIA and two others WIA (one of these dying of the wounds the next day). Other minor contacts reported by patrols from 2d Bn, 9th Mar.

Nov 21: 9th CT advanced to general N-S line 1000 yds E of Piva River occupied and commenced organizing this line for Def. Tied in on beach on R flank and with 21st Mar on left flank. No enemy contacts during advance. (For disposition of units, see Overlay No. 6).

Nov 22-23: Continued organization of ground with intensive patrolling to the front at all points.

Nov 24: Reserve Bn (1st Bn, 9th Mar) ordered to Reinf 3d Mar Sector at 1430; reported thereat and went under control 3d CT at 1730. (See Overlay No. 7).

Nov 25: 1st Bn, 9th Mar committed to action by 3d Mar and engaged with enemy forces in vicinity of Pt (136.2 - 218.7). (For detailed report of action, see Enclosure-B). 3d Bn, 9th Mar was ordered under control 3d Mar and moved to 3d Mar Sec, 1st Bn, 145th Inf relieving 3d Bn, 9th Mar at 1410. (See Overlay No. 8).

Nov 26: 1st Bn, 9th Mar continued Atk at daybreak and reached its Obj by 1000. 3d Bn, 9th Mar relieved 3d Bn, 3d Mar. 1st Bn, 3d Mar in Res under control of 9th CT. 3d Mar and 9th Mar exchanged commands of sub-sectors at 1600. (See Overlay No. 9).

Nov 27: 2d Bn, 9th Mar was relieved by 3d Mar and relieved 2d Rdr of positions on left of Regtl Sector (See Overlay No. 10).

Nov 28: 9th Mar advanced to new line (FOX) with 1st Bn, 9th Mar and 2d Bn, 9th Mar in assault, 3d Bn, 9th Mar in Res. Regtl Wpns Co, 9th Mar was relieved by 3d Spl Wpns Bn and assigned AT Def of Regtl Sec. (For positions occupied, see Overlay No. 11).

Nov 29-30: Continued organization of the ground and intensive patrolling to the front. Several minor contacts reported by patrols.

Dec 1: Continued normal patrols to the front. Reconnoitered final perimeter defense line.

Dec 2: 3d Bn, 9th Mar sent 15 man patrol to high ground (Hill 1000).

Dec 3-4: All units continued patrolling Fwd of their lines. Road construction to present unit positions continued at slow rate due to swampy terrain.

Dec 5: 2d Bn, 9th Mar patrol had contact with Japanese; two KIA and two WIA. Jap opposition totaled 10 Japs with light MGs who withdrew after a few bursts. 3d Prcht Bn passed through our lines to occupy Hill 1000.

Dec 6: R-2 and 40 man patrol left to reconnoiter area 6000 yds forward of front lines.

Dec 7: 3d Bn, 9th Mar moved from Regtl Res to a position extending from the R flank of 2d Bn, 9th Mar and the left flank of 1st Bn, 9th Mar, respectively, to a Pt near Hill 1000 where they tied in with the 3d Prcht Bn. All units continued aggressive patrolling. 3d Bn, 9th Mar reported Japs in front of their lines. Our Arty shelled enemy occupied area within 50 yds of our front lines. (See Overlay No. 12).

Dec 8: R-2 patrol returned having killed one Japanese; also reported having seen unoccupied Japanese positions in vicinity of (141.8 220.4). 3d Bn, 9th Mar reported finding 7 enemy dead in area shelled by Arty in front of their lines yesterday. All units continued normal patrols.

Dec 9: Co B, 1st Bn, 9th Mar moved up to take position in gap between 3d Bn, 9th Mar and 3d Prcht Bn. At 1545, Prcht Bn was hit hard by Reinf Co of Japanese. At 1620, remainder of 1st Bn, 9th Mar and a Bn of 21st Mar were ordered to leave their positions and move up to a bivouac area preparatory to reinforcing or relieving the 3d Prcht Bn. (For dispositions of our units, see Overlay No. 13).

Dec 10: 1st Bn, 9th Mar and 1st Bn, 21st Mar relieved 3d Prcht Bn on Hill 1000. 3d Prcht Bn attached to 9th Mar as Sub-sector Res. (For disposition of our troops, see Overlay No. 14).

Dec 11: All units conducted normal patrolling.

Dec 12: 1st Bn, 9th Mar reported enemy Arty registering towards evening. All units conducted normal patrolling.

Dec 13: 1st Bn, 9th Mar reported 23 Arty shells landing in Bn area during morning and resulting in injuries to some of our troops. 1st Bn, 9th Mar reported friendly plane bombing and strafing its positions during evening, killing one and injuring several of our men.

Dec 14: All units continued aggressive patrolling. Some Japanese mortar shells fell in 1st Bn, 9th Mar area.

Dec 15-16-17-18-19: Patrolling continued.

Dec 20: Preparations made for the evacuation of "A" Category gear and personnel on Dec 21.

Dec 21-22: Japanese Arty shells landed in 1st Bn, 9th Mar area. Our Arty placed heavy concentrations on suspected Japanese positions.

Dec 23: Land mine exploded in 1st Bn, 9th Mar area and killed one Lt and one enlisted man and injured four other members of Co A.

Dec 24-25: Normal patrolling.

Dec 26: Enemy Arty estimated to be 3 Btrys shelled Evansville area in the evening. Our Arty conducted counter-Btry fire during night.

Dec 27: All units relieved of front line positions in the morning and moved to bivouac area preparatory to embarking for BEVY tomorrow. 3dPrcht Bn detached from 9th CT and was Atchd to 164th Inf. 9th Mar CP closed at 1200.

Dec 28: 9th Mar embarked for BEVY.

3. COMMENTS:

(a) Intelligence: Maps and Aerial Photographs furnished for this operation were found to be inadequate in that they failed to show the true terrain conditions, particularly as regards swampy areas. Information of the terrain Fwd of our lines was obtained almost entirely from patrol reports. Information gained from these patrols, was as a whole, reliable. The terrain in general followed the sketches which were brought back by patrols. Distant patrolling was conducted by this Regt but the information gained was generally of more use to the higher echelons as it did not pertain to conditions to our immediate front.

The use of trained dogs to operate with our patrols was found helpful and gave patrols confidence.

Numerous documents were captured and forwarded to higher echelon for examination. Prisoners captured gave information of some value as to identity of units and condition of enemy troops.

Generally speaking, Japanese tactics in the jungle followed the pattern previously reported in numerous documents and bulletins disseminated to this organization during course of training.

It was noticeable on numerous occasions that the enemy would occupy previously dug emplacements for a limited period, only to withdraw and re-occupy them at a later date.

Japanese methods of marking trails appeared very efficient. Trails were found to be marked by vines attached to trees three feet above the ground. These were apparently used for night guidance. Also used were previously reported Japanese stake markers with name of trail written on face of stake. In one instance, in the vicinity of the Tokina River, it was noted that bamboo strips were used to indicate the junction of a trail with the river bed (thick vegetation along bank of river prevented quick detection of trail opening when observed from Japanese held bank).

In general, Japanese emplacements found in the Empress Augusta Bay Area followed closely the patterns described in previous Intelligence Bulletins. Most common type of individual emplacement were one-man foxholes, dug into the side of hills under large rocks and between roots of giant banyan trees. In one instance a large dugout capable of protecting a small CP was dug under rock.

(b) Tactical Phases: Our standard tactical doctrines proved to be adequate and sound. Our attacking formations were well adapted to the ground. The Atk was ordinarily made in Contact Imminent Formation with two Bns abreast, Bns with two Cos abreast, with Cos in Plat columns.

The use of supporting weapons, particularly HMGs and Mortars, was rather restricted due to lack of observation and natural fields of

fire. Arty supporting fires and aircraft support were excellent. Air support is not only feasible in this type of terrain but also invaluable, both from the standpoint of morale of our own troops and for its ability to inflict heavy damage upon hostile dispositions to the immediate front.

Reconnaissance for the bomber strip found that the only suitable site was a considerable distance inland and as a result it was necessary to establish a long BHL immediately with the troops available. Such frontages as had to be assigned, therefore, created great difficulties in supply and evacuation as well as communication and security measures which placed an extra burden upon the subsector defense force. These difficulties were overcome by careful planning for each contingency, intensive patrol schedules, and the construction of numerous roads, trails and communication facilities.

Patrols, in general, consisted of one officer and twenty men with a high percentage of automatic Wpns included. The BAR is considered an invaluable weapon for patrolling. The use of machetes on patrols must be limited since no sound travels as far in the jungle as a chopping noise.

(c) Specific Engagements: (See Enclosures B & C).

(d) Movement: This organization landed on the left flank of the Div with 3 LTs abreast. It was moved in successive echelons to the right flank of the Div Sec. This movement was accomplished by Amph Tracs and marching. Much difficulty was experienced in maintaining supplies and organizational equipment in a state of combat readiness, particularly during the early phases of the operation due to the fact that the bulk of our supplies and equipment could not be landed on assigned beaches behind Bns, but were landed some miles away behind another organization. This was necessary due to all boats broaching on the original landing beaches assigned to us. However, as a consequence much property was lost and never recovered. No night movement of large forces was made at any time. Movement forward in advancing the BHL was usually through the most difficult terrain consisting of virgin jungle, swamps, rivers and mountains. The Amph Tracs proved invaluable both in ferrying troops from the left to the right flank of the BHL when that move was made as well as transporting supplies forward through swamps that were impassable to any other type of transportation.

(e) Supply: Paragraph 4(b) of this report contains recommendations pertaining to supply.

(f) Evacuation: Due to unforeseen circumstances, the Med Co which normally operates with this Regt was unable to function with this organization during the early stages of the operation. During the latter stages a new Med Co was assigned to the Regt.

The evacuation of the sick and wounded, and of the dead, from the front lines to the Regtl Aid Sta was normally carried out by litters over swamp and difficult terrain. The evacuation from the Regtl Aid Sta was usually accomplished by Amph Tracs, which again proved their great value in this operation.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Intelligence: Aerial photographs, particularly obliques, taken at low level and in sufficient numbers to provide at least one set for each Plat, should be supplied prior to the landing. Similar photographs of terrain over which advance is intended likewise should be made available. Photo maps showing definite terrain conditions are essential.

It is recommended that intensive instruction in Rcn patrolling be given all Inf Units.

(b) Supply:

(1) Rations: The emergency rations as issued gave sufficient food value for periods when hot food could not be provided. For continuous supply of a week or more in stabilized positions, where galleys can not be set up, the 5-in-1 rations is considered superior to the "J" ration. The "J" rations, in either case however, should be added over and above any regular emergency ration in sufficient quantity to provide additional variety to the men. This Regt had to subsist three Bns for one month during which rations were manhandled from

one to two miles over difficult terrain. One Bn had to manhandle all its rations and supplies for a period of eight days through swamps during the early stages of the operation. In this connection it was found that the ration most easily transported in bulk, by hand, is the "B" ration. It was found that more and better food could be furnished using the type "B" rations, considering even the extra burden of bringing up the galleys and fuel, and with less strain on carrying parties than if the concentrated loads in which the emergency rations are boxed were used. On this operation, galley equipment known as the "outfit cooking pack", was found adequate. Stoves are too bulky and add little to a field cook's ability to produce palatable food under the conditions of supply and types of food available.

(2) Ammunition: Where ammunition has to be manhandled over difficult terrain for long distances, it is recommended that the small arms ammunition box sizes be halved as this will facilitate the handling even in the rear areas.

(3) Clothing: Clothing of the type issued was adequate. It is recommended that the issue of one camouflage suit with large pockets be made standard for combat operations. The transport pack containing extra clothing was not a satisfactory medium of supply for the individual during this operation. It is impracticable for a man to be loaded with a transport pack while engaged in combat. Transport packs, hastily dumped in assembly areas, are subject to weather deterioration, rear area bombings, pilfering and loss. If clothing can be issued by the QM as opportunities are afforded by the combat situation, the transport pack with its consequent deficiencies may and should be eliminated. Fresh clothing must be issued at frequent intervals to prevent spread of "jungle rot" and infected feet.

Smaller sizes in clothing, especially trousers, should be supplied. The present system of clothing sizes does not work. At least 70% of the men wear no larger than a size 33 waist after a short time in actual combat. The new Army combat boot with 5 inch top should be issued in lieu of our present field shoe.

(4) Supply Routes: Each Inf Regt must have attached at least one Combat Engr Co, with at least 2 TD-9 Bulldozers, in order to function at high efficiency in this type of terrain. Any other arrangement lessens combat efficiency and movement of the organization. The construction of corduroy road beds should be avoided when other types of roads are capable of being constructed. During this operation it was noted that CB Bns with their heavy road making equipment could construct a two-way, all purpose road, at a much faster rate per day, rain or shine, than corduroy could be cut and laid for temporary roadway. Corduroy took many more manhours per road foot and required personnel in such large numbers as to hinder other necessary work.

(c) Transportation: This headquarters recommends the following additional motor transportation be assigned to combat teams as a result of this operation: 1 Athey Trailer Platoon in lieu of the same number of 2½-ton trucks in the MT Co. It is further recommended that half of the jeeps allotted to the Inf Bns be replaced with one-ton trucks. These trucks can negotiate terrain where jeeps will bog down.

Amphibian Tractors and Athey Trailers with tractor prime mover were the only types of transportation that were suitable in this operation until such times as roads were constructed. We need more of them.

(d) Evacuation: It is recommended that the Med Co regularly assigned this Regt for training be always assigned to this organization in combat. It is recommended that prompt designation of cemeteries be made. Only in extreme cases should it be necessary to inter remains and then remove them later to a cemetery for final burial.

(e) Sanitation: Field sanitary measures were well handled in most instances and as a consequence flies were not a problem. In some cases enemy dead were not buried deeply enough with the result that maggots came through the ground and flies started to breed

necessitating re-burial with a deeper grave. For long periods bathing and washing facilities were not available and the skin condition known as "jungle rot" appeared on a large percentage of troops. It is recommended that the Field Bath and Sterilization units of the Div be pooled and made available to units at specified times. In this way troops will be enabled to get a hot bath and have their combat suits sterilized en masse when they are in a reserve area or can be spared from the front lines.

(f) Guns, 75mm Anti-Tank, Self Propelled: These vehicles did excellent work in knocking out enemy pill boxes on Puruata Island. However, four members of the crew were killed and a number wounded by grenades thrown from trees and from the ground while thus employed. It is recommended that some form of anti-grenade netting be fitted to these vehicles to protect the personnel operating the gun in jungle warfare. Experiments along this line are being conducted by this Regt.

(g) Field Fortifications: A standard type of foxhole suitable for both protection from the elements and enemy fire should be evolved. The tendency among many of the men was to get overhead protection from the rain rather than construct a real defensive position. Where the position is to be held for some time the standard foxhole should be suitable for improvement into a standing fire trench with living space and overhead cover. A board convened within this Regt is now studying this matter.

(h) Postoffice Facilities: Postoffice facilities which would enable men to send and receive registered letters and money orders should be provided at the earliest practicable date after getting settled ashore.


E. A. CRAIG.

~~SECRET~~

3 January, 1944.

From: CO.
To : CO, 9th Mar.


Subject: Account of Engagement with Japanese on 25 November 1943, in Cape Torokina Area, Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville Island, British Solomon Islands.

1. On 24 November, 1943, this Bn was occupying a position in Regtl Res near the Piva River. At 1500 a warning order was received placing the Bn on the alert to move out on 30 minutes notice. At 1600 the Bn was ordered to move N along the Piva Trail and Numa-Numa Trail with orders to report to CO, 3d Mar, under operational control of 3d Mar. At 1730 the Bn reached a point 200 yds S of the 3d Mar CP and was ordered to an assembly area for the night and to be prepared to move into front lines as soon after daylight as possible.

2. During the night the Bn received orders to move out at 0715 on the morning of 25 Nov, 1943, to a position on "Civic Ridge" occupied by Co L, 2d Rdr Regt and Regtl Wpns Co, 3d Mar, from this position to Atk on a front of 400 yds, direction of Atk 80° Mag., objective to extend the left flank of the 3d Bn, 3d Mar. The 2d Rdr Regt to Atk on our left flank on front of 800 yds. The distance to final objective was estimated at 800 yds. Arty support on distant noses to front from H-15 to H-5 and mortar support on close areas from H-5 to H-hour was to be furnished by 3d Mar.

3. It was necessary for the Bn to reach the initial positions on "Civic Ridge" by a very steep trail and by proceeding in single file this was accomplished at 0830, guides being furnished by the 3d Mar. From the position on "Civic Ridge" a good view could be obtained but no observation of close-in terrain. Enemy information was meager.

4. The 1st Bn launched the Atk at 1000, Co A on the left, Co C on the right, Co B in Res to follow on order. Atchd MG Plats supported each Co. Mortar positions were selected on "Civic Ridge." Attacking down the steep slopes of "Civic Ridge", Cos A and C came under fire of enemy automatic weapons and the assault platoons were quickly held up. Both Co Comdrs maneuvered their Res Plats to develop the enemy positions and a fierce fire fight developed that lasted until late evening. A rough sketch of the enemy position is shown below:



The enemy was well dug in, in a complete all-round defense of the knoll and it is estimated that there were 60-70 Japanese in the position with four HMGs, 12 LMGs (Nambus), and plentifully supplied with grenades. The assault Cos tried on all sides to knock out the

(over)

enemy position but the fight was conducted at distances of 5-50 yds and it was found that mortar fire was impossible as it frequently fell too near adjacent Plats. In the main the fight was conducted by use of rifles, BARs, and grenades and all around the hill Marines fought to within a few yds of the crest of the hill and many of the lower dug-outs were destroyed. The 1st Plat of Co A reached the left rear of the Japanese position and fought its way up the Japanese trail nearly into the position. In this action they killed 14 Japanese and severed enemy communication wire. All the other Plats had the same success but were unable to reach the top of the hill. The Japs threw a large number of grenades until the men refer to this action as "Grenade Hill."

At 1530 it was decided to use Co B to close the gap between the right of Co C and the left rear of the 3d Bn, 3d Mar. This was affected by dark but several Japanese groups were encountered and close tying in of the lines was impossible. Co B digging in for the night along the East-West Trail. During their action, they killed two Japanese and silenced several MGs, fighting until after dark.

On the morning of 26 Nov, scouts reported that "Grenade Hill" had been evacuated and it was quickly occupied by Cos A and C. At 1015 the Atk continued, junction was effected with Co B and final objective reached which turned out to be a small ridge astride the East-West Trail.

5. This action was chiefly distinguished by the fierceness of the Atk by our Plats of Cos A and C. With no support they succeeded in killing 32 Japanese in a strongly fortified position and forcing his withdrawal. Co B killed 2 Japanese and undoubtedly all units caused some other damage. 12 LMGs of the Nambu type were destroyed.

6. Our casualties were as follows:

UNIT	KIA	WIA
Co A	1	27
Co B	0	3
Co C	3	9
Co D	0	1
TOTALS	4	40

In addition, one officer and two enlisted were wounded by land mines exploding while moving to the line of departure.

7. Outstanding examples of conduct and leadership on the part of officers and men of this Bn are covered by separate letters of recommendation for medals and Letters of Commendation.

/s/ C. A. RANDALL.
C. A. RANDALL.

WA/ls

HQ, 3d Bn, 9th Mar, 3d Mar Div, FMF.,
IN THE FIELD.

25 January, 1944.

From: CO, 3d Bn, 9th Mar.
To : CO, 9th Mar.

Subject: Report of actions with Japanese Forces by 3d Bn, 9th
Mar on Bougainville, from 1 Nov - 28 Dec., 1943.

1. On 7 Nov, at 0600, two Jap boats landed about 400 yds W of the Div left flank. Co K, with 3d Plat Regtl Wpns Atchd was the left flank Co of the Div. The Japs moved into the jungle and then E toward our line. Initially they were estimated as 50 to 60 men. Mortar and Arty fire was placed on the assumed location of the Japs. There being no Res available then, I Co was ordered to Atk Westward from its defensive position. The Atk was launched at 0820. The left Plat hit the Japs who were digging in about 150 yds from the Div MLR. Very heavy fighting ensued, mainly MG and rifle fire. The center and right Plats of K Co turned S and Atkd the Japs. Many Japs were killed but little advance was made by us as the Japs were being reinforced from boats further down the beach. About 1315 B Co, 3d Mar crossed the MLR on the left and moved up just behind K Co's left. C Co, 3d Mar was supposed to Atk on B's right and echeloned to the rear but they did not contact K Co except later back in the defensive position. When K Co reported that B Co was in position, I ordered K Co to withdraw to its defensive position which they did. Casualties were 5 killed and 13 wounded. The next day 136 Japanese were found dead in the area

2. On 7 Nov about 0600, approximately a Bn of Japs landed near the mouth of the Laruma R. K Co had a patrol of one Plat up the river. This patrol came down the river, ran into the Japs on the E bank, killed several in a skirmish, and seeing that the Japs were coming up both sides of the river, the patrol moved back up stream, ambushing several Japs who were following, and then moved Eastward into the large swamp. During the action the patrol Leader was wounded and one man is still missing. The patrol came through the swamp to K Co lines in 30 hours.

About 0615 a Jap Co (estimated) moved E from the mouth of the Laruma R and ran into the 2d Plat M Co plus a Plat of Co E 3d Tk Bn (Scouts) Atchd, a patrol, which was dug in between the ocean and a swamp. The Japs were surprised and a lot were killed in the initial action. The fighting was fairly heavy, the Japs using rifles, MGs and Mortars. Our patrol had an Arty FO party but its radio did not work. The Arty officer got back to the main lines and called by telephone for a concentration which fell exactly on the Japs. About 1000 the patrol withdrew to successive delaying positions near the beach. They ran into the Japs facing K Co but were soon taken off in boats and returned to Bn. Marine casualties, 2 KIA and 2 WIA. Estimated 25 Japanese dead.

3. About 1630 on 7 Dec 43 a party of Japs approached our lines on the ridge one mile N of Hill 1000. We opened fire and pinned them down on a small knoll about 75 yds N of K Co. They attempted to advance but our MG, rifle and mortar fire stopped them. The firing stopped about 1900. We placed harrassing fire with Arty on the knoll throughout the night. At 0700 the next morning a two-squad patrol investigated the knoll from the West side and found it still occupied by some Japs. 81 and 60mm fire were placed exactly on that spot and a Plat of K Co advanced under cover of 60mm fire to take the knoll. The Japs had just retreated and could be heard down the hill in the jungle. No further contact was made. 30 Jap foxholes were found on the knoll and 7 dead Japs on and in front of it. No Marines were hurt.

/s/ W. ASMUTH, Jr.
W. ASMUTH, Jr.

Encl (C) CO9thMar Ltr CG, 3dMarDiv.

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 21st Marines,
In the Field.
31 January, 1944.

From: The Regimental Commander.
To : The Commanding General, Third Marine Division.
Subject: Operations on Bougainville, report of.
Enclosures: Annex A, Situation Overlays.
Annex B, Operations of 1st Battalion, 21st Marines,
7-14 November, 1943.
Annex C, Operations of 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines,
12-14 November, 1943.
Annex D, Medical Report.

1. The following is a report of operations carried out by this regiment during the Bougainville campaign, 6 November, 1943, to 9 January, 1944, together with comments and recommendations for changes which it is believed these operations revealed are necessary.

2. Summary of Operations.

a. Combat Team 21 moved to Bougainville in three echelons for participation in operations on that island. The first echelon, consisting of the regimental advance command group and the 1st Landing Team, arrived on 6 November 1943 (D+5). Attached special and service troops, engineer, and artillery units of the Landing Team reverted to control of parent organizations after landing, and the 1st Battalion (1st Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company attached) was attached to the 9th Marines, then occupying the right sector of the beachhead, and placed in reserve in the Torokina Point area. The regimental advance CP was established in the same general area. For disposition, see Annex A.

b. On 7 November, 1943, the 1st Battalion (less 1st Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company) was detached by division order from the 9th Marines and moved by landing craft to the left of the beachhead where it was attached to the 3rd Marines for operations against Japanese forces conducting harassing attacks in that area. The 1st Battalion remained in that general area, attached to the 3rd Marines, and subsequently the 148th Infantry, until 14 November, 1943, when it reverted to control of the 21st Marines. For report of operations of the 1st Battalion from 7-14 November, 1943 (inclusive), see Annex B, Operations of the 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, 7-14 November, 1943. The regimental advance command group remained in the Torokina Point area, in close liaison with division headquarters, planning for the bivouacking of the second echelon of the regiment.

c. The second echelon, consisting of the regimental rear command group and the 2nd Landing Team, arrived and landed shortly after daylight on 11 November, 1943. Attached special and service troops, engineer, and artillery units of the 2nd Landing Team reverted to their parent organizations and the 2nd Battalion (less 2nd Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company) was moved north along the Numa-Numa trail to its selected bivouac area. The regimental CP displaced forward at the same time to the same area. Regimental Weapons Company (less two platoons) remained in the Torokina Point area. A regimental rear echelon, consisting of the regimental quartermaster section plus representatives of the supply section of the 2nd Battalion, remained in the Torokina Point area to assemble the equipment of the regiment as it was landed. A QM clerk was stationed n

Puruata Island to look out for regimental equipment landed there. For dispositions of the regiment (less two Battalions and two platoons, Regimental Weapons Company) at the close of operations 11 Nov 43, see Annex A, Situation Overlay.

d. On 12 Nov 43, the 2nd Battalion was moved to a bivouac area farther north on the Numa-Numa Trail, about 400 yards in rear of the 9th Marines' front lines, in order to make sufficient area available for the 1st Battalion whose return was anticipated. There was a definite lack of suitable terrain for bivouac areas throughout the area owing to the swampy nature of the terrain. On the afternoon of 12 Nov 43, the regiment was directed to send, at 0630, 13 Nov 43, a patrol of one company up the Numa-Numa Trail to its junction with the East-West Trail and to reconnoiter beyond the junction along each trail for a distance of 1000 yards with a view to the later establishment by division of a strong outpost in that area. The 2nd Battalion was directed to send a rifle company on this mission. Company "E" was assigned this mission. For dispositions at the close of operations on 12 Nov 43, see Annex A, Overlay. During the night of 12 Nov 43, orders were received from division to increase the patrol for the following day to at least two companies with a forward observer party and suitable command group and establish an outpost at the junction of the Numa-Numa and East-West Trails. Orders were issued for the 2nd Battalion to move out the next morning as soon as the forward observer party arrived.

e. At 0730 on 13 Nov 43, when it appeared that the 2nd Battalion would be delayed in its departure by the late arrival of the forward observer party, division ordered that one company clear the front lines and proceed to the Numa-Numa and East-West Trail junction. Orders were issued the 2nd Battalion to this effect and Company "E" cleared the front lines at 0800. The 2nd Battalion (less "E" Company) cleared at 1100. At 1105 Company "E" made contact with a superior Japanese force in position at the Coconut Grove, about 300 yards south of the Numa-Numa and East-West Trail junction. Company "E" attacked to develop the enemy situation, reporting the situation to the Battalion Commander, then, with the remainder of the Battalion, moving north astride the Numa-Numa Trail. From the report of the messenger, the Battalion Commander believed Company "E" to be in a serious situation and moved his remaining companies up rapidly and committed them to a piecemeal attack. The battalion was unable to drive the Japanese from their positions, and at 1410 withdrew a short distance and organized a perimeter defense for the night. The Battalion Commander estimated the enemy force to consist of a reinforced rifle company, dug in, with numerous snipers in trees and several machine guns. At 1430 the 2nd Raider Battalion of the 2nd Raider Regiment was attached to the 21st Marines and sent forward to secure the line of communication between the perimeter and the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, along the Numa-Numa Trail. No action other than occasional sniper fire, was taken by the enemy during the night. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, in direct support of the 21st Marines, placed harassing fires around the perimeter of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines throughout the night. For dispositions of the regiment and attached units at the close of operations 13 Nov 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

f. At dawn on 14 Nov 43, enemy snipers were again active against the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines. The Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, pushed reconnaissance patrols forward to determine the enemy dispositions, preparatory to launching an attack. Five light tanks, requested by the regiment the night of 13 Nov 43, moved forward from the beach area at 0545, reporting at the regimental CP. They were directed to move forward along the Numa-Numa Trail and join the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, to which they were attached on arrival.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, was detached from the 148th Infantry in the west sector, reverting to 21st Marines control and closing in a bivouac area just south of the regimental CP at 0900. Twenty TBF's, carrying 160-pound 1/10-second delay fuse bombs, were on station over the beachhead at 0700 and were ordered to attack the enemy position at 0905. The attack was carried out as directed between 0905 and 0910. The 2nd Battalion was not prepared to launch an attack at this time because of several factors, and the planes were unable to remain on station any longer. The artillery marked the front lines with smoke shells prior to launching the air attack. At 1135 the artillery began a preparation which lasted until 1155 when the 2nd Battalion launched an attack following a rolling barrage by the artillery, and supported by the five tanks. No serious opposition was encountered and the battalion had captured the Numa-Numa and East-West Trail junction and organized a perimeter defense around that junction by 1545. Enemy forces had withdrawn from contact, apparently to the east along the East-West Trail. Disposition of the regiment and its attached units at the close of operations on 14 Nov 43, were shown on Annex A, Overlay. For a detailed account of the operations of the 2nd Battalion to secure the Numa-Numa -- East-West Trail junction, see Annex C, Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, to secure the Numa-Numa -- East-West Trail Junction, 13-14, Nov 43.

g. At 1000 on 15 Nov 43, the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, was attached to the 3rd Marines when the Forces Beachhead Line was advanced and the 3rd Marines occupied the sector which included the position of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines. During this period, 18-21 Nov 43, units of the 2nd Battalion took part in numerous patrol actions along the East-West Trail east of the Piva River to develop the situation on the 3rd Marines' front. The 1st Battalion, 21st Marines, moved forward and occupied the bivouac area previously occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines. The regimental CP was displaced forward to the same area and the Regimental Weapons Company (less 3rd and 4th Platoons) was moved up from Torokina Point to an adjacent area. For dispositions, see Annex A, Overlay.

h. On 17 Nov 43, the convoy bearing the 3rd Landing Team was attacked by hostile aircraft off the Empress Augusta Bay area and the USS MC KEAN, and APD in which was embarked Company "I", 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines, was hit and sunk at 0400. As a result, 38 men from that company were missing. The 3rd Battalion landed at 0600 and was moved to its assigned bivouac area. The 3rd and 4th Platoons, Regimental Weapons Company, were moved forward to the bivouac area of the Regimental Weapons Company. Dispositions of the regiment (less 2nd Battalion) at the close of operations on 17 Nov 43, were as shown on Annex A, Overlay.

i. On 19 Nov 43, during a hostile air attack, bombs were dropped in the 3rd Battalion bivouac area, killing five, including one officer, and wounding six. At 0830, in accordance with division orders, the 1st Battalion was moved from its bivouac area to a position in reserve in rear of the 3rd Marines and attached to the 3rd Marines. The 1st Battalion was released to the 21st Marines and closed in its former bivouac area at 1530. Patrols were sent out to the new forward beachhead line (line "Easy") to make a terrain reconnaissance and mark limiting points on that line.

j. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines, was moved on 20 Nov 43, to an assembly area in rear of its zone of action for the advance to Line Easy. A reinforced platoon from the 1st Battalion was moved out to the regimental left limiting point on Line Easy as a combat outpost and to assist in establishing contact between the 3rd Marines, on the left, and the 21st Marines when the advance was made to Line Easy on the 21st. For dispositions at the close of operations on 20 Nov 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

k. The advance elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions crossed the Piva River at 0730 on 21 Nov 43, passing through the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines and the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and arrived on the new line at 1425. Both battalions moved forward in the center of their zones of action in a compact, easily-controlled approach march formation and extended to the right and left to their limiting points on arrival on Line Easy. At 1425 the 3rd Battalion was in contact with the 9th Marines on the right, but there was no contact between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, or the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Marines on the left. No enemy interference was encountered during the move. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines, was released by the 3rd Marines at 1045 and closed in its former bivouac area in the regimental reserve at 1400. The regimental CP displaced to a position near the Piva River. On this day the reinforced platoon of the 1st Battalion (Company "A") in position at the left limiting point of the regiment was attacked by a considerable Japanese force. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy and important documents were obtained from a dead Japanese officer. For dispositions at the close of operations on the 21st, see Annex A, Overlay.

l. Contact was established between the 1st and 3rd Battalions on 22 Nov 43, but patrols revealed a considerable gap existing between the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Marines on the left. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to send a company forward to reinforce the 1st Battalion to enable it to extend to the left to contact the 3rd Marines. No contact was established by dark, 22 Nov 43.

m. At 1545, 23 Nov 43, contact was established by the 1st Battalion with the 3rd Marines. The frontage then occupied by the 1st Battalion was found to be greater than it appeared on the map, owing to inaccuracies in the map. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to extend to the left 400 yards to reduce the frontage held by the 1st Battalion. For dispositions at the close of operations on 23 Nov 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

n. On 25 Nov 43, the line was advanced 500 yards to the east as a result of an attack by the 3rd Marines. The 21st Marines were ordered to close the gap thus created between the 3rd Marines and 21st Marines, and a reinforced company of the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move into this gap. The line to be occupied by this company (Company "E") was in deep swamp and thick jungle, and the company was unable to completely close the gap until the morning of the 26th. For dispositions at the close of operations on the 26th, see Annex A, Overlay.

o. On 28 Nov 43, the Forced Beachhead Line was extended farther to the east (Line Fox) by the 9th Marines, then on the left of the 21st Marines, and the 21st Marines shifted their zone of action to the left and extended to the east to tie-in with the 9th Marines. The 2nd Battalion in reserve was shifted to a bivouac area at the East-West Trail crossing of the Piva River, and the companies attached to the 1st Battalion ("E" and "F") were released to it. For dispositions at the close of operations on the 28th, see Annex A, Overlay.

p. Patrolling to the east to the Torokina River on the 29th revealed no enemy to the west of the Torokina. On the 30th a detached post, consisting of an officer and 21 men with a TBX radio, was established on Hill 600 overlooking the Torokina River. This post was increased to a rifle platoon reinforced by a rifle company weapons platoon on 1 Dec 43, in accordance with division orders. On 3 Dec 43, authority was granted by division to reduce the detached post to its initial strength. This was requested by regiment on the grounds that the post was operating as an observation post and the smaller the group the less the chances of discovery. Meanwhile, wire was run from the 1st Battalion to the Hill 600 post to supplement the TBX radio. No ammunition or supplies could be transported to the detached post except on the individual owing to the poor condition of the trail.

g. In accordance with the division plan to place the final ~~Forward~~ Beachhead Line (Line How) along the high ground overlooking the Torokina River and to make the next move to that line, division issued orders on 5 Dec 43, to increase the strength of the detached post on Hill 600 to a rifle company, reinforced by a machine gun platoon and rocket platoon. The rifle company and machine gun platoon were sent forward from the 2nd Battalion and the rocket platoon was attached from Corps Troops. On 6 Dec 43, in compliance with division orders, the remainder of the 2nd Battalion was ordered forward to a previously reconnoitered outpost line along the Torokina River, just east of Hill 600. No enemy opposition was encountered at any time during the operations in the vicinity of Hill 600. An amphibian tractor trail had been completed across the swamp west of Hill 600 on 6 Dec 43, permitting supplies to be brought up to the line of the Torokina River, thus making it possible to move the battalion forward. A parachute battalion had been moved forward to the high ground north of Hill 600, on the left of the 2nd Battalion. On 7 Dec 43, a 37mm gun platoon (less 37mm guns) of the Regimental Weapons Company was attached to the 2nd Battalion. It was impossible to get the 37mm guns forward at this time. For dispositions at the close of operations on 7 Dec 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

r. On 9 Dec 43, division directed that one company be moved forward to the vicinity of Evansville and bivouacked, preparatory to the movement forward within its assigned zone of action of the remainder of the regiment on 10 Dec 43. Company "C", 1st Battalion, was moved to Evansville. The 3rd Parachute Battalion became heavily engaged on this date with a strong enemy force on their front and requested reinforcements to strengthen weak points in their lines caused by casualties. Company "C" was ordered attached to the 3rd Parachute Battalion at 1700 and moved into position on the line.

s. In accordance with plans, the remainder of the 1st Battalion moved forward from Line Fox the morning of 10 Dec 43, to occupy the left sector of the regimental sector on Line How. The battalion moved in column along the East-West Trail, followed by the 3rd Battalion, which was to be in regimental reserve west of Hill 600. It was learned in a reconnaissance of the 3rd Parachute Battalion sector by the Regimental Executive Officer and the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, prior to the arrival of the 1st Battalion, that the enemy was still active on the immediate front of the Parachute Battalion, and the Commanding Officer, Parachute Battalion, was requested to call for an artillery concentration on the area of enemy activity prior to the relief. This was done, but was apparently ineffective, as occasional fire was still received from that area. The enemy, however, appeared to be dug in nearby, and was not active, so it was decided to go ahead with the relief. The relief was completed at 1645. The 3rd Parachute Battalion had been unable to push their lines completely forward to Line How because of enemy opposition. For dispositions at the close of operations on 10 Dec 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

t. From 12-18 Dec 43, operations were carried out to drive the enemy from his positions in front of the 1st Battalion so that the battalion could occupy and organize its assigned portion of the ~~Forward~~ Beachhead Line (Line How). Reconnaissance and a captured situation map revealed that the enemy occupied a well-dug-in, all around defensive position strong in machine guns, on a spur of the ridge occupied by the 1st Battalion, commanding the positions of the 1st Battalion, and about 100 yards from the left of the 1st Battalion line. The captured map indicated the enemy strength to be 235 and was estimated to be a reinforced company. Captured enemy documents revealed the enemy force to be from the 23rd Infantry. Repeated infantry attacks were launched during the period 12-18 Dec 43, supported by artillery and in four cases by air bombing. On the evening of 18 Dec 43, following two air attacks, the infantry seized the ridge. Units of both the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion (regimental reserve) were employed in attacks on this ridge. The lines of the 1st Battalion were pushed forward to the line of the Eagle River on the morning of 19 Dec 43, and work was begun on the organization of the line for deliberate defense. For dispositions on 19 Dec 43, see Annex A, Overlay.

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u. From 19 Dec 43, to 1 Jan 44, operations consisted largely of patrol activity between the Eagle and Torokina Rivers. There was considerable Japanese activity in this area during the period, but no offensive action was attempted by the enemy. Several three-day reconnaissance patrols were sent beyond the Torokina River deep into enemy territory. During the period the enemy periodically shelled the regimental sector, using 75mm guns and 90mm mortars. The fire was ineffective and few casualties resulted. The bulk of the enemy fire fell in the vicinity of Evansville where supply installations were located. On 21 Dec 43, a reconnaissance patrol contacted a force of 14 to 18 Japanese on Hill 600-A and returned with the report. A combat patrol consisting of a reinforced platoon of the 2nd Battalion was sent out to attack the enemy force. The patrol made contact with the enemy on the top of Hill 600-A at 1545 and launched an attack, driving the enemy from the hill. The patrol had one man killed and one wounded. It withdrew within our lines prior to dark as ordered. As a result of this action, division orders were issued to establish and maintain, during the hours of daylight, beginning 22 Dec 43, a detached post consisting of a reinforced platoon, with an artillery forward observer party on Hill 600-A. The 3rd Battalion (regimental reserve) was directed to provide this detached post and selected a rifle platoon of Company "I", reinforced by a heavy machine gun platoon. This force met strong enemy resistance when it neared the top of Hill 600-A, and was unable to advance. The enemy occupied covered emplacements at the foot of a reverse slope on the sharp crest of the ridge line. Wire communication had been established to the 3rd Battalion and the situation was reported to the Battalion Commander and thence to the Regimental Commander. The 3rd Battalion was directed to reinforce the units in contact with the remainder of Company "I". The company commander moved out and attempted a double envelopment of where he estimated the enemy position to be without verifying the situation with the platoon leader in contact, and, as a result, his enveloping platoons moved into the platoon in contact rather than the flanks of the enemy positions. Heavy fire, including machine gun, was received from the enemy position and the company withdrew and brought down an artillery concentration on the enemy position. This failed to dislodge the enemy and the company returned within the lines at dark. On 23 Dec 43, Company "K", reinforced by a heavy machine gun platoon moved out to attack the enemy position. One platoon was sent forward along the narrow, steep ridge to determine the enemy position. Heavy fire was received by this platoon. The platoon was withdrawn and a thirty minute artillery concentration placed on the enemy position. Artillery fire, had appeared to be ineffective owing to the many large trees on the ridge, causing tree bursts. One platoon was sent forward after the artillery concentration, met strong resistance, was withdrawn, and a ten-minute mortar and artillery concentration was placed on the enemy position. Following this, the company attacked, enveloping one flank but met heavy machine gun fire and could not advance. The company was withdrawn within the lines prior to dark. On 24 Dec 43, several reconnaissance patrols sent out to Hill 600-A from several different directions toward the enemy position, found the position unoccupied, the enemy apparently having withdrawn during the night. Inspection revealed there were about 25 covered emplacements, some of which had been destroyed by artillery fire. One dead Jap was found. Total casualties suffered during the several engagements on Hill 600-A were 4 killed and 8 wounded.

v. On 1 and 2 Jan 44, the regiment was relieved by the 182nd Infantry, U. S. Army, and moved into corps reserve in the rear area. The regiment remained in this area until 9 Jan 44, when it was embarked and returned to Guadalcanal. For dispositions during the period 19 Dec 43 to 9 Jan 44, see Annex A, Overlay.

3. Comments.

a. Tactics.

(1) General: Since the enemy forces encountered confined themselves entirely to delaying tactics, mostly astride the Numa-Numa and East-West Trails, and on narrow fronts, the tactics of this regiment consisted of approach marches, local attacks of units no larger than a battalion, interspersed with periods of defense while positions were consolidated and supply routes improved or constructed. The standing operating procedure adopted by this regiment prior to the Bougainville campaign, which was based on a study of reports and recommendations of army and marine units previously in combat in this theater, was found to be sound.

(2) Movement.

(a) Route marches: A number of route marches were made by units of this regiment in changing positions behind the beachhead line. The regiment made one route march as a unit from the corps reserve area to the beach for embarkation. Battalions moving from Line Fox to Line How, well covered to the front by strong outposts, moved along the East-West Trail in route column, files on either side of the trail, and covered by an advance guard. Movement in an approach march formation astride the trail would have been practically impossible due to swamp. Moreover, speed was essential in this movement. None of the route marches presented any problem as far as anti-aircraft security was concerned, since they were made in daylight, and hostile aircraft were inoperative over the beachhead in daylight except for the first few days of the operation.

(b) Approach marches: Approach marches were made by all battalions. The 1st Battalion in advancing outside the beachhead toward the Laruma River on 9 November 1943 employed the "box" formation, which is one of the approach march formations called for in the regimental standing operating procedure. This formation provides all around security, is easily controlled through the wire communication set-up, and facilitates rapid entry into action or a perimeter defense, as the situation calls for. The battalion is covered by one company, which retains freedom of maneuver for the remainder of the battalion should the covering company become engaged. The other two rifle companies follow behind the flanks of the covering company at 100-200 yards distance in a columnar formation, with the weapons company closing the box in the rear. Battalion headquarters moves in the center of the formation. The 2nd Battalion in its advance up the Numa-Numa Trail toward the junction of that trail with the East-West Trail on 13 November, 1943, used a modification of this formation, since it was less one rifle company, astride the trail. In the advance to Line Easy the 1st and 3rd Battalions employed the "Box" formation, moving up the center of their zones for action, and extending to the right and left after arrival on the line. Intervals between battalions were covered by combat patrols in this latter case.

(3) Offensive Tactics.

(a) Battalion: The attack of the 2nd Battalion against enemy positions south of the junction of the Numa-Numa and East-West Trails on 13-14 November 1943 was the only battalion attack made by this regiment. This attack was definitely a piece-meal attack, companies being committed to action successively without prior reconnaissance or adequate knowledge of the enemy situation. It was unfortunate that Company E was ordered to move out so far ahead of the remainder of the battalion as to be beyond close supporting distance when it contacted the enemy. Reports reaching the CO 2nd Battalion, then 1200 yards to the south, that Company E was being cut to pieces, influenced him to push his remaining companies forward successively as rapidly as possible, resulting in their becoming engaged prematurely and without definite plan. The battalion commander on seeing the situation himself, chose the best course of action open to him at the time by withdrawing all companies and breaking off contact. The attack on 14 November was well planned and well controlled. Had the battalion on 13 November been moving as a unit in an approach march formation, well covered to the front by scouts and small patrols, and on a broad front astride the trail the enemy situation could have been developed without initially committing a large force and a coordinated attack would have been launched following an artillery

preparation. The artillery preparation is important, for with the Japanese method of all around defense, well dug-in, concealed, covered foxholes with a large proportion of automatic weapons and covered by snipers in trees, all invisible, severe losses are going to be sustained by attacking infantry, regardless of the size of the force, unless their attacks are preceded by artillery preparations, and/or 81mm mortar preparations, and/or air bombing. In this particular action the 81mm mortars were not employed. Flanking attacks have little effect on the Japanese all-around defense. The Jap refuses to be turned out of his position, and as he can bring fire to bear in all directions, the flanking attack offers no more advantage than the frontal attack, other than enabling a larger force, and consequently more fire power, to be brought to bear on the position. Small groups of three or four men working in close to Jap positions with hand grenades seems to be about the best solution, though it is hazardous work for the small groups. It is essential, also, that selected individuals or groups be detailed solely to anti-sniper work. The purpose of the snipers is to protect the ground positions against troops working up close to them, and they are most effective.

(b) Company and platoon: Much of what was said about the battalion in attack applies to the company and platoon. Companies of this regiment launched attacks against an estimated reinforced company of Japs, well dug-in with overhead cover in all around defense, with ample sniper cover from trees, on a narrow steep ridge. There was not sufficient space on the ridge for the maneuver of a company and company commanders were forced to push one platoon frontally with a partial envelopment by another platoon. The much-written-about Jap reverse slope position was encountered here; foxholes at the foot of a knoll with a ten-yard field of fire to the top of the knoll. The undergrowth was thick and attacking troops could not see the Jap positions. As they cut their way through the bush over the top of the knoll they were taken under short range automatic fire from the positions at the foot of the knoll. The Jap had a cleverly organized system of bands of grazing automatic weapon fire covering all approaches. Fire lanes could not be seen until the men were in them. The 60mm mortars of our companies were invariably used to support the attacks but they were ineffective. They doubtless inflicted casualties but they did not pack the punch to make the holes for the infantry. The use of the 81mm mortar was extensive, and neither could it put the infantry across. Two companies were finally employed, one against each end of the ridge, like a nut cracker, in order to bring more troops, and thus more fire power, to bear. Both companies were pinned down by heavy automatic fire from the all around defense as they neared the Jap positions. Although the Jap position was so cleverly selected that it was partially masked from artillery fire by tall trees in our front lines, such artillery as could be brought to bear, plus repeated air bombing attacks brought the Japs to the surface of the ground and paved the way for the seizure of the ridge by the infantry. In fact, they practically blasted the Japs off the ridge. Once the Jap has been rooted out of his foxholes he can be readily dealt with. No changes are recommended in standard tactics of companies and platoons other than that there must be specific personnel in squads, or squads in platoons, assigned the sole task of dealing with snipers. It is believed that anti-sniper personnel will be more effective if they follow assault elements. Snipers focus their attention on leading elements working in close. Anti-sniper personnel from concealed positions in rear can more effectively search out the sniper and deal with him. The automatic rifle is very effective in "spraying" trees containing snipers. The idea that prevails in many quarters that you can "throw the book out the window" in jungle warfare is definitely erroneous. That has been demonstrated by platoon and company commanders who did "throw the book out the window." Jungle tactics merely call for a common sense application of standard tactical principles and methods to this type of terrain. Emphasis must be on direction, and control with consequent reduction of distances and intervals and a suitable communication system. Every company and platoon of this regiment that attacked had wire communication back to the battalion CP which

was laid as the unit advanced. Companies had wire communication to platoons during the attack. This system was invaluable in maintaining control. The W-130, or assault, wire was used. Platoon leaders must know more about the employment of eight machine guns and 60mm mortars. Platoons of this regiment employed as combat patrols were invariably reinforced with a light machine gun section, and sometimes a 60mm mortar section. Where the Jap was emplaced in a strongly constructed, mutually supporting pill boxes, it is believed that a definite procedure must be used in the attack. In the platoon, an assault group, armed with a flame thrower, possibly a "bazooka", and demolitions (pole charge) should be used to work in close, preferably from the flank, covered by the fire of a holding group to the front. Another group, or squad, should be held in readiness as a maneuver force, while another group should be detailed solely to the mission of destroying snipers covering the pill box. The use of smoke to blanket the pill box should be given careful consideration. Companies attacking mutually supporting pill boxes should engage each pill box simultaneously in order to prevent them firing in support of each other.

(c) Artillery support: Artillery support proved to be vital to all units of this regiment in the attack of Jap positions. The system of forward observers in use was excellent. A forward observer party accompanied every unit sent out on an offensive mission, and their work was excellent. Both infantry and artillery wire were laid on these occasions. Forward observers were handicapped in the registration of artillery fire by the lack of visibility in the thick jungle terrain. Smoke shell and sound ranging methods were employed with very good results. The 155mm howitzers, which were employed on one occasion by this regiment (Hellzapoppin Ridge), were the most effective since they have the weight and power to blast out trees and clear the jungle growth so that the infantry, and also supporting aircraft, can better see the hostile positions. The 105mm howitzer is also effective for this purpose. Both the 105's and the 155's are effective against covered emplacements. The 75mm howitzer is too light to either clear the jungle or knock out covered emplacements. The high trees necessitated placing fire at least 300 yards in front of our lines to avoid getting tree bursts among our own troops. Delayed action fuzes were much more effective against emplacements and reduced tree bursts. It was found that since artillery fire had to be placed well in front of infantry troops on account of the high trees, artillery preparations preceding an attack were not as effective as they normally should be since after the preparation it took the infantry considerable time to advance to the enemy positions through the thick undergrowth, thus losing the full shock effect of the preparation. Even when the preparation can be placed the minimum distance of 200 yards in front of our troops, the time consumed by the infantry advance would be too long to obtain maximum effect. It is safe to say that the artillery was the dominant factor in driving back Japanese forces.

(d) Air Support: Air bombing was used on five occasions in close support of attacks by units of this regiment and was found to be very effective. The final air attack delivered on Hellzapoppin Ridge on 18 Dec was made 75 yards in front of front line troops using 100 lb 4-5 second delay fuze bombs and broke enemy resistance on the ridge. Attacks were made in succession by individual planes from tree-top height with strafing combined with bombing. Runs were made parallel to our front lines, planes dropping one to four bombs on each run. Our front lines were marked with colored grenade smoke and the target by mortar smoke shell, both easily visible from the air. Prior to the two air attacks of 18 Dec, an infantry officer familiar with the situation and the location of hostile positions, together with the air liaison officer, met pilots on the airfield. The infantry officer briefed pilots on the situation using map and aerial photos, including stereo pairs of the area. The plan of attack was outlined by the squadron leader and the air liaison officer returned to the position of the troops being supported. The air liaison officer, using a TCS jeep radio, was in communication with the planes at all times throughout the operation. The infantry officer accompanied the squadron leader. A few minutes prior to the time set for the attack, the smoke marking

the front lines was set off and the 81mm mortars started placing single rounds of smoke shell on the target at intervals. Front line infantry troops had been previously well dug in with overhead cover. During the attack the infantry officers with the squadron leader "spotted" the planes on the target by means of the plane radio. This is believed an important adjunct to the use of mortar smoke shell since it was found the mortars were not always on the target. This method of close coordination between aircraft and supported infantry troops is highly effective and is recommended for future use. In previous air attacks, 100 lb instantaneous fuze bombs were used and were not nearly as effective as the delayed fuze bombs, particularly against organized enemy defenses. The 100 lb 4-5 second delay fuze bomb is recommended as the ideal bomb for close support of infantry troops. It was also found that after the planes had dropped their bombs, if they continued to make passes at the target, the Japs would remain down in their holes and emplacements, facilitating the advance of the infantry against the remaining opposition.

(4) Defensive Tactics:

(a) General: Defensive tactics employed by this regiment consisted largely of occupying and organizing deliberately for defense, sectors on successive beachhead lines. The frontage of these regimental sectors was great, sometimes 4000-5000 yards. As a result, though a regimental reserve of one battalion was held out in each case, the two front line battalions were forced to commit their entire strength to positions on the beachhead line without supports or reserves. With the exception of the final beachhead line the organization of defensive positions was not complete. One strand of wire with booby traps strung along it was placed across the front. In some sections, double apron fence was installed. Men occupied shallow prone three-man firing trenches. Machine guns were sited along final protective lines by sections where practicable, but in many cases it was necessary to use them singly in order to cover the front with machine gun fire. In many cases heavy machine guns and light machine guns were paired together in sections in order to spread the heavy machine guns across the whole front. 81mm mortars were placed in positions 1000 to 1500 yards in rear of the front lines. This facilitated ammunition supply and afforded protection while allowing ample range in front of the lines. In the final beachhead position the defense was completely organized with covered rifle and machine gun emplacements, communicating trenches, and a complete band of double apron fence across the front with platoons in most cases wired in with protective wire. Fields of fire were very short in most cases and were not cleared, only lanes cut for machine gun final protective lines by removing a few twigs and leaves. It is believed, in the deliberate defense, however, that there is much advantage, where there are adequate machine guns, in clearing completely the foreground of the position to a distance of 75 to 100 yards to the front. This improves observation, preventing the enemy from working up under cover to within hand grenade range of the front lines. The location of the position is disclosed by this cleared area which would make the position subject to artillery fire and air bombing, if the enemy has adequate artillery and is able to bomb in the daytime. Infantry attacks across this cleared area would be impossible with well organized machine gun fires. The success of the Japanese defensive organization as it was found in this operation on the other hand, was due to the inability of the attacker to locate the enemy positions. His foxholes and emplacements were cleverly camouflaged and sited, and he did no cutting of the undergrowth except to make narrow, difficult to see, lanes for his machine guns. His fields of fire were, of course, very short. Most marines killed, were killed within 10 yards of the enemy positions, and the rates of killed to wounded was high. Marines felt as though they were fighting a phantom. As they put it "you can't hit what you can't see". The Jap method of defense is believed suitable for a small force opposed by a large force, but where a large force with heavy fire power takes up a deliberate defense, it is believed better results can be obtained by clearing fields of fire in front of the position. Our troops must learn more about field fortification. The tendency is to build large structures in which the men live and fight as well. Fighting positions must be constructed on the defense line with living structures to the rear connected to the fighting positions by communication trenches. Our troops are not

at all camouflage conscious, and, in fact, are very careless in this respect. Front line discipline is poor on the average. Watches are not kept on guns, men do not wear helmets, and there is a general lack of alertness. It is believed we must give more consideration to defense in depth. On the final beachhead line this regiment organized its main line of resistance with two battalions and a Regimental Reserve Line with the third, in order to get some depth to the defense. The reserve battalion prepared positions and sited machine guns in on the Regimental Reserve Line. The battalion was held in rear of the regimental reserve line in mobile reserve, prepared to either counterattack or occupy and defend the Regimental Reserve Line. On these two lines, however, there was no depth. With the single defense line usually employed in beachhead defense great danger to the position exists in case of a breakthrough. Mobile reserves can not be readily moved to meet threats along a wide front in this type of terrain. It is believed that the best defense is with supports and reserves, from platoons on up, organized in fixed defenses in depth with all units wired in all around down to include the squad. This is, of course, the normal system of defense, and it is believed that at least a modified version should be used in beachhead defense.

b. Weapons.

(1) Carbine, cal. .30, M1: The similarity between carbine and Jap .25 caliber fire was confusing to inexperienced troops. The carbine, with present sights, is not considered a very accurate weapon. It tends to rust more rapidly than other weapons and requires greater care. In the case of the gunner and assistant gunner of the machine gun squads the carbine hindered them in carrying the gun and tripod and in some instances resulted in the carbine being abandoned. It is believed that they should be armed with a smaller weapon.

(2) Rifle, cal. .30, M1: This weapon performed in a highly satisfactory manner and was preferred, by the using troops, to the carbine.

(3) BAR, cal. .30, M1918A2: The automatic rifle is considered the most effective weapon in jungle warfare. It is light enough to keep up with advancing troops, can be placed in action instantly, and is considered by some officers to be superior to the LMG in the attack. The BAR was used extensively in defensive situations to deliver fixed fire in areas not covered by machine gun fire. By means of the stock rest and bipod the gun is capable of delivering automatic fire along a predetermine line under any condition of visibility. Very few stoppages occurred that could not be reduced by Immediate Action.

(4) LMG, cal. .30, M1919A4: The LMG is preferred to the heavier water-cooled gun in attack because of its mobility, low silhouette, and the speed with which it can be placed in action. It was used extensively to reinforce rifle platoons sent out as combat patrols.

(5) BMG, cal. .30, M1917A1: Considered to be too heavy and to have too high a silhouette for use in attack in jungle operations but vital in defensive situations.

(6) BMG, cal. .50, HB, M2, Ground: This weapon is much too heavy for jungle operations, both from the standpoint of the gun itself and of ammunition supply. Excluding mechanized targets, which were not encountered in these operations, it is considered that the .50 caliber gun is no more, if not less effective against personnel than the .30 caliber machine gun. In a beach defense it is considered to be a very valuable antiboat gun.

(7) 37mm Gun, M3A1, AT: Due to swamp, dense jungle, and rugged terrain this weapon could not keep up with the infantry and could only be employed in stabilized situations. Engineering assistance was required to get the guns into position. They were not fired during these operations. In view of the difficulties encountered in movement, it is strongly recommended, for jungle operations of this type, that several 37mm guns, M1916 be placed in each infantry regiment. Numerous situations arose where the 37mm gun, AT could have been effectively employed if capable of being moved into position. The 37mm gun, M1916, because of its light weight (174 lbs.) could have been moved by hand and effectively employed.

(8) 75mm Gun SP (halftrack): In the type of terrain encountered in these operations extensive engineer assistance was required to move these weapons into position. They were not fired.

(9) 60mm Mortar, M2: The 60mm mortar was not considered effective against Japanese positions encountered because of the superquick fuze (causing tree bursts) and the small amount of explosive charge in its shell. It can be used effectively against troops above ground or in the open.

(10) 81mm Mortar, M1: The 81mm mortar, using the heavy (11 lb) shell, is a very effective weapon in close support of the infantry. It is capable of delivering a heavy volume of accurate fire. Use of the delay fuze eliminates tree bursts and enables the HE shell to act effectively. Although this weapon was not effective in reducing the enemy positions on Hellzapoppin Ridge it is believed that this was due to reduced visibility and lack of suitable observation points resulting in inaccurate fire.

(11) 4.2 Chemical Mortar: A platoon of these mortars (from the 82nd Chemical Battalion, USA) executed two missions for this regiment using HE shell, one against emplacements and one counterbattery mission which was quite successful. Effect of the fire on emplacements was undetermined as artillery was firing at the same time. The large amount of explosive contained in the shell makes it a very effective weapon in jungle operations, capable of blasting out trees and jungle growth and reducing emplacements.

(12) Flame Thrower, Portable, M1: Used on Hellzapoppin Ridge after the enemy had been driven from their emplacements and was reported to have a very demoralizing effect on the withdrawing enemy.

(13) Bazooka: This weapon was used on Hellzapoppin Ridge but the crews were unable to get close enough to emplacements to employ it effectively due to heavy enemy fire. After the enemy had withdrawn from their emplacements they were used effectively against personnel.

(14) Rocket: An Experimental Rocket Platoon was attached to the regiment during the Hellzapoppin Ridge engagement. These weapons are inaccurate against small area targets, leave a tell-tale trail of smoke and are extremely noisy serving to give away their positions and those of nearby troops.

(15) Grenade Adapter: The fragmentation hand grenade with adapter attached when launched from the M1903 rifle was very effective and was extensively used.

c. Intelligence.

(1) Intelligence Agencies.

(a) Reconnaissance patrol: The reconnaissance patrol proved to be the principal agency available to the regiment for the collection of enemy information. Six man patrols were used effectively for purely reconnaissance missions. This patrol is small enough to slip through enemy territory undetected and can withdraw more readily than a larger patrol if attacked. It has strength enough to protect itself while engaged in withdrawing. Good patrol leaders were scarce and all personnel must be given more instruction in reconnaissance patrolling. Patrol leaders were not properly trained in what to look for and how to report it. They must be instructed in making simple sketches. A reconnaissance platoon in the Regimental H & S Company would have been of great assistance in this operation. The reserve battalion was completely used up in company attacks and combat patrols. Fortunately, two platoons of the Regimental Weapons Company were located at the Regimental CP, not being required on other duties at the time, and a platoon of the scout company was attached and located at the regimental CP. These units had all been used in patrolling prior to the end of the operation. Since it cannot be assumed that a scout platoon will always be attached, or that the Regimental Weapons Company will not be engaged in carrying out its normal mission, or that the reserve battalion, if there is one, will be available to furnish patrols, it is believed that the regimental commander should be provided with an agency for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance deep in enemy territory in his sector or zone of action.

(b) Observation Post: Although commanding terrain was available in several instances, observation posts were ineffective. Observers in elevated positions could only look down on a carpet of tree tops and no hostile ground activity could be observed.

(c) Observation Aircraft: For the same reason as given in (b) above observation from aircraft was ineffective. Aerial photos were of value to this regiment only for information of the terrain. In this respect they were extremely useful.

(d) Prisoners and captured documents: One prisoner was captured within the lines of this regiment but the information obtained from him was believed unreliable. A number of maps and documents were taken from dead Japs which were of great value. Most Japs carry documents of various sorts, including diaries, on their persons. Dead officers were usually found to have a situation sketch on them showing their dispositions and what they believed ours to be. In the beginning of the Hellzapoppin Ridge engagement a sketch of the hostile dispositions was taken from a dead Jap officer. This sketch proved to be quite accurate and was very helpful.

(e) Captured material: Very little captured material was turned in by subordinate units of this regiment although it is known that considerable fell into our hands. This condition is due to the fact that the men will not turn in articles they capture because they want them for souvenirs and are afraid they will not be returned to them. These fears were justifiable in this operation as nothing was returned. To overcome this condition it is necessary to indoctrinate men with the importance of turning in all captured material, and to institute a system whereby the man turning in captured material who wishes it as a souvenir is assured of having it returned to him. The Jap saying "the American fights for souvenirs" is quite true.

d. Supply.

(1) Routes: In the forward areas, the "Jeep" Trail, cut by a bulldozer and a platoon of engineers or pioneers with hand tools will meet the supply and evacuation requirements of an infantry regiment. Bridging over small streams and corduroy over swampy areas can be done by an engineer or pioneer company. Laying corduroy is a slow, laborious undertaking. However, it is the only known practical method of crossing swamps, unless a major engineering project with heavy equipment is undertaken. Experience has shown that a combat engineer company can lay about 150 yards of corduroy per day, provided timber is available on the site. It is believed that insufficient attention was paid to strict traffic control during the current operation. This operation confirmed the need of an engineer or pioneer company as an organic unit within the infantry regiment. Regiments should be given rear boundaries; the men and equipment to do the work; and then held responsible for construction and maintenance of roads and trails within their respective areas, including traffic control over these routes.

(2) Transportation: Jeeps and trailers will meet the regimental supply and evacuation requirements, provided trails over which these vehicles can operate are feasible. Otherwise, eight operating amphibian tractors will meet regimental requirements under average supply distances to be expected in a landing operation. The full allowance of jeeps and trailers should be taken initially in category "A". The 3/4 ton trucks should be substituted for the 1 ton truck, as a prime mover for 37mm guns in the Regimental Weapons Company. When not used for this purpose it will be available for hauling bulk supplies in rear areas, including water trailers. A motor maintenance section should be incorporated in the Regimental H&S Company to maintain the vehicles of the regiment in serviceable condition.

(3) Rations: Two hot meals and one emergency ration were fed daily, with few exceptions. All kitchens were operated in a rear bivouac area under direct control of the Regimental Commissary Officer. All transportation was pooled in this rear bivouac area. The bivouac was under command of the Regimental Quartermaster. This installation functioned in a highly satisfactory manner.

A minimum of 5 jeeps and trailers per battalion or one jeep and trailer per company will handle rations between the kitchens and troops. Unless water is available locally to the troops, these vehicles will not be available for any other service.

(4) Water: Water was not a serious problem at any time during the operation. All defensive positions were on or near streams which simplified this problem. Purification units were operated in kitchen bivouac areas. Individual or group chlorination was employed by front line units.

(5) Ammunition: The supply of this item presented little difficulty under the conditions of operation. It is estimated that a minimum of four (4) jeeps and trailers per battalion will meet the normal ammunition supply requirements in an attack situation.

(6) Post Exchange Supplies: Generally these were furnished in ample quantities. Toothbrushes appeared to be the only item in which a shortage existed.

(7) Clothing: One issue was made during the operation to "all hands", of all essential items. This appeared to be adequate.

(8) Other supplies: It is believed that either division or regimental quartermaster should carry a replenishment supply of items of individual equipment. One company of the regiment which lost all equipment where a destroyer on which they were being transported was sunk, had considerable difficulty in obtaining essential items in this category.

e. Evacuation: It is considered that present Division SOP which attaches collecting sections of medical companies to infantry battalions violates the established principal of "impetus from the rear" in medical evacuation. Further, that all jeep ambulances should remain under control of the medical collecting sections. The medical company supporting an infantry regiment should set up one or more collecting stations between the battalion aid stations and the hospital. This installation should have a medical officer in charge; sort and render additional first aid; send forward litter bearers and ambulances to clear battalion and regimental aid stations; and evacuate the seriously wounded to the supporting hospital. This regiment required all battle neurosis and fatigue cases through the Regimental Aid Station. This method was highly successful and returned many men to their units within a few days without hospitalization.

f. Salvage:

(1) Much equipment was lost by units of this regiment during this operation. Men throw away equipment and lose it. Inspection of bivouac areas after departure of units revealed much abandoned equipment. No regularly organized and trained salvage section exists in the infantry regiment. Had there been one, it is believed much equipment could have been recovered and much of it repaired, or at least passed on to division salvage for repair.

g. Organization:

(1) Regimental H&S Company: It was found that this company had inadequate personnel to properly move, set up and organize the Regimental CP. All enlisted personnel in the company, with five or six exceptions have specific specialist duties to perform. It requires an organization of "roustabouts" to properly move and set up a regimental CP: an organization trained for this specific purpose and with additional duty as CP defense unit. This unit could not be used as a reconnaissance unit and carry out its duty as a CP defense unit also, since patrols are sent out for two or three days.

(2) Battalion Headquarters Company: A pioneer and ammunition section should be added to this company. This section is required for setting up and moving the battalion CP, augmenting the CP defense, performing light pioneer work in the battalion, and assisting in ammunition supply. These men could also be trained in the use of the "bazooka", flame-thrower, and demolitions, to be used as a pool from which they could be attached to units for specific tactical tasks.

h. Medical: (See Annex D, Medical Report.)

4. Recommendations.

a. That a service platoon be included in the Regimental Headquarters

and Service Company composed of five sections as follows: (1) an office section composed of the quartermaster clerical force; (2) a receiving and distributing section for rations, clothing and equipment, etc; (3) A munitions section for the handling of ammunition; (4) a salvage section for the collection and minor repair of abandoned and unserviceable equipment; (5) a motor maintenance section for the repair and maintenance of regimental motor vehicles (1st and 2nd echelon maintenance).




b. That a reconnaissance platoon be included in the Regimental H&S Company in order to provide the regimental commander with an agency which he does not now have for conducting distant reconnaissance in his sector or zone of action.

c. That a CP Defense Platoon be incorporated in the Regimental H&S Company for the purpose of setting up and moving the CP, acting as MP's for local traffic control in the regimental area, for CP defense, and for all the other odd jobs that come up in the field around the regimental CP.

d. That a pioneer and ammunition section be added to the Headquarters Company of the infantry battalion for setting up and moving the CP, performing light pioneer work in the battalion, assisting in ammunition supply, and forming a pool of trained "bazooka", flame-thrower, and demolition personnel for attachment to units for specific tactical tasks.

e. That the present distribution of carbines be reconsidered with a view to furnishing personnel of crew served weapons with a weapon more adaptable to the carrying of a machine gun tripod, machine gun, or 81mm mortar.




A. H. Butler
A. H. BUTLER



Annex A2
Situation





11 Nov 1943

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed.
1:20,000






ANNEX A3
SITUATI
12 Nov 1943

MAP: F/AC Hasty 1st Ed.







ANNEX A5
SITUATION
14 Nov 1943

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
1:20000






MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed.
1:20,000

ANNEX A 6
SITUATION
15 Nov 1943






MAF: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
1:20,000

ANNEX A7
SITUATION
17 NOV 1948



MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
1:20000

ANNEX A8
SITUATION
20 Nov 1943




MAP: FMAC. Hasty Terrain 1st Ed.
1:20,000

ANNEX A9
SITUATION
21 NOV. 1943


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ANNEX A 10
SITUATION
22 Nov 1943




ANNEX A11
SITUATION
23 NOV 1943

220
135



ANNEX A/2
SITUATION
MAP: FMPC Has 4 Terrain 1st Ed. 26 Nov. 1943




ANNEX A14
SITUATION
7 DEC 1943

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
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
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190 — 216



ANNEX A14
SITUATION
7 DEC 1943

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
1:20,000



135 219


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21 3

CRL

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed.
1:20,000

ANNEX A 16
SITUATION
18 DEC. 1943




ENEMY POSITION
21-23 DEC 43
REIN (DETACHED)
EST. 25 000

140
216

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed
1:20,000

ANNEX A IV
SITUATION
19 DEC. 1943
TO
1 JAN. 1944



138

215

MAP: FMAC Hasty Terrain 1st Ed.
1:80,000

ANNEX A
SITUATION
2 JAN 1950
TO
9 JAN 1950

ANNEX B: Operations of 1st Battalion, 21st Marines 7-14 November, 1943.

The 1st Battalion landed at Bougainville 6 November 1943 and was attached to the 9th Marines until 1100, 7 November 1943. At that time the 1st Battalion moved by boat to the west flank, was attached to the 3d Marines, and placed in regimental reserve.

On the morning of 8 November 1943, the 1st Battalion launched its initial attack passing through the 3d Marines' lines after a 20 minute artillery preparation. From H-5 to H-hour 81mm mortars and machine guns also laid down a barrage. (For LD and direction of attack see sketch #1. For formation used see sketch #2.)


At 1500, 8 November 1943, enemy resistance had been broken and the battalion went into a perimeter defense. On 9 November 1943, the battalion having no contact with the enemy continued the advance in approach march formation. (See sketch #3.) At 1430 the battalion halted and established a perimeter defense. (See sketches 4 and 5.)

On 10 November 1943, the 1st Battalion was attached to the 148th Infantry, USA and operated under control of this regiment until 14 November, 1943.

On 13 November, 1943 Company B (Reinforced) moved out to establish a combat outpost at the mouth of the Laruma River moving along the coast in approach march formation. (See sketch #6.) Contact was made with the enemy by the covering platoon, and a brisk fire fight started. (See sketch #7.) The artillery was called on to register on enemy position, but communications went out and no concentration could be laid down. A 60mm mortar concentration was then placed on enemy position after which reconnaissance patrols were sent forward. Patrols made contact along a 200 yard front and Company B (Reinforced) took up a perimeter defense for the night. (See sketch #8.) The next morning reconnaissance patrols were sent forward and no contact was made. Previous enemy positions and route of withdrawal were found. (See sketch #8.)

The 1st Battalion lost 2 killed and 1 wounded in the operations during this period.

The 1st Battalion was relieved on 14 November 1943, and rejoined the 21st Marines.




SKETCH No.1
LD & DIRECTION OF ATTACK,
NOV. 8 & BIVOUAC AREA NOV. 7
OF 1ST BATTALION 21ST MARINES

OCEAN


DIRECTION
OF ATTACK

Scouts




SKETCH No. 2

ATTACK FORMATION 8 Nov. 43
TWO CO'S ABREAST ONE IN RESERVE
ECHELOINED TO RIGHT REAR, LEFT FLANK
PROCEEDING ALONG BEACH
DISTANCE BETWEEN MEN APPROX. 5 YDS
INTERVAL BETWEEN FILES APPROX. 10 YDS




MORTARS REMAINED IN POSITION
BEHIND FBL UNTIL 14 Nov. 43


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


SKETCH No. 3
SHOWING APPROACH MARCH FORMATION
9 Nov. 43



SKETCH No. 4
LOCATION OF PERIMETER DEFENSE
Nov. 8 & Nov. 9-14, 1ST BATTALION, 2ND MARINES






LARUMA RIVER

500 Yds.
300 Yds.



2B  21

FIRED ON AT 1300 13 Nov 43

Wpn B
LMG


LAGOON

3B  21 →

Wpn B
 21

2D  21


Wpn A
60mm
 21

1B  21

SKETCH No. 7

SHOWING INITIAL MANEUVER
"B" Co. (REIN)
AFTER RECEIVING FIRE

NOTE: ARROWS INDICATE DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT



ENEMY WITHDREW ALONG
TRAIL NIGHT OF 13 NOV. 43

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS MADE
CONTACT ON AFTERNOON 13 NOV. 43
NO CONTACT ON 14 NOV. 43

SKETCH No. 8
SHOWING LOCATION "B" CO. NIGHT OF 13 NOV. 43
ENEMY POSITION AND ROUTE OF WITHDRAWAL

ANNEX C:

Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Marines to Secure the Numa-Numa-East-West Trail Junction, 13-14 November, 1943.

On 12 November, 1943 the 21st Marines (Less 1st and 3rd Battalions and detachments Regimental Weapons Company) as Division reserve, was in bivouac in rear of the 9th Marines sector of the FBL (See Figure 1). The situation on the FBL was quiet, action being limited to patrolling. A survey party of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines had been ambushed near the junction of the Numa-Numa-East-West trails.

At 1415 the CO 21st Marines received the following order from the CG, 3d Marine Division:

"Patrol NUMA-NUMA Trail to such distance as patrol can reach and return prior to dusk but not before 1730 unless driven in by enemy. Depart bivouac area prior to 0630. Strength of patrol one company, weapons platoon may be omitted. Reconnoiter junction NUMA-NUMA Trail with ATSINIMA-MOAVIVIA (East-West) Trail each way for a distance of 1000 yds with a view to establishing later strong outpost that locality. Note signs hostile activity not previously reported. See Army Air Force Map No. 7 1/250,000. 21st Marines submit full report with overlay on patrol not later than 1000, 14 November."

In order to accomplish the assigned mission the CO 21st Marines issued the following order to the CO 2nd Battalion at 1800:

"Survey party of 1st Battalion 12th Marines ambushed (135.6-218.0) today. Strength of ambush unknown. 1 Marine dead and 1 wounded. 2nd Battalion will patrol NUMA-NUMA Trail 13 November to such distance as patrol can reach and return prior to dusk but not before 1730 unless driven in by enemy. Depart bivouac area prior to 0630. Strength of patrol one company. Weapons platoon may be omitted. Reconnoiter junction NUMA-NUMA Trail with ATSINIMA-MOAVIVIA (East-West) Trail each way for distance of 1000 yds with view to establishing strong outpost that locality. Note signs hostile activity not previously reported. See Army Air Force Map No. 7, 1/250,000. Particular attention to east portion of ATSINIMA-MOAVIVIA (East-West) Trail. 9th Marines reports this well traveled jeep trail. Confirmation desired. Contact 9th Marines for latest trail details. Submit report with overlay to this Headquarters prior to 0800, 14 November."

The CO 2nd Battalion selected Company E to carry out the patrol operation and made the decision to include the weapons platoon.

At 2100 the Division Chief of Staff directed the CO 21st Marines to increase the size of the patrol to at least two companies with a suitable command group and artillery forward observer party and to establish an outpost to hold the trail junction. The CO 21st Marines informed the Chief of Staff that in view of the importance of the mission he (CO 21st Marines) would send the entire 2nd Battalion. As a result of telephone conference with the Chief of Staff, the CO 21st Marines made the following decision: To have Company E move out at 0630, 13 November and proceed to an assembly area in rear of the front line of the 9th Marines, remaining there until the remainder of the battalion moved up. 2nd Battalion then to proceed as a unit on the assigned mission. Oral orders to carry out this plan were telephoned to CO 2nd Battalion at 2130.




FIGURE 1

The following morning (13 November) Company E cleared the battalion bivouac area at 0630 and proceeded to assembly area in rear of 9th Marines front line.

At 0730 the Chief of Staff telephoned the CO 21st Marines and directed that Company E proceed on to the trail junction and set up the outpost, the remainder of the battalion to follow when ready. Oral orders were telephoned to the CO 2nd Battalion to carry out this directive.

Company E cleared the FBL at 0800 followed by the remainder of the battalion at 1100. (The departure of the remainder of the battalion had been delayed by difficulty in drawing ammunition and rations, and by the late arrival of the artillery forward observer party).

Company E, proceeding along the Numa-Numa trail, was ambushed at 1105 by an enemy force located about 200 yards south of the trail junction. (For formation of Company E, see Figure 2.)




FIGURE 2

At 1200 a runner reported to CO 2nd Battalion that Company E had made contact with the enemy, was receiving heavy machine gun and mortar fire and had several casualties. At the time of this report the 2nd Battalion was about 1200 yards south of the trail junction in the formation shown in Figure 3.




FIGURE 3

Acting on this information CO 2nd Battalion reduced flank security units to a minimum and moved the battalion forward along the trail as rapidly as possible, leaving one platoon of Company F to protect the artillery wire party.

At 1245 the battalion was in position 200 yards to the rear of Company E. At this point CO 2nd Battalion received information that Company E was pinned down by heavy fire, was slowly being annihilated, and reinforcement was needed immediately. The only information CO 2nd Battalion had of the enemy location was that an enemy force was located south of the trail junction.

CO 2nd Battalion assembled company commanders and issued the following oral orders: Company G (attached Machine Gun Platoon) proceed forward, contact Company E and give such assistance as the situation requires; Company H (less one Machine Gun Platoon) emplace mortars and prepare to support the attack, mortar platoon leader with observer report to CO Company G and employ mortars as needed; Company F (less one Platoon) assemble in battalion reserve. The CO 2nd Battalion ordered his Executive Officer to go forward with the artillery forward observer, contact CO Company E and prevent enemy from maneuvering by laying artillery concentrations where needed.

On arrival at the position of Company E the Battalion Executive Officer reported to CO 2nd Battalion that enemy fire was very heavy, Company E was pinned down, had many casualties and assistance was needed. He further reported


that the heaviest fire appeared to come from the east in the direction of the Piva River. (Artillery fire was promptly placed on this position.)

CO 2nd Battalion, having received many conflicting reports on the situation, decided to displace his CP forward and try to obtain more accurate information. The CP was displaced forward into a coconut grove along the Numa-Numa trail. At this point CO 2nd Battalion was informed by the Battalion Executive Officer (telephone) that Company E needed help immediately.

After a quick reconnaissance CO 2nd Battalion assembled the company commanders of Companies E and F and ordered Company F (attached Machine Gun Platoon) to pass through Company E far enough to allow Company E to withdraw, reorganize and protect the battalion right flank. Company G was ordered to hold its present position.

At this time CO 2nd Battalion estimated the enemy strength to be approximately a reinforced company disposed generally east and west astride the trail.

Company E having withdrawn and reorganized on the battalion right flank, CO 2nd Battalion assumed his disposition was as shown in Figure 4.



Receiving reports that no contact had been established with Company F and that the Battalion Executive Officer was wounded, CO 2nd Battalion dispatched staff officers to locate Company F and to check the battalion line. As a result of this check CO 2nd Battalion discovered that Company F could not be found and that the battalion was in a very dangerous position as shown by Figure 5.





FIGURE 5


CO 2nd Battalion immediately ordered Company E (attached Machine Gun Platoon) to move forward, contact Company G and establish a line to protect the battalion front and right flank. Company G was ordered to shift its line to tie in with Company E.

At 1630 CO 2nd Battalion decided that in view of the heavy casualties, loss of contact with Company F, loss of communications with the Regimental CP and artillery, and the late hour, further efforts to develop the situation would be unsound and ordered all companies to dig in for defense.

At 1700 Gunnery Sergeant from Company F reported to CO 2nd Battalion that Company F had penetrated the enemy lines, suffered heavy casualties, was disorganized and the company commander was missing. CO 2nd Battalion ordered the Gunnery Sergeant to return to Company F and lead them around the enemy flank to a position in rear of the battalion line. (See Figure 6 for movements of Company F.)



At 1745 Company F had arrived within the battalion lines. (See Figure 7 for disposition of 2nd Battalion for night of 13 November.)



At 1830 communications were reestablished with the regimental CP and the artillery and the artillery was ordered to register on the north, east and west sides of the perimeter. The 2nd Raider Battalion (attached to the 21st Marines) was moved forward to protect the supply line between the 2nd Battalion and the FBL. CO 21st Marines directed CO 2nd Battalion to send out patrols in the morning and prepare to attack supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft.

No action other than fire by enemy snipers took place during the night.

On the morning of the 14th all companies established outposts 75 yards from the perimeter and sent out patrols. At 0810 friendly aircraft appeared overhead and CO 2nd Battalion was informed by CO 21st Marines that they were ready to bomb and strafe the enemy positions. They had enough gasoline to delay the attack until 0915. CO 2nd Battalion was much concerned because it was estimated that all his patrols would not be in by 0915, his water supply was exhausted and none had been received. His decision was to recall the patrols, request the air attack and delay the infantry attack until water arrived.

At 0905, all patrols having returned and Company E withdrawn to a position in rear of battalion front line, the artillery marked the enemy positions with smoke and the friendly aircraft (20 THF's with 100 lb 1/10 second delay bombs) attacked very effectively. Immediately after the air attack Company E moved back to the battalion front line.

CO 2nd Battalion assembled all company commanders, artillery liaison officer and tank officers (Tank Platoon attached to regiment) and issued the following oral order:

"Available information given to all Company Commanders.

The Battalion will attack the enemy position on a frontage of 200 yards, with the mission of driving the enemy to the north beyond the trail junction, seize the trail junction and organize an outpost.

Companies E and F in the assault, supported by tanks and artillery, Company F on the right, Company E on the left. G and H companies in reserve.

Boundary: Numa-Numa Trail.

Line of Departure: See sketch.

Formation: See sketch.

Contact: To the center. Active patrolling in front of advancing troops.

H-Hour: To be announced after the arrival of water.

Company F will attack on the frontage of 100 yards on the east side of the trail in battalion zone of action, drive the enemy to the north, seize objective OA in its zone of action, and be prepared to set up a battalion perimeter on order.

Company E will attack on the frontage of 100 yards on the west side of the trail in battalion zone of action, drive the enemy to the north, seize objective OA in its zone of action, and be prepared to set up a battalion perimeter on order.

Company G with 3d Machine Gun Platoon Company H attached, follow the attack at 150 yards in rear in center of battalion zone of action. Be prepared to mop up in rear of advancing elements, protect the battalion right flank with one platoon and protect the battalion left flank with one platoon.

Company H be prepared to support the attack with mortars and machine guns.


Tank platoon support the assault companies as shown on sketch above.

Artillery furnish artillery preparation just prior to "H"-Hour and support the attack with a rolling barrage. Period of preparation and technique of rolling barrage to be decided by CO 2nd Battalion 12th Marines.

Aid Station follow CP and be prepared to set up in vicinity of trail.

Communications in accordance with Battalion SOP jungle formation. CP-See sketch."

For sketch to accompany oral attack order see Figure 3.



At 1015 water arrived for the battalion and H-hour was set for 1100. At 1045 communication with the regimental CP and the artillery was lost and the attack was ordered delayed. At 1115 communications were reestablished and CO 2nd Battalion conferred with CO Artillery Battalion. It was decided that H-hour would be 1155 preceded by a 20 minute preparation and followed by a rolling barrage. All units were informed of this plan.

At 1135 the artillery preparation began and at 1155 the attack jumped off according to plan. The enemy opened fire with machine guns and by snipers. As the attack moved forward the tanks opened fire on the friendly troops and several men were run over. Two tanks on the left lost direction completely (one changed direction 270°). For a period of 5 minutes there was complete panic and wild shooting. There was no tendency to retreat but control was lost. CO 2nd Battalion, believing the panic to be due to the noise of the rolling barrage, snipers and loss of control by the tanks, moved forward to the assault troops and gave orders to cease firing and stop the advance. The enemy fire also stopped. (Note: Orders to cease firing were not very effective but ridicule, sarcasm, scorn and humorous remarks were and all troops suddenly realized how foolish they had been.)

CO 2nd Battalion ordered all companies to hold their present positions and send out patrols to a distance of 100 yards north of the trail junction and return. The tanks were ordered to assemble in reserve. (Two tanks had been rendered unserviceable, one by a land mine and one by an AT grenade.) At this time it was discovered that the assault troops had reached the enemy positions, and some enemy were still present in dugouts. They were detected by a trained dog from the Raider Battalion. These enemy emplacements were knocked out by riflemen with hand grenades.

By 1400 all enemy resistance had been overcome and the patrols had returned and reported no contact. At 1415 the advance was resumed and the objective seized without resistance at 1530. A perimeter defense was organized for the night. (See Figure 9.)




FIGURE 9

CO 2nd Battalion estimated that the enemy strength was at least a reinforced company. The enemy dead appeared to have been killed by rifle fire and hand grenades, indicating that the bombing and shelling had been ineffective or the enemy had evacuated or buried his dead.

The enemy positions were very extensive and well organized. The numerous machine gun positions were well constructed and most of the dugouts were deep with good overhead cover.

Although a careful count of enemy dead was not made, an analysis of accurate reports indicated an estimate of about 40 enemy killed. Marine losses were - 5 officers, 15 enlisted men killed in action, 39 enlisted men wounded in action.

ANNEX D: MEDICAL REPORT.

1. GENERAL: This report covers the various phases of medical interest and responsibility during the period November 6, 1943 to January 9, 1944, inclusive.

2. SANITATION.

a. INDIVIDUAL: Further indoctrination of the individual, both officer and enlisted man, in the fundamental principles of field sanitation is needed. A higher sense of individual responsibility in the prevention of disease must be ingrained in the military conscience of each individual. Many violations of the essentials of field sanitation on the part of many individuals were encountered.

b. WATER:

(1) Water for bathing, drinking and cooking was readily obtainable from (a) rainfall, (b) wells, (c) streams, and (d) organized water points. Chlorination of all water before use, for drinking and cooking, was thoroughly and satisfactorily carried out. However, the location of organized water points in respect to bathing areas was careless and unsatisfactory. They were located usually at or near a bridge. No control existed of men bathing above or at the bridge. The control of these areas was confused, and men of many organizations would afford themselves of the opportunity for bathing or laundering at the closest point to the bridge, or in fact within ten feet in many instances of the intake hose. Some measure of control was made by having the reservoir tank filled in the early morning hours and then the water from it passed as needed through the filter and chlorinator to distributing tanks. As a rule the streams were swift (8-10 knots per hour), shallow (3-5 feet), clear of vegetation (gravel bottom) so that a rapid change of water existed. But on the whole the promiscuous bathing and washing of clothes above and at water points was ever present and uncontrolled.

(2) Bathing: Men availed themselves of every opportunity to bathe. In front line positions this opportunity was necessarily limited, so that in some instances as much as a week elapsed between baths. Unit commanders should keep in mind the desirability of cleanliness of skin surfaces of the troops and afford whenever possible relief for bathing purposes.

(3) Laundering: No organized effort was made to afford the troops opportunity to adequately launder (boil) their soiled clothing during this 60 day period. A clothing issue was made once. In many instances a man wore the same pair of trousers during the whole 60 day period. It is recommended that if at all practicable, a plan be developed whereby a change to clean boiled clothing be afforded at least once a week. This will reduce considerably the incidence of skin infection, fungus and other types.

c. FOOD:

(1) Types of Rations: The quality and quantity of rations were satisfactory with a few minor exceptions. The following comments on the rations used are submitted:

B ration - more fruit and fruit juice and sweets (hard candy) are desirable. There is an intense craving for sweet drinks after a period of exertion under conditions of action in jungle in the tropics. Roast beef or chicken and less corned beef and spam are desirable.

C ration - The bread component of this ration is in excess and favors wastage to a large measure. The palatability of the biscuit is low and can be improved upon. More salt in it would improve the flavor. The hard candy could be increased to good advantage.

D ration - A tendency to eat this rapidly as a chocolate bar favors indigestion, pain in abdomen, and diarrhea. This bar molds easily. This type of ration should be improved or altered.

K ration - A very good ration but the aromatic flavor of peppermint from the chewing gum penetrates the bread component and makes this distasteful. There is too much bread and consequently much wastage of this item. The consistency and make up of this component is more acceptable than in the C ration. It is recommended that aromatic flavors be eliminated and the bread component be reduced, and more hard candy added.

J ration - This is excellent. However again the bread component is in excess. A variety of sweet or sandwiched crackers with a sugar filling would be very acceptable. The tendency is to eat more of the sucrose and dextrose carbohydrates than starches. The biscuit is dry, increasing the consumption of water with the meals. The salted roasted peanuts (nutritious and having a high vitamin content) are very acceptable. These were always consumed in entirety. Peanuts could be added to any type ration to advantage.

5-1 ration - Excellent.

(2) Vitamins: There is a deficiency of B complex and C vitamins in the diet. Even when the individual ration is so calculated to meet the daily requirements, this deficiency will develop whenever the availability (fruit and fruit juice) becomes limited or whenever the food is not consumed because of monotony (corn beef - spam). It is urged that vitamin pills be made more accessible in this area and that rations be corrected to overcome these objections.

(3) Storage: Storage in regimental areas presented no problem because of the quick turnover or available stores. These areas were generally satisfactory.

(4) Equipment: Initially there was a lack of adequate galley equipment. Fire units for providing hot chow and for sterilization of mess gear were not in use until after November 13th. Galleys when organized were well conducted with the exceptions noted below under disposal of waste.

d. STERILIZATION OF MESS GEAR: In front line areas this was a problem due to the fact that fires were prohibited for purposes of concealment. As a result, discipline regarding proper cleansing and sterilization of gear became individualized and most neglected. Gastro-intestinal disorders were all too frequent. The need for boiling in soapy and clear water (3 pot system) is exacting where a system of community mess-gear washing is used. But where each individual cleans his mess gear in his own water, there is no opportunity of spreading of disease from one person to another. The problem then becomes one of merely cleaning the grease and food from the gear. This can be satisfactorily done by a conscientious effort at cleaning with soap and water immediately after the meal is finished. Mass sterilization of mess gear was accomplished for a week or two by rinsing the gear in a solution containing 12 parts chlorine per million after cleansing with soap and water. A new disinfectant for this purpose has lately been introduced which it is understood will be issued by the Quartermaster, viz: ("MIKRO KLENE", Economic Laboratory Inc., St. Paul, Minn.). One 3.36 oz. package in 25 gallons of water will disinfect mess utensils for 200 men for 1 meal.

Further study and planning for some practical way of cleaning and sterilization of mess gear in forward areas is recommended. Individual responsibility must be stressed.

e. DISPOSAL OF WASTE:

(1) Human:

(a) In general this was unsatisfactory. Slit trenches were used by all personnel, but the covering of feces and used toilet paper with sand was haphazard and grossly careless. This was the case with the officers' heads as well as the heads for the enlisted men. Head pits were used until they were almost level with the ground surface before being closed. In the regimental train bivouac, heads were not more than 35 yards from the galleys. Some heads were open, others had crude covered seats that were warped and were in no way fly-proofed. Later steel drum heads were used and were quite satisfactory when careful attention was paid to a snug, well fitting, hinged cover. Further discipline of the individual is acutely needed in his responsibility to see that all fecal matter or used toilet paper in trench is thoroughly covered with sand. The proper use of a trench so as not to soil the sides of the trench, particularly with liquid stools, should be stressed.

(b) Pit or trench urinals were used properly, and later when the forward line was stabilized, closed pit urinals were used in bivouac areas.

(2) Kitchen Waste Garbage: The disposal of used cans from individual rations was bad. In galley areas in the regimental train bivouac, (RTB) the disposal of garbage was bad. Large pits containing garbage were found uncovered. It is better to dig a pit just large enough to bury the garbage from each meal than one so large that it is difficult to keep the garbage covered.

f. INSECTS:

(1) Flies: Flies were not present in large or annoying numbers until after troops had been in an area long enough to favor breeding. This invariably was the case. Closer enforcement of accepted principles and correction of the above mentioned errors would have reduced the fly menace, which, on the whole was never bad in extreme degree.

(2) Mosquitoes: Mosquitoes were present but were extremely scarce and were not a nuisance at all. Anopheles mosquitoes were present. The consensus was that the malaria that manifested itself had been contracted prior to the landing at the Empress Augusta Bay area and was a breakthrough of the suppressed infection in the individual. This area was apparently inhabited by only a few natives, and mosquitoes were not at all plentiful.

(3) Centipedes and Scorpions: Centipedes and scorpions were present. Their bite was particularly painful and disabling for 1 or 2 days.

g. MALARIA CONTROL: Repellant was little used, head nets not at all, and cot nets rarely except in those instances where jungle hammocks were slung in foxholes. The freon pyrethrum bomb was used when available. Adequate supplies of freon bombs were not available at first due to loss in movement or due to not bringing them because of error. Atabrine discipline was good. Oiling and draining was done by malarial control sections as was practicable.

h. PERSONAL HYGIENE:

(1) Clothing: Clothing takes a terrible beating under conditions of rapid advance. It is recommended that some plan be formulated to see that the men have adequate change of clothing and socks. The knapsack system is only partially successful. In many instances these were lost by individuals or as company gear, or, at any rate, did not reach the owner. As a result, the individual will go through the operation without even a change of clothing. Many men will discard extra clothing in times of physical stress, only to wish for it later. Some system whereby organizations could re-issue clean clothing at intervals is desired.

(2) Bathing and Laundry: Mentioned above.

(3) Toilet Paper: This was limited and was always sought for. In the absence of other things, toilet paper was used for wiping out moss gear, wrapping spoons to protect them from flies in forward areas where corpses lay unburied, and for handkerchiefs. While this use is not esthetic, it is practical and desirable under the circumstances. It is urged that a more liberal supply of toilet paper be issued for use in the forward area.

(4) Tooth Brushes and Tooth Paste: These are much desired by troops in the front lines. Many use their tooth brushes for cleaning of their weapons, then feel neglected because their teeth later suffer. However it should be planned to have an issue of tooth brushes during any operation. Tooth paste while desirable is not a necessity, ordinary face soap will do as well.

1. POLICE OF CAMP AREAS: On leaving the camp sites, policing of areas should be emphasized more. The proper filling, mounding, and labeling of heads and garbage pits should be more scrupulously done.

3. MEDICAL (OPERATIONAL) DATA.

a. SUPPLIES:

(1) The procurement and availability of medical supplies was satisfactory. Battalion and Regimental medical dumps were amalgamated at the RTB and this dump was readily and satisfactorily supplied from the nearest medical company. Formal chit or requisition was not used, and this privilege was not abused.

(2) Battalion and regimental gear suffered some loss by way of spoilage from the rains. Labels came off bottles, cotton and gauze were ruined. Proper tentage or canvas cover was not available for one month. It is desirable that adequate cover be issued, marked, boxed and carried with each medical section for use of the aid station and medical dump.

b. EVACUATION.

(1) Evacuation of wounded from battalion aid stations to field hospitals was done mainly by amphibious tractors. The medical company collecting sections did not function as usually contemplated because of the swampy terrain. Ambulances were not used except in rear areas where roads

were passable. It was not until after December 23rd when the East-West trail was available and enemy activity had practically ceased, that ambulances could evacuate all the way from aid station to field hospital. Ambulances, drivers, and corpsmen were bivouacked at the Regimental CP.

(2) The medical company collecting section was divided into 3 groups under the control of a Chief Pharmacist Mate and the Regimental Surgeon. Each group bivouacked and advanced with their respective battalion. The control of the sections was located at the Regimental CP so as to have ready access to tactical data, medical estimate of the situation, condition of roads, and location of available jeep trails, etc. All ambulances (7 jeep ambulances) were under regimental control with ambulances parked at the Regimental CP.

(3) Many line personnel received commendation for evacuation of wounded under fire. Such evacuation while humane and laudatory is not strictly SOP in that such evacuation was from the very advance point to the company corpsmen while under active fire.

(4) Medical companies remained under division control and not under regimental control. Similarly, their collecting section was never under official regimental control. Occasionally the use of these sections in areas forward of the battalion aid station on orders originating in the battalion CP led to confusion and misunderstanding. Moreover, the use of these corpsmen as litter bearers forward of the battalion aid station is not authorized in the Medical SOP and, if continued, will lead to unwarranted casualties in this group. When it is considered that the ratio of line personnel to corpsmen is 30 to 1, the loss of a corpsman is equivalent to the loss of a platoon.

(5) Personnel available for evacuation in the battalion area from the front line to the battalion aid station consists of 3 groups, (a) 12 corpsmen of battalion medical section and band section (7-9) making a total of 21, or 5 litter teams, (b) 2% of line personnel, and/or (c) the litter bearer platoon (42 men, 1 line officer) (Medical SOP). These resources should be utilized to the fullest extent, and a reasonable expectancy of exhausting these facilities in the battalion should exist before a call for additional assistance from the medical section of another battalion is made. The reason for this is that the medical section of each battalion must be prepared in strength of number and strength of physique to be able to go forward with its battalion if and when the battalion is called on to advance. There are times when a medical section is inactive, but how long this will continue is always problematic. In other words all eggs must not be put in one basket initially.

c. TRANSPORTATION:

(1) Medical Section: No organic transportation except 5 jeep ambulance is assigned to the medical section according to the tables of organization. Division orders restrict the use of these ambulances entirely to the use of sitting or litter patients. They are not to be used for the purpose of transporting gear from CP to CP or to transport the dead to cemeteries. Occasions however do arise when it is necessary to carry medical gear in ambulances. A difference of opinion arises and creates an awkward situation. Medical gear consists of many crates; transportation is necessary. The efficiency of the medical section would be considerably enhanced by the addition of several 1-ton vehicles and 1 jeep.

d. LOADING AND UNLOADING OF MEDICAL GEAR: It is a common and predictable experience that medical gear and cases will be rifled aboard ship and on docks in search for alcohol and brandy. All protection for medical gear to prevent such pilfering should be taken. It is suggested that all alcohol and brandy be cases and stored aboard ship in a locked compartment under guard and under care of some responsible officer. Any system other than the present laissez-faire attitude will be conducive to good results.

e. CARE OF WAR NEUROSIS AND AMBULATORY CASES AFTER LEAVING HOSPITAL COMPANIES:

(1) There is urgent need for a casual company or convalescent ward attached to the Medical Company or Division Hospital wherein patients recovering from hospital treatment can rest two to four days before being sent back to their units for active duty. In the need for beds and the hurried evacuation subsequent thereto, we have had casualties evacuated from the combat zone having remained in the medical company one-half day. Three of these cases were of the Combat Fatigue Neurosis group. After November 22, in order to relieve the medical companies, a ward was erected at the Regimental Aid Station where all combat fatigue and war neurosis patients were sent for rest and observation. After a rest of three to seven days these patients were able to return

to active duty. Moreover cases of diarrhea and malaria, after being discharged from the hospital due to the need of a quick turn-over were insufficiently well to return to duty at the front line. Experience showed a recurrence of this illness, or combat fatigue would make them non-effectives again. Accordingly these patients were retained in the Regimental Aid Station Ward until they had recuperated sufficiently to resume their full duty. This arrangement fulfilled the purpose of a casual company. However, under conditions of rapid advance, a Regimental Aid Station could not be encumbered in this manner.

(2) According to the CO of the Rear Echelon, approximately 47 men were returned to his command after having been evacuated from forward area. Not more than 7 of these men could be returned to the combat zone because of lack of available transportation. It is reasonable to conclude that all of the 47 men would have been available for duty in the combat zone had such casual company existed in the forward area.

f. RETURN OF PATIENTS FROM HOSPITAL TO BATTALION: Sometimes patients on being discharged from the hospital would not report to their respective battalions in a reasonable time. There was a feeling in the Battalion Headquarters that some of these patients went sight-seeing or visiting. In order to counteract this, the medical companies were requested to send all patients on discharge to the Regimental Aid Station, and from there they would be directed to the exact location of their Battalion CP. This did not function 100%. It is understood that in the Army, a patient upon discharge is delivered to the Military Police who then take the patient directly to the Battalion CP and receive a chit for him. This enables the patient to find his battalion area promptly and eliminates patients wandering around trying to find their organizations which have moved during the time of their illness.

g. MEDICAL SOP:

(1) The medical SOP was issued late, just prior to embarkation, and had not been thoroughly digested by all pertinent officers.

(2) The SOP concerning the transportation and responsibility for the dead, after the medical officer has completed his medical records as to cause of death, and identification of the body, was not either understood or followed. This regiment's association as a regiment with the graves' registration section was not a happy one. Ambulances are not to be used to transport the dead except when death occurs enroute.

h. CONCLUSIONS: The above criticisms are to be construed entirely as constructive. Consideration of the splendid work accomplished by all hands, and due credit for sincerity of effort did not influence for or against minimizing the unfavorable factors as mentioned. It is only in the hope of the attainment of the highest degree of efficiency and accomplishment of medical aims that this critical report is offered. It is the consensus of opinion that an exceedingly high achievement of the ultimate medical objective was reached in this operation.

3. BATTLE AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES:

a. KILLED IN ACTION:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL
WOUNDS, GS, Chest and Trunk	0	0	7	4	2	13
WOUNDS, GS, Extremities	0	0	0	0	0	0
WOUNDS, GS, Head	0	0	2	5	2	9
WOUNDS, GS, Multiple	0	0	2	3	9	14
SHELL FRAGMENTS, Artillery & Bombs	0	0	8	6	7	21
WOUNDS, Details Not Known	0	1	4	10	38	53
MISSING IN ACTION	0	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL						111

b. KILLED IN ACTION (DETAILED):

	GUNSHOT WOUND						SHELL FRAGMENTS					
	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL
Head	0	0	2	4	2	8	0	0	1	0	1	2
Chest	0	0	5	3	0	8	0	0	4	0	1	5
Abdomen	0	0	2	1	2	5	0	0	1	0	1	2
Neck	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
Leg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Buttock	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Multiple	0	0	2	3	9	14	0	0	1	4	4	9
Details not Known	0	1	4	10	38	53						
			(a)	(b)	(b)	(c)						

Note: (a) Killed on reconnaissance patrol - body not found.

(b) Wounds not described.

(c) Lost on USS MC KEAN.

Remarks: Died -

(1) In Field Hospitals WIA - 7 Malaria - 1 Total - 8

(2) After evacuation from Combat Zone Total - 5

(3) After having been previously wounded, returned to duty and was KIA 23 days later - 1.

(4) Killed by own men when leaving foxhole after darkness - 2.

(5) Killed by accidental discharge of own weapon - 1.

c. WOUNDED IN ACTION:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	EVAC	DUTY
WOUND, GS, Chest and Trunk	0	0	4	5	5	14	11	3
WOUND, GS, Extremities	0	1	17	18	13	49	39	10
WOUND, GS, Head	0	0	2	6	2	10	8	2
WOUND, GS, Multiple	0	0	0	6	3	9	9	0
SHELL FRAGMENTS, Artillery & Bomb	0	0	28	18	17	63	43	20
WOUNDS, Details not known	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BURNS, Multiple (USS MC KEAN)	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	0
CONTUSIONS:								
Rt. Elbow (Tank)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Head (Tank)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
MISCELLANEOUS:								
Chemical Burn Eyes	0	0	0	0	6	6	1	5
Blast Concussion:								
Head-Persistent Headache	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Ears - Rupture drums	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
Chest and Abdomen	0	0	0	0	7	7	6	1
Multiple	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0
DU Fracture Spine	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
DU Shock	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
						177	132	43

d. GUNSHOT WOUNDS, Comparison of Right and Left side distribution:

	RIGHT SIDE	LEFT SIDE
Upper Extremities, (Including shoulder)	15	6
Chest	6	2
Lower Extremities	15	13
Face	3	0

When firing from behind cover, the face, right upper extremities, and right side of the chest are the exposed portions of the body.

e. WOUNDED IN ACTION (DETAILED) Listed according to anatomical distribution.

	GUNSHOT WOUND								SHELL FRAGMENTS							
	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	DUTY	EVAC	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOT	DUTY	EV
Head	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	3	2	1
Neck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Shoulder	0	0	5	3	3	11	3	8	0	0	2	3	1	6	4	2
Upper Arm	0	0	2	2	2	6	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lower Arm	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	4	1	3
Wrist	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
Hand	0	0	1	0	2	3	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	1
Chest	0	0	3	4	0	7	3	4	0	0	2	1	2	5	4	1
Abdomen	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Back	0	0	1	0	3	4	0	4	0	0	3	1	3	7	2	5
Buttock	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	3	2	1
Hip	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Thigh	0	0	2	2	1	5	0	5	0	0	5	2	1	8	3	5
Knee	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lower leg	0	1	4	7	2	14	4	10	0	0	3	1	2	6	0	6
Ankle	0	0	1	2	1	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Foot	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
Face	0	0	0	4	2	6	2	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Eye	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
Multiple	0	0	0	7	3	10	1	9	0	0	3	5	4	12	4	8
TOTALS	0	1	24	36	21	82	17	65	0	0	27	18	18	62	24	38

Remarks:

- (a) Wounded on two different occasions - 5 (1 KIA)
- (b) Wounded with fracture of bone @ 3 (Mandible, forearm, humerus)
- (c) Wounded, evacuated from combat area and returned to duty by rear echelon casual company - 7.
- (d) Wounded, evacuated from combat area, but could not be returned to duty because of lack of transportation - 40.

f. BATTLE CASUALTIES USS MC KEAN:

Missing - details not known - now carried as KIA - 38

Chemical Burns of Eyes - 6 1 evacuated.

Blast Concussion Chest and abdomen 7 6 evacuated.
Multiple 3 3 evacuated.
10 9 evacuated.

Burns, Multiple 9 9 evacuated.

GSW, (Strafing) 2 2 "

DU Fracture Spine 1 1 "

DU Shock 1 1 "

TOTAL WIA (McKean) 29 24 evacuated

TOTAL KIA (McKean) 38

TOTAL 67

g. DIED:

Injuries
Illness

H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	REMARKS
0	00	0	0	0	0	
0	0	0	1	0	1	Malaria

h. INJURIES:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	DUTY	EVAC	TOTAL
Lacerated Wounds (Machette)	0	0	5	0	2	4	3	7
Gun Shot Wound (Accidental)	1	0	4	2	2	0	9	9
Fire Burn - gasoline	1	0	6	1	1	2	7	9
DU Fracture Ankle	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DU Fracture Tibia, Right	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Fracture, Patella	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
DU Fracture Spine	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Dislocation Clavicle	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Dislocation Right Hip	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Stab Left Hip	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Contusion Neck	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
Contusion Left Thigh	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Contusion Right Kidney	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Contusion Left Abdomen	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Sprain Ankle	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Sprain Back	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	3
Total	3	0	20	7	10	9	31	40
Evacuated by units	2	0	14	6	9			

Note: Many accidental GSW, gasoline fire burns, and machette wounds are being carried on other records as wounded in action or battle casualties.

i. ILLNESS

(1) DU MALARIA:

H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	EVAC
9	8	49	31	14	111	16

(2) GASTRO-INTESTINAL DISORDERS:

Diarrhea and Dysentery	9	0	73	17	12	111	6
Note: 64 cases remained in hospital 4 days or less.							
Colitis	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Intestinal Parasites	0	0	2	1	2	5	0
Hemorrhoids	0	0	7	0	2	9	0
Appendicitis, Acute	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Jaundice	1	0	1	0	1	3	3
Abscess - Perianal	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Totals	11	0	84	18	18	131	11

(3) NERVOUS AND MENTAL ABNORMALITIES:

Combat Fatigue	0	0	11	11	7	29	10
War Neurosis	0	0	8	3	2	13	8
Shell Shock	0	0	0	2	1	3	3
Nervousness	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Amblyopia (Hysteria)	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Dementia Precox	0	0	1	0	1	2	2
Psychopathic - personality	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Mental Observation	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Totals	1	0	22	16	12	51	25

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES (CONTINUED) - ILLNESS:

(4) <u>FILARIASIS:</u>	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	EVAC
	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
(5) <u>SKIN DISORDERS:</u>							
Fungus Infection	0	0	14	0	0	14	4
Cellulitis	2	2	23	6	5	38	5
Dermatitis Venenata	0	1	6	3	3	13	6
Furunculosis	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Ingrowing Toe Nail	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Erythema	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Sebaceous Cyst, face	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Cyst, recurrent, buttock	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Totals	2	3	47	9	9	70	16
(6) <u>RESPIRATORY:</u>							
Catarrhal Fever	0	5	9	6	1	21	4
Bronchitis	0	0	4	0	0	4	0
Asthma	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Broncho Pneumonia	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Totals	0	5	14	7	1	27	6
(7) <u>E.E.N. & T.:</u>							
Tonsillitis	0	0	1	1	1	3	1
Vincent's Angina	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Conjunctivitis	0	0	1	1	1	3	3
Otitis Media, Chronic	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Iritis	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Totals	0	0	4	2	3	9	6
(8) <u>CARDIOVASCULAR:</u>							
Paroxysmal Tachycardia	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
(9) <u>GENITO-URINARY:</u>							
Eneurosis	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Ureteral Colic	0	0	1	0	1	2	0
Hydrocele	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Totals	0	0	1	0	3	4	2
(10) <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u>							
Heat Exhaustion	0	0	2	1	0	3	0
Neuritis-sciatic	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Medical Observation	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Bursitis, Knee	0	1	1	0	0	2	2
Arthritis	0	1	0	0	1	2	2
Adenitis-Inguinal	1	0	1	0	0	2	0
Thrombo-phlebitis	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Post Malaria-anemia and Malnutrition	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Dental Post-Extraction, Abscess - jaw.	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Peridental Abscess	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Cyst Recurrent L. Knee	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Totals	2	2	6	5	1	16	8

j. CASUALTIES:

HOSPITAL CORPSMEN:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	EVAC	DUTY
KIA	0	0	2	0	0	2		
WIA	0	0	6	1	3	10	9	1
NON BATTLE INJURY	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
ILLNESS	0	0	2	2	2	6	6	0

Loss by death or evacuation 18
Replacements 12

OFFICERS:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL	EVAC	DUTY
KIA	0	0	1	5	1	7		
WIA	0	1	3	2	0	6	5	1
ILLNESS	4	1	7	2	3	17	5	12

k. RECAPITULATION:

WOUNDED IN ACTION:

	H&S	R/W	1st	2nd	3rd	TOTAL
KILLED IN ACTION	0	2	23	28	58	111
WOUNDED IN ACTION	0	4	51	55	67	177
TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES						288 or 9.6%

DIED INJURY	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIED ILLNESS	0	0	0	1	0	1
NON-BATTLE INJURY	3	0	20	7	10	40
NON-BATTLE ILLNESS	25	18	288	89	61	421
TOTAL NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES						462 or 15.4%

TOTAL CASUALTIES ALL SOURCES 750 or 25.0%

TOTAL EVACUATED FROM COMBAT ZONE:

WOUNDED IN ACTION	133
NON-BATTLE INJURY	31
NON-BATTLE ILLNESS	91
TOTAL	255 or 8.5%

Note: These records brought up to date as of 1-25-44.

1. NOTES ON NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

(1) DU MALARIA: A total of 110 cases suspected of being malaria were admitted to the field hospitals. In 28 of these the diagnosis was not confirmed by positive blood smear. 22 cases admitted with diagnosis of diarrhea were found to have positive blood smear and were admitted diagnosis changed to malaria established. Total number of established cases of malaria in the regiment during the period 9 November 1943, to 9 January 1944, was 126. 13 of these cases have had a previous attack of malaria and 2 of these 13 have had it 3 or 4 times respectively. It is the consensus that all of these cases carried the malaria to the combat zone with them in a suppressed state and that under the conditions of physical stress and strain in combat, the infection broke through the atabrine suppression. During November the average number of admissions per week was 9, and during December the average number per week was 19.5. The peak load coming during the week of December 5-11 when 29 cases were admitted. Average loss in days per man admitted was 5 days, making a total loss of 550 man days. Of these 110 cases admitted, 10 cases were evacuated from the combat zone on or prior to December 27th. 4 of these cases were evacuated after being in the hospital 1, 2, and 3 days. One death occurred from malaria on the second day after admission to the field hospital. The death was sudden, unexpected, and unaccompanied by severe symptoms. Post mortem examination confirmed the diagnosis of malaria.

(2) DIARRHEA: A total of 111 cases were admitted to the sick list with symptoms of diarrhea, enteritis, or dysentery. 22 of these cases also had a positive malaria smear. Diarrhea was a common experience in about 75% of the troops. It was usually mild and responded readily to treatment. Some cases corrected themselves without treatment. The cause of wide-spread diarrhea is manifold and cannot be placed ipso facto on unsanitary galley conditions. Atabrine is a gastro-intestinal irritant and has laxative effects. It is a "primer" in some cases and in others it produces cramps and liquid stools. With all the troops taking atabrine, this stage was set for diarrhea at the least provocation. The water was alkaline, contained pumice, and this change of water constituents is to be considered a factor tending to produce diarrhea in some individuals. The onset of malaria symptoms may be featured by the predominance of gastro-intestinal symptoms. Improperly cleaned mess gear, careless galley conditions, rapid and excessive consumption of D rations, and over-eating generally are all factors which produce diarrhea. Other contributory factors are physical or nervous exhaustion, coryza or colds, illness, and avitaminosis. Six cases were evacuated from the combat zone, only 3 of these remained in the field hospitals more than 3 days. The need for beds, and the lack of a casual or convalescent company in the combat zone resulted in an unwarranted number of evacuees on the one hand and too early discharge to duty from the hospital on the other. Cases of diarrhea require 3 to 4 days of convalescence before returning to duty; otherwise in this weakened condition, diarrhea symptoms reoccur or else they become victims of early combat fatigue and have to be readmitted to the sick list. The average stay in the hospital was 3.4 days. Of the 111 total cases admitted, 12 cases remained in the hospital 1 day; 26, 2 days; and 19 remained 3 days.

(3) NERVOUS AND MENTAL ABNORMALITIES (NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC DISEASES):

(a) Fifty-one cases in this group were admitted to the sick list. The following general terms are defined:

COMBAT FATIGUE: Sheer physical and nervous exhaustion which can be completely corrected by rest, sleep and hot food, in one or two days.

WAR NEUROSIS: War anxiety or fear which exists in the absence of physical fatigue, occurring in a constitutionally inferior individual unable to adjust or compensate for the realities of war. Even after a rest period these symptoms persist if the individual remains in the combat zone, and if returned to duty in active combat the man inevitably has to be readmitted to the sick list.

SHELL SHOCK: Subjective symptoms (anemic, dizziness, stammering, headaches) concomitant with a history of having been near the bursting of a large shell. All these cases have to be evacuated.

(b) Here again cases were unnecessarily evacuated due to the need of beds. In order to remedy this after November 22nd, all cases in this group were ordered to remain for a period in a ward tent at the Regimental Aid Station before admission later to the field hospital if this was deemed necessary. This system did not function perfectly. Fourteen out of 25 such cases were admitted to the field hospital direct contrary to instructions, and 7 of these cases were unnecessarily evacuated. The average stay in the hospital of these cases returned to duty was 2.3 days. Whereas the average stay in the hospital of those evacuated from the combat zone was 2 days.

(c) The December 6, 1943, issue of Time Magazine quotes figures issued by the Office of War Information as follows:

(1) "In the last war the rate of admission for neuro-psychiatric diseases in Army hospitals averaged 30 per 1000 per year in the continental U.S. and slightly less than 20 per 1000 per year in the A.E.F. In this war the admission rate for neuro-psychiatric diseases is about 50 per 1000 men in the continental United States and slightly higher in some theaters." (In contrast, our regimental rate (22 men for 60-day period - strength of regiment 3000) was 44 per 1000 per year. ($22 \times 6 \times \frac{1}{3}$ equals 44) In this calculation cases of combat fatigue were not counted as this is not a true mental disease but rather a condition of physical exhaustion.).

(2) "The ratio of killed to wounded in the Army is one to three; in the Navy one to one; in the Marines one to four." (Our rate counting all KIA was 1 to 1.618. This high rate is due to 38 men lost on the MC KEAN. The rate, considering only men engaged in action on land, is 1 to 2).

(3) "About 3.5% of the Army's wounded have died; the Navy has lost 3.16%; the Marines 3.15%. In World War I, wounded fatalities were: Army, 6%; Navy, 7.95%; Marines, 12%." (Our ratio of battle casualties to die after evacuation to field hospitals (7) and thence to base hospitals (5) is 6.7%. In field hospitals death occurred after the casualty was received as follows: 1 in $\frac{1}{2}$ day; 3 in 1 day; 1 in 2 days; 1 in 4 days; 1 in 6 days; and other base hospitals 1 in 4 days; 1 in 7 days; 1 in 9 days; 2 in 35 days.).

Hq, CP, 12th Marines
3 Mar Div
In the Field

26 Jan 44

From: CO.
To: CG, 3 Mar Div.

Subject: Report of operations Nov-Dec 1943.

References: Ltr CG, 3 Mar Div to CO, 12th Mar, dated Jan 4, 1944.

1. The below report is not a narrative of the operation. It covers only points of particular interest from the standpoint of variations from standard procedure.

J. B. WILSON

wwj

General Report on Operations, Cont'd.

1. Tactical Phases--The tactical phases of the operation logically fall into the following groups:

A. INITIAL LANDING: In the initial landing of two combat teams abreast, artillery was decentralized with a battery attached to each landing team. The combat teams landed on a wide front, and thus the artillery batteries were widely separated on initial landing. The battalion headquarters batteries were landed in two echelons on different beaches within each combat team beachhead. A large percentage of artillery personnel was used as working parties to assist the shore party. These circumstances did not permit quick or easy centralization of artillery control. At no time did landing team commanders actually order or supervise the installation of the batteries. It is recommended that in future operations direct support artillery be landed under artillery battalion control on a beach centrally located within the combat team beachhead and where artillery positions are available. The above circumstances did not allow the artillery to get into position to be ready to fire immediately upon landing. In the Ninth Combat Team, "Baker" battery was in position ready to fire at 1400 on "D" day. "Able" battery was in position ready to fire at 1700. "Charlie" battery was not in position ready to fire until "D plus 1" day. In the Third Combat Team "Item" battery was in position ready to fire at 1700 on "D" day. It was registered at 1810, and fired intermittent fires throughout the night. "George" battery was in position ready to fire at 1800 on "D plus 1" day. "How" battery was in position ready to fire at 1000 on "D plus 1" day. The first request for fire from the infantry came from the Third Combat Team at 1305 on "D" day. Since no batteries were in position ready to fire, this request could not be answered. It is believed that had artillery batteries landed under battalion control and had not been required to furnish shore working parties, that effective fire could have been delivered by at least one battery per battalion within two hours after landing. The artillery recommends that batteries land under battalion control and be relieved of shore party duties. This however, is a command decision. If early artillery support is desired, it is necessary that the above conditions be complied with. The artillery regimental headquarters was landed in two parts on beaches five thousand yards apart. The headquarters battery equipment was not landed with the personnel. This condition required two days to rectify, and the artillery regiment was not able to take control until 1200 on "D plus 2" days. Had the artillery headquarters been landed in a single echelon on a central beach, centralized control could have been obtained on "D plus 1" day. Similarly, it is recommended that artillery headquarters battery personnel be relieved of shore party duties if early massing of fires is desired.

To further emphasize the desirability of landing batteries on call under artillery battalion control the following excerpt from the report of CO, 3-12 is quoted:

" 'George' FO's, Liaison and reconnaissance parties landed as scheduled with the 1st Bn, 3d Marines on Beach Blue 1 except that the liaison party was not boated in the boat with the infantry battalion commander as in SOP. The landing was made against very heavy opposition, the boats being caught in cross fire of automatic weapons firing from Puruata Island, Beaches Green 1 and Blue 1, and a 75mm gun from Blue 1. Naval gunfire and dive bombing had proved almost useless in knocking out those weapons which were all in well-built log and sand bunkers. In the confusion caused by boats being sunk, officers and NCO's in charge of boats and coxswain being wounded and killed, companies landed on wrong sections of the beach and the landing team as a whole was displaced to the right about two hundred yards. The FO teams fought with the infantry helping to clear out the bunkers which started about 5 yards from the water's edge and extended inland in depth. The liaison and reconnaissance parties landed on schedule and were assembled in a long enemy trench just off the beach. The

front lines were still only 10 to 15 yards from the beach and the Japs were covering the beach with automatic weapons, tree snipers, knee mortars, and hand grenades. The BC left the two parties under the RO and proceeded with 3 men to find the infantry battalion commander in order to learn the situation. Progress was slow due to Jap fire but the infantry battalion executive who had taken command when the battalion commander was wounded was located about 200 yards down the beach. The situation proved obscure but our infantry appeared to be advancing slowly. As a counter attack was feared, the BC returned to his party and took them to the left flank of the beach where very little fighting was taking place. This move was completed at "H plus 2" hours. Reconnaissance for a battery position was still out of question. The #5 boat assigned to the firing battery containing the remainder of the detail, machine gun section and miscellaneous battery personnel landed at this time, having been ordered to do so by the naval officer in charge of the boats. This personnel was assembled with the parties on the left flank and the battery executive was ordered by TBY not to land under any circumstances and to stay spread out during the air attack which was taking place at the time. The BC tried to contact the CO, 3-12 by TBY to ask permission to land "George" battery on beach Blue 3 but the attempt was in vain. At about "H plus 3" hours the CO, 3d Marines was seen on beach Blue 1 and permission was obtained from him to land the battery on Beach Blue 3. At this time beach Blue 1 was still covered by Jap small arms and mortar fire except on the extreme left flank. However, at this point a lagoon was 10 yards inland from the beach and there was no room for any more equipment much less a battery position. The Battery Executive was ordered to come in to the beach and pick up the BC and the firing battery was landed on the left edge of beach Blue 2 at about "H plus 5" hours. Wire was laid from Blue 1 to Blue 2 and later during the day "George" FO's and liaison officer fired "Iton" battery in support of the 1st Bn, 3d Marines who had advanced about 150 yards inland by nightfall although Cape Torokina had not been taken. The BC contacted the CO 3-12 who was trying to find battery position in the vicinity of Blue 2 and 3.

As a battery position had not been selected by nightfall the entire battery less FO and Liaison sections was bivouaced on Beach Blue 2. On the morning of "D plus 1" a battery position was selected on the inland side of a deep lagoon about one hundred yards inland from the right edge of beach Blue 2. Two amphibian tractors were finally obtained at about noon and the movement of the guns and 2/3 of a unit of fire to the battery position was completed at about 1500 when the tractor were taken away by order of D-4. Rubber boats and additional ammunition were obtained from beach Blue 1 and by about 1800 slightly over a unit of fire was across to the battery position. By 1800 on "D plus 1" enough gear had been carried across the lagoon to enable the battery to occupy the position and clear enough of a field of fire to enable the battery to shoot in support of the 1st Bn, 3d Marines. However, fire of the battery was not called for and clearing of field of fire and organization of the position continued the next day. All the ammunition was brought from Blue 1 by boat and carried across the lagoon by rubber boat and by nightfall of "D plus 1" over 2 units of fire was at the battery position. The battery fired its first round at 1005 on "D plus 2" on a registration on Piva Village by air spot through battalion FDC. The first supporting fire was delivered at 1015 on Piva Village when 124 rounds were fired prior to an advance by the Raiders." (End of quote)

B. CHARTS AND PHOTOS: The following charts and photos were provided prior to leaving the advanced base:

- (a) 1/20000 half-tone mosaic controlled by radial-line plot.
- (b) 1/20000 full-tone mosaic identical with the half-tone mosaic.

- (c) 1/40000 full-tone mosaic identical to the 1/20000 full-tone mosaic.
- (d) 1/20000 hasty terrain map reproduced from the full-tone mosaic and torn lined by stereocomparagraph.
- (e) A complete set of stereo-pairs, 1/15000, that were used in the preparation of the mosaics.
- (f) A set of obliques of the beach, intended primarily for use with naval gunfire.

It was originally intended to use the full-tone mosaic as a firing chart, but due to inaccuracies in the camera used for reproduction (which inaccuracies were inherent in the camera) each sheet of the mosaic was to a scale slightly different from 1/20000, and it was therefore impossible to assemble the sheets in a complete mosaic of the beachhead area. Different sheets of the half-tone and hasty terrain map were identical in scale and could be assembled into a mosaic of the beachhead area. It was therefore decided that the half-tone mosaic would be used as a firing chart. The coordinates measured on the full tone agreed to within five yards of the coordinates measured on the half-tone. Thus, it was possible to transfer coordinates directly from one chart to another. It was also found that the hasty terrain map agreed with both mosaics in areas that had little or no difference in vertical elevation. However, the area to the north of the beachhead has numerous sharp hills and mountains. In this area, coordinates differed by as much as three hundred yards. Along the coastline and to the west of the beachhead, the average chart correction for range was a minus ten yards per thousand and a right three mils in deflection. On the right flank of the beachhead along the coastline, the average chart deflection for range was zero and the average deflection correction was zero. In the northeastern sector of the beachhead, the average chart range correction was plus fifteen yards per thousand. The average deflection correction was right fifteen. To the north of the beachhead, the average chart range correction was zero, and the average chart deflection correction was right fifty. This latter deflection correction indicated an east-west error in the assembly of the mosaic.

C. SURVEY AND AIRSPOT: The survey plan was prearranged to leaving the advanced base; it was not found necessary to deviate from this plan. The plan was as follows: Two points about nine thousand yards apart, which from a study of the mosaic believed to be inter-visible and easily identifiable on the ground, were selected. These two points were used to establish a basic direction. Observation into the target area was impossible because of the dense jungle and flat character of the terrain. It was initially intended to use the direction of this line for the purpose of redeclinating all instruments. This was found impossible because of the magnetic local attraction which varied from thirty to sixty mils. Therefore, compass needles were not used, but the chart direction of this base line was used as a basic direction. A third point intermediate between the above two points, was identified and used to accurately determine the scale of the mosaic. Initially, directional traverses only were carried to battery positions from this line. Horizontal control was established by inspected locations. After the length of the auxiliary base line had been accurately determined by a chain traverse, horizontal control was carried to battery positions. The surveyed location and the inspected location of battery positions did not differ by more than nine yards. Horizontal control by chain traverse was later extended to the front lines for a distance of five thousand yards and was found to agree with inspected locations to within two yards. Initially, all traverses were open traverses. These traverses were eventually closed when road nets and trails permitted. Target area survey was impossible. Battalions were tied together in the position area by accurate survey and in the target area by registration on common check points by air spot. The location of these check concentrations was prearranged. They were pin-pricked by inspection

on all firing charts and air observer's charts prior to the departure of any units from the advanced base. These concentrations were found to be adequate in number and location. They were selected so that there was at least one check point in each photo and so that there was at least one check point within transfer limits of any target subsequently selected. The corrections, determined by registration on these check points, were very good. Known velocity errors and weather effects were taken out of the adjusted data, leaving a chart correction only. With the application of weather corrections of the moment to the chart corrections, effective fire could be delivered at any point at any time. Air spot had little or no difficulty identifying these check concentrations, but because of the dense character of the jungle and the fact that the SBD plane flies too fast and has too many blind spots to be a good observation plane, targets of opportunity picked up by airspot were rare. There were very few communication failures in air-ground communication. Most failures were believed to be caused by failure to adequately check the aircraft's communication equipment prior to leaving the ground. Good evidence is available to substantiate the belief that the various battalions were accurately tied together in the target area. On several occasions surprise fire by three or four battalions were delivered on targets pin-pricked on the firing chart and identified to the air observer prior to delivering the surprise fire. In all cases, the air observer reported all battalions together and in the target area. The effect of this fire has not been determined, since the target areas fired upon have not yet been occupied. Considerable disruption of the enemy's plans is believed to have been caused by fire of this type. No system of adequate vertical control in terrain of this character where observation is virtually impossible has yet been devised. The form lining on the hasty terrain map was found to be very inaccurate. A hill shown to be one thousand feet high on the terrain map was determined to be six hundred eight feet high by survey. Another hill shown as six hundred feet high was found to be three hundred ninety feet high. A hill shown as five hundred feet high was found to be two hundred ninety feet high. A hill shown to be fifteen hundred feet high was found to be eleven hundred seventeen feet high. At the present time, the following system of determining elevation is being tried, and seems to give satisfactory results: The tops of such hills as can be surveyed were located. By the aid of a stereocomparagraph or contour finder, the form lines below these spot elevations were made. These elevations are checked by barometer readings taken from a Cub spotting plane flying at the same altitude as the top of the hill. On Dec 13, two battalions fired five hundred twenty five rounds into an enemy pocket below the crest of a hill, where the altitude of the hill was determined by a surveyed elevation and the altitude of the enemy pocket was determined by stereocomparagraph. The slope of fall between these two points was thus determined and a charge selected that would give a steeper slope of fall than the slope of fall between the two points determined in the above manner. These computations proved to be correct, but a probable error in range of thirty nine yards and the varying height of trees on top of the mass caused seven tree bursts in the five hundred twenty five rounds fired. This indicates that spot elevations plus contour finding work gives adequate information on elevations, but cannot prevent tree bursts caused by the inherent inaccuracies of the gun.

D. CLOSE SUPPORTING FIRES: Most close supporting fires were adjusted by sound. In the case of the 20 minute (5000 round) preparation delivered for the 3d Marines on Nov 24, the short limit was adjusted by sound and replotted on the firing chart (half-tone mosaic) the remainder of the preparation was computed from the chart and fire with excellent results. Later inspection showed that the coverage of the target area was uniform and correct. Adjustments by sound aided in the location of front lines. The procedure was: the forward observer located himself by inspection; a round surely over was fired; the forward observer adjusted the fire in to the target, then by replot the location of the round was determined, and the observer knew his location with respect to the adjustment, thus the front lines were located. This procedure is suggested for use on subsequent operations.

2. FORWARD OBSERVER TECHNIQUE.

Training of forward observers in sound adjustment paid dividends. Forward observers were not sufficiently drilled in FDC procedure. In most cases the FO did not know the nature of the target except, "Japs in unknown number". Forward observers failed to give even this much of a target identification. The BFC-3 had no way of judging the proper amount of ammunition to expend on the target. The forward observer had to be called again in an effort to determine the extent of the target in order to place an adequate amount of ammunition on the target. This caused delay in the delivery of fire. The same was true of regimental missions.

Forward observers were not familiar with the operation of instruments (B.C. scopes and azimuth instruments).

More instruction in the reading of aerial photos is necessary and adequate steps must be taken to provide forward observers with an opportunity to study stereo-pairs prior to going to the front. They must be provided with verticals to a scale of not more than 1/10000 of the area in which they will operate.

Bilateral sound adjustment between adjacent forward observers was used to good effect but made adjustment slower.

Forward observers as well as liaison officers were guilty of sending back information based on casual remarks of the infantry or first impressions gained by hasty observation. A little thought before a report is forwarded would materially reduce the number of conflicting reports received.

Forward observers must be more familiar with the characteristics of artillery fire such as maximum ordinate, slope of fall, probable error. They must be able to draw panoramic sketches when verticals are not available.

A training program to rectify these deficiencies has already been instituted.

3. INTELLIGENCE.

Information of the enemy received from front line units was generally vague and incomplete. The nature of the terrain (swamp, flat, dense jungle) was in a large measure responsible for this condition. Individuals responsible for reporting information neglected to include all elements i.e. what, where, when, by whom observed. The time element is particularly important. Often the same incident was reported by two different agencies but was so vague and conflicting that the two reports could not be recognized as having originated from the same incident, an accurate report as to time would have helped rectify this condition.

By far the most valuable source of information available was aerial photographs. Stereo-pairs to a scale of 1/5000 or 1/10000 were provided at least bi-weekly after "D plus 10" days, of areas surrounding the beachhead. These photos were studied to give information on ground forms and enemy activity. In most cases they revealed new clearings made by the enemy. Deep supporting fires were delivered by as high as seven artillery battalions on these trails and clearings as they were found. These fires assisted materially in the defeat of the enemy forces contacted by the Third Marines during the period Nov 21 to 27. When the beachhead had been enlarged sufficiently to include these trails and clearings, it was found that the artillery fires delivered had been extremely accurate and effective. These fires were all unobserved and delivered by a transfer from nearby check points and the use of astro data. An API section, consisting of one naval officer specially trained in this type of work was utilized.

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

for the interpretation of these photographs. His information was very accurate. Where the tropical foliage was sufficiently thin to allow him to pick up trails and foot paths along the ground, these trails were interdicted, and later examination of the ground showed that the fires were accurately delivered. In one of these an enemy bivouac area believed to have been occupied by a minimum of two companies was effectively neutralized by unobserved fires. These interdictory fires were delivered during a six day period preceding and following the Third Marines attack, and are believed to have effectively prevented reinforcement or evacuation. This belief is substantiated by the statements of one prisoner of war taken following the Third Marines' action.

Instruction of all information agencies to rectify the deficiencies noted above is in progress and the following request for photos for succeeding operations has been forwarded:

- a. 1/20000 full-tone mosaics for firing charts.
- b. 1/10000 stereo-pairs of entire area.
- c. 1/10000 verticals for use by forward observers.
(These photos to be gridded and bound into books of suitable size for forward observers.)

4. SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS. --No comments.

5. MOVEMENT. This operation proved conclusively that where no road net exists artillery must have priority on position areas and requires engineer help in movement and supply.

6. SUPPLY. This operation indicated that allowances as set up in TBA are adequate but that the system of distribution is poor, outstanding examples of shortages were: post exchange supplies, gun cleaning material (waste, sal soda), raw linseed oil, lubricating oil, graphite grease.

7. EVACUATION. --No comments.

8. It is recommended that the TBA be changed as follows:

a. Additions.

Gp No.	Art No.	Article	New Allowed	Add	Total
1	11	Canteen, M1910	1 per Mar Off & Enl	1 per Mar Off & Enl of FO Team	
1	12	Cover, canteen, M1910	1 per Canteen	1 per Canteen	
4	35-37 39-40 41-42 43	Gun, Machine, Cal..30, Brown-ing M1919A4 and M1919A5	None	4 per Bty in fld arty	4 per Bty in fld arty
4	870	File Eqpt TE-8	None	1 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN	1 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN
4	926	Pliers, long, round-nose, side cutting, 6"	None	1 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN	1 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN
4	945	Radio receiving eqpt, Model RBO (recreational purposes)	None	1 per Bty in fld arty	1 per Bty in fld arty
4	958	T&R Eqpt, Model TPX	3 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	6 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	9 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	993	Stamp MC-181	None	1 per H&S Bty PH/BN	1 per H&S Bty PH/BN

Q#	Art No.	Article	Now Allowed	Add	Total
4	1004	Switchboard Unit EE-2-C	1 per firing bty in A/RGT 2 per H&S bty in A/RGT	10 per H&S	12 per H&S bty in A/RGT 1 per firing bty in A/RGT
4	1001	Switchboard BD-72	2 per H&S bty in A/RGT	2 per H&S bty A/RGT	4 per H&S bty A/RGT
4	1013	Telephone EE-8	10 per firing bty in A/RGT 20 per H&S bty in A/RGT	15 per H&S bty in A/RGT	10 per firing bty in A/RGT 35 per H&S bty in A/RGT
4	1026	Tool eqpt TE-33	1 per onl (CP)	30 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per onl (CP) plus 30 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	1028	Tool eqpt TE-41			
4	1036	Viso, Machinist, 3 1/2"	None	1 per Bty in A/RGT	1 per Bty in A/RGT
4	1113	Generator, electric, 3 to 6.5 KVA, portable, 110V, 60 cycle, 1 phase complete w/spare parts	None	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	1161	Kit, demolition, Engr	None	1 per firing bty in A/RGT	1 per firing bty in A/RGT
4	1195	Shovel, round point, short handle	2 per How	1 per Vehicle	2 per How 1 per Vehicle
4	558	Sighting eqpt, telescope, Panoramic, M1	5 per Bty 75mm PH	2 per Bty 75mm PH	7 per Bty 75mm PH
		Mechanism, recoil 75mm PH M1A2 assembly, spare	None	1 per Bty 75mm PH/BN	1 per Bty 75mm PH/BN
		Axle, assembly, 75mm PH, spare	None	2 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN	2 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN
4	589	Sighting eqpt, telescope, panoramic, M12A2, complete	5 per Bty 105mm How	2 per Bty 105mm How	7 per Bty 105mm How
		Mechanism, Recoil 105mm How M1 assembly, spare	None	2 per H&S Bty 105mm How/BN	2 per H&S Bty 105mm How/BN
		Brushwire, surface cleaning, bore 75mm PH	None	1 per 75mm PH	1 per 75mm PH
5	49	Chest, arty 55x 22x16" (MC) empty	20 per H&S Bty in A/RGT 10 per firing bty in A/RGT	10 per Bty in A/RGT	30 per H&S Bty in A/RGT 20 per firing bty in A/RGT
11	17	Grease, O.D. #0, lb.	5 per 75mm How	5 per 75mm How	10 per 75mm How
11	20	Grease, general purpose, #2, lb	2 per 75mm PH	8 per 75mm PH	10 per 75mm PH
11	38	Oil recoil, heavy lgt can	4 per 75mm PH	2 per 75mm PH	6 per 75mm PH
11	39	Oil, neat's Foot, gal		Add allowance 2 per bty in A/Rgt	Add Allowance 2 per bty in A/RGT
11	40	Paint, Green, gal (FED TT-P-71)	12 per H&S bty A/RGT	40 per bty in A/RGT	40 per bty A/RGT
11	45	Brush, Camel's Hair, Round #1	None	12 per H&S bty in A/RGT 6 per firing bty in A/RGT	12 per H&S bty in A/RGT 6 per firing bty in A/RGT
11	49	Cloth, Crocus, Quire	1 per bty	1 per bty	2 per bty
11	69	Soda Ash, (Sodium carbonate), lb.	25 per 75mm PH	25 per 75mm PH	50 per 75mm PH

Report on Operation, Cons'd.

Gp No	Art No	Article	Now allowed	Add	Total
11	82	Soap, laundry, cakes, (FED P-S-571)	3 per individuals	3 per individual	6 per individual
5	4	Ax, w/handle	2 per btry in fld arty	23 per bty in A/RGT	25 per Bty in A/RGT
*5	96	Kit, repair, instrument M-4 for Field Arty & Seacoast Arty, complete	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
5	107	Machete, 18", M1942, w/scabbard	10 per bty	20 per bty in A/RGT	30 per bty in A/RGT
6	7	Outfit, cooking, pack, MC, M1942	2 per bty in A/RGT	2 spare parts per bty in A/RGT	2 per bty 4 spare parts per bty in A/RGT
7-A	44	Hook, brush, curved blade, w/handle	3 per bty	3 per Bty in A/RGT	6 per Bty in A/RGT
7-A	54	Pick-mattock, 6lb w/handle	5 per bty	35 per bty in A/RGT	40 per Bty in A/RGT
7-A	57	Saw, cross cut, 2-man, w/handles	1 per bty in fld arty	2 per bty in fld arty	3 per Bty in fld arty
7-A	59	Shovel, round point short handle	5 per Bty	35 per bty in field arty	40 per bty in field arty
7-A	68	Paulin, 20'x50'	1 per bty 75mm PH/BN 2 per H&S bty 75mm PH/BN 4 per H&S bty A/RGT	4 per bty 75 PH/BN 8 per H&S bt 75mm PH/BN 6 per H&S bty A/RGT	5 per bty 75mm PH/BN 10 per H&S bt 75mm PH/BN 10 per H&S bt A/RGT
8	11	Cart, T4E1			
8	12	Accessories for Cart, T4E1, set	1 per Cart		1 per Cart
8	13	Parts, spare, cart T4E1, set	Do	Do	Do
*8	33	Tractor, medium w/angle-dozer, w/double drum take off		1 per bty in A/RGT	1 per bty in A/RGT
8	38	Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, water 300 gal	TO		
8	34	Trailer, 1 ton 2 wheel, cargo	TO		
*		Pump, hand operated, Water, double acting, positive displacement	None	1 per bty in fld arty	1 per bty in fld arty
*		Blower, ventilation, 12" fan	None	1 per H&S Bty in fld arty	1 per H&S Bt in fld arty
*		Tent, blackout (special design)	None	1 per H&S Bty in fld arty	1 per H&S Bt in fld arty
*		Gun, machine, .50 cal., AC w/modified M3 AA Mount		4 per bty in fld arty	4 per bty in fld arty
		Cover, Gun, form-fitting, for 75mm PH	None	5 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN	5 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN
		Chains, Tire			
4	856	Chest, EC-5	4 per Bty in A/RGT	4 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	8 per H&S Bt in A/RGT

Report on Operations, Contd.

Gp No	Art No	Article	Now Allowed	Add	Total
4	822	Belt LC-23	6 per Bty in A/RGT	6 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	6 per firing bty in A/RGT 12 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	909	Lineman's eqpt TE-21 or equal	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	963	MTCE eqpt MME-9 f/TBX	1 per 10 radio T&R eqpt, model TBX, or major fraction thereof	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	987	X Solder M-31 lbs	2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	8 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	10 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	1003	X Lamp LM-19	2 per swbd	2 per swbd	4 per swbd
4	1007	X Tape, TL-83 (friction) $\frac{1}{2}$ lb roll	1 per mile of wire W-110; W-130	1 per mile of wire W-110B; W-130	2 per mile of wire W-110-B W-130
4	1014	NTCE Eqpt, MME-1	1 per 25 telephones EE-8	1 per 15 telephones EE-8	1 per 15 telephones EE-8 or major fraction thereof but not less than one per Bn or higher unit
4	1019	Terminal strip TM-184	6 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	6 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	12 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	1034	Typewriter, portable (WU Type)	None	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT
4	1044	X Wire, W-110-B on reel DR-4, miles	8 per Bty in A/RGT	8 per Bty in A/RGT	16 per Bty in A/RGT
9	1-A 21	Wire, copper, solid #8 B&S Gauge, weather-proof triple braid, ft.	None	2000' per H&S Bty in A/RGT	2000' per H&S Bty in A/RGT
		Thermometer for powder temp 75mm shell	None	1 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN	1 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN

b. Deletions.

Gp No	Art No	Article	Now Allowed	Minus	Total
4	955	Radio T&R eqpt, models NU, MV, MW, or MX (Frequency-- complete)	6 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN 8 per H&S Bty A/RGT	6 per H&S Bty 75mm PH/BN 8 per H&S Bty A/RGT	None None
4	856	Chest, EC-5	4 per Bty in A/RGT	2 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN	2 per firing bty 75mmPH/BN
4	967	Radio T&R eqpt model TBV or SCR-300	4 per Bty in 75mm PH/BN 2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	4 per Bty in 75mm PH/BN 2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None None
4	954	Radio T&R eqpt, model GT/RU, complete (mounted in truck, 1-ton 4x4, RSN, radio shielded)	TO	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None
4	975	Reel Unit RL-26	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

Gp No	Art No	Article	How Allowed	Minus	Total
4	972	Reel Cart RL-16	1 per firing bty in A/RGT 2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per firing bty in A/RGT 2 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None None
4	1045	X Wire W-110B, on reel DR-5, miles	8 per Bty in A/RGT	4 per Bty in A/RGT	4 per Bty in A/RGT
5	43	Can, expeditionary 5 gal	15 per 1 ton 20 per 1 ton		
		Brush wire, surface cleaning, bore 75mm PH	None	1 per 75mm PH	1 per 75mmPH
5	47	Chest, Arm & Eqpt			
5	48	Chest, Arm, M19C3			
5	51	Chest, cleaning material and small stores			
5	56	Chest, supply w/o contents			
5	101	Kit, tool, trimmer & upholster, comp.	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None
5	142	Rod, cleaning, barracks, M3	4 per firing bty in A/RGT 6 per H&S Bty in 75mm PH/Bn & 105mm How/Bn 8 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	4 per firing bty in A/RGT 6 per H&S Bty in 75mm PH/BN & 105mm How/Bn 8 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	None None None
5	217	Drill, electric portable, 3/8" capacity, heavy duty w/2 sets of drills	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	1 per H&S Bt 75mm PH/BN & 105mm How/BN
5	218	Do (except 3/4" capacity)	Do	Do	Do
5	92	Jack, hydraulic, 7 1/2 ton 4 wheel	1 per Bty in A/RGT	1 per Bty in A/RGT	None
5	387 to 423	Chemical warfare Eqpt			None (to be carried by Division)
6	5	Kettle, camp w/cover	1 per Bty in A/RGT	1 per Bty in A/RGT	None
6	6	Mill, coffee	2 per Bty in A/RGT	2 per Bty in A/RGT	None
7A	3	Blanco, Kahki, can	1 per 8 men	1 per 8 men	None
7B	101	Hammer Carpenter's	120 per H&S Bty in A/RGT	Change to--	5 per Bty in fld arty

Report on Operations, Cont'd.
 9. It is recommended that current T/O's be changed to read as follows:

HQS 75mm PH

	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	Battery				Total
							Headquarters	Maintenance			
Lt Col	1c										1
Bn CO	(1)										
Major	2c										2
Bn-3	(1)		(1)								
Exec	(1)										
Captain	4c	1c		1c							6
Bn-1, Adj., BC	(1)						(1)				
Bn-2	(1)										
Bn-4	(1)										
Comm Off		(1)									
Survey Off				(1)							
Liaison Off	(1)										
Lieutenants	1c				1c	1c					
Ass't Bn-3	(1)		(1)								
Motor Trans Off					(1)						
Quartermaster						(1)					
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	8	1		1	1	1					12
Marine Gunner (CRA)					1c						1
Ord and Munitions Off					(1)						
TOTAL WARRENT OFF					1						
Sgt Maj	1c										
1st Sgt							1c				
Ten Sgt		1c									
Signal Electrician (CP)		(1)									
Supply Sgt						1c					
Platoon Sgt				1c	1c						
Munitions					(1)c						
Secy Chf				(1)							

H&S 75mm PH

	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	Battery				Total
							Headquarters	Maintenance			
Staff Sgt					1c	1c					2
Moss Sgt (C)						(1)					
Motor Trans (QM)					(1)						
Sergeant		2	2	2		1		2			9
Clerical (QM)						(1)					
FDC			(2)								
Inst				(2)c							
Mech, motor (QM)								(1)c			
Radio Chf (CP)		(1)c									
Supply & Property								(1)			
Wire Chief (CP)		(1)c									
Chief Cook (C)						2					2
Corporal	3	20	6	2	4	2	1	1			39
Clerical (QM)						(2)					
Clerk	(1)				(1)						
Clerk, bty							(1)				
Clerk, postal	(1)										
FDC			(6)								
Gunner, machine					(2)c						
Inst				(2)c							
Intel	(1)										
Mech, motor (driver) (QM)					(1)c			(1)c			
Operator, swbl		(2)c									
Operator, radio		(13)c									
Radio, repair		(1)									
Wire team Chf		(4)c									
Field Music Cpl							1				1

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

H&S 75mm PH

	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	Battery				Total
							Headquarters	Maintenance			
Ass't Cook (C)								2			2
Fld Music 1st Class							1				1
Private	1	52	2	4	1		6	19			85
Barber								(1)			
Driver, angledozer								(1)c			
Driver, Truck								(12)c			
FDC			(2)								
Gunner, machine								(2)c			
Gunner, machine, ass't								(2)c			
Intelligence	(1)										
Inst				4)c							
Lineman		(20)c									
Mean helper motor(driver)					(1)			(1)c			
Messenger		(2)c									
Operator, radio (CP)		(26)c									
Operator, swba (CP)		(4)c									
Rifleman											
Other duty						(6)	(6)				
TOTAL ENLISTED	5	75	10	9	7	5	10	26			140
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	13	76	10	10	9	6	10	26			150
Commissioned, Medical C	1										1
TOTAL COMMISSIONED USM	1										1
Pers 1/1st CI	1										1
Pers M/24 CI	1										1
Pers M/31 CI	1										1
H&S Apr/1st CI	3										3
H&S Apr/24 CI	3										3
TOTAL ENLISTED US NAVY	9										9
TOTAL NAVY PERSONNEL	10		(14)								10

100

[illegible]

7.5mm Battery

	Bty Headquarters	Maintenance	AA Section	FO	Detail			Firing				Total
					Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer	Firing Bty	
Captain	1c											
BC	(1)											
Lieutenant				2c	1c			2c				
Exec								(1)				
Ass't Exec. Motor	0							(1)				
Forward Obsrs				(2)								
RCN Off					(1)							
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	1			2	1			2				6
Marine Gunner (Arty)		1c										1
TOTAL WARRANT OFF		1										1
1st Sgt	1c											1
Gy Sgt								1c			1	2
Pl Sgt					1c							1
Sergeant		2	1	4		1	1		1	1	5	14
Instrument							(1)c					
Mech. motor (QM)		(1)										
Spot				(4)c								
Sect Chf			(1)c					(1)c	(1)c			
Supply & Property		(1)										
Wire Chf (OP)						(1)c						
Mess Sgt (C)		1										
Chf Code		1										
Corporal		1	2		2	4	2	1	1	2	10	20
Ammunition								(1)c				
Clerk, Bty (C)	(1)											
Gunner									(1)c			
Gunner Asst									(1)c			

Report of Operations, Cont'd.

75mm Battery

	Bty Headquarters	Maintenance	AA Section	FO	Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer	Firing Bty	Total
Gunner, machine			(2)c									
Instrument							(2)c	(1)c				
Mech, motor (QM)		(1)c										
Operator, swbd						(1)c						
Scout					(2)c							
Wire team, Cbr						(3)c						
Ass't Cook (C)		1										1
Field Music 1st Cl	1c											1
Private		24	10	6		13	3	2	8	9	43	102
Ammunition									(8)c	(2)c		
Barber		(1)										
Cannoneer										(7)c		
Driver, angledozer		(1)c										
Driver, truck		(14)c										
Gunner, machine			(2)c									
Gunner, machine ass't			(8)c									
First							(3)c	(1)c				
Limeman						(12)c						
Mech, bty								(1)				
Mech, helper, motor driver		(1)c										
Operator, swbd						(1)c						
Rifleman				(6)c								
Other duty		(7)										
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	3	30	13	10	3	18	6	4	10	12	62	146
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	4	31	13	12	4	18	6	6	10	12	64	151

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

75mm PH Bty

	Bty Headquarters	Maintenance	AA Section	FO	Detail			Firing			Total
					Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer	
Carbine											
Gun, machine, .50 cal.			4								4
Gun, machine, .30 cal. M1919			4								4
Howitzer, 75mm Pack									1	4	4
Cart, arty, T4E1		6									6
Cart, hand, MML (Comm)						1					1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo		4									4
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, water, 300 gal		1									1
Tractor, med., w/angledozer, w/doubledrum power take off		1									1
Truck:											
1 ton, 4x4 cargo		6									6
1 ton, 4x4 cargo		9									9

H&S-Bty, 105mmBN

	Bn Headquarters						Battery Headquarters			Total
	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	AA Section	Headquarters	Maintenance	
Lt Col	1c									1
BC	(1)									
Major	2c									2
Bn-3	(1)		(1)							
Exec	(1)									
Captain	3c	1c		1c						5
Bn-1, Adj. FC	(1)							(1)		
Bn-2	(1)									
Bn-4	(1)									

Report of Operations, Cont'd.

H&S Bty, 105mm BN

	Bn Headquarters						Battery Headquarters		Total
	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	AA Section	Headquarters	Maintenance
Comm Off		(1)							
Survey Off				(1)					
Lieutenants	4c				1c	1c			6
Ass't Bn-3	(1)		(1)						
Liaison	(3)								
Motor Trans Off					(1)				
Quartermaster						(1)			
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	10	1		1	1	1			14
Marine Gunner (Ord)					1				1
Ordnance and Munitions Off					(1)				
TOTAL WARRENT OFFICER					1				1
Sgt Maj	1c								1
1st Sgt								1c	
Tech Sgt		1c							
Signal Electrician		(1)c							
Supply Sgt						1c			
Platoon Sgt				1c	1c				
Munitions (OP)					(1)				
Sect Chf				(1)					
Str Sgt					1c				1c
Mess (C)									(1)
Motor Trans (QM)					(1)				
Sergeant		2	2	2		1			2
Clerical (QM)						(1)			
FDC			(2)						
Inst				(2)c					
Mech, motor (QM)									(1)

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

H&S Bty, 105mm BN

	3d Headquarters						Battery Headquarters		Total
	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	AA Section	Headquarters	
Radio Chf		(1)c							
Supply & Property									(1)
Wire Chf		(1)c							
Chf Cook (C)					1				1
Corporal	3	17	6	2	2	2		3	1
Clerical (QM)						(2)			
Clerk	(1)				(1)				
Clerk, bty								(1)	
Clerk, postal	(1)								
FDC			(6)						
Gunner, Machine								(2)	
Inst				(2)					
Intel	(1)								
Mech, motor (QM), driver					(1)				(1)c
Operator, swbd		(2)c							
Operator, radio		10)c							
Radio, repair		(1)							
Wire Team Chf		4)c							
Fld Musicl Cpl								1c	1
Ass't Cook					1				1
Fld Music 1st Class								1c	1
Private	1	43	2	4	1				19
Barber									(1)
Driver, angledoxer									(1)
Driver, truck									(12)c
FDC			(2)						
Gunner, machine									(2)c
Gunner, machine, ass't									(2)c

H&S Bty 105mm BN

	Bn Headquarters							Bty Hq		Total
	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	AA Section	Headquarters	Maintenance	
Inst				(4)c						
Lineman		(20)c								
Mechanics, helper, motor driver					(1)				(1)	
Messenger		(2)c								
Operator, Radio (CP)		(20)c								
Operator, swbd (CP)		(4)c								
Other duty								(6)		
Intel	(1)									
TOTAL ENLISTED	5	68	10	9	7	4	12	25	0	138
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	15	67	10	10	9	5	11	25	0	143
Commissioned Medical Corps	1									1
TOTAL COMMISSIONED, U.S.NAVY	1									1
PhmM/1c	1									1
PhmM/2c	1									1
PhmM/3c	1									1
Hosp Apr/1c	3									3
Hosp Apr/2c	3									3
TOTAL ENLISTED, U.S.NAVY	9									9
TOTAL NAVAL PERSONNEL	10									10
Carbine										
Gun, Machine, 50 cal									4	4
Browning M1919										
Steam cleaning unit, high pressure, portable, trailer mounted					1					1
Cart, Hand										
M41 (Comm)		2								2
M3 (Comm)			1							1
Tractor, med, w/angledozer w/doubleclutch power take off									1	1

Report of Operations, Cont'd.

H&S Bty 105mm BN

	Bn Headquarters						Bty Hq		Total
	Headquarters	Communication	FDC	Instrument	Maintenance	Supply	AA Section	Headquarters	Maintenance
Trailer:									
1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo									5
1 ton, 2 wheel, greasing					1				1
1 ton, 2 wheel, water									1
Truck: 300 gal									
1/2 ton, 4x4									2
1/4 ton, 4x4, radio TCS		4							4
1 ton, 4x4, cargo									7

105mm Bty

	Headquarters	Maintenance	Detail					Firing			Total
			AA Section	FO	Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer	
Captain	1c										1
3d	(1)										
Lieutenant				1c	1c			2c			4
Exec								(1)			
Asst Exoc) Motor Off								(1)			
Forward Observer				(1)							
Run Off					(1)						
TOTAL COMMISSIONED	2			1	1			2			5
Marine Gunner (Arty)		1c									1
TOTAL WARRANT OFF	1	1									1
1st Sgt	1c										1
Co Sgt								1c		1	2
Pl Sgt					1c						1
Sergeant		2	1	2		1	1		1	1	10

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

105mm Bty

	Headquarters	Maintenance	Detail					Firing			Total	
			AA Section	FO	Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer		Firing Bty
Inst							(1)					
Mech, motor, (QM)		(1)										
Scout				(2)c								
Sect Chf			(1)c					(1)c	(1)c			
Supply & Property		(1)										
Wire Chf						(1)						
Mess Sgt		1									1	
Chf Cook		1									1	
Corporal	1	1	2		2	4	2	1	1	2	10	22
Ammunition								(1)c				
Clerk, bty	(1)											
Gunner,									(1)c			
Gunner, Ass't									(1)c			
Gunner, Machine			(2)c									
Inst							(2)c	(1)c				
Mech, motor (QM)		(1)										
Operator, swbd (CP)						(1)c						
Scout					(2)c							
Wire Team, Chf						(3)c						
Ass't Cook		1										1
Fld Music 1st Class	1											1
Privates:		27	10	6		13	3	2	16	7	46	100
Ammunition								(16)c	(2)c			
Barber		(1)										
Cannoneer									(5)c			
Driver, angledozer		(1)c										
Driver, truck		(12)c										
Gunner, machine			(2)c									

1. Report on Operation, Cont'd.

105mm Btry

	Headquarters	Maintenance	Detail						Firing			Total
			AA Section FO	Headquarters	Communication	Instrument	Headquarters	Ammunition	Howitzer	Firing Bty		
Gunner, machine, ass't			(8)c									
Inst						(3)c	(1)c					
Limeman						(11)c						
Mech, bty								(1)				
Mech, howitzer, driver		(1)c										
Operator, swbd (CP)						(2)c						
Rifleman			(6)c									
Other duty		(7)										
TOTAL ENLISTED	30	28	13	8	3	18	6	4	18	10	62	41
TOTM MARINE CORPS	4	29	13	9	4	18	6	6	18	10	64	37
Carbine												
Gun, machine, .50 cal			4									4
Gun, machine, .30 cal M1919			4									4
How, 105mm										1	4	4
Cart, Hand, M1						1						1
Trailer 1 ton, 2 wheel cargo		2										2
Truck:												
1/2 ton 4x4		2										2
1 ton, 4x4, cargo		3										3
2 1/2 ton, 4x4, cargo		8										8
Trailer, 2 wheel, water 300 gal		1										1
Tractor medium w/angle- dozer, w/doubledrum power take off		1										1

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

10. Ammunition Expenditures were according to following tables:

No	RED			WHITE			BLUE			GREEN			TOTALS	
	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	75's	105's
4	154	131	13	-	-	-	-	40	2	-	-	-	340	-
5	182	166	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	387	-
6	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	51	8	-	-	-	87	-
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	170	401	12	35	-	-	583	35
8	-	-	-	72	-	-	456	1022	-	238	-	-	1550	238
9	84	175	-	1025	-	3	261	201	9	677	-	-	1758	677
10	6	-	4	8	-	-	20	34	4	-	-	-	70	-
11	63	31	18	-	-	-	72	18	12	22	-	-	214	22
12	19	13	113	33	-	6	11	14	8	35	-	-	217	33
13	41	15	1	-	80	-	132	83	-	134	-	-	361	134
14	13	19	17	416	531	3	37	-	2	765	-	-	1095	765
15	262	50	8	118	109	5	7	-	3	215	-	3	562	216
16	49	114	9	37	117	3	13	10	5	62	69	1	357	132
17	47	103	15	-	59	11	142	50	7	129	10	7	434	146
18	91	113	-	125	112	-	299	257	3	6	-	-	1000	6
19	22	49	4	353	193	-	94	55	-	95	4	-	778	99
20	-	-	-	134	123	2	251	15	-	298	25	-	557	323
21	82	70	6	83	119	-	605	141	-	166	149	4	1111	319
22	114	243	22	60	13	-	1174	100	12	243	234	35	1744	510
23	216	256	24	533	143	-	400	137	74	362	120	30	1792	512
24	1170	232	24	838	697	-	1806	392	39	634	522	24	6236	1320
25	294	319	22	210	203	14	113	588	16	316	215	23	1785	559
26	170	173	6	48	13	-	127	264	0	276	97	21	810	394
27	23	35	-	66	3	-	-	-	3	162	81	16	132	260
28	156	244	14	270	8	2	-	94	11	203	65	-	809	268
29	23	11	13	6	-	-	-	-	-	30	5	7	53	42
30	57	75	6	85	-	-	24	-	17	131	30	1	264	163
Dec														
1	50	74	22	172	22	-	-	-	-	114	9	4	340	127
2	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	96	89	3	200	191
3	-	-	-	609	-	-	554	119	49	91	72	8	1331	177
4	8	17	9	263	10	9	54	237	23	2	17	4	640	2
5	95	105	-	178	-	4	187	159	25	185	156	1	753	341
6	-	1	8	-	71	32	192	146	47	336	179	32	497	354
7	98	94	6	-	5	7	-	7	-	87	93	-	217	185
8	269	157	20	40	-	50	27	88	7	287	158	4	653	449
9	372	307	19	-	13	7	228	-	-	243	130	34	946	427
10	436	470	14	-	5	12	-	93	-	175	175	15	1036	386
11	50	50	-	220	151	43	-	-	-	75	63	34	514	177
12	-	12	-	156	51	10	100	-	-	87	62	26	330	132
13	23	34	-	247	-	-	100	-	-	295	137	23	414	505
14	137	169	-	60	-	2	23	73	14	91	47	7	491	145
15	210	483	-	-	-	-	425	364	17	110	65	12	1939	187
16	191	84	19	20	-	6	147	481	14	322	273	25	971	624
17	437	167	20	173	171	6	159	372	2	223	139	15	1512	371
18	249	80	-	-	-	-	724	24	23	85	13	13	1100	110
19	249	62	-	-	-	-	92	-	-	37	21	21	365	79
20	212	-	-	-	-	-	419	128	-	221	71	3	770	300
21	111	-	-	20	113	-	81	16	14	224	157	1	358	387
22	140	303	-	100	489	-	306	78	5	253	490	13	2673	757
23	843	699	43	42	83	20	374	64	-	703	292	13	2139	1310
24	-	132	11	39	80	-	149	8	-	74	77	24	529	171
25	49	34	2	102	92	-	402	522	-	375	215	10	1509	60
26	-	151	2	290	353	-	-	753	-	223	207	-	1513	43
27	84	303	-	290	214	-	256	236	-	64	37	9	1429	111
28	-	-	-	97	450	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	549	-
29	-	-	-	-	204	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	273	-
30	-	-	-	-	220	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	222	-
31	-	-	-	-	159	-	-	-	-	32	13	10	129	-

Report on Operations, Cont'd.

Ammunition Expenditures Cont'd.

	RED			WHITE			BLUE			GREEN			TOTAL	
	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	M48	M54	M57	75's	105's
Jan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	-	26	13	494	249	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	792	-
2	-	-	-	172	241	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	413	-
3	-	-	-	53	148	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	201	-
4	-	23	3	362	366	4	-	-	-	30	-	10	758	40
5	9	15	28	233	242	21	-	-	-	22	5	19	549	46
6	-	-	-	100	100	-	-	-	-	93	93	9	200	195
7	-	-	-	134	253	-	-	-	-	100	100	-	317	200
8	-	152	-	111	37	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	300	7
9	-	172	2	114	60	-	-	-	-	180	139	14	348	335
10	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	8	2	200	14
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	37	4	-	100
12	-	-	-	150	81	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	231	-
13	-	-	-	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	-
14	-	-	-	156	303	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	459	-

	M48	M54	M57
1-12	9482	7340	653
2-12	10064	7390	276
3-12	11397	8020	498
4-12	11063	5546	614
Total	42006	28596	2041

En Totals	
1-12	17775
2-12	17750
3-12	19916
4-12	17223
Total	72664

11. CONCLUSIONS.

Standard Artillery procedure as taught at the Field Artillery School and Marine Corps Schools is adequate except for the innovation of sound spotting, first used at Guadalcanal and Munda. The training of the artillery regiment was satisfactory except for the deficiencies noted above, which deficiencies are being corrected by current training.

J. B. Wilson
J. B. WILSON

vwj

HEADQUARTERS, NINETEENTH MARINES,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

29 January, 1944.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS - NOV - DEC 1943.

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE J.

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS, NINETEENTH MARINES.
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

28 January, 1944.

From: CO.
To : CG, 3rd Mar Div (Attention D-3).
Subject: Report of operations, Nov - Dec, 1943.
Enclosure: (A) Supply letter.
(B) Motor Transport, H&S Company.
(C) Division Engineer and Operations Section.
(D) Bomb Disposal Operations.
(E) 1st Battalion.
(F) 2nd Battalion.
(G) 3rd Battalion.
(H) Map of operation.

1. Reconnaissance:

(A) Aerial photographs, and FMAC Hasty Terrain Map First Edition were available shortly before combat operations. This advance issue of reconnaissance information proved inadequate, lacking indication of terrain features of great importance, i.e., high ground, low ground, swamps and beach conditions.

(B) Stereoscopic pairs and aerial photos were studied by this organization prior to combat. Such studies failed to reveal any relief except the highest of terrain features, and afforded no indication of extensive swamp areas.

(C) Reconnaissance by ground and plane was not available to engineer units previous to combat, and for approximately 11 days after the opening of the operations. This eleven day handicap considerably retarded the later engineer operations. It is considered necessary for engineer units to conduct reconnaissance prior to invasion and immediately after D day, and not be detained because of shore party activities.

(D) Part of the Engineering Section of the H&S Company landed on D day. On D plus 3 days they were released from shore party activities and began general reconnaissance for orientation, high and low ground areas with view of disseminating necessary terrain information for tactical, engineer and dispersal purposes. On D plus 6 days a base line was established, and some inland points were surveyed in. Sketches were being established constantly, information was compiled and on D plus 20 days the first accurate maps were reproduced, with coordinated information. Transit work ahead of pioneer roads was accomplished on approximately D plus 15 days. Considerable time was lost during the shore party functions, when the mapping section should have been accomplishing their preliminary work and establishing a suitable base line.

(E) Engineer reconnaissance was additionally retarded due to the lack of precise information on the tactical situation. Many of the reconnaissance missions, lacked a concise intent of purpose, and were rendered somewhat useless.

(F) Reconnaissance in advance of friendly lines for proposed supply routes proved difficult. Infantry units usually wanted no one in advance of their sectors. A workable solution consisted of:

The infantry command selects the areas of the new positions and furnishes a guide to conduct the engineer reconnaissance party to this new or proposed position. The engineers then conduct reconnaissance from this proposed area rearward to the old position and end of the supply line. Possible lateral supply routes were then reconnoitered along the proposed FPL and work orders issued.

(G) Engineer intelligence in the past operation was concerned primarily with maintenance of a situation map, and in the coordinating of available information for use by engineer battalions.

(1) It is proposed in future operations that the R-2 section:

(a) Control the photographic section and assign the tasks of recording progress on engineer operations for enclosure in daily and weekly reports.

(b) Through its personnel, have daily contact with the other regiments, gathering and coordinating this information and disseminating such to all engineer units and higher echelons.

(c) The R-2 should be subordinate to R-3, as the functions are closely allied.

(d) Furnish the mapping and reproduction section information in the R-2's hands, and upon request, secure any information desired by the mapping and reproduction section.

2. Tactical phases:

(A) Flame throwers. Several attempts were made to utilize flame throwers in knocking out stubborn enemy positions. The short range of the flame denied any effective results, but did cause minor enemy evacuations in several instances. Flame throwing terrified the enemy and sometimes caused him to flee, but never were the flames within effective range. Ignition of the jet proved difficult. Best method in the field seemed to be the utilization of an incendiary grenade thrown ahead of the jet and ignition accomplished by contact with the jet.

(B) Reserves. Engineer units were always required as passive or active reserves. The First Battalion was constantly one of the latter. Occasionally they were called upon to fill gaps in the front lines. Ammunition, weapons and personnel were always ready for such calls, and often stood by during an expected condition black.

(C) Patrol activity, aside from the reconnaissance patrols, was limited.

3. Security measures:

(A) Rear areas. The situation demanded only routine security. Personnel were required to carry small arms and ammunition at all times, or have them immediately available.

(B) Forward areas. Engineering assignments being accomplished in the forward areas did not always require security measures nor often justify them. It was found, however, that engineer troops worked more efficiently, and under less strain, when local security was amply provided. For this reason, in the forward areas, task units were accompanied by adequate security patrols.

(C) Night sentinels and posts were found to be impracticable. There was no safe manner of conducting routine inspections. It was SOP of this regiment to be in foxholes and dugouts by dark. The engineers slept in double foxholes in planned areas, each pair of engineers providing their own local security. This proved entirely adequate in the situation.

4. Communications:

(A) Wire communication was the predominating channel for our operations. Because of the difficult terrain and irregularity of the supply routes, communication lines were constantly being crossed and damaged by heavy equipment. A solution was found in linemen equipped with belts, climbers, TE-33, and test phones accompanying each tractor on pioneer assignments.

(B) The maintenance difficulties of communications far surpassed the capabilities of our limited personnel. This was partially overcome by having a limited number of pre-trained engineer personnel who were utilized to the utmost. Twenty line-men, trained from the ranks for three weeks, would secure us the needed personnel to properly maintain wire communications.

(C) The following additional changes would help considerably:

(1) It is recommended that metal watertight packs be made to contain two complete sets of TBX batteries, plus six batteries BA-30, each. All batteries to be shipped and kept in these containers until actually ready for use. (Five gallon food containers with modification would suffice).

(2) The SCR-536 (radio) should be replaced with the SCR-511 (radio) for shore party command nets. The SCR-536 proved practically useless for shore party use and its operation was very unstable.

(3) That all switchboards BD-72 in the engineer regiment be replaced by BD-71 switchboards. BD-9 or BD-11 switchboards would be preferred, if available, over the BD-71's.

(4) Cryptographic side should be held to an absolute minimum. Div. SOI, CSP-488, CSP-1500, and CSP-1528 would suffice for operations.

5. Equipment:

(A) Motor Transport.

(1) Two and one half ton, six by six cargo carriers, and two and one half ton six by six dumps, proved invaluable on this operation. It is deemed necessary, however, that these trucks be equipped with chains, and preferably with flexible metal half tracks. So equipped, these trucks could operate over the most difficult terrain.

(2) One ton, four by four, reconnaissance trucks provided an important complement to the larger six by six trucks. They could travel over almost as difficult terrain, provided they were fully equipped with chains.

(3) One quarter ton, four by four (jeeps) were found to be inadequate on the secondary roads used by heavier equipment, and often when stranded, considerably retarded vital traffic on poor roads. It is felt that the use of jeeps on secondary roads should be curtailed as much as possible in future operations of a similar nature.

(B) Heavy equipment.

The tractors furnished H&S, First Battalion and Third Battalion should never be smaller than a TD-14 or HD-10. Tractors furnished the Second Battalion (pioneers) should not be smaller than a TD-14, and equipped with bulldozers of a width which would allow tractors to be loaded and unloaded from an LCM. It is also desirable that all tractors be cable operated and equipped with double-drum power take-offs. Each letter company of the Third Battalion (Naval Construction Battalion) should have an additional eight (8) cubic yard carry-all and power unit. H&S Company should also be allowed two eight (8) yard carry-alls with power units. The First Battalion should carry a minimum of three bulldozers in each letter company. It is recommended that the bull clam excavator, three and one half cubic yard, back dumping scrapers, and the mobile loaders be dropped from the TBA. Two bucket conveyor type material loaders should be included in the H&S Company equipment, "Barber Greene", or equivalent. (Not if three quarter yard crane is furnished letter companies of 1st Battalion). H&S Company and lettered companies of First Battalion and Third Battalion should be equipped with the longest and widest tracks available.

All equipment in the engineer regiment should be of the same make in order to expedite maintenance, servicing and spare parts supply. It is recommended that H&S Company and the First Battalion be equipped with a tractor crane (not the 20-ton Le Tourneau type).

(C) Maintenance.

(1) The difficulty of proper maintenance proved one of the greatest obstacles in efficient engineering operations. For 15 days after D day only minor repairs could be accomplished. During the early stages of shore party activities, very little routine maintenance was accomplished. Vehicles and tractors operating in the sand and salt water should have been serviced at least daily. Salt water was found in tractor differentials as late as D plus 20 days.

(2) Suggestions for better maintenance.

(a) Each piece of equipment should be assigned a permanent operator, and responsibility shall rest with him for operation and maintenance.

(b) That a repair and service unit be set up in each battalion with one individual responsible for that battalions equipment being serviced at all times.

(c) It is deemed necessary that the repair sections land as soon as possible after D day, so they may follow engineer equipment inland after shore party activities, and maintain equipment during the operation. Several reconnaissance trucks should be equipped with the necessary tools and equipment to go to the jobs and perform light and medium repairs. One tractor with winch should be available to tow heavy equipment to repair shops and remove foundered equipment.

(d) Light hand tools and equipment proved insufficient during the combat operations. An increase of 100% should be made in the allowances of hand tools, such as double bitted axes, round point shovels, machettes, brush hooks, two man cross cut saws, wedges and mechanics hand tools. This increase is requested due to the heavy demands of all Marine units upon engineer supply during combat. Due to the rapid pace of operations, the tools mentioned above are abandoned, lost or become property of the borrowing organizations. Salvage operations netted few lost tools. Picks were used very little during the Bougainville operations.

(D) Water purification.

(1) It was found during the operation, in similar terrain, that a minimum of one (1) portable unit should be available for each infantry battalion. PWP should be complete with water supply set, supplementary distillation units should be in Category "A", to augment ground water supplies. Three MWPU should be available for use in establishing central water points.

(2) Reports from water points should be made to H&S Company Utilities Section as often as the situation permits, preferably each day. These water points should be located with consideration of accessibility by wheeled vehicles.

(3) Each company should have a minimum of four (4) lyster bags.

6. Engineer operations:

(A) Bomb disposal. See Enclosure "A", classified secret.

(B) Shore party, see Enclosure "B".

(C) Roads and trails, see Enclosure "H".

(1) Yellow II Road. Completed 6Dec43.
Started 20Nov43.

(2) Wachtler Road.

(3) Craig Road.

- (4) Major Fissell Highway
- (5) East-West Road.
- (6) Amphibian tractor trail.

(D) Bridges. See Enclosure "H".

All bridges constructed by this regiment were of the pioneer type consisting of logs and rough timber secured with drift pins. Portable bridging and tubelox were not used except for LST ramps.

(E) Obstacles.

In addition to the bomb disposal activities, many minor obstacles were removed by the engineers. Typical was the removal of 200 land mines and sixteen booby traps by "A" Company along the then proposed East-West Trail.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following recommendations are suggested as a result of observation of operations from Nov - Dec 43, by this regiment.

1. Engineer personnel and equipment should be reverted to command of CO not later than 1200 on D plus 2.

A. This is necessary to start construction of vital communication lines at the earliest possible date.

2. Additional equipment as listed by Enclosure "A", RQM, report should be supplied this regiment before next operation.

A. It was found that equipment now contained within this regiment was entirely inadequate in both size and amount to perform efficiently and with the necessary speed, the work expected and required by it.

3. Amphibious tractors should not operate over roads and trails constructed for wheeled and tractor drawn equipment.

A. It was found that many traffic congestions resulted from the above condition and also that the tractor did considerable damage to roads and bridges.

4. Loads carried by all vehicles traveling over roads should be governed by recommendations made by this regiment.

A. It was found during the operation that a great percent of vehicles were loaded well over their rated capacity and, as a result, many of the roads were damaged to the extent that they became impassable.

B. Responsibility for controlling loads should rest upon the loading personnel at the supply dumps to avoid unnecessary delay in deliveries.

5. The engineer regiment should prepare and engineer plan for the next operation and that the plan be followed in so far as possible to avoid construction work that ultimately becomes of no value.

A. It was found during the last operation that much work and time was expended constructing roads that were later paralleled or abandoned because of the final tactical disposition of troops and future permanent construction projects such as air strips.

B. It is believed that a large portion of this lost work can be avoided if complete knowledge of the tactical plans in all stages and the final disposition of all troops are known in sufficient time to make necessary engineer plans to coordinate their work with the advance of combat troops.

6. It is believed that all trucks of the engineer regiment should be considered as engineer equipment.

6. Continued.

A. The trucks allocated to this regiment are partly dump and partly cargo. The dump trucks are necessarily used for hauling earth or surfacing materials for roads and the cargo trucks are necessary to transport engineer personnel and construction supplies to the projects on which they are working.

B. It was found on the last operation that the diversion of engineer trucks to other uses was the primary cause of having insufficient hauling facilities on construction projects.

7. Engineer equipment should be given high priority for shipment to operation.

A. It was found that engineer equipment taken ashore on the initial landing was entirely inadequate to construct primary roads and that much valuable time was lost waiting for heavy equipment which was not made available to us for several days.

B. Engineer personnel can be utilized only as labor until their equipment is available.

8. It is believed that repair parts for all engineer equipment of all engineer units on the operation, should be catalogued, consolidated and lists given to each unit to facilitate repair of unservicable equipment.

A. It was observed on the last operation that many machine hours were lost because location of necessary parts was not known.

CONCLUSION:

It is believed that with the fulfillment of the above recommendations and suggestions, that this engineer regiment can function efficiently, and rapidly and be used to the greatest advantage in supporting combat troops and constructing necessary all weather communication lines.

R. E. FOJT.



RQM, 19th Marines, (Engrs).
3d Marine Division, FMF,
In the Field.

18 January, 1944.

From: RQM.
To : CG, SS, FMAC.
Via : (1) CO, 19th Marines.
(2) Div QM, 3rd MarDiv.
(3) CG, 3d Mar Div, (Attention D-4)

Subject: Supply letter.

Reference: (a) Supply Administrative Order #1-43,
dtd 27 May, 1943.

1. The below listed recommendations and information is forwarded in accordance with reference (a), after observations made during the operation of November-December 1943.

(A) All tractors should be furnished with bulldozer attachments.

(B) Tractors furnished H&S Co., 1st Battalion and the 3d Battalion, should not be smaller than a TD-18 or HD-10. Tractors furnished the 2d Battalion (Pioneers), should not be smaller than a TD-14 and equipped with bulldozer blades of a width that would allow the tractors to be loaded and unloaded from a LCM. In fact all tractors that were used in initial landings should be fitted with blades, if possible, that will fit into an LCM. It is also desirable that all tractors be cable operated and equipped with double drum power take-offs in addition.

(C) Each letter company of the 3d Battalion (NCB), should have an additional eight (8) cubic yard carry-all and power unit. H&S Co., should also be allowed two eight (8) cubic yard carry-alls with power units.

(D) The 1st Battalion should carry a minimum of three bull-dozers in each letter company.

(E) It is recommended that the below listed items be removed from the basic allowances for the Engineer Regiment.

1. Bull-clam excavators.
2. Back dumping scrapers; 3½ cu.yd.
3. Mobile loaders.

(F) Two bucket conveyor type loaders should be included in H&S Co., equipment; Barbar-Greene or equal. (Not is 3/4 yd., crane if furnished).

(G) H&S Co., and each letter company of the 1st and 3d Battalion, should be equipped with a 3/4 yard crane and attachments instead of present equipment.

(H) All track laying equipment should be equipped with the longest and widest tracks available.

(I) All the equipment in Engineer Regiments should be the same make or as close as possible as that would tend to expedite repairs and servicing.

(J) It is strongly recommended that light meters be furnished for all photographic chests and every camera. At the present time, hundreds of dollars worth of film is ruined due to the lack of the above mentioned meter.

(K) It is recommended that H&S Co., and the 1st Battalion be furnished a tractor crane. (Not to be confused with the 20-ton Le Tourneau Crane)

(L) An increase of 100% should be made in the allowances of hand tools such as double-bitted axes, shovels R.P., S.H. machettes, brush hooks, two man cross-cut saws, wdges and mechanics hand tools. This increase is requested due to the heavy demands of all Marine units which the Engineers supply in combat. Due to the rapid pace of the operations, the tools mentioned above, are abandoned lost or become property of other organizations. Salvage operations have netted little results. General opinion is that 75% of all axes should be double-bitted. Picks and mattocks were used very little during the operation at Cherry Blossom.

/s/ V. M. DAVIS

ENCLOSURE "A"

[REDACTED]

19 January, 1944.

From: Motor Transport Officer.
To : CO, H&S Co., 19th Mar.

Subject: Suggestions for future operations from experiences
of present operations.

1. 6x6 trucks have held up satisfactorily and it has been found they will take a lot of punishment. Would suggest that every effort be made to equip all 6x6 trucks with half tracks for the dual rear end, as it was noted that trucks so equipped could go most anyplace.

2. It is believed that drivers instruction in the use of the Winch should be stressed. It was noted that a considerable number of drivers failed to use winches and walked or waited for tractors to pull them through bad spots.

3. 4x4 Recons were found to be very useful as they would go through roads where the going was really difficult. Considerable trouble was found with the front and rear differential and it is believed that a large part of this was caused by improper driving. Using the high gear ration, instead of the reduction gear.

4. This writer believes that a large part of mechanical failure in this organizations equipment would be eliminated if it were possible to have the driver responsible at all times for his vehicle. It is felt that several drivers on the same piece of equipment should be eliminated completely.

5. 4x4 jeeps were found to be very inadequate for use on secondary roads, where trucks were used, and it is believed their use should be curtailed as much as possible. The ones used, stood up well and only troubles found were caused by use in salt water.

6. D-6 tractors caused most of the trouble in tractors and this writer is of the opinion that practically all of the trouble with these tractors would have been eliminated if they could have been properly serviced as soon as their use on the beach and salt water was secured. Salt water was found in tractor differentials and transmissions as late as D plus 20 days. It was noted by this writer that none of the tractors had been lubricated when turned over to MT for repair, and all indication was, that was the reason for this mechanical failure.

6. Spare parts were almost completely non-existent for tractors, practically all repair had to be improvised, or patched up. It was found that our machine shop and its equipment was of the utmost value in making and converting parts so they could be used.

7. This writer has the following suggestions to make for future operations:

(a) The same operators shall stay with the piece of equipment and be responsible for it, regardless of the location or use of equipment.

(b) That some central means for each battalion be set up with responsibility to be settled on one individual for that battalion equipment to be properly serviced at all times.

(c) That a central regimental repair section be set up complete with all equipment for heavy repair to be done at that one location and only minor repair to be handled by the companies. All parts-trailer, machine shops, welding, etc., to be centralized. This heavy repair section to handle all repairs for 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, and any H&S equipment used in the operation. This section be supplied with personnel from all organizations and to be under the direction of H&S Co.

(d) This section should have the following equipment other than present equipment:

- (1) 1 or 2 4x4 Recons equipped with the necessary tools and equipment to go to the job and do medium repairs.

(e) Be equipped with one trailer with a winch, to pull jobs to central locations for heavy repairs, and to help pull tractor and other heavy equipment out of holes, etc.

(f) It is suggested that the repair section be debarked as soon as possible after D day, and that they be kept as mobile as possible so they can follow the companies inland and keep within a reasonable distance of where equipment is being used.

(g) Suggested equipment for use in the field:

- (1) Machine Shop
- (2) Welding Trailer, Arc - Two if possible
- (3) Welding Equipment Gas
- (4) Parts supply
- (5) Blacksmith shop
- (6) 105 cu.ft. air compressor
- (7) Greasing Trailer
- (8) Electric Shop for generator and starters.

/s/ S. VUNCANNON,
Wrnt. Off. (MTO), USMCR.

ENCLOSURE "B"

DIVISION ENGINEER & OPERATIONS SECTION
H&S Co, 19th Marines,
3rd Marine Division.

21 January, 1944.

From: Section Leader.
To : CO, 19th Mar.
Via : CO, H&S Co, 19th Mar.

Subject: Div Engr and Oper Sec, use of in future operations,
recommendations for.

1. The below recommendations are based on the experience gained in the last operation. It is felt that this section can be of great value to the Division by following the recommended outline. It is further recommended that this plan be adopted as S.O.P. for the section on all future operations.

2. All recommendations are based on the experience of this section and its contact of front line units. It was found that these units were lacking and begging for information regarding their correct locations. It was found on several occasions that units had believed themselves to be 4-5000 yds. from their actual location.

3. It is recommended that one transit survey party be attached to the two leading combat teams and one office force be attached to the advance H&S Co. detachment. All units must land on D day.

4. The transit parties will be composed of 7 men, 4 men as transit party, 2 men as field sketchers and 1 man as runner. Both parties will be responsible to and controlled by the section leader. The surveying equipment will be handled and carried by the men as part of their combat equipment. On hitting the beach D-Day, the survey parties will immediately establish a Base line, survey the beach line and proceed surveying inland to the front lines. Their duties will be:

- (a) To give to units correct grid coordinates of their locations. This will be accomplished by calculating latitudes of departures as the survey lines are run.
- (b) To establish permanent stations from which future surveys by other units may be made.
- (c) To make survey controlled field sketches of all areas not covered by the transit survey.
- (d) To gather and report all information regarding terrain features that may affect Engineering Operations.
- (e) To make Engineer Reconnaissance whenever called upon.
- (f) To make a daily report to the section leader w/enclosed copies of all field notes and sketches. This report must be in by 1800 daily.

5. The office force shall be composed of 6 men and 2 officers; 2 men to plot survey notes and compile available information, 1 draftsman, 2 Aerial Photo Interpreters, 1 photo and reproduction man. All the work of this section will be done between 1800 and 0800. Their duties will be:

- (a) To plot all field notes and compile all field sketches into a 1:5,000 map (on hard copy or acetate).
- (b) Reduce the 1:5,000 map to a 1:20,000 map by 0800 the following morning and make distribution by 1000.

Subject: Div Engr & Oper Sec, use of in future operations,
Recommendations for.


5. (Cont'd)

- (c) Check survey notes w/ 12th Marines surveyors to give a double check on all surveys and to initially have a Fire Control Map.
- (d) To obtain aerial photographs taken during intervals of the campaign and make semi controlled aerial mosaics. To obtain as much accurate information from the mosaics, as possible, and plot on the 1:20,000 map.
- (e) To check origin of grid system and establish True North by Solar Observations.

6. It is further recommended that:

- (a) All aerial photos, survey notes of other organizations and field sketches be made available to this section.
- (b) All survey parties of this Regiment come under Div Engr Sec control w/authority to coordinate all survey work.

K. A. GORDON,
1stLt., USMC.



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Co "A", 1stBn, 19th Mar, 3dMarDiv, FMF,
In the Field.

12Jan44.

From: Bomb Disposal Unit #1, 3dMarDiv.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
(1) CG, 3dMarDiv.
(2) CG, FMAC.
(3) CMC, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Bomb Disposal Activities, report of.

Reference: (a) U. S. Navy Bomb Disposal Intelligence Bulletin
#52.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

2. Unit #1, 3dMarDiv, composed of First Lieutenant's Robert C. COFFEY and David W. SCHUMAKER, is attached to the Engineer Regiment of this division, and in such capacity serves the entire command.

We were present at the original landing on Bougainville Island, B.S.I., on 1Nov43, serving under the command of the Ninth Marine Regiment, to which we were tactically assigned. The second day on the beach we extracted fuzes from three (3), ANM, 100# bombs. The fuzes were identical, M-103, two having armed, and the other in a safe and relatively harmless condition.

The first few days were spent clearing out areas for provisions and gun emplacements, of small arms, grenades and knee mortar shells. The 75mm howitzer ammunition (Jap) which was disposed of was stored in three formidable pill boxes. As the roads were being pushed forward, we were engaged in removing 5" Naval shells, probably fired at the time of the initial landing, land mines and unexploded artillery and mortar shells. We were used on a few occasions to clean out bivouac areas of foreign as well as domestic ordnance. On two occasions we were assigned the mission of destroying by demolition, the unexploded experimental rocket, in an area approximately 500 yards forward of the barbed wire. We were given adequate security patrol by the commanding officer in whose area we were employed.

We were called upon at different times to remove unexploded bombs from the area of the Bomber Strip, and the area embracing the second Fighter Strip on Bougainville Island.

The ammunition dump of the Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines which received a direct hit from a 63 Kg. Japanese bomb, was cleared, and straightened away by Unit No. 1, with the aid of the Twelfth Marine Ordnance command. A fire resulted from the explosion, and many of the fuzes has shrapnel imbedded in them. We cleaned out the rejected shells and duds from the various ammunition areas of the artillery batteries.

During the month of December much of the work was done in conjunction with Capt. D. J. Merriman, of H&S Co., 19th Marines.

SUMMARY:

2 63 Kg. F. P. Japanese bombs, fused with A3A. Low order detonation, after penetration of 6 and 12 ft. respectively.
20 ANM, 100# bombs. M-103 Nose fuzes throughout, (about 2/3 of these failed to arm). Most all fuzes of this type were set on delay. Three of these bombs contained AN-M101A1 tail

fuzes, all were noted to be in an armed condition.


10 5" Naval shells duds.
7 155 mm shells - duds.
3 75 mm shells - duds.
8 75 mm shells - duds.
20 60 mm mortar shells - duds.
4 81 mm mortar shells - duds.
12 Land Mines - Japanese
150 Rounds 75 mm Japanese, (15 duds included)
12 Hand grenades - U.S. (some duds)
100-200 Hand grenades - Japanese (some extracted on 20)
300-400 Knee mortar shells.
1500 75mm pack Howitzer, U.S.C. (extracted)

Unit #1 of 3d Marine Division in conjunction with Capt. D. J. Merriam, and the B.D. officers of 1st MAB was employed for a period of three weeks, previous to the recent campaign. During this time we helped in the vast program of cleaning out ammunition dumps, and prospective bivouac areas of Japanese ordnance as well as domestic, and also cleaned out paths which at a later date were developed into roads. A complete report on this undertaking was forwarded via proper channels by 1st MAB B.D. personnel.

3. I would recommend a set of drills with a small brace be forwarded to Marine Units, for removing crimps on domestic artillery fuzes. A two (2) pin spanner for removing mortar base fuzes, and also one spanner that could be employed in the removal of the detonating cap of the M-103 fuze, would be useful additions to a Marine B.D. tool set. Field expedients are practically out of the question when a B. D. unit is attached to an infantry command.

(2)

ENCLOSURE "D"



FIRST BATTALION NINETEENTH MARINES, THIRD MAR DIV,
IN THE FIELD.

9 December, 1944.

From: CO, 1st En.
To : CO, 19th Mar.

Subject: Report of Operations November-December 1943.

1. For the first eight days of this operation all personnel of this battalion with the exception of twelve demolition teams were committed to shore party functions. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the combat engineer should not be committed to shore party functions after the first day. It is apparent that the rapid completion of engineer work may be the determining factor in the success of an operation of this type. It is therefore believed that engineer reconnaissance, planning, and the assembling of engineer units and equipment should begin immediately, and not ten days after D-Day. It is impossible for the engineer battalion to do this and perform shore party duties concurrently. In this particular operation there was apparently little or no engineer reconnaissance conducted until D-plus ten day. This first paragraph also applies to the Pioneer Battalion as well, though to a lesser degree. It is believed that some form of labor troops should be furnished to do the routine stevedoring after the initial landing, thus permitting the pioneers to do engineering work.

2. All of the tractors of this battalion worked on the beach for ten days. During this period they often worked in salt water three or four feet deep and it was noted that heavy equipment was operated continuously with little or no servicing during this ten day period. It is recommended that a six by six (6x6) truck be equipped with a grease unit, an extra supply of special lubricants, and emergency tools. This truck should be patterned after the service truck now carried by the companies of Naval Construction Battalions, and should be landed in Category A along with electric welding equipment. Mechanics assigned to this vehicle should not be given shore party or other duties.

3. For the most part the equipment of the battalion held up very well, considering the operating conditions and the servicing facilities available. The six by six (6x6) dump trucks performed especially well. There were practically no mechanical failures among the twenty-seven dump trucks operated by this battalion. It is recommended that they all be equipped with half tracks. The three trucks that were so equipped proved themselves invaluable.

4. In general, the heavy equipment is too light. There was a definite need for heavier tractors and more of them. It is recommended that the TD-14 Bull Clam, Athey Mobile Loader, and TD-9 tractors be dropped from the Table of Organization. An engineer company should be equipped with three Caterpillar D-7 Angle Dozers, three D-6 Angle Dozers, and three D-4 Angle Dozers, all to be equipped with hydraulically controlled blades. The D-7's and D-6's should in addition to be equipped with a double drum power take off. The D-4 should have a Hyster winch on the rear end. The Hyster winches now on the D-4's were literally worth their weight in gold. Should the procuring agencies desire to equip us with International equipment, each company should have three TD-18 Angle Dozers and six TD-14 Angle Dozers, equipped as recommended for the Caterpillar equipment. The two 3½ yard back dumping scrapers in each company should be dropped from the Table of Organization, and one 5 yard cable operated front dumping scraper be substituted.

5. It is recommended that one 3/8 cubic yard Bay City shovel with crane and pile driving, and drag line attachments be provided each company. The use of LST and LCT type landing craft make the landing of this equipment a relatively simple matter. Each company should have one pull grader, leaning wheel type.
6. The small tools provided each company were able to meet the needs of the engineers in general. Additional cant-hooks, peavies, axes, and machetes should be added to the pioneer sets. Each company should be provided with a supply of 3/4" and 5/8" steel cable, together with cable clips and large snatch blocks. There were not enough entrenching tools to fully meet the needs of the infantry regiments. It is suggested that the pioneer company carry an additional infantry entrenching set. At the present time one infantry entrenching set is carried by the engineer company. The pioneer company carries no tools for issue to other units. If a second infantry entrenching set were carried in the pioneer company the reinforced regiment would have two entrenching sets available. This would not add any tonnage to the engineer company which is already very heavy and it is thought that this additional equipment would not overburden the pioneer company which is relatively light.
7. In this operation there was no demand for portable bridge equipment and it is believed that pioneer bridges are the practical answer to the bridging problem.
8. The demolition equipment and explosives provided were ample. It was possible to fulfill every request. The flame thrower equipment was obtained just prior to this operation and it is believed that additional training should be conducted. A method of handling requests for this equipment should be developed and the problem of getting the equipment to the proper place in time to meet the situation requires more study. They did not prove themselves practical in this operation.
9. In general, the engineer were not informed of the tactical situation and it was impossible to anticipate future requirements. It is believed that an engineer liaison officer should work with each infantry regiment supported by the battalion. It is our opinion that the engineers could be of more assistance to the artillery regiment and that some provision should be made for providing engineer support to the artillery.
10. Communications functioned as well as could be expected. It is believed that the number of communication personnel and radio equipment in this battalion could be reduced. There was, however, a definite need for all communication personnel in the shore party. It is our opinion that this service could better be provided by some other communication unit, possibly the pioneer company.
11. There is a definite need for an Intelligence Section and an Operations Section in the Battalion Headquarters Company. The Table of Organization should be changed to add six enlisted to the Bn-2 Section, and three enlisted to the Bn-3 Section.
12. The Athey trailers operating here were noted with much interest. On several occasions they were borrowed by the engineer companies and they met a real need. If two are assigned to each company it would do much to solve the problem of moving engineer equipment and supplies. It is believed that this equipment should be landed in Category A.
13. The engineer companies should not be attached to infantry regiments longer than absolutely necessary. Prolonged attachment divides command and does not make for harmonious operation or co-ordinated effort. A definite doctrine of command and administration should be established when engineer companies are supporting infantry regiments.

14. Water supply here was no problem. The equipment functioned perfectly and was ample to meet existing requirements. Water being plentiful, no use was made of distillation equipment. This equipment is considered essential, however, should ground sources prove inadequate in future operations.

15. Three 7.5 KVA generators were landed in Category A by this battalion. These generators were put to no use until D plus 18 days and should be placed in Category B.

16. There is a definite need for a six by six (6x6) cargo truck in battalion headquarters. It has been necessary to constantly tie up a dump truck to haul for the battalion quartermaster.


17. The supply of food, ammunition, etc., was ample at all times. However, the amount of clothes provided was inadequate. Engineer troops work under such adverse conditions that keeping these troops in shoes, socks, and dungarees was a serious problem. The Battalion Surgeon continually reported that the lack of dry clothing, especially shoes and socks, was having a detrimental effect upon the health of the troops in this command.

18. Surveying and drafting equipment should be provided for the headquarters company of the engineer battalion in the Table of Basic Allowances. Surveying equipment should be landed during the first three days of an operation. All surveying in a beach head area should be coordinated by the senior engineer unit. A base traverse should be established along the beach by the senior engineer unit operating in the area and all surveys should originate from this base system, whether conducted by infantry, artillery, or engineer units. This would save much duplication of effort and maps could be corrected with greater speed.

RALPH W. BOHNE,
Major, USMCR, Commanding.

(3)

ENCLOSURE "E"



HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, SECOND BATTALION NINETEENTH MARINES,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

7 December, 1943.

From: CO 2nd Bn, 19th Mar.
To : CO, 19th Mar.
Subject: Activities, etc., report on.

1. Activities:

D CoFrom D day thru D day plus 8.

D day. D Co., attached to 9th Mar. (reinf.) made combat landing. Served Shore Party functions for CT 9 unloading on Beaches Red 1, 2, 3 and Yellow 3 and 4, handling supply and equipment from ships of CT 9 and from two AK's.

Beaches Red 2 and 3 and Yellow 4 were found unsatisfactory due to surf conditions and receipts were switched to beaches handled by other shore parties.

D day plus 1 to D day plus 5.

The company sent platoons to take over beaches of other shore parties in handling altered receipts mentioned above.

1st Platoon moved forward with combat troops on D day plus 1 to serve as combat reserve and remained on this duty until D day plus 3 when they rejoined shore party.

3rd Platoon moved forward on left flank on combat patrol with D-3-9 on D day plus 5, rejoining shore party same day.

D day plus 6.

Company, now consolidated, moved to East Torokina Beach under control of Div SP CO and remained as Shore Party unit for this beach until coming back under orders of its own battalion.

D day plus 7 thru D day plus 35.

Under bn. control and engaged on unloading ocean receipts of all classes at East Torokina Beach and storing and forwarding.

F CoD day to D day plus 7.

D day F Co, attached to 3d Mar. (reinf) made combat landing. Served shore party functions for CT 3 unloading on beaches Blue 1, 2 and 3 handling supply and equipment from ships of CT 3 and from and AK.

D day plus 2.

Organized dumps and forwarded supplies to CT 3 and drained swamp in rear of Beach Blue 2 to assist artillery positions.

1st Platoon moved with LT 7 to serve as combat reserve.

D day plus 3 thru D day plus 7.

Rejoined bn. at Beach Green 1.

E. Company

D day plus 5 thru D day plus 7.
D day plus 5.

1st Platoon landed with LT 4 and served as Shore Party for them on East Torokina Beach.

D day plus 6 to D day plus 10.

1st Platoon served infantry with misc work details.

D day plus 10.

2nd Platoon landed and company (less 3rd Plat.) joined bn.

Battalion

D day plus 5.

Hq Co landed on beach Blue 1 and unloaded boats of its own embarkation group.

D day plus 6.

Hq Co moved to beach Green 1 and went into bivouac.

D day plus 7 thru D day plus 9.

D and F companies joined and bn. (less E Co.) proceeded with organization of corps supply and material on all Puruate Island, and East Torokina beaches (the latter under D co) and receipt of all incoming corps supply and transshipping of same.

This routine remained fixed from D day plus 7 thru the conclusion of this report a D day plus 36 except as noted below.

D day plus 10.

Bn was joined by 1st and 2nd Platoons of E Co.

D day plus 15.

Bn, was detached from 3d MarDiv and attached to Corps Service Group. 3rd Platoon E Co. joined.

2. Criticisms or favorable comments on Equipment:

Motor Vehicles:

The number and make of cargo trucks, 2½ T, as allowed, seems to be proper to the task just completed. But it should be assured that all trucks going into combat in the future carry their Flexible Steel Treads. Division trucks assigned to this battalion were lacking in this necessity.

There should be not less than one dump truck per pioneer company and this should be supplemented by one power shovel or crane with drag line bucket per pioneer bn. These items should be held inviolate for pioneer shore party work and included in the first category. This thought is based on pioneers handling supply, after the initial assault, for second and all following categories.

Tractors:

It is again repeated that the minimum necessity for pioneer shore party work is one tractor per platoon and that this should not be less than a medium (TD-14 International or equiv.) with bulldozer blade. It is also requisite that they be recognized as necessary to shore operation and not subjected to transfer order.

Trailers:

It is believed that shuttling of cargo by Heavy flat bed trailers should be abandoned until such time as both, serviceable tongue be developed, and over loading can be prevented. On this maneuver the trailer loads were a severe handicap to the operation. The tongues broke too frequently, and this always happened at the most inopportune places, and the heavy loading was too severe on the available road net.

All classes of wheeled vehicles:

Because of the incessant use of supply vehicles over many classes of ramps, it is recommended that more thought be given to larger diameter wheels. The ease with which the heavy artillery prime movers negotiate both ramps and heavy mud holes suggests that this might be a general panacea.

3. General remarks:


As a result of shore party work on two combat landings the writer has concluded that: Each reinforced infantry battalion should have one shore party staff specialist and should handle its own ship load with its own troops under his direction and as a responsibility of his own Bn CO.

Following this, the regular shore party organization, as a function of the senior service group, would pick-up shore party work. This latter unit to be in no ways connected with combat or engineer command.

HALSTEAD ELLISON,
Major, USMCR,
Commanding.

(3)

ENCLOSURE "F"



HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BATTALION, NINETEENTH MARINES,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD.

25 January, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Commanding Officer, 19th Marines.


Subject: Consolidated report activities 2d Battalion.

1. Submitted herewith is the report of activities of the Second Battalion, 19th Marines, from D day plus 36 thru D day plus 80.

2. This report is a continuation of report previously submitted and together the two form a complete report for the entire Bougainville Campaign.

HALSTEAD ELLISON
Major, USMCR,
Commanding.

ENCLOSURE "F"



ACTIVITIES

D co From D day plus 36 thru D day plus 77

Under Bn control and engaged in unloading ocean receipts of all classes at East Torokina Beach and storing and forwarding.

D day plus 78

Joined Bn on Puruata Island.

Bn (less D Co.) From D day plus 36 thru D day plus 77.


Engaged in unloading ocean receipts of all classes on Puruata Island and in transshipping these receipts to Bougainville Island.

Bn (In full). From D day plus 78 thru D day plus 80

Policing bivouacs, preparing property for embarkation, unloading the 20th flight of LST's and embarking. During this period all staff functions remained in service for training the relieving cadre of the XIV Corps Service Command.

Signed:

HALSTEAD ELLISON
Major, USMCR,
Commanding.



THIRD BATTALION, NINETEENTH MARINES,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

9 December, 1943.

From: CO.
To : CO, 19th Mar.
Subject: Comments on recent landing operations.

1. As per requested, the following suggestions are offered for the improvement of landing operations of this regiment.

- (a) Use larger and newer tractors for beach operations.
- (b) Have definitely decided who is in charge of shore party work. Combat team commanders normally assume these duties although SOP specifies shore party commanders.
- (c) Plan before landing, operation where roads and other construction work will be installed, with alternate plans if practical.
- (d) Have one person in charge of all engineering work with authority to coordinate work of all engineering and CB units. This person to land on "D" day.
- (e) Have central authority to specify locations where construction equipment is to be used.
- (f) Have duties of various engineering battalions distinctly specified. Combat engineers to build trails for supply lines, CBs to follow and build roads or widen and improve trails as necessary.

G. J. WHELAN

ENCLOSURE "G"



SERVICE TROOPS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

27 January, 1944.

From: CO, Service Troops.
To : CG, Third Marine Division.
Subject: Report of operations, November - December, 1943.
Enclosures: (A) Salvage Section report.
(B) Report of weapons salvaged and repaired by Ordnance Company.
(C) Report of weapons exchanged with the Americal Division.

1. The following report of operations of Service Troops is arranged by battalions comprising a narrative in chronological order and general comments pertinent to the operations of each battalion, followed by recommendations which are grouped together:

A. THIRD SERVICE BATTALION
I. NARRATIVE

1 November, 1943.

1.a. Major Chandler and eleven men from the Division Quartermaster Section of Headquarters Company, landed on Bougainville and supervised the supply functions in the Empress Augusta Bay area.

b. The First and Third Platoons, Service and Supply Company, consisting of the Headquarters, Service and Supply, Chemical, Commissary, Post Exchange, and Graves Registration Sections, were attached to the Ninth and Third Regiments respectively, and were present during the initial landing. The First Service and Supply Platoon assisted in the unloading of the ships; next at 1500, it went ashore, joined the shore party, and assisted in unloading supplies from the landing boats. The Third Service and Supply Platoon was split equally between the Higgins boats and the shore party dumps on the beach for purposes of moving regimental supplies from the ships to the beach and then inland off the beach.

c. The Third Graves Registration Section acted as gunners in the Higgins boats.

d. The ammunition section of the Ordnance Company were assigned to duty with the following units:

First Section, consisting of eight enlisted men, to the Ninth Regiment.

Third Section, consisting of eight enlisted men, to the Third Regiment.

Fourth Section, consisting of Chief Marine Gunner Bartoszek and eight enlisted men to Division Headquarters.

2 November, 1943.

2.a. Division Dump #1, located near Beach Blue #1, was established by the Division Quartermaster and Commissary Sections. They operated this dump throughout the operation. Details of their duties and the supply set-up of Dump #1, and the other dumps that were set up later, are covered in the Division Quartermaster's Report.

b. The Graves Registration Sections, attached to the First and Third Service and Supply Platoons, joined the section under Marine Gunner McBee. These three sections established Cemetery #1, on Torokina Point, collected, identified, registered, and buried the dead.

c. The First Service and Supply Platoon, attached to the Bn-4 of the Third Battalion, Ninth Regiment, assisted in clearing the beach of all equipment and supplies. The Third Service and Supply Platoon worked on Beach Blue #3, and at the battalion ration dumps of the Third Regiment.

3 November, 1943.

3.a. The First Service and Supply Platoon was assigned to beach defense on the left flank of the lines during the night and worked at supply dumps during the day. This continued through the 7th of November. The Third Service and Supply Platoon continued to function as working details and also to operate dumps, while still attached to the Third Regiment, until the 14th of November.

b. Men from the Graves Registration Section were sent out to search the battle areas and to sketch all isolated burials. Cemetery #2 was established on Puruata Island. A daily check was kept in this cemetery by this section.

6 November, 1943.

4. Two men from the Second Ammunition Section, Ordnance Company, arrived on Bougainville attached to the First Battalion Twenty-First Regiment.

8 November, 1943.

5. The First Service and Supply Platoon moved to Torokina Point to be used as an ammunition detail where it remained until 12 November.

11 November, 1943.

6. Two men from the Second Ammunition Section, Ordnance Company, arrived on Bougainville, attached to the Second Battalion, Twenty-First Regiment.

12 November, 1943.

7. Three men from the Division Quartermaster Section were sent with Lieutenant Lowe and twelve of his men from the First Service and Supply Platoon, to establish Division Inland Dump #2. The First Service and Supply Platoon, which was detached from the Ninth Regiment on this date, reverted to division control. The platoon, except for the detail listed above, assisted in the Operation of Dump #1, under Major Chandler.

14 November, 1943.

8. The Third Service and Supply Platoon was detached from the Third Regiment and reverted to division control. The platoon was assigned to Dump #1 to assist in its operations.

16 November, 1943.

9. The Third Service and Supply Platoon moved up the beach to a trans-shipment point to unload shuttle trucks and reload amphibian tractors which carried supplies to Dump #2.

17 November, 1943.

10. Chaplain Reeves, Service Troops chaplain, arrived at Empress Augusta Bay, and took charge of the religious and morale functions of the Division Hospital.

11. The personnel for operating the Service Troops Command Post landed and set-up the command post on Piva Trail Road, one thousand yards north of Beach Yellow #1.

12. The Second Service and Supply Platoon, attached to the Third Battalion, Twenty-First Regiment, arrived on Bougainville. It assisted in unloading the ship, and then it was detached from the Twenty-First Regiment and reverted to divisional control. This platoon assisted in the operation of Dump #1, and occasionally sent men to help operate Division Dump #3, after it was established. The Graves Registration Section, attached to the Second Service and Supply Platoon, was detached and reported to Marine Gunner McBee at Cemetery #1.

13. Four men from the Second Ammunition Section, Ordnance Company, arrived on Bougainville, attached to the Third Battalion, Twenty-First Regiment.

18 November, 1943.

14. The Graves Registration Section moved inland and established Cemetery #3.

27 November, 1943.

15. The Third Service and Supply Platoon moved to Dump #2, joining Lieutenant Lowe and his detachment. At this dump all supplies from Dump #1, including commissaries, clothing, barbed wire, etc., were received and issued to the regiments. Later the personnel loaded and dispatched amphibian tractors to Dump #3.

28 November, 1943.

16. The "B" categories of Headquarters Company, Service and Supply Company, and Ordnance Company, arrived at Empress Augusta Bay. After the completion of the unloading of the LST's, the companies moved to the Service Battalion bivouac area. Category "B", of Headquarters Company, consisted of the battalion command post and battalion aid station personnel. Category "B", of the Service and Supply Company, consisted of the Headquarters Section, four Bakery Sections, the Fourth Service and Supply Platoon, and fifty men from the Salvage Section. Category "B", of the Ordnance Company, consisted of the repair and Maintenance Sections for small arms, artillery, and instruments.

29 November, 1943.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Bethel took charge of Service Battalion installations that were already in operation, and began to lay the ground work for future installations, such as bakery shops for the infantry regiments and division troops.

18. The battalion aid station was set up and put into operation by Doctor Roemer.

19. The Ordnance Company set up its installations and began the repair, maintenance, and supply of weapons and ordnance material to the division. This, they continued through the 4th of January, 1944.

29 November, 1943.

20. The Salvage Section went into operation on this date, working in all regimental and division areas, as well as any place where gear could be recovered. This included much ordnance equipment. Daily and weekly reports were submitted to the D-4 office, showing total collected, serviceable and unserviceable by item. A great amount of serviceable equipment was re-issued on Bougainville, some sent to the Salvage Section on Guadalcanal for repair and return to the Division Quartermaster, and other items were sent to the Fourth Base Depot. Included in the Salvage Section were two sterilization trailers with crews. One of these units set up showers at Dump #2, and the other sunk a well near the Salvage area and set up the unit; natives washed salvaged clothing and other equipment. This last section sunk another well and set up a purification unit, and helped in the operation of a water point with personnel from the Nineteenth Regiment.

30 November, 1943.

21. Major Conger was sent up to Division Headquarters to act as liason officer between D-4 and the Commanding Officer, Service Troops.

22.a: The Bakery Sections of the Service and Supply Company, set up their bakery shops as follows:

Section #1 at the command post, Ninth Regiment.
Section #2 at the command post, Twenty-First Regiment.
Section #3 at the command post, Third Regiment.
Section #4 at Dump #2.

b. The first three sections supplied the respective regiments with bread and rolls, while the fourth section supplied the remainder of Division Troops.

6 December, 1943.

23. By authority of the Commanding General, Third Marine Division, Major Stokes was detailed as assistant to the Division Quartermaster, in addition to his regular duties. Major Stokes took charge and administered the Division Inland Dump #2.

8 December, 1943.

24. Major Conger was relieved of his duties as Service Troops, liason officer and was ordered to establish and take charge of Division Dump #3, to be located Evansville. Major Conger, with Lieutenant Jeppesen, three men from Headquarters Company, and the Fourth Service and Supply Platoon, attached, moved to Evansville. This dump received from Dump #2, and later from Dump #1, commissaries, fuel, ammunition, and

engineering equipment, and re-issued these supplies to the Twenty-First Regiment, the First Battalion, Ninth Regiment, and the Second Raider Regiment.

12 December, 1943.

25. The personnel of the First Service and Supply Platoon, which had remained at Dump #1, moved to Dump #2.

14 December, 1943.

26. Major Conner was evacuated by the Medical Battalion to Guadalcanal, and his assistant Lieutenant Jeppesen took charge of Dump #3.

24 December, 1943.

27. The ammunition section, attached to the Third Regiment, returned to Guadalcanal.

25 December, 1943.

28. The Division Inland Dump #2 was turned over to the Americal Division, U.S. Army, by Major Stokes. All Headquarters Company personnel and the First and Third Service and Supply Platoons returned to the Service Battalion bivouac area, awaiting evacuation to Guadalcanal.

29. Captain Smith was sent to Evansville to take charge of Dump #3, which now became the main Division Supply Dump. The Athey Trailer Platoon, Third Motor Transport Battalion, was placed under his control so as to move supplies forwarded from the dump to the various battalions of the Twenty-First Regiment and to the Second and Third Raider Battalions.

2 January, 1944.

30. The Division Dump #3, was turned over to the Regimental Quartermaster of the 182nd Infantry. Division Dump #1 was closed. All Service Battalion personnel operating these two dumps, returned to the Service Battalion bivouac area awaiting return to Guadalcanal.

5 January, 1944.

31. All Service Battalion personnel, except Lieutenant Colonel Bethel, Captain Miller, Doctor Roemer, a small detachment of quartermaster and administrative personnel, and twenty-four salvage men, embarked aboard LST's for return to Guadalcanal.

9 January, 1944.

32. The Ammunition Section, attached to the Twenty-First Regiment, returned to Guadalcanal.

16 January, 1944.

33. The remaining personnel of the Service Battalion departed Bougainville for Guadalcanal.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. All the Division Supply Dumps (#1, #2, and #3), were operated by Service Battalion personnel, except for the fuel dumps, which were operated by the Motor Transport Battalion personnel.

2. During the campaign, the Graves Registration Section dug graves in addition to their regular duties stipulated in Graves Registration S.O.P. Besides maintaining cemeteries #1, #2, and #3, they assisted at all funerals and memorial services.

3. The Ammunition Section was split up into four groups of eight men each, one group to each infantry regiment, and one group to handle the Division ammunition. The task of the men with the regiments was to establish and operate the regimental dumps. In addition to doing this, they often carried ammunition up to the front lines. The task of the section handling the Division Ammunition Dump was to move the ammunition off the beaches into the Division Dump and from there to supply the regiments.

4. During the operation, the Small Arms Repair Section sent men to the front lines to repair weapons and issue cleaning materials.

5. One watch repairman of the Ordnance Company was taken forward to Bougainville. During the period 28 November, 1943, to 4 January, 1944, this man repaired approximately 125 watches, a service in combat, not offered by any other Marine Division, as far as is known.

6. The Third Service Battalion had the following casualties during the operation:

KILLED

None.

DIED OF WOUNDS

Service and Supply Company:

MAYBERRY, Warren W., PFC, (412730), USMCR 26 November, 1943.

MISSING

None.

WOUNDED

Service and Supply Company:

SEUME, Robert R., PFC, (428231), USMCR (1Nov43), Returned to duty.
WARREN, Oren C., Sgt., (299808), USMC (26Nov43), Returned to duty.
MANSFIELD, James E., Corp., (463705), USMC (3Dec43) Evac. to U.S.

Headquarters Company:

PORTEUS, Donald F., Sgt., (415905), USMCR, (26Nov43), Evac Dest unkwn.

Ordnance Company:

MORROW, Gordon J., Corp., (441330), USMCR, (22Nov43), Returned to duty.

B. THIRD MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION.
I. NARRATIVE

1 November, 1943.

1.a. Major S. W. Purdy and one enlisted man from Headquarters and Service Company, participated in initial landing attached to the Headquarters Staff as Division Motor Transport Officer and assistant to the Division Shore Party Commander.

b. Five officers and sixty-nine men landed from Company "A", attached to the Ninth Marines.

c. Five Officers and sixty-two men from Company "C" participated in initial landing attached to the Third Marines.

2-5 November, 1943.

2.a. The companies functioned with the regiments. Due to the lack of roads there was little operation except along the beach.

b. Captain Bungarner was assigned additional duties as beachmaster of Blue #1 Beach.

6 November, 1943.

3.a. Six officers and one hundred six men from Headquarters and Service Company arrived at Empress Augusta Bay.

b. One officer and nineteen men from Company "B" landed.

c. A shuttle convoy under Lieutenant Brown, composed of men and vehicles from the various companies landed supplies and returned to Guadalcanal.

7 November, 1943.

4.a. A gas dump for division use was set up and maintained throughout the Bougainville Operation.

7-10 November, 1943.

5.a. During the period Captain Harrod and Lieutenant Henry were assigned as beachmasters at Yellow #1 Beach.

b. On or about 9 November, Lieutenant Henry took the first convoy of supplies to the front using tractors and Athey trailers. The convoy went to the front everyday, moving troops and supplies until 1 December. Wounded were evacuated on each return trip.

11 November, 1943.

6.a. One officer and seven men from Company "A", three officers and forty-one men from Company "B", and five men from Company "C", landed at Bougainville.

b. Lieutenant Jackson was assigned as beachmaster, Yellow #1 Beach.

14 November, 1943.

7. Captain Bloch took first truck convoy to the front. These convoys went up daily after this until roads improved to the extent where trucks could be dispatched directly from the various dumps. Wounded were evacuated on the return trips.

15 November, 1943.

8. D-4 advised Battalion Command that all Regimental Transport Companies reverted to battalion control as of this date.

17 November, 1943.

9. Two officers and twenty men from "B" Company, and seventeen men from "C" Company arrived. Second shuttle convoy arrived.

18 November, 1943.

10. Captain Wilson assigned duty as beachmaster on Blue #1 Beach vice Captain Bumgarner, who was evacuated.

20 November, 1943.

11. Motor repair facilities were set up at Piva Village.

28 November, 1943.

12. Third shuttle convoy arrived. Two officers and thirty men landed at Empress Augusta Bay.

30 November, 1943.

13. Marine Gunner Peterson and additional men enlarged repair facilities at Piva Village.

5 December, 1943.

14. A tractor platoon was formed this date under Lieutenant F. M. Thomason, consisting of eighteen T.D.9 tractors, eighteen Athey track-laying trailers and twenty-three men. This platoon carried equipment and supplies from forward dumps to the front lines from this date to 10 January. They bivouaced in the vicinity of the forward dumps and a section of the platoon serviced each regiment.

21 December, 1943.

15. Two officers and twenty-eight men left Bougainville to set up repair facilities and repair rear echelon vehicles on Guadalcanal.

24 December, 1943.

16. On this date three trucks and drivers were ordered to each of the following regiments; Ninth Marines, Twenty-First Marines, and Second Raiders.

28 December, 1943.

17. Seven officers and one hundred forty-two men left for Guadalcanal.

1 January, 1944.

18. Twenty-one men left for Guadalcanal.

5 January, 1944.

19. Three officers and ninety-one men returned to Guadalcanal.

16 January, 1944.

20. Three officers and sixty-two men returned to Guadalcanal.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. In addition to furnishing transportation and motor maintenance to the division, this battalion also furnished working parties in the dumps and for unloading ships during the first week.

2. The mechanics worked under unfavorable circumstances, and with equipment that was of necessity taking considerable punishment, kept better than ninety percent of the cargo trucks in daily operation. In addition to other repair work, the repair section reconditioned all vehicles exchanged with the Americal Division.

3. On 1 November, 1943, two members of Company "C", Third Motor Transport Battalion, while assigned to shore party duty, took cover in an enemy slit trench while work was suspended due to heavy enemy fire from emplacements on Cape Torokina. The First Battalion, Third Marines, was attacking the enemy position. These two men, Corporal George V. Annese and Private William T. Nelson, left the trench and crawled toward the enemy to investigate the source of the fire, and located an enemy pill box, the fire of which was enfilading the beach. They agreed upon a plan of maneuver and attack, crawled to the rear of the pill box, rushed it, and through the rear opening, killed the two remaining enemy, who were firing through the slit to the front.

4. On 7 November, 1943, Sergeant Manning A. Spencer and Corporal Harry W. Bearringer, Company "C", Third Motor Transport Battalion, stalked and killed two enemy snipers, who were harassing our supply lines in the vicinity of the Korokomina River.

5. Third Motor Transport Battalion had the following casualties during the operation:

KILLED

Company "A":

COAD, Richard J., 2dLt. USMCR 1 November, 1943.

DIED OF WOUNDS

Company "C":

GILLIS, Philip F., 2dLt. USMCR 1 January, 1944.

MISSING

None.

WOUNDED.

Company "A":

HARVEY, Ross R., PlSgt. (266002), USMC, (1Nov43) Trans to IMAC
VAUGHT, Russell W., PFC, (323889), USMC, (1Nov43) Trans to IMAC
SUTTON, Harry J., Pvt., (412593), USMCR, (1Nov43) Returned to duty.
THIEL, Harvey V., PhM2/c, 314-25-71, USNR (11Nov43) Evac. to MOB #8.
SUAREZ, Raymond R., PFC, (444260), USMCR, (26Nov43) Evac dest unknown.

Company "B":

KLOCK, Lipe, PFC (394390), USMC, (21Nov43) Returned to duty.

Company "C":

THOMPSON, Samuel R., Corp., (356499), USMC, (11Nov43) Returned to duty.

Headquarters & Service Company:

MARTIN, Luther B., Corp., (576060), USMCR, (6Nov43) Returned to duty.

C. THIRD AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION.
I. NARRATIVE.

1 November, 1943 - 15 January, 1944.

1. Amphibian tractors participated in this operation in varying numbers as anticipated and in accordance with plans and availability of cargo space for their delivery to the theater of operations. Thirty-nine amphibian tractors arrived at Augusta Bay on "D" Day, and a total of one hundred twenty-four arrived by "D" Day, plus fifteen days.

2. The amphibian tractors were assigned and carried out the following appropriate tasks during the operations:

- a. Delivered initial equipment and supplies directly from the ship to beaches and to inland positions and dumps.
- b. Cleared the beach for unloading boats of vegetation on water's edge and just above high tide line, when vegetation hindered or prevented beaching the boats or movement of material.
- c. Transported rations and ammunition to front line troops.
- d. Evacuated dead and wounded from front line positions on return trip to the beach, hospital or to ship. This operation demonstrated a practical use of amphibian tractors when no other means of transportation could be used without road building.
- e. Especially during the first days of the operation, amphibian tractors were dispersed at night along beachfronts and crews stood gun watches in beach defense sectors.
- f. Towed out stalled vehicles, aided grounded boats, and performed general utility work on the beach.
- g. Delivered equipment and supplies over terrain that could not be traversed by other vehicles.
- h. Broke trails for supply routes, roads, and access to aid stations to remove wounded.
- i. Cleared beaches and moved supplies and material to main dumps and dispersed dumps.

j. Blazed trails for communications to forward echelons. These were trails that were blazed specifically for communication units. However, after amphibian tractors have blazed a trail to the front, they are followed by CP men of numerous units, who

[REDACTED]

string wire on both sides of the two track ruts. This makes it impossible for vehicles to pass each other quickly in meeting or to make detours when a portion of trail becomes bad or impassable. Tractor operators and crews exerted time and care to prevent communications from being disrupted by broken lines. Many CP men learned that the additional trouble required at first to string wire away from the tracks or at least only on one side of the tracks saved a great deal of subsequent work.

k. Transported vehicles which included jeeps and trailers.

l. Rescued a great many personnel from undertow in addition to picking up one pilot.

m. Reconnoitered with and furnished transportation for advance patrols.

n. Furnished transportation for field commanders and inspecting parties.

3. Amphibian tractors arrived in the Cherry Blossom area in stages as follows: 29 on D-day, 28 on D-plus 4, 10 on D-plus 5, 17 on D-plus 10, 18 on D-plus 11, and 18 on D-plus 16, which completed the 124 amphibians carried into this area.

4. Amphibian tractors operated 3832 tractor days, and transported an estimated 22, 992 tons of supplies and materials.

5. The major type of cargo transported by amphibian tractors, listed in order of predominance, was as follows: rations, ammunition, weapons, organization gear including military impediment, medical supplies, casualties, water, barbed wire and engineer equipment; packs, personnel, gasoline, and vehicles consisting of jeeps and trailers.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS.

1. The battalion was able to cope with the tractor maintenance problem with great difficulty. This was due to the great need for tractors and failure of previous conducted breakdown tests. The need for amphibian tractors was really greater than the number of tractors available. Consequently, many tractors constantly operated, whereas, under more suitable conditions, these tractors would have been available at times for minor maintenance. There was an excessive loss of tractors because of wearing out of channel and tracks prior to expectation due to the fact that practically all operation was on land with very heavy wear through cutting action of mud and sand. From previous tests, replacements of parts had been figured on basis of a certain percentage of water operation. The moving of camp sites and the lack of suitable parking areas for amphibian tractors offered additional hindrances to good maintenance. In addition, some tractors were completely lost in the earlier stages because the battalion lacked necessary heavy equipment for salvaging these tractors from water and surf.

2. Amphibian tractors were frequently commandeered by officers under the guise of an emergency errand that turned out to be routine runs of low priority and thereby diverted tractors from original mission of carrying out orders of D-4.

3. This battalion operated a battalion aid station in addition to each company operating a sick bay and aid station. The Third Amphibian Tractor Battalion had the following casualties during the operation:

KILLED.

Company "A":

ASBY, Aubrey, Corp., (373766), USMCR, (11Nov43)
DAILEY, Harold W., PFC, (295827), USMC, (11Nov43).
DAVIS, Leon E., Pvt., (455585), USMCR, (11Nov43)
METCALFE, Henry B., PlSgt., (277009), USMC, (11Nov43)
PRIETO, Isabel V., PFC, (399809), USMC, (11Nov43)

DIED OF WOUNDS

Company "A":

GOBEYN, Albert R., PFC., (455647), USMCR, (12Nov43)
TOWNSEND, Robert L., Corp., (390342), USMC, (12Nov43)
ENGLISH, Evan F., Corp., (400294), USMC, (11Nov43.)

MISSING

MC DEVITT, Robert X., PFC, (345045), USMC, (Since 11Nov43) "A"Co.

WOUNDED

Company "A":

GARRATY, Raymond F., 1stLt., (USMCR) (11Nov43) Returned to duty.
HAGEN, John W., PFC, (430436), USMC, (11Nov43) Evac, dest unknown.
KERIN, Thomas D., PFC, (430805), USMCR, (11Nov43) Returned to duty.
SANDERS, Elton A., Corp., (348185), USMC, (11Nov43) Evac, dest unknown.
MC DONOUGH, Gerald F., PFC, (424989), USMCR, (11Nov43) Evac, dest unknown.
COLLINS, James S., PFC., (337109), USMC, (11Nov43) Returned to duty.
GRAY, Clarence H., Jr., Pvt., (471927), USMCR, (11Nov43) Returned to duty.
GORDON, Frank R., Jr., PFC., (283700), USMC, (11Nov43) Returned to duty.
DOUGLAS, Leon S., Pvt., (435293), USMCR, (11Nov43) Evac, dest unknown.
GILMORE, Kenneth, PFC, (455522), USMCR, (11Nov43) " " "
WOFFORD, Ivon D., GySgt., (266353), USMC, (11Nov43), Returned to duty.
SANDERS, Vance., Pvt., (402747), USMC, (11Nov43) Evac, dest unknown.
BECHTOLD, Harlan L.R., Corp., (399818), USMC, (11Nov43), Returned to d.

WOUNDED

Company "C":

MOORE, Floyd E., 1stLt., USMC, (13Nov43) Returned to duty.
HEOS, John T., Sgt., (264213), USMC, (25Nov43) Returned to duty.
LEWIN, Donald, Pvt., (524617), USMCR, (29Nov43), Returned to duty.

5. First Lieutenant Hugh H. Bownes, Company "A", Third Amphibian Tractor Battalion, on 2 January, 1944, was awarded the Silver Star medal for conspicuous gallantry while serving as a member of a scouting patrol through enemy territory.

D. THIRD MEDICAL BATTALION.

I. NARRATIVE.

1 November, 1943 - 5 January, 1944.

1. Headquarters and Service Company: The Battalion Commander, the Adjutant, the Quartermaster, and clerical staff normally attached to the Division Hospital (of which the Battalion Commander is in command by Division Order) were embarked on the

CLYMER, with the Second Raider Battalion. Before embarkation the Battalion Commander tried to have this changed, but without avail, and Headquarters and Service Company went ashore with the Raiders on Beach Green #2, separated from their destination by 5,000 yards of fire-swept beach.

2.a. Company "A", attached initially to the Ninth Marines, landed on Beach Red #1, about 11:00, November 1, 1943. It was assigned to shore parties until the first patients were admitted on November 5, "A" Company hospital was fully established on November 6. On November 29, this hospital was moved across the Piva River to a site in the vicinity of the Ninth Marines' command post, where it remained until departure from the area on December 25, 1943. This company took care of the following:

Wounded in Action	278
Non-battle (sick, etc.)	1024

b. It performed a total of 178 operations.

c. It should be noted that this company, located as it was near the airfield, was subjected to daily bombing or shelling for over three weeks. Tentage was badly damaged; on one occasion a shell landed sufficiently close to bury a patient alive. The calmness and courage of the personnel of this company is highly commendable.

3.a. Company "B", attached initially to the Twenty-First Marines, landed on the morning of November 11, 1943, near Cape Torokina. It was assigned to shore parties until the afternoon of November 13, 1943, when it moved to the vicinity of the Twenty-First Regiment's command post. It halted here for the night, took care of a few patients, and established its hospital permanently a few hundred yards away on November 14, 1943. It remained in this location until it left the area on January 5, 1944. This company took care of the following patients:

Wounded in Action	332
Non-battle (sick, etc.)	941

b. It performed a total of 325 operations.

c. This company also behaved well under bombing and mortar fire.

4.a. Company "C", attached initially to the Third Marines, landed on Beach Blue #3, November 1, 1943. Its collecting sections landed on Beaches Blue #1 and #2. Because of the tactical situation, it was relieved at once of duties with shore parties, with the result that it was able to handle nineteen wounded inside of the first hour, and was enabled to perform major surgical operations the same day. Starting on November 18, the company moved forward to a point further inland near the Piva River. This movement was skillfully carried out by echelons, patients being cared for continuously at both points; and the hospital was well established on its new site on November 21, 1943:

b. This company took care of the following:

Wounded in Action	422
Non-battle (sick, etc.)	1102

6. The number of operations performed totaled 134.

d. Here, again, the work of the hospital was carried on under frequent bombing and mortar attacks.

5.a. Company "D" remained at Bevy and operated the Division Hospital, rear area.

6.a. Company "E" landed on Beach Red #1 on the morning of November 1, 1943, and performed with shore parties for three days.

The original site selected having proved too swampy, they finally set up as the Division Hospital at Beach Yellow #2, on November 7, 1943. On that date they were subjected to attack by enemy rifle fire, but the surgeons continued to operate until the attackers were driven off, after five hours, by a detachment from the Twenty-First Marines. During this engagement (the hospital was protected by a mixed detachment of corpsmen, Marine cooks, messmen, and chauffeurs, under command of First Lieutenant Leo F. Halotek, USMCR, Third Medical Battalion Quartermaster.) Chief Pharmacist's Mate Lovelace was wounded in the shoulder. On November 17, 1943, the company moved to Beach Yellow #1, and moved again to the area vacated by Division Command Post on November 25, 1943. It remained there until leaving the area on December 15, 1943.

b. The Division Hospital (Company "E") took care of the following patients:

Wounded in Action	336
Non-battle casualties	995

c. The hospital surgeons operated on 316 patients, and evacuated 831.

d. In addition to the direct attack by enemy forces already mentioned, the Division Hospital, situated near the beach, was subjected daily for over three weeks, to bombing attacks and twice to artillery fire.

7. Recapitulation:

CO	W.I.A.	SICK	OPERATIONS
A	278	1024	178
B	332	941	325
C	422	1102	134
E	336	995	316
Totals	1368	4062	953

II. GENERAL COMMENTS.

1. The Commander, Third Medical Battalion, criticized the landing teams for utilizing medical personnel for shore party labor, that is, as stevedores, and also for impressing medical personnel placed on guard over medical property, for same purpose. The solution of this problem must necessarily be a compromise and rests in better discipline and organization of battalion shore parties. Guarding supplies on the beach strip and in dumps, is relatively simple, but great opportunity for theft occurs in transit between the two, particularly in the ungle and because of necessary dispersion. A substantial increase in military police in shore party organization and harsh disciplinary measures for offenders, is necessary. Regarding unloading of boats and transport of supplies to dumps, this is an all-hands task, and if work is light or nil in shore party aid and evacuation stations, hospital personnel may expect orders to assist in handling cargo. The tactical situation largely governs the time medical personnel should be released from shore party duty to organizational functions.

2. Medical supplies, however, were adequate during the operation due in a large measure, to the outstanding performance of duty of Lieutenant Commander D. H. McNamara, in charge of Division Medical Supply Depot at BEVY.

In this respect, it is felt that increased use of parachute drops could have been authorized by higher authority, not because the situation was critical, but for experience and training.

3. The Commanding Officer, Third Medical Battalion, highly commended the Amphibian Tractor Battalion for outstanding performance of duty and cooperation in evacuation of wounded and delivery of Medical supplies to forward stations; without this aid, the situation would have been critical.

4. The Third Medical Battalion had the following casualties during the operation:

KILLED

None.

DIED OF WOUNDS

Company "B":

HEWITT, William R., PhM3/c., 564-00-52, (USNR) (12Dec43.)

MISSING

None.

WOUNDED

Company "C":

MATHERS, Ralph W., Jr., PhM2/c., 6616-51-69, (USNR) (22Nov43)
Returned to d.

MC COY, Kenneth M., PhM2/c., 628-54-35, (USNR) (24Nov43)
Returned to duty.

RALSTON, Duford A., PhM3/c., 677-02-01, (USNR) (24Nov43)
Returned to duty.

Company "D":

LOVELACE, Darrel M., ChPhM., 356-17-13, (USN) (8Nov43) Evac dest unkwn

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In future operations, it is recommended that the majority of the Service Battalion be landed in the Theater of operations, preferably on D plus 5 days, and at the very latest on D plus 10 days. The reasons for this are as detailed below:

a. Headquarters Company - Operating personnel of Headquarters Company should be available for Division Quartermaster supply functions, in full strength, as soon as Division assumes responsibility of supply.

b. (1) Ordnance Company - Personnel of ammunition sections must be ready momentarily to take over, establish dumps, receive and distribute ammunition under division control.

SECRET

(2) Repair and maintenance personnel must be on the ground early to maintain and salvage ordnance equipment, else much of it quickly deteriorates beyond a state of economical repair.

c. (1) Service and Supply Company - Personnel of the Service and Supply and Commissary Platoons should be available, in full strength, to the Division Quartermaster at once, when Division takes over operation of dumps. This personnel is essential for placing supplies in dumps from beaches and distribution of supplies by Division Quartermaster under Division directives.

(2) Bakery platoon with equipment should be set up and operating by D plus 10 days. The ration gets very monotonous after ten days with dry biscuit.

(3) Five men of Salvage Platoon should follow each battalion on its initial landing; this to be familiar with the routes followed and areas occupied by advancing troops so as to quickly facilitate recovery of supplies and equipment when Salvage Platoon begins operation. About ninety men are necessary for efficient salvage. They should be lightly equipped with repair facilities and have at least two trucks, 2½-ton, available for salvage gear. Salvage Platoon should land not later than D plus 10 days, otherwise, salvaged supplies and equipment is deteriorated, usually, beyond the state of being repaired, cleaned, and re-used. This, especially applies to clothing and equipment containing fabrics or leather. If it is intended that Salvage Platoon salvage more than light ordnance, general supplies, and individual and other equipment, it should be furnished at an early date with adequate mechanical means for salvaging heavy equipment.

2. (a) It is recommended that Service and Supply Company be reorganized for more efficient service and flexibility, as follows:

- (1) Service and Supply Platoon
- (2) Bakery Platoon
- (3) Chemical Platoon
- (4) Commissary Platoon
- (5) Graves Registration Platoon
- (6) Post Exchange Platoon
- (7) Salvage Platoon

The platoons should then be organized into four sections, each, which can readily be detached for duty with line units, as occasion demands.

(b). At present, Service and Supply Company is organized into four platoons, each composed of the seven functional sections.

(c). The above recommended organization is in accord with actual practice of this Division in the field. As soon as practicable after a situation is stabilized, the various sections are grouped into one unit for efficient functioning. Commissary Sections go to Division Commissary; Bakery Sections to Division Bakery, Salvage Sections to Division Salvage, etc. Officers with special qualifications are then assigned to command the units or sections so combined, according to function. This, of course, is not provided for in present Table of Organization, wherein a platoon commander is assumed to be a "jack of all trades", commanding the seven diversified sections.

3. It is further recommended that service sections be utilized to the fullest extent in shore party organization. By employing these sections in the initial landing it is believed that supplies will be more efficiently handled and that pilferage may be reduced. This trained personnel will be on the ground, familiar with the situation and ready to function during and immediately after the transition from shore party to Division control.

4. The amphibian tractor is a highly specialized type of equipment and the commander should be consulted frequently in planning its employment throughout the various phases of an operation.

5. a. It is recommended that not over twenty-five percent of the cargo trucks be landed on D-day, either in swampy terrain or over fringing coral reef, but that tractors and trailers of maximum number that can be carried, be landed on D-day.

b. At least two greasing trailers per combat team should be landed on D-day.

c. The La Tourneau Cranes, one for Motor Transport Battalion, and one for Amphibian Tractor Battalion, should be landed on D-day. These are invaluable for salvaging trucks, tractors and boats.

d. Watson Galinot tracks for at least fifty percent of the 2½-ton cargo and dump trucks should be provided for use in lieu of chains.

6.a. TBA provides for two medium tractors in Motor Transport Battalion. These were not provided for the BOUGAINVILLE operation. These are the only vehicles of this type authorized for Service Troops, and the necessity for them was felt in every phase of the operation. They should be equipped with blades. They are needed to:

- (1) Haul vehicles ashore.
- (2) Open up routes to dumps.
- (3) Clear dump sites.
- (4) Rescue bogged-down vehicles.
- (5) Excavate dugouts for wounded, for operating rooms, for medical supplies.
- (6) Excavate emplacements for machine shop and repair shop trailers, and other expensive and vital equipment.
- (7) Clear trails from dumps to forward units.
- (8) Assist TD 9 tractors and trailers over rough routes to forward areas.
- (9) Make emergency repairs to roads.
- (10) Clear vehicle parking areas.
- (11) Salvage heavy equipment.
- (12) Assist in unloading cargo in succeeding echelons.

b. It was found that in the initial phases of landing that engineers' equipment was available for shore party work, but immediately after landing this equipment was put on priority work of road and air strip building and was no longer available to Service Troops.

c. Service Troops should have a minimum of four medium tractors (TD 14) with blades. They are needed in coral surfaced islands as well as in swampy areas in order to excavate trenches to provide hasty protection for troops, ammunition, supplies, fuel, vital equipment and wounded.

7.(a) It is recommended that Division Hospital be not separated from equipment and landed together in a central location with consideration given to accessibility and security, that is, removed from CP's, artillery positions or other facilities which might draw aerial or surface bombardment.

(b) It is recommended that medical personnel be armed with the .45 caliber automatic pistol. It is apparent that they cannot safeguard, while working, arms other than those worn on their person.

W. D. Bassett.

SERVICE TROOPS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD.

Enclosure (A) to CO, ServTrs report of operation, Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd 27 January, 1944.

Salvaged Ordnance gear turned over to Division Ordnance
at Bougainville:

- 4 Machine guns, cal. .50, air cooled, complete
- 23 Machine guns, cal. .30, air cooled, complete
- 1 Mortar, 81mm, complete
- 2 Mortar, 60mm, complete
- 2 Rifles, BAR, cal. .30.
- 162 Rifles, M1, cal. .30.
- 20 Rifles, '03, cal. .30.
- 17 Rifles, Carbine, cal. .30.
- 14 Reising guns, cal. .45.
- 19 Tripods, machine gun, cal. .50, air cooled.
- 20 Tripods, machine gun, cal. .30, air cooled.
- 129 Barrels, machine gun, cal. .30, air cooled.
- 173 Barrels, machine gun, cal. .30, air cooled.
- 65 Barrels, machine gun, cal. .30, water cooled.
- 18 Receivers, machine gun, cal. .50, complete.
- 2 Bipods, Johnson machine gun, cal. .30.
- 1 Bipod, 60mm, mortar.
- 9 Mounts, Higgins boat, machine gun
- 16 Mounts, truck, machine gun
- 4 Mounts, AA, .50 cal. machine gun rack.
- 1 Mount, observation scope
- 8 Barrel supports, machine gun, cal. .50
- 7 Barrel extensions, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 6 Elevating mechanisms, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 2 Cradles, machine gun, water cooled, cal. .30.
- 5 Drums, ammunition, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 11 Drums, ammunition, Lewis machine gun, cal. .30.
- 2 Clips, Johnson machine gun, cal. .30.
- 559 Clips, Reising, cal. .45.
- 223 Clips, BAR
- 213 Clips, carbine
- 222 Carriers, clips, Reising
- 11 Carriers, clips, BAR
- 4 Belts, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 2 Bolts, machine gun, cal. .30.
- 26 Slings, rifle, M1.
- 10 Slings, carbine
- 6 Slings, ammunition boxes
- 1 Water cooling system, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 5 Covers, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 8 Rods, cleaning, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 10 Driving, springs, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 1 Oil buffer body, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 2 Back plate groups, machine gun, cal. .50.
- 4 Link filling machines, machine gun, cal. .30.
- 5 Belt filling machines, machine gun, cal. .30.
- 7 Parts and kits, spare, machine gun, cal. .30.
- 4 Tools, rifle, M1
- 4 Cases, oil and thong, M1.
- 3 Operating springs, M1
- 570 Cleaner, bore, cans
- 101 Bayonets
- 81 Scabbards, bayonet

Enclosure (A) to CO, ServTrs report of operation, Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd 27 January, 1944. (Cont'd.)

Salvaged Ordnance gear turned over to Division Ordnance
at Bougainville:

- 9 Launchers, anti-tank grenade
- 1 Launcher, VB, rifle grenade
- 2 Mounts, 20mm, AA gun
- 2 Bipods, BAR.

Salvaged ammunition turned over to ammunition dump
at Bougainville:

- 30 rounds, 81mm mortar ammunition.
- 65 rounds, 60mm mortar ammunition.
- 267 rounds, 37mm anti-tank gun ammunition.
- 52 rounds, 90mm AA Gun ammunition.
- 24 Grenades, anti-tank, rifle.
- 67 Grenades, hand.
- 27,000 rounds, cal. .50 machine gun ammunition.
- 43,000 rounds, cal. .30 machine gun ammunition.
- 1,700 rounds, cal. .45 ammunition.
- 12 rounds, 105 ammunition.

Salvaged amphibian tractors and parts thereof,
accounting of:

- 23 Tractors, amphibian
- 56 Tracks, f/amphibian tractors

NOTE: 22 Tractors, amphibian, and 54 tracks, f/amphibian
tractors were placed in the Division Ordnance
Company area at Bougainville.

1 tractor, amphibian and 2 tracks f/amphibian
tractor, complete, was turned over to the
Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Guadalcanal.

1 Trailer, bath and sterilization, complete
salvaged, and is now in the Salvage Section area.

1 Jeep, complete, salvaged, and turned over to the
Division Motor Transport Battalion at Bougainville.

Items salvaged at Bougainville by the Salvage Section,
Third Service Battalion, Service Troops, Third Marine Division:

<u>ITEMS:</u>	<u>SALVAGED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
Anchors, steel	15	0	15
Axes, w/handles	16	2	14
Axes, brush, w/handles	21	21	0
BATTERIES, lantern	75	0	75
Batteries, jeep, radio	61	0	61
Bags, clothing	1	0	1
Bags, lyster	2	1	1
Bags, mail	1	0	1
Bags, officer, bedroll	3	0	3
Bags, sand, burlap	1525	1525	0
Basins, collapsible	439	0	439

Enclosure (A) to CO, ServTrs report of operation, Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd 27 January, 1944, (Cont'd).

Items salvaged at Bougainville by the Salvage Section,
Third Service Battalion, Service Troops, Third Marine Division:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>SALVAGED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
BELTS, cartridge	534	302	232
Belts, life preserver	75	0	75
Belts, pistol	2	2	0
Blankets, wool, green	19	19	0
Block and tackle	2	2	0
Boats, rubber	18	0	18
Brick, fire, case	1	1	0
Buckets, collapsible	588	0	588
Candles, cases	3	0	3
Cans, expeditionary, 5 gal.	1918	168	23
Cans, GI, large	3	3	0
Cans, meat	83	83	0
Cans, sand soap	48	0	48
Canteens	508	407	101
Carriers, canteen	416	242	174
Carriers, dispatch	118	0	118
Carriers, packet, first aid	277	275	2
Carriers, pack, f/corpsman	9	0	9
Carriers, pick, entrenching	95	73	22
Carriers, shovel, entrenching	126	84	42
Carriers, wire cutters	12	0	12
Chests, fire, unit, empty	3	0	3
Cleavers, meat	2	0	2
Clips, steel mat, cases	4	4	0
Coats, camouflage	101	46	55
Coats, utility	591	583	8
Compressor, air, f/truck	1	1	0
Containers, cargo, f/parachute	5	5	0
Containers, food	15	14	1
Cord, primer, feet	20	0	20
Cots, field	81	21	60
Covers, camouflage, f/steel helmet	88	0	88
Covers, individual	30	0	30
Covers, meat can	64	64	0
Cups, canteen	221	221	0
Cutters, bolt	1	1	0
Cutters, wire, entrenching	8	0	8
Digger, post hole, screw type	1	1	0
Equipment, aviation signal, cases	3	3	0
Equipment, water purification, case	1	1	0
Extinguisher, fire, large, empty	12	0	12
Extinguisher, fire, small, empty	20	0	20
Flares, electric	85	0	85
Garlands, camouflage, rolls	68	0	68
Globes, lantern, Oil	67	0	67
Gloves, leather, pairs	8	0	8
Guard, radiator, Recon.	1	0	1
Handles, pick, large	41	41	0
Haversack	504	390	114
Helmet, steel, M1	635	294	341
Hoist, block and chain	4	4	0
Hook cant	1	1	0
Inflators, rubber, boat, Co2	14	0	14
Jacks, hydraulic	2	0	2

Enclosure (A) to CO, ServTrs report of operation, Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd 27 January, 1944, (Cont'd.)

Items salvaged at Bougainville by the Salvage Section,
Third Service Battalion, Service Troops, Third Marine Division:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>SALVAGED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
Knapsacks	588	353	235
Knife, corpsman	29	6	23
Lanterns, Coleman, small	5	0	5
Lanterns, oil, w/o globes	78	8	70
Leggings, prs.	245	13	232
Lines, 3/4", feet	3,000	3,000	0
Liners, helmet	105	95	10
Litters, canvas	37	0	37
Litters, metal basket type	21	0	21
Machette	52	16	36
Mallets, wooden, small	8	4	4
mats, floating, f/rubber boat	16	0	16
Mills, coffee	9	2	7
Motor, Evinrude, outboard	1	0	1
Motor, jeep	1	0	1
Motor, recon.	1	-	1
Mounts, machine gun, f/boat	10	0	10
Mounts, motor, outboard, metal	8	0	8
Mounts, motor, outboard, wood	10	0	10
Nets, camouflage, gun emplacement	13	0	13
Nets, mosquito, cot	256	61	195
Nets, mosquito, head	215	35	180
Ointment, protective, tubes, cases	2	2	0
Packets, first aid	202	159	43
Packs, Army, old type	5	0	5
Packs, radio	4	0	4
Packs, MC, old type	39	0	39
Paddles, boat	480	0	480
Paint, camouflage, gals.	18	0	18
Paint, protective, clothing, gals	6	0	6
Pans, baking	5	5	0
Parts, tractor, amphibian, case	1	1	0
Pegs, shelter-half	300	0	300
Pegs, tent, large, cases	6	3	3
Picks, entrenching, w/handles	120	95	25
Picks, pioneer, large	50	43	7
Poles, shelter-half	2	0	2
Poles, upright	256	250	6
Ponchos, rubberized cloth	107	63	44
Pots, stock and lids	10	10	0
Pads, protector	2	0	2
Pulley, chain	2	2	0
Pump, decontaminating	1	0	1
Pump, gas, hand	1	1	0
Pumps, hand inflation, boat	12	0	12
Racks, pan, baking	11	11	0
Radiator, Recon.	1	0	1
Ranges, field, cabinet	32	12	20
Repellent, mosquito, cases	20	20	0
Respirators, dust	35	0	35
Rims, 900 X 16	6	0	6
Rims, 800 X 25 X 20	6	0	6
Rims, 700 X 20	2	0	2
Saw, crosscut	1	1	0
scabbard, machette	7	0	7

Enclosure (A) to CO, ServTps Report of operation, Nov - Dec, 1943,
 dtd 27 January, 1944. (Cont'd.)

Items salvaged at Bougainville by the Salvage Section
 Third Service Battalion, Service Troops, Third Marine Division:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>SALVAGED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
Shelter halves	149	46	103
Shirts, ss	123	211	2
Shovels, entrenching	140	97	43
Shovels, R.P.S.H.	62	23	39
Soda ash, case	1	1	0
Soap, salt water, case	6	0	6
Tanks, gas, 6X6	2	0	2
Tanks, gas, auxiliary, f/planes	2	0	2
Tanks, gas, Recon.	4	0	4
Tanks, pressure, fire units	7	1	6
Telephone, field	2	2	0
Tents, fly	9	9	0
Tents, pyramidal	17	15	2
Tents, storage	23	23	0
Tires, 700X20	3	0	3
Tires, 600X16	8	8	0
Tires, 900 X 16	5	0	5
Tires, 825X20	7	0	7
Tongs, log	3	3	0
Trousers, camouflage	85	46	39
Trousers, ss	227	208	19
Trousers, utility	406	406	0
Tubes, acetylene, empty	2	0	2
Tubes, tire	60	0	60
Tubes, oxygen, empty	13	0	13
Units, fire	9	4	5
Wheels and tire, complete, f/jeep	8	0	8
Wire, barbed, rolls	9	9	0
Wire, communication, reels	43	39	4
Wire, galvanized, #9, lbs.	600	600	0

The following salvaged items were turned over to the
 Salvage Platoon, Fourth Base Depot, Russell Islands:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SALVAGED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>TO 4TH B.DEPOT</u>
Shoes, prs.	1294	15	1279
Mask, gas, Navy type	2870	0	2870
Mask, gas, Army Type	409	0	409
Nets, cargo	4	0	4

Enclosure (B) to CO, ServTrs report of operations, Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd. 27 January, 1944.

ORDNANCE COMPANY,
THIRD SERVICE BATTALION,
SERVICE TROOPS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FMF.,
IN THE FIELD.

12 January, 1944.

Weapons salvaged and repaired on Bougainville -
(28 Nov 43 to 4 Jan 44.)

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>	<u>RE-ISSUED</u>
Rifle, Cal. . 30, M1	643	632	256
Rifle, Cal. .30, M1903	26	26	16
Rifle, Cal. .30, M1, carbine	38	38	27
Bayonets, M1905	55	55	55
Guns, Reising, cal. .45	47	47	47
B.A.R., cal. .30	17	17	13
B.M.G., cal. .30, M1917	3	3	3
B.M.G., cal. .30, M1919A4	19	19	19
Mortar, 60mm	3	3	2

(Artillery)

1 Gun, 37mm AT, M3A1 Repaired and issued
Bent axle and wheel bent.

2 Half-track S. P. 75mm
Clutch throw-out bearings replaced.

3 75mm Pack Howitzers - 2 repaired
Damaged by artillery fire of the enemy.

Enclosure (C) to CO, ServTrs report of operations Nov - Dec, 1943,
dtd 17 January, 1944.

ORDNANCE COMPANY,
THIRD SERVICE BATTALION,
SERVICE TROOPS, THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FMF.,
IN THE FIELD.

12 January, 1944.

Following items serviced and checked - Exchanged with the
Americal Division:

14	Gun, 37mm, AT M3A1, w/acc
8	Carriage, motor, 75mm Gun, AT, w/acc
87	Gun, BMG, cal. .50, HB M2, w/tripod, elev.mech, and pintle
2	Gun, GMG, cal. .30, M1919-A4, w/tripod, pintle, and elev m.
24	Mortar, 60mm, w/bipod, base plate, and M4 sights.
10	Mortar, 81mm, w/bipod, base plate, and M4 sights.

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HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION SPECIAL TROOPS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

~~SECRET~~

25 January, 1944,

From: CO.
To: CG, 3d MarDiv, FMF.
Subject: Report on CHERRY BLOSSOM Operation.
Reference: (a) CG Ltr ALB/crw, dated January 4, 1944.
Enclosure: (A) Overlay of Tokokina Area, Scale 1:20,000.

SECTION I, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

I. Headquarters Company. (a) Headquarters Company landed in the second wave. Enlisted personnel of the Staff Sections went ashore with respective sections. All personnel other than the later of five (5) men that aided in the setting up of the Division CP, formed a beach working party from "D" day to "D" plus 6. Headquarters Company assisted in establishing Division CP security. Commanding General's galley operated on "D" plus 5 days, Headquarters Company galley operated on "D" plus 5 days. Hot coffee was available on "D" plus 3 days. Prior to a galley functioning, K rations were used. On "D" plus 7 Headquarters Company displaced to a new Division CP as shown in enclosure (A). Pyramidal tents were erected at this new location. Three galley's (namely; CG's, Staff Officers and enlisted personnel's) set up and functioned from 7 November on. Security established and regular routines of Headquarters Company performed. "D" plus 17 (seventeen) days rear echelon of the Company arrived. One officer and ten men set up temporary CP 24 November as shown in enclosure (A). Headquarters Company moved to its fourth Division CP 26 November as shown in enclosure (A). A more permanent CP was established during this period. Personnel assisted in Division CP security and regular routine was established. Two galleys including Commanding Generals and combined Staff Officers and enlisted personnel operated. A working party consisting of one officer and fifteen (15) men served as an ammunition carrying detail for one day. From 8 December to 15 December eleven men were furnished as working party in the vicinity of the front lines. 15 December advanced echelon embarked to return to Division rear base. 28 December at 1600 Company CP closed; remaining personnel of Headquarters Company except nine officers and twelve men embarked aboard ship to return to rear base.

2. Military Police Company. (a) Initial phase ("D" day to "D" plus 10).

(1) This company was attached to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, during the initial landing. For landing purposes this company was divided into three groups; reconnaissance detail, rear detail, and shore party working detail.

(2) The Third Platoon, comprising one (1) officer and twenty-five (25) men, disembarked at "H" plus one, landing on Beach Yellow Two. See Enclosure (A). This platoon provided security for the reconnaissance party during the selection of the division CP, then assisted in setting up the CP installations and performed local CP security. The rear detail consisting of the CO, MP Co, and nine (9) men landed at "H" plus three (3), with the division commander and his party, escorted them to the division CP, then joined the Third Platoon in local security duty. The remainder of the company comprising two (2) officers and forty-four (44) men remained with 3d Battalion, 9th Marines until "D" plus 3, as a shore party working detail. Upon rejoining the company, this detail was sent as an advance element to make preparation for the opening of a new division CP and to provide local security for same. On "D" plus six (6) the remainder of the company closed out the last elements of the old CP and moved to the new CP.

(b) Second phase ("D" plus 10 to "D" plus 59)

(1) During this phase traffic control was established as the road net developed, both along the beach and the PIVA Trail. Later when the road net was further expanded, traffic control points were established on the beach, NUMA NUMA Trail, EAST - WEST Trail, and later on the Corps Road.

(2) On "D" plus twenty-one (21) the first platoon of the company was sent forward to help establish an intermediate Division CP as shown on enclosure (A), on "D" plus twenty-seven (27), the Company Headquarters, 2d platoon and 3d platoon moved to the fourth site of the division CP.

(3) During this phase, ten prisoners of war were confined in the Division Stockade, prior to transfer to First Marine Amphibious Corps.

(4) This company furnished a permanent fifteen man working party for handling supplies in the forward area throughout the period from Dec 8, until Dec 27, 1943; a purely Service Troops mission.

(5) All Military Police duties were turned over to the Military Police Company, Americal Division, on the morning of 28 December, 1943.

(6) The MP Company embarked aboard the U.S.S. President Adams at 1000 on 28 December, 1943 arriving Guadalcanal, 30 December 1943.

(c) Comments.

(1) The nature of the operation, influenced as it was by the local terrain, did not permit the military police to perform fully part of the mission for which it is organized, until the road net developed with its normal traffic problems. However, it is believed that this unit was not always employed to the best advantage under the conditions as they existed. For example there was lack of sufficient correlation between the MP Co. and such sections as D-3 and D-4, and such activities as the Div QM and the engineers. As a result there was some avoidable confusion that arose through the giving of incorrect information by MP's concerning the direction and location of CPs, dump locations, and projects under development.

(2) Care should be observed in future operations that the primary duties such as furnishing guides, maintaining order in the beach areas, rounding up stragglers and guarding dumps, are not ignored.

3.

Signal Company. (a) Planning and preparation.

The signal Company, with its 383 Officers and men, was divided into five groups as follows:

GROUP	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	DAY OF ARRIVAL AT BOUGAINVILLE
"A"	12	183	D-day
"B"	5	110	D plus 5 days
"C"	1	20	D plus 15 days
"D"	1	20	(To be left at Guadalcanal)
"E"	1	30	(To be left at Guadalcanal)

Group "A" was to install, operate, and maintain the initial communication system. The function of group "B" was to participate in the extension and expansion of the initial system. Additional supplies and replacements were to be brought up by group "C". Groups "D" & "E" composed the rear echelon which was to remain on Guadalcanal, group "D" sending supplies forward to Bougainville as needed, and group "E" operating the communication system for the Division Administrative Group.

(b) Operations.

(1) Initial phase, 1 November 1943 thru 6 November 1943.

During the landing phase, contact with other transports was maintained by using a TBY on the Navy TBS net. This proved to function satisfactorily. Upon landing, the re-

giments came up on the division command net and this net continued to operate satisfactorily throughout the entire operation. When the division command post was established ashore, the command net continued to carry most of the traffic load, though runners proved very valuable. Due to faulty loading aboard ship telephone equipment did not reach shore until the third day. This caused an almost complete lack of wire communications during this period. During the first two days of operation there was no radio contact with IMAC, but traffic was relayed through Radio Koli Point on Guadalcanal.

On the third day, telephone communication was established through there was difficulty in finding the regimental lines which were to have been dropped on the beach. From this point on, the wire system carried most of the communication burden. Radio contact with IMAC was also established at this time and the net continued to function for the duration of the operation.

(2) Second phase, 2d CP 7Nov thru 26Nov.

To execute the forward displacement of the CP, an advance echelon was sent forward to the proposed sight of the new location. A temporary set up was made by using a BD 72 switchboard and connecting it to the rear installation by means of two trunk lines. The following day the movement was completed. Two TC-4 switchboards were installed, the regimental trunks were connected, and the various radio stations were set up. The rear switching central was kept in operation for a period of six days and was then taken over by Corps troops.

(3) Third phase, 3d CP 27Nov thru 28Dec.

A ten pair cable was pushed forward towards the new CP location and there was sufficient time available for establishing a complete and neat set up prior to the movement of the command post to accomodate the various units which remained in the beach area.

(e) Notes concerning the installation, operation, and maintenance of the various agencies.

(1) Wire.

(a) Trouble on wire lines was caused by bombings, amphibious tractors, road building, and especially by the carelessness of our own troops.

(b) Approximately 400 miles of #-110 and 20 miles of #-130 was laid by the Signal Company.

(c) When cabling #110, terminal strips were used every 800 yards in lieu of splices. This proved to be a tremendous aid in trouble shooting.

(d) All wire was, by necessity, laid with RL-27's. Because of this, we needed more linemen.

(e) Teletype, when simplex, caused quite a bit of interference. It was necessary to use a separate metallic circuit for satisfactory operation.

(f) During active phases of the operation, trouble shooters were posted at intervals along the more important trunk lines. This reduced to a minimum the time necessary to repair broken lines.

(g) One switchboard operator was rendered senseless when lightning struck a line, though the switchboard was well grounded. A bakelite handset was thereafter used by all operators during electrical storms.

(2) Radio.

(a) The following nets were guarded by the signal company.

- (1) IMAC Command net "A"-local on Bougainville.
- (2) IMAC command net "B"-Bougainville, Munda, Vella Lavella, Guadalcanal.
- (3) Division command net.
- (4) Air Warning net.
- (5) Scene of action frequency.
- (6) A remotely controlled net R/T between CG, IMAC and CG, 3dMarDiv.

(7) Raider and Parachute battalions when under division control.

(b) During the initial phase of the operation heavy losses were sustained in dry cell batteries and some equipment was rendered unoperative due to heavy rains.

(c) Some interference was encountered because of the fact that very few Marine vehicles were radio shielded.

(d) Other than in the ship to shore phase of the operation, TBY's were of absolutely no value because of their extremely limited range in thick vegetation.

(e) The SCR-193, TCS, TBW-2, TBX-2 radios all gave excellent service. In the last stage of the operation, a TCS set worked perfectly in a direct net between Guadalcanal and Bougainville.

(3) Message Center.

(a) Runners were used exclusively in the initial phase, but as roads improved "Jeep" messengers took over most of the load.

(b) The Hagelin, for both speed and accuracy, is an extremely valuable coding device for combat areas.

(c) The Indian talkers proved to be very valuable and efficient.

(d) A Corps order directed all units on Corps radio net "A" to transmit a number of drill messages daily. This placed an extra and needless burden on an already extremely busy message center.

(4) Air Warning.

(a) Air Warning functioned very well except at such times as the command was spread out and the Air Warning section had to use a TBX. In this case the TBX did not have enough power to reach all units. An SCR 193 was used most of the time and had sufficient output to reach all units.

(b) Air warnings were also relayed over the division command net and over the telephone system.

(c) The Air Warning service was connected to the fighter command and 3d Defense Bn by telephone and was kept informed as to conditions red and green in addition to the AA status.

(d) Recommendations.

(1) All equipment necessary to establish the initial CP ashore should be carried by communication personnel when they first go ashore. Therefore, this equipment should not be stored in the holds of the ship, but should be carried either on deck or in the troop compartments.

(2) In the landing phase of an operation, a division wire team should go ashore with each regimental command group for the purposes of laying wire from the regimental CPs to the proposed location of the division CP. These wire teams should be attached to the various regiments at point of embarkation. Only by following this procedure can it be hoped that the Commanding General will have control of the regiments immediately upon the landing of the division command group.

(3) In operations such as this, where wire can not be laid by use of vehicles, but must be laid entirely with RL 27's, there is a definite need for more linemen in all echelons.

(4) Signal QM equipment and Signal Company equipment should be completely separated, with separate tonnage allowances.

(5) Signal QM equipment should be landed earlier than was done in this operation. In fact, some signal supplies should be landed with the first echelon, thus making it unnecessary for subordinate units to carry 30 days supplies, which they can't begin to handle.

(6) Signal QM should carry more extra wire and more extra telephones than was carried in this operation.

Subject:

Report of Operations.

25 Mar 44.

SECTION II, SPECIAL WEAPONS BATTALION

1. This Battalion moved from Bevy to Cherryblossom largely in four different echelons, Battery A by platoons was attached to landing teams and moved into Cherryblossom on D day. The entire movement was without particular incident other than in one convoy one ship was lost by enemy torpedo bombing, but no men or equipment of this Battalion were aboard this ship.

After the larger part of the Division had returned to Bevy, H&S and the three AT Batteries were attached to the 21st Regiment and the 2nd Provisional Raider Regiment. This period covered 21Dec43 to 14Jan44.

2. H&S Battery. (a) This Battery performed normal functions and while attached to the Raider Regiment, furnished and manned eight (8) machine guns in the front lines to augment the weapons of the weapons of the Raider Regiment.

3. Battery A. (a) Three platoons of this Battery landed on D day, the remaining platoon landed on D plus five. On landing the Battery was attached for tactical purposes to the 3d Def Bn, and remained attached until the day of departure, 16Jan44. Originally the Battery set up AA defenses on the landing beaches. During the construction of the Tokokina air strip, the guns were moved and concentrated about the air strip. This Battery during the seventy five day period maintained continuous air watches and skeleton firing crews on their weapons. In the period enemy planes were fired on, on fourteen different days, 2029 rounds of 40mm ammunition were expended, and 843 rounds of 50 cal. ammunition were expended.

(b) The Battery was credited officially with one (1) enemy plane shot down, and with assists along with the 40mm guns of the 3d Def Bn of five (5) enemy planes shot down.

(c) The secondary mission, although the 40mm are AA guns, was beach defense.

4. Battery B. (a) This Battery was initially in Division Reserve, however, during the period from 28Nov43 to 19Dec43, the Heavy Platoon was detached by Corps to the Army Div. and was set up on the left flank on beach defense.

(b) From 21Dec43 to 14Jan44, Battery B was attached to the 2d Raider Regiment and manned fourteen (14) machine guns in the front lines.

5. Battery C. (a) This Battery was initially in Reserve. The Battery was attached to the 9th Regiment during period 25Nov43 and 26Nov43; the 3d Regiment during the period 26Nov43 to 21Dec43; and the 2d Raider Regiment during the period from 21Dec43 to 5Jan44. They were employed on the right flank perimeter as sea and beach defense.

6. Battery D. (a) This Battery was initially in Reserve. It was attached to the 21st Regiment during the period from 10Dec43 to 7Jan44, and occupied defensive positions.

(b) The Heavy Platoon, comprised of two 75mm guns mounted on half tracks, was sent by LCM's to cover the withdrawal of a Paratroop Battalion which had landed in the Jaba River area. The Platoon left on 29Nov43 and returned on 30Nov43. One gun was sent to the right flank under the command of a Naval Ensign and failed to accomplish its mission. The other gun, under command of Lieutenant Kavanaugh, proceeded to within 500 yards of the beach on the other flank and opened fire on signal and aided in the successful withdrawal of the Paratroop Battalion.

7. Due to the employment of this Battalion, supply and evacuation were normal.

8. In view of the terrain and conditions in Cherryblossom area, the following recommendations were made to the Marine Corps Inspector, who visited the Division in Cherryblossom:

- a. (1) The 37mm, self propelled Fargo mount be replaced by the split trail 37mm gun as soon as practical.
- (2) However, the recommendation was made to the Inspector that in the event that this Battalion were to operate in areas other than this South Pacific jungle area, it is believed by the officers of this Battalion the self propelled 37mm gun is the superior weapon.
- b. (1) The 75mm self propelled half track be replaced by the 75mm gun mounted on the M5 full track tank mount.
- c. (1) Comments: As a result of the lessons learned in this operation, this Battalion will stress in its training period, the firing of the 75mm half track from landing craft, and particularly stress the formation and training of .30 cal. machine gun squads to be used in areas not suited to the use of the present organizational weapons.

Casualties.

(a) Battale Casualties.

- (1) Killed in action: None
- (2) Wounded in action: Four (4)
- (3) Missing in action: None
- (4) Total cases transferred to Field Hospital: Four (4)
- (5) Total cases evacuated: Four (4)
- (6) Total cases returned to duty: (none)

(b) Non Battale Casualties.

- (1) Died injuries: three (3)
- (2) Died diseases: None
- (3) Injured: Three (3)
- (4) Total cases transferred to Field Hospital: Three (3)
- (5) Total cases evacuated: Two (2)
- (6) Total cases returned to duty: One (1)
- (7) Illness: Sixty six (66)
- (8) Total cases transferred to Field Hospital: Sixty six (66)
- (9) Total cases evacuated: Thirty nine (39)
- (10) Total cases returned to duty: Twenty seven (27)

SECTION III, TANK BATTALION

1. Personnel.

(a) The initial personnel of this Bn landing on D day consisted of:

Bn Comdr	Bn Maint Officer
Bn - 2	Bn Medical Officer
Bn - 3	Bn Liaison Officer.
Co Comdrs of Cos "A" "B" "C"	
Enlisted personnel of Cos Hq Sects	
Co "D" (Scouts)	

(b) Additional personnel arrived at later dates making total units present as follows:

H&S Co (less part of maint & supply sects)
Co "A" (less 2 plts and part of Co Hqs)
Co "B"
Co "C" (less 2 plts and part of Co Hqs)
Co "D" (Scouts)

(c) Remainder of personnel at Bevy after receiving orders that they would not move forward engaged in working parties and preparing camps for units returning from Cherry Blossom. All units of this Bn had returned to Bevy by 11Jan44.

(d) Casualties for this Bn as follows:

	Officers	Enlisted
Dead	1	3
Wounded	1	12
Missing	0	1

2. Tactical Employment.

(a) The Bn CP was established on D day in the vicinity of the Division CP and remained there until D plus six when it move to Beach Blue 2 and on D plus 21 moved to a forward position. The Bn kept liaison with Division at all times. Bn Hqs returned to Bevy on 17Dec44. All units of the Bn had returned by 11Jan44.

(b) Co "A"

(1) The Co Comdr and part of Co Hqs landed on D day and engaged in reconnaissance work.

(2) The 1st Plat, (Capt. B. R. Nichols), arrived Cherryblossom D plus 16. The plat was not committed to action against the enemy. It remained in Division reserve until its time of departure.

(3) Co Hqs and the 1st plat returned to Bevy 3Jan44.

(c) Co "B"

(1) Co Comdr and part of Co Hqs landed on D day.

(2) The 1st Plat, (1stLt. D. H. Graham), arrived on D plus 5. On D plus 6 the 1st Bn, 3d Mar, requested tank support on the left flank of the Division and the 1st Plat was attached.

(A) Five tanks attacked enemy positions and emplacements for about thirty-five minutes. The platoon was credited with killing about 50 Japs. One tank man slightly wounded.

(B) On D plus 7 the plat was detached and attached to the 1stBn, 21st Mar for an attack along the beach. The Tanks attacked for about 750 yards against light opposition.

(C) On afternoon of D plus 7 one section was detached and attached to 3d RaiderBn. This section carried supplies and evacuated wounded. This section returned to Bn on D plus 10, the three tanks with 21stMar, returned to TkBn on D plus 12.

(3) The 2d Plat, (1stLt. L. S. Stanley), arrived Cherryblossom on D plus 11.

(A) On night of D plus 12, 21stMar requested tank support for an attack on D plus 13. Tanks report to CO, 2d Bn on morning of D plus 13 and attacked with 25 yard interval, line formation. They advanced about 250 yards through dense jungle. Tank plat leaders hit land mine on Piva Trail and blew off right track, Lt. Stanley was killed as he attempted to evacuate his tank. Remaining members of crew evacuated safely after enemy resistance cleaned up. Another tank was hit on the bustle and the engine caught fire, it was extinguished and crew escaped uninjured. Both tanks were repaired and in operation in a couple days. Tank then remained in mobile reserve.

(4) The 3d Plat, (1stLt. Q. H. Joy), arrived Cherryblossom D plus 16.

(A) On D plus 18 entire company was attached to 3d Mar and moved to a position in the vicinity of the CP, 3dMar.

(B) The 3dBn, 3dMar, used tanks to break trails, convoy supplies and evacuate wounded.

(C) On D plus 19, Lt. Joy had three tanks, transporting supplies to front lines when he discovered enemy along East West Trail. Together with some stray infantry who guided him, they attack and routed the enemy. Lt. Joys tank was hit four times by an AT gun, one penetrating and seriously wounding the radio operator and driver. Lt. Joy was also slightly wounded from MG splash when he tried to open his pistol port. The plat was credited with destroying 2 MGs, 1 AT gun, and several Japs.

SECRET
Subject: Report of Operations.

25 Jan 44.

(5) (The tanks of Co "B" were used to break trails transport supplies, evacuate personnel until they were detached to Bn on D plus 27. Personnel was also used as MPs and on working parties.

(6) The company less the 2d plat which was held in Division Reserve, returned to Bevy on 17Dec43. The 2d plat returned on 1Jan44.

(d) Co Comdr and part of Co Hqs landed on D day and performed reconnaissance work. On D plus 16, the 1st plat, (1stLt M. F. Ruud), arrived. This platoon was not employed in action against the enemy. It remained in Division reserve until 1Jan44. Co Comdr and Co Hqs arrived Bevy 17Dec43, the plat arrive 3Jan44.

(e) Co "D" (Scouts)

(1) Co Comdr and Co Hqs landed on D day and returned to Bevy.

(2) 1st Plat, 1stLt. O. Salgo, landed D day attached to 9thMar.

(A) Made four day reconnaissance patrol in Laruma River sector. Made contact with the enemy and native patrols. On fourth day the patrol sighted eight enemy barges landing at mouth of Laruma River. Patrol layed ambush and when forced to withdraw they discovered three more Jap barges had landed between the patrol and our own lines. Two members of the patrol were wounded and being carried. Two men volunteered to swim to an amphibian tractor which was about 1500 yards off shore. They returned with two Higgins boats which evacuated the patrol under fire from the enemy.

(B) The R-2, 9th Mar ordered a reconnaissance patrol in Tokokina River sector around hill 600A. Patrol contacted enemy killing one Jap guarding a Jap bivouac area, mission of patrol was accomplished.

(C) Guarded 9th Mar CP and used for working parties until return to Bevy, 30Dec43.

(3) 2d Plat, Capt G. Saussey.

(A) Landed D day attached to 21st Mar, returned to Bevy 11 Jan44.

(B) Made seven reconnaissance patrols for 21stMar patrols varying in size and from one to four days. Contacted enemy on seven different occasions.

(4) 3dPlat, 2dLt. E. Jenkins.

(A) Landed D day attached to 3dMar, returned to Bevy 27Dec43.

(B) The plat was used to guard the wrd CP, security and reconnaissance patrols varying in size. The platoon was also used to check communication lines and to string wire to forward observers.

(C) Detached from 3rd Mar on D plus 22.

(5) 4th Plat, 1stLt. R. C. Franklin.

(A) Landed on D day attached to 9thMar, returned to Bevy 27Dec43.

(B) Used in beach parties until D plus 9 when it returned to Bn.

(C) On D plus 22 relieved 3d Plat and attached to 3d Mar, for security of CP and working parties.

(D) D plus 28 became part of provision Bn and became part of line held by that Bn.

(E) Detached and returned to TkBn on 21Dec43.

(6) All platoons furnished TkBn information of the terrain within the areas they were operating in. The plats attached to the Regts performed duties that normally should have been performed by organic personnel of the regiments. They lack the proper weapons for this type of duty and the working parties made them unavailable for scouting missions.

Subject: Report of Operations.

25Jan44.

(a) Comments.

- (1) To be most effective in jungle it appears that tanks must:
 - (A) Not be employed until definite resistance is located.
 - (B) Be preceded by artillery preparation.
 - (C) Be given time to beat down jungle with firepower.
 - (D) Be allowed time to stop and check direction and infantry support about every fifteen yards, (depending on density of jungle).
 - (E) Not be permitted to advance once contact with the infantry is lost.
 - (F) Wait for infantry to issue order for advance every fifteen yards.
 - (G) Keep distance and interval between tanks such as to permit visual contact at all times.
 - (H) Use as many columns of tanks as available.
 - (I) Never turn back but depend on infantry to hold ground they have gained and call on artillery support to accomplish this if necessary.
 - (J) Never move far enough in to allow themselves to be outflanked.

(2) For jungle, a special infantry battalion should be trained and used solely for directing and supporting the units of the Tank Battalion and holding on the line of farthest advance until relieved by the troops of the zone in which employed. In the absence of such a Bn the next best is to use the scout company partially for this purpose by having them guide the tanks to proper line of departure and thereafter direct the rate of advance and direction of attack. Also help form close support between the tanks and the close supporting infantry. After the position is consolidated the personnel of the scout company would then lead the tanks out of the area and back to their reserve position. Even using the scout company in this manner, before committing the tanks unit, it would be necessary for thorough plans to be formulated between the artillery, infantry, and the tanks. These plans in the final form must be thoroughly understood by each individual infantry man and tank man.

(3) In general, in small areas it is believed that tanks should be returned to a central area after each mission rather than held in reserve in a forward position. The reason being that in the event of a break through in the jungle, the point of which may be anywhere, artillery can better cope with the situation than the tanks as it requires more time to organize a tank counter attack. Also the fact that the tanks are in the immediate area is a good reason for the enemy to concentrate his anti-tank defenses at that point. Furthermore, it is generally easier to return the tank for resupply than to move the supply forward. It also affords better rest, and replacement of personnel and repair or replacement of equipment.

(4) The compass in the light tank is only an approximation, in the medium it is somewhat better. For jungle work it is recommended that some type of a small gyro compass as used in airplanes be installed. If practical, a dead reckoning unit should be installed; in the absence of the latter a yard measurer would be better than the present odometer which measures in tenths of a mile.

Subject: Report of Operations.

25 Jan 44.

(5) While these comments are considered the ideal conditions for using our tanks in the jungle it is realized in warfare one hopes for the ideal, but generally fights under far poorer conditions. Therefore any method of use in an emergency that tends to get the Division to its objective is warranted.

(6) While loss of tanks is to be avoided, it is believed that we should not hesitate to lose tanks if it saves lives.

3. Supply and Evacuation.

(a) The supply and evacuation problems in this Bn were negligible. The main difficulty experienced was from an administrative standpoint. With small units attached to larger units within the division, there was no way that we would receive the word on men killed, wounded, or evacuated except by calling all possible sources and checking on each individual case. The senior man of the attached unit would not always have the information as to the disposition of each case. Some system should be devised to have either the unit or the aid stations advise the parent unit the disposition of all cases.

Maintenance.

(a) Maintenance difficulties experienced in this unit were of a minor nature chiefly due to the vehicles being submerged in salt water when being unloaded.

(b) All vehicles either damaged or broken down were placed in repair by our units own maintenance sections.

(c) Maintenance equipment will have to be determined for each operation depending on time for supply from rear areas and type of operating anticipated.

Communications.

(a) Previous reports and our own experience warned us of difficulties that might be encountered in jungle operations. The greatest problem we were confronted with was reduction of range in transmitting. In order to operate effectively from rear to forward areas it was necessary to establish relay stations within range limits. In most cases CW had to be used as voice range was substantially less.

(1) The GF 11/RU tank radio worked remarkably well and very little maintenance was required. Its range was greatly reduced operating in the jungle.

(2) The TBX set although more cumbersome to handle, operated very well. It had the greatest transmitting range of any set we used.

(3) The TCS radio jeep worked very satisfactory and we increased its antenna and were able to pick up transmissions from the TBX.

(4) The SCR 536 would be a most valuable set in connection with tank infantry operations if it were more dependable. Due to its unreliability it was not used too frequently, however, it did on occasion prove its worth by stopping tanks that had lost their direction of attack. There is a definite need for a hand set of this type that is more mechanically sound.

(5) The MP set also used and found less reliable. The SCR 536 is preferred to this set.

(6) Some material with a great affinity for water should be on hand for drying out radios and radio equipment, silica jell might work.

(7) We are now experimenting with mounting a control box on the rear of the tank so that anyone on the outside can converse with the tank crew inside.

Subject: Report of Operations.

25Jan44.

4. EQUIPMENT-GENERAL

(a) Organic.

(1) Cos "B" and "D" moved forward with most of their "A" category equipment. "B" category equipment was held at Bevy. Other units moved only part of their "A" and no "B" equipment forward.

(2) The situation in each operation should dictate what organic equipment should move in "A" category and its priority of movement.

(3) Tent flys were found more suitable temporary shelters.

(4) The metal LNG boxes for MG ammunition used by Co "D" were found to be more satisfactory than the wooden boxes.

(b) Individual.

(1) Most important to allow individual to carry only the bare necessities, any excess is usually discarded to make pack lighter.

(2) Co "D" (Sets) individual weapons were not adequate when employed on missions without their vehicles. Every patrol in the jungle is a combat patrol regardless of its nature and it is recommended that their TO be changed to authorize two BARs and four TSMGs per platoon if they are to be used on similar missions.

(3) The high top, canvas top, rubber-soled jungle boot proved very satisfactory where long marches were not required. The boot kept mud and sand from the feet and dried out much quicker than leather when it became wet.

(4) Every man should be issued one or two of the water tight packets to keep personal articles dry inside of his pack.

James M. Smith
JAMES M. SMITH.

~~SECRET~~
Serial (102-44),
R-3

HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND RAIDER REGIMENT
FIRST MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
IN THE FIELD.

8 February, 1944.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Third Marine Division.
Subject: Report of Operations of this organization while
attached to the Third Marine Division. October
30, 1943 to 28 November, 1943.
Reference: Secret Dispatch from CG, 3d Marine Division to
CO 2d Raider Regiment No. 080956L, dated 8
January, 1944.
Enclosure: Report called for in reference, and one copy.
1. In accordance with the reference, the enclosed
report is submitted.

s/ Alan Shapley
ALAN SHAPLEY

Enclosure M1.

Serial (102-44)

R-3

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF SECOND RAIDER REGIMENT (PROVISIONAL)
WHILE ATTACHED TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION.
30 OCTOBER, 1943 to 28 NOVEMBER, 1943.

Reference: IMAC Hasty Terrain Map, BOUGAINVILLE,
B.S.I., first and second editions,
scale 1:20,000.

Enclosure: Regimental Operations Order 2-43.

NARRATIVE OF BOUGAINVILLE OPERATION:

The Units aboard the U.S.S. CLYMER included the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional), less the Third Raider Battalion, three-hundred and ninety-nine Naval Construction men of the 53d C.B.'s and 71st C.B.'s, which were designated as Landing Team Ten for "D" Day, under the command of Lt. Col. Alan Shapley.

Also, prior to landing, Lt. Col. Alan Shapley, Commanding Officer of the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional), was designated to be C.O. of Corps Reserve immediately upon his unit's return to IMAC reserve.

The Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) composed of Regimental H & S Company, Second and Third Raider Battalions, was trained during the months of May, June, July and August of 1943, on NEW CALEDONIA for the next operation, which was the BOUGAINVILLE Operation.

On 3 October, 1943, the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional), which is a unit of Corps Troops, was attached to the Third Marine Division for further duty. The Third Marine Division attached the Regiment, less the Third Raider Battalion to the Third Marines; the Third Raider Battalion being attached to the Ninth Marines. Practice landings and maneuvers took place on EFATE Island, NEW HEBRIDES; 16, 17, and 18 October, 1943. The practice landing included unloading the ships and holding maneuvers as similar to the Operations of "D" Day as possible. The beach and terrain was similar to that of BOUGAINVILLE except that the BOUGAINVILLE jungle was thicker and contained more swamp.

"D" Day (1 November, 1943), the Second Raider Regiment (Provisional) less the Third Raider Battalion, landed on BEACH GREEN TWO and YELLOW ONE, BOUGAINVILLE, BSI, at 0730. On our right flank was the 1st Battalion, Third Marines and on the left flank was the Second Battalion, Third Marines. The Third Raider Battalion, less "M" Company, which was the Road Block Company for the Regiment, landed on PURUATA Island. The landings were opposed by enemy machine gun fire, "knee mortars" (grenade dischargers), 37mm and 77mm pack artillery. On BEACHES GREEN ONE and TWO, the Japanese had built several strong pillboxes of logs and sandbags, and had them covered with several feet of earth; also, on BEACH GREEN TWO was a slit trench approximately 150 yards long and about thirty feet inboard and parallel to the beach. Only a few people were wounded on BEACH GREEN TWO while landing. However, the Second Battalion Commanding Officer, (Lt. Col. J. P. MacCaffery) was wounded by enemy machine gun fire on the beach. After moving inboard of the beach strip, lagoons and swamp were encountered. Inland, thirty yards from BEACH GREEN TWO, we found the greater part of our sector impassable. Due to the impassability of our sector, battalion, company, and even platoon control was difficult. Enemy sniper fire made reconnaissance of the sector difficult. However, by 1100, 1 November, 1943, enemy resistance had been broken and we

had advanced inland to line O - 1 as the operation order had called for on "D" Day (see Appendix 1 to Annex 1, Operational Order #21-43, Hq., Third Marines, Third Marine Division).

Contact was made with the 1st Battalion, Third Marines on our right flank but none was made on our left flank due to the swamp.

The Third Battalion, less "M" Company, attached to the 9th Marines, landed on PURUATA Island and encountered sporadic fire while the boats were nearing the beach. The two casualties were caused by snipers firing from coconut trees over the bow of the boats. No resistance other than sporadic sniper fire was met on the beach. Due to strong resistance met on BEACH GREEN ONE, "L" Company, Third Raider Battalion, was attached to 1st Battalion, Third Marines. Strong enemy resistance was met near the West end of the island. The enemy consisted of not more than a reinforced platoon, but their prepared defenses made the fire fight intense for three hours. The remaining opposition consisted of scattered sniper fire which was knocked out by 1500 "D" plus 1 (2 November, 1943).

A perimeter defense was set up by the Third Battalion. The C.B.'s and Third Defense Battalion "turned to", making the permanent defense of the island. Galleys were set up and the men improved their living conditions during the next few days.

On 2 November, 1943, the Second Raider Battalion was astride the PIVA TRAIL about 1200 yards inland on the O-2 line. Local security patrols killed several stray Japs, but no organized resistance was met.

On 3 November, 1943, the Demolition Company of the Third Raider Battalion landed on TOROKINA Island after fifteen (15) minutes of shelling by artillery and found no live Japs, but eight or ten freshly dug graves were found. One platoon remained in occupation of the island.

"E" Company relieved "M" Company at the Road Block (135.0-214.2) at 1520 3 November, 1943.

On 4 November, 1943, the Second Battalion, 9th Marines relieved the Second Raider Battalion at 1300. At 1400 the Third Raider Battalion reverted to the Second Raider Regiment.

On 5 November, 1943, "E" Company was detached to the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at 1530. "L" Company, Third Battalion was attached to the Second Raider Battalion to set up a Road Block at (134.3-214.2). Lt. Bangser, Lt. Devore and eighteen men left in two rubber boats on a night patrol along the JABA RIVER by order of First Marine Amphibious Corps.

On the morning of November the 5th at 1130 "E" Company relieved "F" Company on the Road Block. Lt's Bangser, Devore and eighteen men returned from patrol and made their report to Lt. Col. Alan Shapley and the C-3.

On 7 November, 1943, "H" Company relieved "F" Company on the Road Block at 1300. "H" Company contacted the enemy at 1430 and "G" Company was sent up at 1500 to reinforce "H" Company. The enemy action ceased at 1550. "G" Company relieved "H" Company at the Road Block and was harassed by enemy during the night. "I" Company, Third Raider Battalion was sent to BEACH BLUE ONE.

On 8 November, 1943, "M" Company was sent up to the Road Block behind "H" Company at 0730 and made contact with the enemy. "E" and "F" Companies were sent forward in support at 1000. The remainder of the Third Raider Battalion (Hq and S) less "K" Company, landed on BEACH BLUE ONE at 1330 and bivouacked in the rear of the Second Raider Battalion bivouac area. The attacking enemy force was estimated to be a Battalion. Enemy action was very vigorous. "L" Company reverted to the Third Battalion at 1500. At 1600 the Second Battalion withdrew to the Road Block. "F" Company returned to the Second Raider Battalion Bivouac area and was attached to the Third Raider Battalion. The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, sent half-tracks and tanks to support the attack. Due to the thick jungle, they were used only to evacuate wounded.

On 9 November, 1943, the Third Raider Battalion moved up to the "jump-off line" at 0620. The artillery barrage began at 0730 and continued until 0800. The Third Raider Battalion "jumped-off" on the attack. The enemy activity and fire power was very heavy, evidence of many M-96's being used. At 1230, the enemy resistance was broken and the advance was very rapid. The advance was halted at 1515, having met no enemy for about seventy (70) minutes. "K" Company was sent from PURUATA Island to support the attack.

On the 10th of November, the Second Raider Battalion moved six-hundred yards back along the PIVA TRAIL to reorganize and rest in the Division Reserve area. The Second Battalion, 9th Marines passed through the Second Raider Battalion's lines to attack PIVA VILLAGE at 0930. At 1330, First Battalion, 9th Marines relieved the Third Raider Battalion. The Third Raider Battalion then joined the Second Raider Battalion in Division Reserve Area. "K" Company was sent out on a night patrol beyond PIVA VILLAGE, by order of The Commanding General, Third Marine Division, and returned the next day with a negative report.

On the 13th of November, the Second Raider Battalion left the Division Reserve Area, to be attached to the 21st Marines, the mission being to set up a Road Block at (135-216) to prevent the enemy from flanking the 21st Marines. "M" Company, Third Raider Battalion, left reserve area and was attached to the 21st Marines for C.P. defense.

On the 15th of November, the Third Raider Battalion moved out of reserve area to relieve the Second Battalion which returned to the reserve area. The Third Raider Battalion remained at the Road Block until the 19th of November, at which time they moved out and went in reserve of the Third Marine Regiment in the vicinity of (135.6-216.3).

On the 21st of November, the Second Raider Regiment, less the Third Raider Battalion, moved to (134.90-217.85). The Third Raider Battalion moved out of reserve of the Third Marine Regiment and joined the Regiment.

The next day the Second Raider Battalion relieved the Third Battalion, Third Marines, upon Third Division Order, received the preceding day. The Second Raider Regiment, minus the Second Battalion, moved 1500 yards east to the position formerly occupied by the Third Marines. At 1505 "K" Company left on a thirty-six (36)

hour patrol for First Marine Amphibious Corps, reporting to BEACH YELLOW ONE to embark on LCM's. They disembarked LCM's near MOPARA and went down the beach to scout the area of MOPARA Village east of the TOROKINA River. They returned to the Third Battalion area on the 23d of November with negative report.

At 1200, November 23d, the 1st Parachute Battalion landed at YELLOW BEACH ONE, and joined the Second Raider Regiment at Corps Reserve Area (135.00-218.02). Headquarters and Service Company moved to the Corps Reserve Area on the morning of the 24th. The forward C.P. was established at the Third Marines Regimental Command Post.

The Second Raider Battalion started a push to establish "Fox line" at 1000; they had completed their mission by 1530 with only slight resistance.

At 1200, the 26th of November, the Second Raider Regiment, minus the Second Raider Battalion, moved to the Corps Reserve Area, and were attached to First Marine Amphibious Corps, and designated Corps Reserve Troops. On the 27th of November, at 1200, the Second Raider Battalion was detached from Third Marines and re-joined the Regiment in Corps Reserve Area. However, they were recalled to the Third Marines at 1500 to go in reserve for that Regiment; at 0800 on the morning of the 28th they returned to the Reserve Area.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

"One unit of fire expended from November 1, through November 9, another unit was then issued but only a few rounds expended.

"The Raider Regiment is organized under the Marine Corps Table of Organization D-310, Approved 1 February, 1943."

Unit of fire consisting of:

M-1	128 rounds.
BAR	260 rounds.
TSMG	220 rounds.
Carbine	75 rounds.
60 MM Mortar	36 rounds.
LMG	2000 rounds.

LOSSES OF MUNITIONS BY ENEMY ACTION:

"No losses of ammunition by enemy action."

OPERATIONAL FEATURES AND MATERIAL PERFORMANCE:

(1) WEAPONS:

The M1918-A1 BAR was preferred over the A-2 because of it's lighter weight, ability to fire S.A. as well as F.A., and the fact that the bypod and butt plate are of little use in jungle offensive warfare.

The M-1 rifle was very satisfactory and performed excellently.

The 1919 A4 B.L.M.G. was very satisfactory and performed excellently.

The Model M-1 Carbine gave trouble by jamming when only slight amounts of sand or mud would get in the receiver, and the report is confusing because it sounds so much like the Japanese 6.5 or 25 caliber.

(2) OPERATIONAL FEATURES:

The Third Raider Battalion split their regular ten man squad into two five man teams with squad leader in charge of one and assistant squad leader in charge of the other. The Second Raider Battalion, divided their squads into three, three man teams with an M-1 man for the leader of the BAR and TSMG men. The division of the squad gives the automatic weapons better control in the jungle.

The rifle platoons attached LMG's with each squad with much better results than bringing them to the firing line after the fire fight had already begun.

The 60 MM Mortars were held in reserve and used during assaults only. They were not attached to squads and were not brought to the firing line.

Outposts and patrols should be sent to each battalion's respective front daily, as far out as four thousand yards. They should come back a pre-determined route and return to the lines just after dark. This keeps the enemy from knowing exactly where the front lines are.

When attacking the snipers should be completely forgotten about. Snipers don't cause enough damage to afford starting unnecessary firing that often gets out of hand. Snipers can be cleaned out later by anti-sniper patrols.

When attacking the adjacent units must at all times maintain contact; the enemy will always try to cut off a company or any small unit that pushed ahead of the rest of lines.

In any case where a defense is set up, two or three man foxholes should be used and a watch maintained at all times.

There should be no firing at night. In case of enemy infiltration firing will only cause confusion. Knives and bayonets should be used exclusively.

ENEMY TACTICS, TECHNIQUE, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

The Japs have a "do or die" spirit that makes it difficult to capture personnel unless they are badly wounded. They congregate in groups and talk loudly when they are attempting to find a weak point in our lines. After we had set up permanent defense lines, the Japs came up close and constructed pill-boxes. Our patrols drove them out and destroyed their emplacements, only to find that they would return at night and rebuild them in the same area. They also sent out a large number of small patrols into the area to the front of our lines.

At night they will often send small patrols into our bivouac areas. These will not shoot, but use bayonets, and, if we start firing, they will throw hand grenades.

NAMES OF SUBORDINATES DESERVING OF COMMENDATION

LtCol.	Joseph P. McCaffery
LtCol.	Fred D. Beans
Capt.	Robert N. Page
1stLt.	Robert G. Willard
1stLt.	Karl Tanner
1stLt.	John A. Sabini
2ndLt.	Charles W. Flannery
ChWO	Anthony G. Yelanich
GySgt	Robert C. Loney
GySgt	John R. Leyden
P1Sgt	William I. Yount
Sgt	Ingatius J. Gorack
Corp	Ralph Stephens
Corp	Brian J. Quirk
Corp	Bernard W. Somers
Pfc	Roberts J. Henderson
Pfc	Benjamin D. Ferguson
Pfc	John C. Broderick
Pfc	John W. Studer
Pfc	Donald G. Probst
Pfc	Henry Gurke
Pfc	Stanley Dierker
Pfc	William D. Beasley
Pvt	James E. Riigel

U. S. NAVY

Lt(ChC)	William H. McCorkle	USNR
Lt(Jg)(ChC)	Robert J. Cronin	USNR
PhM3c	Daniel Webster	
PhM3c	William M. Gorman	
PhM3c	John G. Howard	
HA2c	Joseph R. Woolridge	

2. Grid coordinates given in this report refer to IMAC Hasty Terrain Map, BOUGAINVILLE, B. S. I., first and second editions, scale 1:20,000.

s/ Alan Shapley
ALAN SHAPLEY

Landing Team Number Ten,
Third Marine Division,
At Sea, Pacific.

27 October, 1943. 1200

OPERATIONS ORDER)

NUMBER.....2-43)

References: Maps: (a) Army Air Forces Chart of Solomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:600,000 sheet 51.
(b) Army Air Forces Chart of Solomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:250,000 sheets 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Third Edition).
(c) Photo Map of Solomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:20,000 sheets 162, 163, 180, 181, 200.
(d) Hasty Terrain Map, Solomon Islands, Bougainville Island, scale 1:20,000 sheets 162, 163, 180, 181, 200 (IMAC Hasty Terrain Maps 162, 163, 180, 181, 200).
(e) Sketch, Appendix 1 to Annex "A".
(f) Third Marine Regiment Operations Order Number 21-43.

1. (a) ENEMY

- (1) Ground Forces: The number of troops in the Torokina Area is not exactly known except that the area is lightly defended (perhaps one Company) which is undoubtedly used to patrol the beaches and man observation posts.
- (2) Capabilities: Unknown, except that he can re-enforce at an early date from any direction, including the sea. He can be expected to strike with as much air power as available day and night after our landing.

(b) OUR FORCES

The Third Marines Reenforced with the Second Raider Regiment (less Headquarters and three Companies of the Third Raider Battalion) attached. See sketch Appendix 1 to Annex "A". The Ninth Marines Reenforced will land abreast and to the left of the Third Marines.

2. Landing Team Number Ten will land on Beach Green-2 at H-hour, D-day on Bougainville Island, destroy Japanese forces encountered and seize a beach head 2250 yards in depth and secure that area for the construction of vital military installations and protect the Division right (SE) flank.

3. (a) The Second Raider Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel McCaffery) will land at H-hour, D-day on Beach Green-2 and Beach Yellow-1 and drive in rapidly and secure it's initial objective. The Battalion will maintain contact to the right with the First Battalion, Third Marines.

Make active patrols inland beyond the initial objective for a distance of 1000 yards.

Be prepared to send reinforcements to Company "M", Third Raider Battalion which will be advancing along the Piva Trail for a distance of about 1500 yards.

Be prepared on order either to continue the advance to O-2 within the sector now assigned; or to continue the advance to O-2 within the sector now assigned to the First Battalion, Third Marines. (See sketch, Appendix 1. Annex "A").

- (b) Shore Party (Commander Brockenbrough) will organize, coordinate and operate a combined shore party, consisting of a Headquarters, Shore Platoon, Service Platoon, Ship Platoon, Naval Platoon, and Boat Platoon. This shore party will service both Beach Green-2 and Beach Yellow-1. Separate dumps will be set up on each beach.

Detach units of shore party only upon completion of it's duties and when released by the Landing Team Commander. Have the units when released report to organizations as directed in paragraph 3(a) of Third Marine Regiment Operations Order Number 21-43.

Organize the various platoons of the shore party to render immediate assistance in defense of the beach at any time called upon to do so.

- (c) Company "M", Third Raider Battalion (Captain Cunningham) upon landing on Beach Green-2 and Yellow-1 will assemble in the general vicinity of the beginning of the trail leading from Beach Yellow-1 inland. They will remain clear of elements of the Second Raider Battalion and the Shore Party.

Immediately upon assembly they will receive verbal orders to advance along this trail for a distance of about 1500 yards and establish a road block to deny the use of the Buretoni Mission-Piva Trail to the enemy. See sketch, Appendix 1, Annex "A".

- (d) H&S Company, Second Raider Regiment (Lieutenant Lamb) upon landing will locate, establish and operate the CP, Second Raider Regiment, this CP to be in the vicinity of the New buildings in the vicinity of Buretoni Mission if practicable.

- (x) Fox holes or/and shelters for protection from air attacks will be constructed at the earliest opportunity. Unit Commanders will particularly concern themselves with this matter.

There will be absolute black out during hours of darkness.

Unit Commander will be responsible that troops take cover quickly on condition Red and just as quickly get back on the job from this cover on condition Green.

H-hour will be about 0730, exact time to be announced later.

~~SECRET~~
Landing Team Number Ten, Third Marine Division,
Operations Order Number 2-43.....Cont'd.....

D-day is 1 November, 1943.

4. Beach area under Second Raider Battalion Bn-4 Quartermaster Clerk Davis on D-day. Major Wade, Second Raider Regiment R-4 will be in control after D-day. See Administrative Order (Annex "B") to Third Marine Regiment Operations Order 21-43.
5. (a) Axis of communication USS CLYMER-CP Shore Party Beach Green-2 - CP Second Marine Raider Regiment.
- (b) Signal communication: See Annex "C", Third Marine Regiment Operations Order Number 21-43.

s/ Alan Shapley
ALAN SHAPLEY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding.

AUTHENTICATION:
s/ O. F. Peatross
O. F. PEATROSS
Captain, USMCR
R-3.

DISTRIBUTION: CT Commander, 3d Marines (3) NOTE:
CO 2d Raider Battalion (20) CERTIFIED A TRUE:
CO Shore Party (10)
CO Co "M", 3d Raider Bn (2) s/ O. F. Peatross
CO H&SCo, 2d Raider Regt (4) O. F. PEATROSS
R-3

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~~SECRET~~
1975/A3-elb

HEADQUARTERS
SECOND MARINE RAIDER REGIMENT (PROVISIONAL)
IN THE FIELD.

3 January, 1944.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps.
Via: The Commanding General, Third Marine Division.
Subject: Battle reports.
Reference: (a) CG, IMAC, Secret Despatch 3022531.
Enclosures: (A) Report of the Battle of Puruata Island with overlay #1.
(B) Report of the Battle of Piva Trail with overlays #2 and #3.
(C) Report of the Battle of Piva Trail with overlays #4 and #5.

1. In compliance with reference (a), Enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are hereby submitted.

s/ Alan Shapley
ALAN SHAPLEY.

Enclosure M2.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (A)

Overlay # 1.

2d Marine Raider Regt (Prov)
In The Field.

3 January, 1944.

Report of the Battle of Puruata Island. 0730, 1-11-43 thru 1530 2-11-43. 0730, 1 Nov 43 - Attached to the 9th Marines the 3d Bn Raiders landed at Beach Green (1) on Puruata Island with "I" Co and one Plat of "K" Co in assault. "M" Co landed on Beach Green (2) attached 2d Raider Regt, Marines. "L" Weapons Platoon, and 2d Platoon of "K" Co used as shore parties. One Platoon of "K" Co in reserve.

Encountered sporadic fire while boats were nearing beachhead, two men were wounded. No resistance at beach, but met heavy resistance at West end of Island (estimated one Nip Platoon).

0930 - Reinforced right flank with reserve Platoon of "K" Co.

1000 - Attack halted, established BHL about 125 Yds in from beach. Jap snipers (Approx 3) and knee mortars (Approx 3 or 4) causing some trouble on right flank.

1150 - Dispatched "L" Co to Beach Blue (1), attached to 3d Marines.

1330 - Began attack on Jap positions near village with two Platoons from "K" Co and two Half Tracks. Advance about 75 Yds under heavy fire. Received quite a few casualties and attack halted.

1600 - Established OP at South East end of Island. Patrol to South East end of Island reported contact with several Japs. Established C.P. about 100 Yds in from beach at center of Island.

1630 - Dug in for night around BHL. During night of 1 & 2 Nov. 43, killed several Jap snipers and riflemen who were attempting to infiltrate. Delayed occupation of Torokina Island on D-Day due to non-accountability of troops.

0810 - 2Nov43 - Weapons Platoon began sweep of Island from the South end, proceeded slowly, cleared South East and center of Island of several snipers.

0830 - "K" Co patrols on North East end of Island reported about twenty Jap bodies near position attacked yesterday and also cleared area of several snipers.

1220 - Weapons Platoon made contact with "K" Co at North East end of Island. A few snipers remained in this area.

1530 - Set up perimeter defense of Island with "I" and "K" Co on beach and "K" Co in reserve. Tied in with automatic weapons of 3d Defense Bn on beach. Received sniper fire during the night. Island was definitely under Blue control with exception of one or two snipers which were killed the next day.

Enemy killed ----44

Blue casualties --KIA 5, WIA 32.


Tactical conclusions.

It is quite certain that ship bombardment before our landing did little or no damage to enemy personnel. They were well dug in and emplaced.

-1-

Enclosure "A"

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OVERLAY "1"

MAP: F.M.A.C. Photomap No. 130
 SCALE: 1:2,500
 DATE: Nov. 1, 1943
 FROM: R-2-2 NO RIDER REGT.
 TO:
 MAP: Taken from F.M.A.C. Photomap
 Sheet 130.

~~S. E. E. T.~~

Overlay #2 and #3.

2d Marine Raider Regt (Prov)
In The Field.

Enclosure (B)

3 January, 1944.

Report of the Battle of Piva Trail, 1200, 7 Nov. 1943 to 1159, 9 Nov. 1943.

1200, 7 Nov. 1943 to 1159, 8 Nov. 1943 - At 1200, 7 Nov. 1943 the 2d Raider Bn, with "L" Company and "M" Company, 3d Raider Bn, was holding the Road Block on the Piva Trail, and in reserve for 3d Marines. (See overlay #1).

1205 - At this time "H" Company was sent from the reserve area to relieve "F" Company, which had held the Road Block the previous night. There had been no enemy action during the day up to this time.

1430 - "H" Company had effected the relief of "F" Company and was in position when contact was made with Red forces estimated at one company. This contact occurred at (135.20-214.25). The company commander "H" Company requested 81mm mortar support from the 2d Bn. 9th Marines, who were holding the front lines about 300 yards behind the Road Block.

1445 - "H" Company reported receiving 81mm mortar support from the 2d Bn. 9th Marines which apparently stopped the Red attack.

1455 - One platoon, "E" Company, in command of "E" Company executive officer was to support "H" Company as a temporary expedient until "G" Company could be moved up. "H" Company commander had requested that one company be sent forward to prevent enemy from encircling and cutting off "H" Company.

1503 - "G" Company moved forward and was deployed along the Piva Trail to rear of Road Block.

1526 - CO, 2d Bn. 9th Marines reported that 40 rounds of 81mm mortar had been delivered as requested. Enemy forces continued to carry out small scale attacks on "H" and "G" Companies, but were repulsed.

1740 - Red forces attempted to cut off Road Block, but were repulsed by "G" Company. During the night Red forces attacked repeatedly with knee mortars, 90mm mortars, and infiltrating groups. "H" and "G" Companies inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy by holding their fire until infiltrating Japs were at point blank range.

Blue casualties - - KIA 1.

0710, 8 Nov. 43 - "H" Company reported that a patrol to their front had met the enemy (135.20-214.25). "M" Company was ordered to relieve "G" Company to the rear of the RB and "G" Company was ordered to relieve "H" Company at the RB. Enemy action necessitated that "H" Company remain at the RB, and patrols were ordered forward from "H" Company. The patrol went out 300 yards with no contact, but after starting to return to RB the enemy appeared in small numbers. "M" Company had taken over "G" Company position along the trail to rear of the RB and "G" Company patrol and

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Enclosure "B" Cont'd

deployed with 2 Platoons on the left of the trail and one Platoon on the right. This occurred at about 1045. The enemy moved forward and was stopped by "G" Company. They were employing automatic weapons and mortars.

1100 - Enemy mortar shells fell on the RB in a heavy concentration. "E" Company moved from the reserve area at 1110, and arrived at the RB at 1135. "E" Company was deployed on the right side of the trail tying in with "G" Company's right and swinging to the rear to protect the right flank. The combined front of "G" and "E" Companies was about 400 Yds, astride the Piva Trail.

1200, 8 Nov 1943 to 1159, 9 Nov 1943

1200 - "L" Company was ordered forward from the reserve area, and was deployed on the left of the trail, tying in with "G" Company's left flank and running parallel to the Piva Trail. "H" Company was deployed to the rear of "G" and "E" Companies on the right of the trail, giving additional protection on the right flank.


1300 - "F" Company was ordered forward and "E" Company began a flanking attack to flank the enemy on their left. They hit a large force of enemy after moving forward about 50 Yds. And inflicted very heavy casualties. The enemy began an all-out attack at 1345, but were repulsed by "G" Company and "E" Company. Blue machine guns and other automatic weapons inflicted heavy casualties, in one case a machine gun mowed down 25 to 30 Japs who charged down the trail.

1600 - The battalion began a withdrawal through the RB - "G" Company moving back first, then "E" Co, then "H" Co, then "L" Co. When the withdrawal was nearly completed the enemy attempted another attack, but were repulsed by "H", "L" and "F" Companies. "F" Co had previously been sent through the RB to cover the withdrawal. The 2d Bn returned to the reserve area.

1630 - "L" and "M" Companies were detached from the 2d Bn and the Bn was relieved from the Road Block.

Blue casualties - - 8 killed, 27 wounded,
Red casualties -- 125 killed,
Tactical conclusions.

It was later learned that the Red force consisted of at least a part of a battalion, and they were making an "all out effort" to break thru our lines. Wide flanking movements which would have been practicable for both sides were denied due to the swampy terrain on both flanks. However, the flanking attempts made by at least two enemy platoons, first on one flank then on the other (see overlay) actually resulted in straight frontal attack by the enemy since our own flanks were so well protected (i.e. full company on each flank). This accounted for the heavy enemy casualties compared to our own. These attacks by the enemy were very determined which forced him to expose his troops



MIF F. 12.1. C. HASTY TERRAIN

SHEET: NO. 184

SCALE 1:12,000

DATE: NOV 8, 1943

FROM: P-2; 2ND RNDER REGT.

TO:

OVERLAY - No. 2.

Enclosure (C)

Overlay #4 and #5
2d Marine Raider Regt (Prov)
In The Field.

3 January 1944

Battle of the Piva Trail, 1-9-43.

0620, 9 Nov 43 - Moved out from bivouac area in rear of 2d Rdr Bn bivouac (133.78-213.70) up Piva Trail with "L", "F", HQ, and Weapons Company's in that order. "L" Co deployed on the left of trail in rear of "M" Co on road block (134.76-214.0). "F" Co (2d Bn) deployed to right of trail behind part of "M" Co and "I" Co on road block.

0730 - Artillery preparation from 0730 to 0800. Japs began heavy fire and made several attack threats on our right flank at about 0800 which delayed one platoon of "F" Co and cause "F" Co to lose contact with two platoons, contact was never effectively regained.

0800 - "L" Co jumped off on attack, pushing thru "M" Co lines. Two platoons of "M" Co went into BN reserve behind "F" Co. The fire fight was very heavy and since the Japs evidenced heavy activity along almost both Co fronts, it is estimated that there were at least two Jap Co's to our front. "M" and "I" Co's sent out flank patrols which contacted nothing but one or two snipers. Weapons company in center in reserve.

0930 - Companies had advanced only forty or fifty Yds above the road block at (134.76-214.00). Heavy fire fight with many Model 96 LMG's in evidence and some knee mortar shells lobbed in. Japs screeching and Marines yelling back.

1030 - "I" Co relieved "F" Co who had trouble keeping contact within the Co. "I" Co reported start of Jap flanking movement on our right. Sent Weapons Platoon to protect "I" Co flank. Stopped Jap flanking movement. Continued heavy fire fight with slow advance.

1130 - Committed one Platoon of "M" Co to fill the gap between "I" and "L" Co. "I" and "L" Companies had contact again at 1215. Continued very slow advance.

1230 - Broke enemy resistance and began rapid advance. By 1500 had advanced to trail junction of Piva, Numa Numa Trails.

1515 - Halted advance having no enemy contact for about seventy minutes. Dug in for night at trail junction in a diamond defense. At 1535 sent patrol to Piva, reported no enemy contact. Patrol was sent up the Numa Numa Trail about 300 Yds, no enemy contact, but found large enemy empty bivouac area. Companies patrolled to their fronts for about twohundred yards, without making contact. "L" Co, at about 1720, reported seeing several Japs retreating along Numa Numa Trail.

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (C) Cont'd

1815 - F.O. party fired defensive barrage on three sides. No enemy contact on night of Nov 9, 1943.

Casualties Red -- 100 killed
Blue - KIA 11, WIA 30, MIA 1.

Tactical conclusions.

The artillery barrage was very effective on rear area Red troops. The barrage was brought down to 250 yards of our Road Block. However the enemy had crept up to about 25 yards, of our front lines during the night. They kept quiet and hidden until the barrage lifted. Then when we commenced the attack we were met by enemy automatic and rifle fire. They could have opened up previous and during the attack as there was much moving about on our part getting into position for the jump off. However, they held fire and suppressed us with so much fire on the jump off as we did not expect them to be inside our barrage.

Being pinned down at the RB at the time of the "jump off" the undersigned had an excellent opportunity to watch our superior fire power gradually take effect on the enemy fire power. They opened up with all they had in the way of small arms. We replied with all we had (each rifle squad has 3 BAR's and 7 M1). After twenty minutes of this the enemy couldn't stand up under it and were forced to withdraw.